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This essay presents an overview of an emergent culture of ecological 
consciousness and sensitivity for nature within and without humans. The 
inquiry pertains to the interdisciplinary field of human ecology. 
The essential methodological approach is eco-systemic, implying the 
basic interrelatedness of entities and their environment. The essay explores the 
interconnections at various levels of human-ecological interaction, analyzed 
from the perspective of the basic components of an ecological culture: 
sustainability - as an economy of metabolic exchange with the environment and 
inclusion into natural cycles of renewal; post-domination - as  human relations 
based on individuals' responsibility for their social and natural environment, 
and on surpassing the authoritarian structures of subordination of humans and 
nature; and a spirituality of immanent ethic and sensitivity. 
Individual responsibility is the core of an ecological culture, and the 
basis of an ecological consciousness - an awareness of the ecological context of 
the individual's life process - the impact which the ways of satisfymg the indivi- 
dual's needs have on the immediate, and also the wider social, biological and 
physical environment. Ecological culture involves the revitalization of the local 
community and the household as  the levels of immediate human-ecological 
interactions. 
The lack of individual responsibility is both caused by and expressed in 
domination patterns. Domination is based on dualism. Its essential routines are 
inferiorization and exclusion of mutuality which entail a lack of empathy and har- 
mony - thus hindering a positive relation to the social and natural environment. 
When domination structures are deconstructed, a possibility of a new 
integration emerges in the reconsidered sphere of spirituality, involving 
immanence (re-comection of spirituality and nature), and integrative 
epistemology (inclusion of other-than-rational modes of comprehension and 
communication). 
An essential epistemological component is a sensitivity which links life 
processes in and around us, thus enabling us to feel that we are part of natu- 
ral renewal and energy exchange. Such a sensitivity is the basis for individual 
responsibility which is no longer a matter of reliance on external authority and 
imposed morality of prescribed rights and duties. Responsibility becomes an 
individual's inner ethic of joy as an ultimate expression of liveliness. 
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Chapter 
Introduction 
We can only rediscover a d~ferent relation to 
nature by making cultural choices. 1 
Throughout the process of conceiving and writing this essay, an image has 
been coming up in my mind: the waterfalls and lush vegetation in the national 
park "Plitvice Lakes". This natural reservation is an outstanding ecological 
phenomenon of symbiosis, of natural conviviality and of continuous change and 
transformation. It displays, in overwhelming beauty, the endless possibilities 
and wealth of natural diversity in its creative evolution. The national park is in 
the part of Yugoslavia (now Croatia) where homfyrng genocide went on during 
World War I1 and where killings and exodus took place again during the last 
civil war. Unfortunately, this was not an isolated or rare manifestation of 
violence. But it makes more apparent the deep rift between the creativity and 
conviviality of nature, and the mindless destructiveness of humans. 
- 
1 Melucci and Chorover, 1997: 80 
The conflicting relationship between humanity and nature is the principal 
underlying theme of this dissertation, and an  obtrusive and daunting 
characteristic of the current predominant culture. 
The Topic: Aspects of an Ecological Culture 
The objective of this essay is to defme and examine different aspects of an  
ecological culture. By ecological culture I consider a new, different cultural 
pattern, toward which the process of cultural development is heading. 
This statement can imply two questions: first, what is an  ecological cultural 
pattern? and second, how do I know that cultural development will evolve 
toward it? The way the second question is framed, however, is not quite 
applicable to the methodological approach of this essay and I will explain why 
later on in this introduction 2. 
I have chosen the term "ecological culture" as  my synthesis of various 
views and concepts addressed in the literature which pertain directly or 
indirectly to this issue. In the process of defining the basic notions of my 
essay, I have encountered the terminological problem of making clear 
connotational delineations, a task which is particularly difficult with some 
words that have become fashionable and lost their precise or original meaning. 
Their meaning becomes paradigmatic, a symbol of an  array of attitudes, which 
is often an  attempt to denote new notions for which there is little or no 
previous experience. This terminological issue will be repeatedly addressed 
along with the development of the thesis. 
2 This project does not include experiential research. A most recent evidence of an 
emerging cultural change in the direction which is in general terms congruent with 
the framework of my essay is presented in the book The Cultural Creatives, by Paul 
Ray and Sherry Ruth Anderson, published in 2000. It offers an extremely 
optimistic outlook at the number of people in the US.  (26 percent of adults) who 
support change toward a more ecological world view. This outlook is based on 
extended surveys b n  more than 100,000 Americans, hundreds of focus groups. and 
about sixty in-depth interviews that reveal an entire subculture I...] They are the 
drivers of the demand that we  go beyond environmental regulation to real 
ecological sustainability, to change our entire way of l$e accordingly. " (Ray and 
Anderson, 2000: 4-5) 
When a process of innovation begins but we lack the words to identi& the 
new, ureoftenfind it necessary to ransack our cultural attic for the language, 
practices, and symbols required to give voice to needs for which suitable 
names do not exist as yet 3 
The choice of the word "ecological" presents such a terminological problem. 
The original meaning pertains only to the biological sciences, and does not 
directly imply any connection to the social and anthropological notions of 
culture (itself a term with broad and often imprecise meaning). However, the 
term "ecological" has considerably widened its connotational scope. It has 
become a symbol of a new way of thinking that observes the systems, rather 
than isolated entities, not only in the context of biology, but also in the human 
interactions with the social, biological and physical environment. Such a wider 
connotation of the word has been used by a great many authors (in my 
literature list alone, there are 31 titles where the word eco, ecology, or 
ecological is used with this broader meaning). 
By choosing to use the term "ecological culture", I have had in mind this 
symbolic, paradigmatic meaning of the word ecological, a meaning that contains 
the awareness of the broader context and of the wider environment in which 
human life processes evolve. 
The emerging new paradigm may be called a holistic, or an ecological 
world view, using the term ecological here in a much broader and deeper sense 
than it is commonly used. Ecological awareness, in that deep sense, recognizes 
the fundamental interdependence of all phenomena and the ernbeddedness of 
individuals and societies in the cyclical processes of nature. 4 
The broader meaning also entails the awareness of the impact which the pre- 
sent cultural patterns have had on this comprehensive social, biological and phy- 
sical environment. This impact has brought us into the current state of crisis. It 
is perceived primarily as an environmental crisis, as a threat to the physical and 
biological environment, a possible destruction of life on the planet. But it also 
reflects the crisis of values and of world views. On the primary level, environ- 
mental crisis invokes an awakening to the problems of pollution and resource 
depletion caused by the current technology and way of life. This level of con- 
3 Melucci, 1996: 87 
4 Capra, 1988: 335 
cern reflects a perception of the outward, physical manifestation of the crisis - 
a concern which is an expression of the prevalent preoccupation of the current 
culture with external, physical aspects of life. This one-sidedness will be ad- 
dressed in this essay by pondering into a more comprehensive context of cultu- 
ral change. 
Why has ecology become an issue? Not simply on account of the pollution 
obviously enough threatening our existence, with the environmental disaster 
visible on aU sides: but also as a consequence of a profound change in our 
cultural and social perception of the reality in which we live. Unless we take 
account of this qualitative leap in the way the world is experienced through 
our minds and emotions, we may mistakenly restrict our concern solely to the 
environment. 5 
"Ecological culture" is perceived as a different cultural pattern, different in 
the sense that it questions present cultural patterns and offers new perspec- 
tives. I am using the term "ecological culture" as an "umbrella" for diverse 
movements, ideas, concepts, which have emerged simultaneously, but have not 
always been perceived as parts of the same process. Such a perception is the 
central concept of my thesis - that ecological culture encompasses three 
essential notions: sustainability, post-domination and spirituality. 
Sustainability is the notion that comprises the current response to the chal- 
lenge of the environmental crisis. This response entails an environmental/ecolo- 
gical consciousness. Through a comprehensive exploration of sustainability and 
its economic, social and technological aspects, I will follow the thread of see- 
king a basis for an ecological consciousness. On this quest, I will analyze the 
complex alienation which amounts to an individual's disconnectedness from in- 
teractions with her or his environment - both natural and social. I will discuss 
the immediate levels of interaction, the local community and the household and 
will arrive at the individual responsibility for the natural and social environment 
as the basis for ecological consciousness. Individual responsibility is primarily 
situated in the household which is the basic human-ecological unit of interac- 
tion with the (social and natural) environment. Positing individual responsibility 
as the key issue of an ecological culture is the central tenet of this essay. Thus 
5 Melucci. op.cit.: 58 
it differs from the majority of treatises on sustainability which offer solutions. 
or envision paths to change at the institutional end - as the responsibility of 
various institutional entities, or communities: business, government, regulation, 
administration. Often the realm responsible to bring about change is not speci- 
fied, but it is assumed that the path to change has to be imparted to the undif- 
ferentiated mass of individuals as a new moral prescript which would take the 
environment into consideration. I will argue that a genuine ecological conscious- 
ness can be fully achieved only with individuals empowered to have responsibi- 
lity for their environment. The problems of instigating or imposing responsibili- 
ty necessitate a thorough insight into domination. I will address the authorita- 
rian characteristic of human relationships which presents a systematic hind- 
rance to a full development of individual responsibility. Individual responsibility 
for the environment (natural and social) brings up the link between domination 
over nature and over humans. When perceived as interconnected, domination 
over nature within and without humans emerges also as a possible origin of a 
repressed, unexpressed, or frustrated inner sense of nature - a sensitivity for 
nature within and without ourselves which can be conceived of as a spiritual 
basis for an ethic toward nature, or toward the eco-systemic web of which we 
are an integral part. 
The previous paragraph presents, in a concise form, the core argument of 
this essay. The essay follows the development of this core argument and thus 
it will become an inquiry into an array of different aspects of an ecological 
culture within its three basic issues - sustainability, domination and spirituali- 
ty. This inquiry will seek an integrative, eco-systemic view of ecological culture. 
I will explain further on how such an integrative perspective is distinctly 
relevant for an insight into ecological culture. This perspective implies an 
overview and integration of a broader scope of interrelated issues. However, 
the integrative approach of this essay is primarily determined by the vision of 
ecological culture as  an emerging consciousness based on individual responsi- 
bility and sensitivity for nature within and without ourselves. 
For all three basic elements of ecological culture, I will be using words 
which present the same kind of terminological problems that I have mentioned 
before. I have decided to use the terms sustainability and spirituality because 
of their wide acceptance a s  symbols of notions, which are not, however, clearly 
and unambiguously defined. The term post-domation is my own compound. 
The dissertation will attempt to clarify the connotational scope of these notions. 
Personal Views and Objective Evidence: 
Methodological Approach 
My interest in ecological culture stems from a preoccupation with the current 
environmental crisis and the potential ways out of it. This preoccupation is both 
emotional and rational, and as such, it is subjective. The intentional inclusion 
of the emotional component might be reflected in the manner of writing, which 
could sometimes express approaches to the subject other than only rational - 
contrary to the usual academic style (particularly in this part of the world). 
Scienttfic education I...] simpl~fies 'science' by simpl~ji$ng its partici- 
pants I.. .I A person's religion, for example, or his metaphysics, or his sense of 
humour [...I must not have the slightest connection with his sc ient i .  activi- 
ty. His imagination is restrained, and even his language ceases to be his own 
This is again reflected in the nature of scienti .  tfacts' which are experienced 
as being independent of opinion, belief, and cultural background. 6 
This inclusion of rationality and emotionality is more than just a matter of 
writing style. It involves a change of attitude toward scientific objectivity which 
I find closely related to the issue of domination and post-domation as part of 
an  ecological culture. The conflict between "objective" reality and "subjective" 
judgement, as well as the problem of "value-free" analysis, pertains to a basic 
epistemological issue. This issue will emerge in the course of this essay as cri- 
tical for an  ecological culture that is based on an ethic of individual responsibili- 
ty and sensitivity for nature both within and without ourselves. This ethic will 
entail the concept of an  integrative epistemology, inclusive of both rational and 
6 Feyerabend, 1978: 19 
non-rational modes of comprehension. So it involves a paradigm shift, a 
departure from the perspective that has been in use since the Enlightenment: 
The kind of knowledge that scientists had of the world was essentially 
disembodied. It was as ifthe scientist was not involved in what he was doing, 
as if he was seeing the worldflom outside. I.. . I  The idea that scientists are 
somehow disembodied, not bodily or emotionally involved in what they're 
doing, is part of the style of science to this day. Scientific papers are full of 
language like "observations were made," [...I "a test tube was taken " No one 
actually does anything; things just happen inflont of the observing, detached 
scientist. Of course, the reality of scientific research is very diflerent. 7 
I do, however, find that a certain level of objectivity can be confirmed in 
the literature. This dissertation has been developed as  a search for shared 
views with other authors, a search for c 1 a . g  my own initial sense (as a 
unity of emotional and rational knowledge) of what is ecological culture. 
The members of [the Project on Ecological and Cooperative Education 
(PEACE)] shared the conviction that more than everything else our planet 
needed an ecologically conscious cultwe that might overcome the 
flagmentation and specialization that is typical of the world view dominating 
societies of today. We shared the conviction that humankind needed to 
cultivate the attitude of caring and cooperation instead of encouraging 
competition, conflontation, and threats of violence. 8 
In this essay I have adopted a method of presentation which uses direct 
quotations extensively. The reason is not only that ideas are better conveyed in 
their original wording than retold (in the conventional academic style). An 
emphasis on a diversity and juxtaposition of voices is intended as  a different 
conception of objectivity - as  an  integration of actual subjective viewpoints 
adding up to a web-like interaction of ideas akin to what F'ritjof Capra and 
David Steindl-Rast term network knowledge 9. 
In this way, the existing literature, pertaining to the topic, can be regarded 
as  evidence of the relevance of my own preoccupation with ecological culture. 
Such a regard entails another important aspect of the subjectivity/objectivity 
issue: relevance based on the authority of published authors. 
The man who reads a science text can easily take the applications to be 
the evidence for the theory, the reasons why it ought to be believed. But science 
- 
7 Sheldrake and Fox. 1996: 19-20 
8 Nordland, 1994: vii (emphasis mine) 
9 See quote (paragraph number 4) related to footnote 70 in chapter 2. At the end of 
this essay (in footnote 3 in the Epilogue) I have given additional explanation which 
will become clearer after the entire discussion has been elaborated. 
students accept theories on the authority of teacher and text, not because of 
evidence. 10 
I am bringing this up, not to question the relevance of the authors that I 
will be referring to in my essay, but to hint upon an expression of authoritaria- 
nism ingrained in our present cultural pattern. Authoritarianism is often ano- 
ther reason for the suppression of the subjective voice, which adds up to epi- 
stemological reductionism, and - in the context of ecological culture - calls for 
a more integrative epistemology which I will address in the last chapter of this 
essay. In the following sections. I will elaborate on the context of culture and 
cultural change, and of human ecology, and in the next chapter. I will present 
systems theory as the conceptual and methodological framework of my essay. 
The ensuing chapters will contain the discussion of the principal components 
of an ecological culture - sustainability, post-domination and spirituality. 
Ecological Culture: 
Human-Nature and Culture-Nature Relationships 
The ecological question also highlights the cultural 
dimension of human action. Industrial society organized 
its experience around the inevitability of economic laws 
and technical power. The ecological issue shows that the 
key to survival is no longer the s ystem of means founded 
on purposive rationality. [. . .I Culture - as the capacity to 
lend meaning to objects and relations - is the 
unbreachable conjhe within which questions concerning 
the destiny of humankind must be posed. 1 1 
By defining the topic of my essay as "ecological culture", I have chosen to 
view the emergent environmental/ecological consciousness as a form of culture. 
A similar scope of issues has in the literature been also considered in terms of 
"society", "world", "paradigm", "world view" or "identity" 12. A most simplified 
explanation for my choice of the notion of an "ecological culture" is that it 
10 Kuhn, 1962: 80 
1 1  Melucci, op.cit.: 58-59 
12 Capra. 1988; Milbrath. 1989; Pirages, 1977; Platt, 1977; Ruckelshaus, 1989; 
Thomashow, 1995; Tucker and Grim, 1993 
should primarily mean a way of life which is based on an environmental/ecologi- 
cal consciousness and sensitivity for nature within and without ourselves. 
The term culture is often used in a very broad sense and such breadth is 
quite appropriate to the perspective of this essay. (Culture is also sometimes 
used interchangeably with all of the above mentioned notions, except possibly 
"identity".) Nevertheless, I will explore in this chapter the more precisely 
defined meanings of the term. 
The etymology of the word culture (in all Indo-European languages, I 
believe) is Latin cultura = tillage, husbandry, cultivation, tending - and it is 
derived from cultus - colere = inhabit, cultivate, protect, honor with worship. 
Through the history of its use in the English language, the word culture has 
included (according to the Oxford Dictionary) the notions of "the cultivating or 
development of mind, faculties, manners", "reverential homagen, "the training of 
human body", "improvement or refinement by education and trainingn. This 
etymological framework is relevant to the complex connotational scope which 
will be elaborated throughout the thesis. 
Culture is certainly an encompassing notion and it includes 
not only the arts and sciences, religions and philosophies to which the word 
culture has historically applied, but also the system of technology, the 
political practices, the small intimate habits of daily lve, such as the way of 
preparing or eating food, or of hushing a child to sleep, as well as the method 
of electing a prime minister or changing the constitution. 13 
Mead, therefore, contends that culture is a systemic and integrated whole 14. 
This view indicates an ecological/systems theory approach which 
perceives entities or persons in context. Such a contextual aspect of culture is 
manifest when it is perceived as a set of norms or behavioral standards for the 
social life of a group that shares them 15. These norms are learned and 
therefore continuously transmitted and reproduced from generation to 
13 Mead, 1959: 10 
14 ibid.: 9 
15 Dobriner, 1969; Haviland, 1978 
generation 16. Consequently, culture is a dynamic, evolutionary process and 
thus it is not universal either in spatial or in temporal terms. 
It is important, however, to distinguish between cultural patterns - as 
varying forms that these behavioral standards can take in different times and 
at different places - and the function of culture which is common to all of them 
and therefore universal. Seeking such a universality of culture should not be 
confused with cultural universalism which marked the early developments in 
anthropology and which perceived the Western/Christian cultural pattern as an 
ultimate achievement of cultural development, to be followed by other "less 
developed" cultures. 
It was Malinowski who explored the universal function of culture and who 
thus arrived at its basic definition. Humans organize to satisfy their vital needs 
and organizing for this purpose is a universal human characteristic 17. Vital 
needs are biologically determined, but the ways of satisfying them are defined 
by the cultural pattern of the social group who share such ways as a behavioral 
standard. 
The satisfaction of the organic or basic needs of man and of the race is a 
minimum set of conditions imposed on each culture. The problems set by 
man's nutritive, reproductive, and hygienic needs must be solved. They are 
solved by the construction o f a  new, secondary, or artificial environment. 
This environment, which is neither more nor less than culture itself; has to be 
permanently reproduced, maintained, and managed. This creates I.. .I a new 
standard of living, which depends on the cultural level of the community, on 
the environment, and on the emiency of the group. A cultural standard of 
living, however, means that new needs appear and new imperatives or 
determinants are imposed on human behavior. 18 
The analysis of transformation of primordial, organic needs into derived cul- 
tural necessities is defined by Malinowski as functionalism 19. For the context 
of an ecological culture, with a principal focus on the relationship between 
humans and nature, Malinowski's functionalism has a particular relevance. It is 
a concept of culture distinctly congruent with the systems theory perception of 
interactions and exchange between humans and their environment. 
16 Mead, op.cit.: 9 
17 Malinowski. 1944: 38 
18 ibid.: 37 
19 Malinowski. 1961: 291 
The processes of food intake, digestion, the collateral secretions, the 
absorption of nutritive substances, and rejection of waste matter are related 
in several ways to environmental factors and the interaction between the 
organism and the outside world, an interaction culturally framed. 20 
The relationship between humans and nature is one of the key issues of 
cultural inquiries. It is specifically addressed by cultural ecology as 
a s M y  of how and why h u m  use Nature, how they incorporate Nature into 
Society, and what they do to themselves, Nature, and Society in the process. 21 
A fundamental question to start from is the distinction and the separation 
of culture from nature. Why should human activities, artifacts and interven- 
tions into natural processes be considered un-natural, or external to nature? If 
humans are biologically part of nature, why should some aspects of human life 
be perceived as if they do not belong to natural processes? What is the 
meaning of the differentiation between humanity and nature? These questions 
are of paramount importance for the discussion of an ecological culture which 
is most directly involved with the current environmental crisis and the impact 
that humans make on natural environments and eco-systems. 
If Culture comes to embrace more and more of Nature, we are left with a 
dilemma: on the one hand, it becomes more d~ficult o work with theories 
that assume a permanent distinction between Nature and Culture - Humanity 
and Environment - Man-made and Natural environments. On the other hand, 
if Culture absorbs Nature, then what general theory of ecology shall we 
choose? [...I I believe that the long-term trend will run I. ..I toward a theory that 
assimilates Humans and Nature into a common social frame of reference. 22 
The next question is how the nature/culture distinction is determined. If it 
is not defined at a transcendental level, external to humanity (a proposition, 
however, not entirely incompatible with some views which will be discussed in 
the last parts of this essay), then the notions of nature and culture are 
themselves cultural constructs 23, and therefore as dynamic and changeable as 
culture itself. 
Such categories are always represented, perceived and understood 
within the conceptual frameworks of particular languages, and thus within 
20 Malinowski, 1944: 9 1 
21 B€!~et t ,  1976: 3 
22 ibid.: 4 
23 King, 199 1 ; Melucci and Chorover, 1997 
the boundaries of human systems that are themselves the ever-evolving 
products of the incessant interplay between nature and culture. 24 
Consequently, the dividing line between nature and culture is also 
culturally defined - determined by the context of the current world view. World 
views are included in the encompassing, integrative notion of culture (which 
also accounts for their apparent connotational overlap). 
A major world view, or conceptual framework, that long characterized our 
civilization (another term sometimes used as homogenous with culture), is the 
dualized perception of humanity and nature, and consequently of culture and 
nature. They are construed as conflicting and mutually exclusive. A s  I will 
elaborate further on, dualism between culture and nature has been identified 
(mainly by eco/feminists) as primarily related to patriarchy: 
With the advent of patriarchy, the social divide between male and female 
created a split between mihd and body, culture and nature, which destroyed 
the symbiosis with the natural environment on which a circular regenerative 
world view depended. 25 
In the context of an ecological culture, the dualist construct of the 
culture/nature relationship has to be questioned. 
Redefining "humanity" and 'naturew becomes a central scienhjic and 
cultural problem. Where are the boundaries to be set? How are 'human' and 
'natural' systems related? What shall we recognize as being 'natural'? When 
should we intervene? When refrain from intervention? 26 
If a new relationship between humanity and nature has to be defined in 
terms of an environmental/ecological consciousness which would be based on 
individual responsibility and sensitivity for nature within and without humans - 
it would have to be established on the interrelatedness and interconnectedness 
of the eco-systemic perspective, rather than on a dualist construct of opposition 
and exclusion. Consequently, the boundaries between humanity and nature, as 
well as between culture and nature, are defined as those between entities and 
their interrelated environment, or context, where the entity has its integrity, 
but is, at the same time, fully interconnected with the larger whole, environ- 
24 Melucci and Chorover, op-cit.: 80 
25 Goodison, 1992: 134 
26 Melucci and Chorover, op.cit.: 80 
ment, or context. Boundaries are then flexible and permeable for interactive 
relationship. From such a perspective, the problem framed by Bennett (quoted 
above) in terms of either/or (culture or nature), emerges as resolved when 
reframed in a both/and mode - which he seems to refer to in terms of "a 
common social frame of reference". 
Such a systemic concept of culture and its relation to nature corresponds 
fully with Malinowski's functionalism which perceives the two realms as 
necessarily dynamically interrelated - exempllfvmg the "interplay" which 
Melucci and Chorover speak of in the paragraph quoted above. 
A pertinent expression of the static and dualistic concept of the 
nature/culture relationship is the notion of "human nature". Its usage typically 
reveals a sharp divide between what is considered as naturally given human 
traits and those that are culturally defmed. Often the notion of "human nature" 
implies a conviction that human behavior is innate or genetically determined 
and, therefore, unrelated to social conditions of a person's life. Such views, 
most often shrouded in a "value-free" scientific guise, present a defense of 
social status quo and resistance to social change. 
Critical discussions of biological and environmental determinist 
thought in comparative psychology I.. .I recognize the extreme scient~jlc 
inadequacy and potentially profound social implications of the tendency to 
conceptualize and describe psychological phenomena as iJ they were comple- 
tely reducible to expressions of insensate forces deriving from ElTHER innate 
(e.g., genetic) OR acquired (e.g., environmental/experimental) sources. I...] By 
contrast, within the broader ecosystemicfrarneumrk I am trying to develop, 
the organization and development of human systems is seen in composite 
synchronic (contextual) and diachronic (evolutionary) perspective. 27 
Even the most sophisticated contemporary discussions of behavior 
control are based upon false and misleading ideas about human nature, 
versions of which have beenfostered since antiquity for the sole purpose of 
just~jijing the power ofsomepeople to control the behavior ofothers. 28 
From the viewpoint of the nature/culture relationship, the static view of 
"human nature" fails to comprehend the evolutionary and interactive character 
of both nature and culture. They both continuously change in their "interplay". 
27 Chorover, 1990: 99- 101 (bolded emphasis mine) 
28 Chorover, 1979: 4-5 
I will put forth an assumption here that the difficulty of comprehending a 
more relational concept of nature and culture, or nature and humanity, could 
very possibly result from a systematic disconnectedness of humans from 
nature 29. This disconnectedness is closely related to the dualist construct of 
humanity and nature. The causal interaction between dualism and the discon- 
nection from nature, as  well as  their forms and impacts, will be discussed in 
detail throughout this essay. 
The perception that we are lac- something seems to be one of the 
main springs of our behaviour. The human species ceased to betong entirety to 
nature as only one animal species among many when, through developed 
language, it learned to give a symbolic representation to such a perception of 
lack and absence and the accompanying urge to overcome it. A culture is a 
symbolic universe which contains the gestures, the actions, and the words 
with which the fundamental experience of absence - as limit, death, and 
otherness - can be expressed 30 
In addition to the basic Malinowskian definition of culture as  organized ways 
of satisfylng vital human needs, culture also has a symbolic, paradigmatic 
aspect. It clearly ensues from the fact that the culturally defined ways of satis- 
fymg vital needs imply a set of habits, attitudes and rnindsets that create a 
non-physical cultural sphere - a "symbolic universe" described in the previous 
quotation. 
Culture includes also some elements which apparently remain 
intangible, inaccessible to direct observation, and where neither form nor 
function is very evident. We speak more or less glibly about ideas and values, 
about interests and beliefs; we discuss motive in folk tales, and dogmatic 
conceptions in the analysis of magic or religion. 31 
This symbolic aspect of culture has been a primary focus of both 
structuralist and postmodernist perspectives 32, but it is possibly best defined 
by Melucci a s  its "capacity to lend meaning to objects and relations" 33. 
In this sense, culture is also a paradigm, a world view. Therefore, an  
ecological culture would give a different "meaning to objects and relations", and 
29 The quotation of Sheldrake and Fox - related to footnote 7 above - is also 
pertinent in this context. 
30 Melucci, 1996: 24-25 (emphasis mine) 
31 Malinowski, 1944: 69 
32 Uvi-Strauss, 1963; Baudrillard, 1976 
33 in the paragraph quoted at  the beginning of this section 
to human lives - different from the meaning bestowed upon us  by the cultural 
pattern that we currently live. 
In this essay, I will focus my attention to the Western industrial-consumer 
culture and discuss ecological culture as a departure from that cultural model. 
Such a focus might seem at  odds with the rejection of the universalist anthropo- 
logical approach to cultural inquiry which I pointed at earlier. However, it is 
again important to distinguish between an anthropological paradigm which 
upholds a belief in the superiority of the Western cultural model, and the 
reality which clearly indicates that this cultural model has now become an 
overwhelmingly dominant one, and has invaded and colonized most other cultu- 
res. It is necessary to note in this connection that supremacy of a cultural pat- 
tern at a certain stage of cultural development does not imply its superiority 34. 
A cultural pattern can very well be unsustainable or otherwise inadequate - or 
rather become so in the course of evolutionary processes which thus induce 
cultural change. The basic aspects of the industrial-consumer culture have by 
now penetrated almost every society, and the comprehensive environmental 
and social crisis related to that cultural model has become global. 
I will not, therefore, in this essay, look much into cultures other than the in- 
dustrial-consumer (and, of course, the emerging ecological culture). If I did, 
such an  outlook would need to include an analysis of the relationship between 
cultures, religions and ecology 35. Some pre-consumer cultures (e.g. Native- 
American) had a more ecologically-minded world view than the Judeo-Christian 
tradition and the cultures that evolved within its framework, particularly toward 
the later stages of their development 36. It should be noted, however, that some 
crucial aspects of the Christianity-based paradigm - like patriarchy, 
domination, violence - appear in barely different forms in other major religions. 
34 Malinowski, 1961: 281 
35 Tucker and Grim, op.cit. 
36 The following statement exemplifies a non-dualist concept of the relationship 
between humans and nature: 
Native American ethic with respect to the physical world is a matter of 
reciprocal appropriation. I...] In the? mind, nature is not something apartfrom 
them They have existence within the element. (Momaday, 1976: 80, 84) 
It is doubtful that the ecologically-minded pre-consumer cultures - even in 
the case of the Native-American, which is historically most recent - can have 
much influence under the dominance of the industrial/consumerism reality, 
other than an  indication that the current model is not the only available one. 
The levelling effect of the omnipresence of the consumer cultural model 
still does not entirely obliterate the differences of the historically distinct 
cultures into which consumerism has now invaded. Likewise, the development 
of a new ecological cultural pattern does not have to follow identical paths, and 
will not have to occur everywhere at the same time and at  the same pace. 
These considerations bring up the issues of cultural evolution, transforma- 
tion and change. 
Cultural Change 
The concept of cultural evolution seems to be confusing in the context of 
ecological and environmental issues and of the relationship between humans 
and nature: 
While I express some criticisms of evolutionary conceptions of cultural 
development, I have to some extent relied on such interpretations in 
developing an approach to the problem of why Homo sapiens has exploited the 
physical environment to an increasing extent. 37 
How can cultural development not be evolutionary? Obviously, the criticisms 
implied here are related to the application of Social Darwinism to cultural con- 
cepts. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries the anthropological field was 
predominated by Social Darwinism, although, already when it emerged, it was 
vigorously disputed (notably by Kropotkin 38). Social Darwinism contended that 
human relations were subject to Darwin's laws of natural selection, according 
to the notion of "the survival of the fittestn (actually coined by Herbert Spencer, 
the principal proponent of Social Darwinism, not by Darwin), and, therefore, 
the "strongn, domineering cultures naturally influenced and prevailed over the 
37 B e ~ e t t ,  op.cit.: 1 1 
38 Kropotkin, 1902 
"weak". The essential domination-based cultural concept has, however, 
survived through subsequent development of anthropological "schools", and is 
still present in various, more or less disguised universalist perspectives. 
Ecofeminist and feminist writers 39 put a lot of emphasis on rejecting the 
universality of the cultural patterns which just@ domination over women and 
over nature. 
In the last hundred years, anthropology has produced a wealth of eviden- 
ce about the symbols of other cultures very d~fferent from our own. Potentially 
this could allow us to see that symbols are not a universal order [...I But anthro- 
pologists [...I have tended to assume that westem culture is superior to those 
under investigation, which are seen as more 'primitive', and which could come 
to see the world our way ifonly they were more 'intelligent' or 'developed'. 40 
Goodison explains how an often unconscious, or at least unrecognized applica- 
tion of the prevailing standards of our culture prevents a recognition that there 
are other possible avenues of cultural development, and that the attitudes of dua- 
listic perception of masculinity/femininity and humanity/nature, and the conse- 
quent domination-based relationships, are only a stage in cultural evolution. 
I will argue that symbols are not universal or inevitable, but are the 
product of a particular society at a particular time; and that they serve to 
validate and perpetuate the status quo in that society. 41 
The critique of cultural universalism, in the context of cultural evolution, 
becomes substantially different from cultural relativism, which stems from the 
same critical starting point. In its extreme form cultural relativism emerges as a 
"value-free" perspective, and its proponents "maintain that aU diverse cultural 
values are equally valid"42. This approach implicitly (in most cases) prevents eva- 
luation of the current dominant cultural pattern and consequently defends the 
status quo. Thus an anti-universalist perspective becomes anti-evolutionary. 
The cure is not to reactivate the tribal form of ecological ignorance (take 
away our means), nor to continue the modem form of that ignorance (the free 
market will save us), but rather to evolve and develop into an integrative mode 
of awareness that will - also for thefirst time in history - integrate the 
biosphere and noosphere in a higher and deeper union. 43 
39 e.g. Coward, 1983; Goodison, 1992 
40 Goodison, op.cit.: 24-25 
41 ibid.: 1 
42 Wilber. 1995: 28-29 
43 ibid.: 166-168 
The concepts of cultural evolution, transformation and change are a key 
framework for the discussion of an ecological culture, not only because its 
emergence could not be contemplated without an evolutionary perspective, but 
also because in this essay, the evolutionary paradigm will constitute an 
essential context for understanding sustainability, post-domination and 
spirituality as  components of a new cultural pattem. 
Cultural transformation and change are implicit in Mahowski's functiona- 
list concept of culture. The dynamic process of emergence and continuous rede- 
finition of secondary needs - which are culturally determined ways of satisfymg 
basic vital human needs - points to a constant and ongoing cultural change. 
Human beings live by nonns, customs, traditions, and rules, which are 
the result of an interaction between organic processes and man's 
manipulation and re-setting of his environment. 44 
Cultural transformation indicates a likelihood that a new cultural pattern 
(e.g. an ecological culture) could offer different ways of solving the problems of 
human interaction with the social and physical environment, create new needs 
in the process, and - what is particularly important in the context of the 
current environmental/ecological crisis - abandon some of the needs that 
previous cultures have created, or render them obsolete, unethical, or 
dangerous - as  it happened with, for example, ritual cannibalism, or ritual 
witch hunt and burning. I t  can also happen that some of the newly created 
cultural expressions could have negative impacts when analyzed in specific 
contexts. Such an analysis would not imply an embracing of cultural 
universalism as  the "value-free" approach mentioned above would suggest. 
An array of ideas exists, available to a given age; some of these for 
unarticulated or even unconscious reasons seem plausible to individuals or 
social groups; others do not. Some ideas spread; others temporarily die out. 
[...I Out of this d~fferential appeal of ideas that seem most plausible under 
particular social conditions, cultural trans formations develop. 45 
The process of cultural transformation has been very much visible in the 
infusion of the prevailing consumerist model into non-industrial societies: 
44 Malinowski, 1944: 68 
45 Merchant, 1980: xviii 
When social constraints on consumption break down as a result of 
acculturation or other economic pressures people are subject to the seduction 
of the marketplace. Acculturating peoples may be emulating admired foreig- 
ners, or they may be victims of advertising and cultural imperialism. I.. .I 
What is the adaptive value of selling rice to buy Coca-Cola? I...] The very 
concept of economic utility is premised on a set of preferences and values that 
are cultural and therefore partially symbolic. New goods acquire new 
symbolic values that are used in economic and political competition, and they 
become tools in contests over reshaping society. 46 
The predominance of symbolic over productive aspects of the economic 
exchange, and its deeply and increasingly alienating effects have been the 
subject of an extraordinarily insightful analysis by the postmodernist social 
theorist Jean Baudrillard 47. 
Such analyses indicate that cultural transformation is equally manifested 
within the dominant culture. The formidable environmental crisis with its 
daunting social and ecological aspects generates a pervasive despair of 
pandemic proportions: 
From news reports and from our environment we are bombarded by sig- 
nals of distress - of toxic wastes and famines and wiring species, of arms 
and wars and preparations for war. These boggle the mind and stir within us 
feelings of dread, anger and sorrow even though we may never express them 48 
The profound helplessness, hopelessness and apathy has become probably the 
most worrying symptom of the current crisis. 
However, a crisis can cut both ways. In Chinese the notion of crisis is 
depicted by juxtaposing danger and opportunity 49. 
The notion of cultural transformation can inspire a sense of optimism and 
positive change. Riane Eisler uses the term to denote the emerging shift from 
the long-lasting domination-based cultural pattern to a partnership model of 
human relationships toward each other and toward nature 50. 
Evolution toward an ecological culture can offer a more hopeful outlook. 
46 Wilk, 1991: 159-160 
47 Baudrillard, 1976. His contentions - as well as the preceding analysis of the 
alienation of the consumer culture by the "Frankfurt school" members, 
Horkheimer, Adomo and, notably, Marcuse -will be presented in chapters 2 and 4. 
48 Macy, 1983: 1 
49 Capra. 1982: 26 
50 Eisler, 1987: xvii 
Human Ecology: 
The Human-Environment Relationship 
Through the extension of our understanding of the 
ecological context, it will ultimately be possible to 
develop a sense of belonging with a more expansive 
perspective: ecospheric belonging. 51 
Human ecology is defined as the study of interrelationships between 
humans and their "total environment including other human beings" 52. 
Consequently, my essay has to be situated within this field of inquiry. I am 
describing human ecology as a field of inquiry, rather than as a scientific 
discipline, because one of its primary characteristics is its interdisciplinarity. 
Likewise, it is not only scientific, a s  its interdisciplinarity entails an integration 
of sciences with other forms of human creative activities. It is, however, an  
"ecology", which is a science in its original meaning and scope. 
The term ecology was coined in 1866 by the Gernzan biologist Ernst 
Haeckel, who defined it as "the science of relations between the organism and 
the surrounding outer world." In 1909 the word Umwelt ("environment") was 
used for the _first time by the Baltic biologist and ecological pioneer Jakob von 
Uexkiill. 53 
Although ecology was originally limited to the study of non-human species, 
its definition has become more inclusive. 
In Viennafrom 1967 onwards an attempt was undertaken to establish a 
framework of guiding principles for dealing with human ecological problems 
in practice as well as in theory. I. ..I Dejhitions are provided for I...] Human 
Ecology: The ecology of the species Homo sapiens. I...] 
Species Homo sapiens: The living being with the characterization "nosce 
te ipsum" Fnow thyself) (Linnaeus 1758, p. 20). 54 
The initial exclusion of humans as subjects of ecological inquiry reflected 
the reductionist epistemological paradigm of scientific objectivity (which I 
mentioned in the first section, and I will discuss its transcendence in the last 
chapter). Another reason for the late inclusion of humans into ecology has been 
that their relations with the environment could not be studied only in terms of 
- 
51 Naess, 1989: 168 
52 Griffore and Phenice, 1993: 144. Almost identical definition: Ehrlich, etal., 1973: 
vii. 
53 Capra, 1996: 32-33 
54 Knbtig, 1993: 1 16 
biology (as ecology initially emerged as a sub-discipline of biology). Therefore, 
the interdisciplinary perspective is requisite for human-ecological inquiry. 
Although a more systematic interdisciplinary approach was developed in 
the later half of the 20th century, the basic principles of interrelatedness and 
interconnectedness have been developing in scientific inquiry since the 
eighteenth century 55 or even earlier 56. One of the pioneers of human ecology 
was the American chemist and home-economist Ellen Swallow Richards (1842- 
191 1). who, as the first women admitted to the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, founded there the discipline of home economics. Her approach 
was distinctly eco-systemic and human-ecological in considering the 
interactions between humans and their environment, and she was one of the 
first scientists to pay attention to the issues of pollution 57. More recent 
background to the development of human ecology as a distinct field of inquiry 
includes the Chicago school of human ecology from the 1920s, and the 
emergence of social ecology, anthropological ecology and cultural ecology in the 
'70s and '80s 58. Human ecology is inherently integrative and interdisciplinary 
It is, therefore, necessary (as this essay will demonstrate) to consider it in the 
scope of a much broader conceptual framework. 
The central issue of human ecology - human/environment relationship - 
necessarily entails the systems theory perspective which regards the entities, 
or individuals (human or other) together with their environment as basic units 
of inquiry. This methodological approach derives from the ecological backgro- 
und, wherefrom its application has been broadened to humanistic disciplines. 
Ecological anthropology was profoundly inJuenced by the advent of 
systems thinking in biology I . . . ]  his was part of an attempt to replace the 
conceptual units "culture" and "environment" with 'ecosystems " and 
component "populations. " so that the work of anthropology was fully 
integrated into an ecological approach that included the emergingfilds of 
systems theory, ethology, and population biology. 59 
55 Griffore and Phenice, op.cit.: 143 
56 See quotes related to footnotes 1 1 and 12 in the following chapter. 
57 Encyclopaedia Britannica 
58 Griffore and Phenice, op.cit.: 144; Bennett. 1976; Netting. 1977; Bookchin, 1988 
59 McCay, 1993: 2 13 
For the context of this essay, the most salient expression of the relational 
eco-systemic approach of human ecology is its preoccupation with human belon- 
ging to nature 60. An awareness, a sense of belonging and connectedness to 
nature is the central premise for contempleting a n  emergent environmental/eco- 
logical consciousness, and the principal foundation of the ecological culture a s  I 
perceive and discuss it. 
In Carolyn Merchant's view, the systemic perspective (and she specifically 
refers to Bateson's concept of "the pattern that connects" 61) has linked a new 
ecological self with the traditional Buddhist concept of interconnectedness: 
The new ecological self is a self connected to the world, bringing new resources 
of courage, ingenuity, and endurance to combat despair and engage in healing 
our body - the world. 62 
The new ecological self has to regain what is often perceived as  a loss: 
The myth behind human ecology is one of the oldest of all, the myth of 
lost connectedness or lost wholeness that goes back to thefist chapters of 
Genesis and is repeated in most cultures of the world: a myth of separation or 
alienation from nature and from our own history. 63 
Most of us have lost that sense of un* of biosphere and humanity which 
would bind and reassure us dl with an a t a t i o n  of beauty. 64 
A s  pointed out before, the problem with human belonging to nature and 
with the sense of lost connectedness derives from the dualist perception of 
humanity and nature: 
The real question is: where have humanity and nature been pitted into 
antagonism or simply detachedfrom each other? The history of civilization 
has been a steady process of estrangementfrom nature that has increasingly 
developed into outright antagonism. 65 
Humanity and nature are the basic antagonistic pair in a comprehensive 
dualist mind-kame which consistently encompasses a whole spectrum of pola- 
rities and schisms. According to ecoferninist philosopher Val Plumwood, dualist 
structure is an essential characteristic of western thought. She discerns the 
60 as  it is indicated in the opening quotation for this section 
61 Bateson, 1980: 8 
62 Merchant, 1994: 16 
63 Carpenter, 1990: 6 1. See also the quote related to footnote 30 above. 
64 Bateson, op.cit.: 19 
65 Bookchin, 1991:316 
following oppositional pairs: culture/nature, reason/nature, male/female, 
tion, mind and spirit/nature, freedom/necessity, universal/particular, hu- 
subject/object, self/other 66. Feminist writer Lucy Goodison begins her book 
with dualities: 
Good/ bad. mind/body; pure/irnpure: white black; male/ female; active/pas- 
sive; sun/moon; up/down; spirit/matter; culture/nature; spirituality/sexuali- 
ty. This book is about divisions in our thought and society - and about explo- 
ring possibilities of connection. The inequalities and splits in our society are 
echoed in aseries of symbolic divisions which shape the way we think and ima- 
gine. Society is split between haves and have-nots, dominant and oppressed 
races, leaders and followers; and we recreate those splits inside ourselves. 67 
Systemic examination of the dualist paradigm and avenues to overcome it 
present an eminently human-ecological project. The basic dualist split between 
humans and nature and all the related schisms are deeply implicated in the 
present environmental crisis in all its complex and interrelated social, ecological 
and ideological aspects. 
Human Ecology as an 
Interdisciplinary and Integrative Field 
Any good poet, in our age at least, must begin with 
the scientin view of the world; and any scientist 
worth listening to must be something of a poet. 
must possess the ability to communicate to the rest 
of us his sense of love and wonder at what his work 
discovers. 
Edward Abbey 68 
Human ecological inquiry into interactions and interrelations between 
humans and their environment in their entirety, entails necessarily an 
approach of interdisciplinarity and integration. What do these notions exactly 
connote? 
66 Plumwood, 1993: 43 
67 Goodison, 1992: 1 
68 American writer ( 1927- 1989) whose works reflect an uncompromising 
environmentalist philosophy (Encyclopaedia Britannica). 
Interdisciplinarity is a difficult issue because the traditional scientific 
approach has long been deeply emersed in disciplinary divisions. Therefore, 
interdisciplinarity emerges from a recognition about the inadequacy of separate 
disciplinary viewpoints - their narrowness and lack of interrelational 
perspective. It has become necessary to understand not only that other 
disciplines have different perspectives, but that they are interrelated, and not 
engaged in issues that are entirely distinct and irrelevant to other disciplines. 
Physicists have [...I focussed their attention on the[ ...wlds at the opposite 
ends of the scale of magnitude: on the one hand the&& of universal extent, 
gravitational and electro-magnetic, and on the other hand the submicrosco- 
pic_fields of subatomic particles [...I So far, physicists have hardly begun to 
consider the idea of _fields of sys tems that lie between these extremes, partly 
for the simple reason that the natural sciences are divided into departments: 
the study of molecules and crystals is the province not of physicists, but of 
chemists, crystallographers, biochemists, and molecular biologists; living 
organisms lie in the realm of biology, and minds in psychology. 69 
The increasingly restricted focus of narrow specialization and disciplinary 
and subdisciplinary fragmentation often develops into a systematic impediment 
to communication among scientists. As a reaction, a common saying has 
cropped up in academic circles that too much in-depth study can lead to 
knowing more and more about less and less, until it - in mathematical terms - 
nears asymptotically the point when (or where) each narrow specialty will 
"know everything about nothing". 
However, interdisciplinary breadth can seemingly lead to the other extreme: 
While the scope of human ecology may be confusing for some people, it is 
also its strength. As the professional literature and contacts expand those of 
us committed to this new_field are encouraged by the range of interests drawn 
to it. 70 
The broad range of interests might verge on "knowing nothing about every- 
thing". Obviously, interdisciplinarity is not merely a multiplicity of views, a 
composite perspective drawing upon a wider pool of data. 
The integrative interdisciplinary approach entails crossing of disciplinary 
boundaries. It can create confusion as Wright et al. observed, or, sometimes, 
69 English biologist Rupert Sheldrake frames this issue (Sheldrake, 1988: 299-300) 
within the context of discussing his concept of fields, which I will present in more 
detail in the last chapter. 
70 Wright, et al., 1993: 312 
from a more dogmatic perspective, it can be taken for a transgression into 
jealously defended disciplinary domains. Sheldrake observes that 
chemists, crystallographers, biologists, and psychologists do not usually feel 
free to postulate new kinds of fundamental Jields, because fundamental Jield 
theory is the province of physics. 71 
The necessity of an integrative interdisciplinary perspective is best (and 
pertinently for this essay) exemplified in the approach to the current 
environmental crisis. The traditional fragmentation of scientific disciplines, and 
the (consequent) dividedness and disconnectedness of policy making and 
implementation, typically hinder insights into interrelations and 
interdependencies requisite for understanding of complex interactions between 
humans and their all-inclusive environment. 
Global environmental change presents a special challenge and 
opportunity for human ecology. Central to the practical and intellectual 
challenges is the need to integrate knowledge across the sciences. [. . .I 
It is also clear that all the major problems facing humanity in the 
twenty-first century, and especially those related to global change, will 
require a broad, interdisciplinary understanding. Problems of con.ict 
resolution, social and economic development and of the environment cannot 
be solved using the knowledge of only a single discipline or specialty. 72 
Interdisciplinary integration entails several levels of synthesis. The integra- 
tion of scientific disciplines is only the first level. Even more important for the 
human-ecological perspective is the cross-scientific connection between natural 
and social sciences (humanities). It overcomes the dualized concept of 
humanity and nature. A further significant integration is between sciences 
(natural and social) and art. The transcendence of this traditional and rather 
strictly posited boundary can be a manifestation of rapprochement between 
objectivity and subjectivity. 
The nature of lve and conscwusness are not in practice taken into 
account in the actual theories of physics. These are the concern of other 
departments. But if a truly un~fied theory is ever to emerge, living organisms 
and conscious minds must be included within it along with the particles and 
Jields of physics. There is a need for a new natural philosophy that goes 
further than physics alone can go but remains in hannony with it. 73 
71 Sheldrake, op.cit.: 300 
72 Dietz, 1993: 188 
73 Sheldrake, op.cit. : 304 (emphasis mine) 
Life is the utmost level of integration of the human-ecological perspective. 
It involves an understanding of interrelatedness between human consciousness 
and human belonging to nature - a most controversial issue which lacks 
consensus among those who seemingly talk about the same thing when they 
consider the connection between noosphere74 and biosphere: 
As a transdiscipline, human ecology acknowledges the existence of 
human intellect and therefore incorporates the noosphere as well as the 
biosphere as altered consciously or unconsciously by human activities. 75 
Interdisciplinary integration assumes an eco-systemic meaning which 
offers the distinction between multidisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity. The 
systemic perspective entails an approach which starts from the whole and 
proceeds toward specific aspects. Interdisciplinarity thus transcends the 
fragmentation of disciplinary divisions and reaches the comprehensive 
wholeness of ecological processes and human life processes as  their part. 
Multidisciplinarity represents the old paradigm - a mere accumulation of 
already fragmented perspectives. 
Without this clear systemic determinant, some authors find it necessary to 
devise a term to distinguish the integrative approach from mere accumulation. 
It ultimately becomes a matter of different terminological choices: 
Beyond interdisciplinarity, human ecology also provides a 
transdisciplinary overarching framework from which problems involving 
human-environment relationships are approached and examined. Relatedly, 
Tengstrom [...I questions whether 'the principle aim of human ecology is to 
restructure knowledge already gained, or is it to produce fundamentally new 
and spec~fw human ecological knowledge or both.. .". 76 
Regardless of how it is defined, interdisciplinary integration has to be 
perceived not as  exclusive of in-depth, narrowly focused and analyhcal 
methods of inquiry, but rather as  complementary to them. Interdisciplinarity 
reflects the fundamental holistic meaning that a whole is more than the sum of 
74 noosphere - The sphere of human conscbusness and mental activity esp. in regard 
to its influence on the biosphere and in relation to evolution. (Merriam-Webster's 
Collegiate Dictionary). 
75 Griffore and Phenice. op.cit.: 145. See also the quote by Wilber above (footnote 42) 
whose explicitly dualistic concept of these notions will be criticized in the last 
chapter. 
76 ibid.: 144-145 
parts. An overall view can put some of the disciplinary issues into a new 
context, which would help their better understanding. 
Interdisciplinarity is the primary methodological approach of this project. 
The thesis is built up  on insights and research that pertain to diverse discipli- 
nes, and there is much overlap between them. The main disciplines that I fo- 
cus on are the following: political science and environmental policy in particular; 
anthropology, which covers primarily the issues of culture, cultural develop- 
ment, community and household, but in its wider context, and for the purpose 
of this project, it can be perceived a s  embracing also the issues of psychology 
and sociology. The economic problems addressed in the thesis can be seen as 
pertaining both to anthropology and to the conceptual framework of environ- 
mental policy. The third field I have focused on is technology, a s  a n  engine- 
ering discipline, but touching also a lot upon architecture, which is my original 
field of academic and professional involvement. Architecture, in its broader con- 
text, also involves the issues of sociology, psychology and economy. The issues 
of technology are connected to the more fundamental questions of physics, 
which also presents a link to philosophy - the last, and most encompassing of 
the disciplines I focus on, a s  it embraces the overall conceptual issues and also 
the ethical and epistemological questions that I address in this essay. 
Consequently, the form of this thesis is a n  integrative overview, an  overar- 
chingframework as  described in the previous quotation. Therefore, in this 
essay I will not attempt in-depth examination and discussion of any of the 
raised issues. I wiU offer an  initial insight into the comprehensive scope of 
essential aspects of a new world view and way of life - an  ecological culture. 
Chapter 
Conceptual Framework: 
Systems Theory and Holism 
Major theoretical interventions such as Bateson's 
"ecology of mind," Bohm's theory of the implicate 
order, Sheldrake's theory of formative causation 
I.. .I LovelocKs Gaia hypo thesis, Prigogine's theory 
of dissipative structures and order by fluctuation, 
Lorenz and Feigenbaum's chaos theory, and Bell's 
theorem of nonlocality have pointed to new 
possibilities for a less reductionist scientijk world 
conception. I.. .I 
A further crucial development encouraging 
these integrative tendencies in the postmodern 
intellectual milieu has been the epistemological 
rethinking of the nature of imagination, carried 
out on many fronts - philosophy of science, 
sociology, anthropology, religious studies 1.. .] 
Imagination is no longer conceived as 
simplistically opposed to perception and reason; 
rather, perception and reason are recognized as 
being always informed by the imagination. 1 
Interdisciplinarity is the central methodological departure point of this pro- 
ject. It reflects, as I have already indicated, a more fundamental systemic, holis- 
tic and ecological conceptual framework fiom which to approach an ecological 
culture. 
Basic Concepts: Integrity and Interaction 
The basic principle of systems theory is that the unit of inquiry is never an  
isolated entity, but the unity of entity-in-its+nvironrnent or in-its-context. 
Such unity is a system and its fundamental characteristics are inter-related- 
ness; inter-connectedness; inter-dependence; and inter-action between the 
entity and its environment or context. Consequently systemic units exist and 
evolve within larger or wider units as  nested levels of complexity. 
The philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead's Process and Reality ( 1  928) 
[...I views the world as an organism comprising individual organisms existing 
in relationship to the environment. 2 
Systems theory, ecology and holism share the basic concepts, or can be 
perceived a s  congruent, if not homogenous. 
The emphasis on the whole [has been called] holistic, organismic, or 
ecological. In twentieth-century science the holistic perspective has become 
known as "systemic" and the way of thinking it implies as "systems thinking." 
I shall use "ecological" and "systemic" synonymously, "systemic" being merely 
the more technical, scientific term. 3 
The original ecological meaning of the basic unit of inquiry is organism-in- 
its-environment. In human-ecological terms it also entails the individual (or per- 
son)-in-her/his-environment, or context. 
Holism is also one of the words - now very popular - that present terrnino- 
logical vagueness which I was mentioning in the first chapter. The etymology is 
simple - holos means whole in Greek - but the connotation of the concept is 
somewhat controversial. There is a widespread assumption that holism means 
only a perception of wholes, which flattens everythmg into undifferentiated in- 
distinguishable mass 4. There is also a concern that holism can be given a totali- 
tarian interpretation - understood as  a leveling unification, and a rejection of 
2 Merchant, 1994: 16 
3 Capra, 1996: 18. See also the quote in previous chapter (footnote 52). 
4 Wilber, 1995 
contrasts and diversities 5. Even the (1977 edition of) Fontana Dictionary of 
Modern Thought defines holism as "hostile to the philosophical technique of ana- 
lysis," which is a misconception (or, even more, an emotionally framed judgment 
in stark contrast to a "value-free" discourse that should be expected from a 
dictionary: Why hostile?!). As usual with encyclopedic compilations, it represents 
a conservative view, derived from the perspective of the current paradigm. 
These confusions and misconceptions arise because holism, systems 
theory and broadly conceptualized ecology are relatively new concepts, and 
because they shake the foundations of the presently prevailing world view. 
The basic and most widespread meaning of holism/eco-systems approach 
(in the Fontana Dictionary too) is that a whole is more than the sum of its 
parts. Therefore, analysis is not sufficient, it cannot give conclusive knowledge. 
A holistic/eco-systemic view is also needed. 
Systems theory looks at the world in tenns of the interrelatedness and 
interdependence of all phenomena I.. .] An integrated whole whose properties 
cannot be reduced to those of its parts is  called a system 6 
The relational perspective is the essential systemic and ecological precept. 
It means that any property, quality or characteristics of an  entity cannot be 
derived from the entity itself, but only from its relation to its environment or 
context. Many writers relevant to the human ecological context consider Alfred 
North Whitehead most important in developing the relational concept 7. His 
philosophy of organism is "based upon the notions of 'system', 'process'" 8, and 
what he terms extensive continuum - "a complex of entities united by the vari- 
ous allied relationships of whole to partw 9 .  He considered that the perception of 
physical attributes as  internal and external relationships presented the shift 
from a materialistic to an organismic paradigm lo. 
5 Marcuse, 1964 
6 Capra, 1982: 43 
7 Capra, 1982; Capra, 1996; Cobb, 1982; Prigogine and Stengers, 1984; Sheldrake, 
1988; Wilber, 1995 
8 Whitehead, l929/ 1978: 128 
9 ibid.: 66 
10 ibid.: 309 
However, the essential elements of systems thinking can historically be 
traced much earlier. Giordano Bruno appears (in the sixteenth century) as one 
of the first systemic and holistic thinkers. In Carolyn Merchant's view 
Bruno's dialectic stressed the unity rather than the struggle of opposites, 
anticipating idealist rather than materialist dialectics. He emphasized the 
harmony of the whole, pointing out that an organic whole is always more 
than the sum of its parts. His plurality of worlds within the infinite universe 
formed a living whole. 11 
Wilhelm Reich perceived Bruno as a principal precursor of what he will 
have developed as a functionalist-organic-systemic perspective of the integrity 
of inner and outer spheres of organisms-in-their-environment. I will present 
Reich's work in the last chapters of this essay 
Bruno had in the sixteenth century, [. ..I discovered and captured in a 
system of thought, the interrelations between the body and the mind, the 
single organism and its environment, the basic unity and multiplicity of the 
universe, an infinite universe embracing infinitely numerous worlds. 
Everything exists for itself; and yet it is an integral part of a whole. Therefore, 
the individual unit or sod existsjbr itrevand, at the same time, is a part of 
the whole I...] To Bruno, the universe and all its parts had qualities identical 
with lge. In his system there was no unbridgeable contradiction between 
individualism and uniuersalism, since the individual was an integral part of 
an all-encompassing whole. 12 
An important system thinker (whose work is very pertinent to some of the 
main issues of my essay) was the French philosopher Henri Bergson (1859- 
1941), who first developed a process philosophy (and influenced Whitehead) by 
introducing the non-deterministic notion of becoming. 
We cannot reason about the parts as we reason about the whole; [...I the 
same principles are not applicable to the origin and to the end of a progress; 
[. ..I in the concrete duration, in which alone there is true generation and not 
only a composition of parts [. . .] the material world melts back into a simple 
_flu, a continuity of _flowing, a becoming. 13 
He perceived a holistic property of life as duration and becoming, which cannot 
be entirely grasped by rational and analflcal methods. From there he deve- 
loped an epistemological theory which I find very appropriate to the discussion 
of an emergent ecological consciousness based on sensitivity for nature within 
11 Merchant, 1980: 1 14 
12 Reich, 195 1/ 1980: 104 (emphasis mine) 
13 Bergson, 1983: 368 
and without ourselves. (I will examine these epistemological issues toward the 
end of the essay.) 
The focus on life processes is essential for an  eco-systemic perspective. 
The concept of open systems conveys the interactivity which is characteristic 
of self-organizing processes. These present the link between systems theory 
and non-equilibrium thermodynamics which has recently thrown new light on 
the relation between entropy and life processes 14. (Entropy and life processes 
have a bearing on sustainability and will be reviewed in the following chapter.) 
Before the 1940s the terms "system" and "systems thinking" had been 
used by several scientists, but it was Bertalanm's concepts of a n  open system 
and a general systems theory that established systems thinking as a major 
scientific movement. [...I 
Ludwig von Bertalanm is commonly credited with the first formulation 
of a comprehensive theoretical framework describing the principles of 
organization of living systems. 15 
The fundamental interactivity, interrelatedness and interconnectedness of 
systems reflect the exchange of matter, energy and information between the en- 
tity and its environment. Consequently the boundary between the entity and its 
environment is always permeable, it never completely isolates the entity from 
its surroundings. The boundary is best conceived of a s  an  interface, a sphere 
of interrelations and interconnections. This aspect of systems is often percei- 
ved as  the characteristic which goes beyond the tangible physicality of entities: 
The materiality of a body does not stop a t  the point a t  which we touch it: 
a body is present wherever its influence is felt; its attractive force, to speak on- 
ly of that, is exerted on the sun, on the planets, perhaps on the entire universe. 
The more physics advances, the more it effmes the individuality of bodies and 
even of the particles into which the scienti$c imagination began by decornpo- 
sing them bodies and corpuscles tend to dissolve into auniversal interaction. 16 
Bergson's observation came out of his awareness of the early develop- 
ments in physics - primarily quantum physics - which later led to a critique 
and reevaluation of the concept of clear-cut, isolated corpuscules: 
Particles can be called atoms or sometimes these are broken into elec- 
trons, protons, and neutrons; now the most elementary particles are called 
quarks, maybe there will be a subquark. Whatever they may be called, the 
assumption is that a basic element exists which we either have or hope to 
14 Prigogine and Stengers, 1984 
15 Capra, 1996:43,46 
16 Bergson, op.cit.: 188 
haue. I...] These elements are basically external to each other; not only are 
they separate in space, but even more important, thefundamental nature of 
each is independent of that of the other. 17 
The interconnectivity of boundaries is most obvious in living organisms, 
and, indeed, ecology is intrinsically systemic (and therefore the principal origin 
of the systems theory). 
The entire cell unit's dynamics extend far beyond its observable bounda- 
ry. Electrical charges and chemical processes occur over an extensive area so 
that it is meaningless to isolate 'the cell itself" from an environment. The cell 
walls are not independent of their surroundings - they are not walls in a 
commonsense way. We are dealing with an 'all-pervasive network" of forces 
and interactions. 18 
This dynamic concept of boundaries as  spheres of division and connection 
at the same time, indicates the basic character of systems: they are integral 
wholes and at the same time they are parts of larger wholes. Their integrity 
does not preclude their interrelations, interconnections and belonging to more 
complex wholes. Or vice-versa, their belonging to broader levels of complexity 
does not deny their integrity. This has been pointed out above in Reich's 
account of Giordano Bruno's systemic concept as  an overcoming of contradic- 
tion between individuality and universality - a fundamental tenet of systems 
theory with significant implications for eco-environmental issues, particularly in 
the domain of ethics (which I will discuss in the last chapter). The term holon 
has been devised by Arthur Koestler 19 to depict this holistic or systemic 
property of simultaneous integrity and belonging to larger whole. 
An important aspect of systemic/holistic logic emerges from this dual 
property of wholes (or holons). The conventional linear logic where there is 
always an either/or alternative, is replaced by a both/and logic which throws a 
different light on many oppositional dichotomies. 
Such a defmition of holism clearly delineates it from both reductionism and 
"wholism". "Wholism" is a non-systemic view which disregards the integrity of 
entities and collapses everything into an undifferentiated whole 20. Some 
-- 
17 Bohm, 1988: 344 (emphasis mine). See also quote at footnote 34 below. 
18 Naess, 1989: 79 
19 Koestler, 1978: 18 
20 Wilber. op.cit.: 35 
proponents of ecocentric concepts have fallen into this fallacy 21 in an  attempt 
to overcome the current egocentric practices which are perceived as  
responsible for the negative impact humans exert on the environment. 
Reductionism, on the other hand, fails to perceive that the properties of a 
whole cannot be revealed from the analysis of its constituent components: 
It is one of the main tenets of analytical atomism and mechanistic- 
reductionism that the best (indeed the only scientifically respectable) way to 
understand things is to divide them up or break them down into their smaller, 
supposedly simpler (and hence ostensibly more conceptually and materially 
manageable), constituent elements or parts. 22 
Reductionism and atomism have for a long time been the basic precepts of the 
current scientific paradigm. They tend to reduce all knowledge to divisions and 
classifications, which miss the outlook of the whole. What is particularly signifi- 
cant, is that reduction hinders the possibility of perceiving life processes, as  
they are typically killed by dissection for the purpose of analyhcal examination. 
However, this does not mean that analysis is always inadequate and unneces- 
sary. On the contrary, it is an  appropriate method for acquiring insights into cer- 
tain aspects of things. But it is important to understand its limitations and acknow- 
ledge that some analyhcal procedures can impair integrative perspectives. So 
there is no place for hostility, as  the Fontana Dictionary described it. Rather, ana- 
lysis and systemic integration represent complementary scientific methods 23. 
A method, to some extent comparable to analysis, has emerged with post- 
modernism, and is known as  "deconstruction". I t  is specifically focused on the 
relationship between language and meaning, and, by taking apart (deconstruc- 
ting) the logic of language, it scrutinizes and re-evaluates the deeply rooted 
assumptions of traditional mind sets (primarily Western) 24. I will use the 
21 See quote at footnote 56 in chapter 8. 
22 Chorover, 1990: 89-90 
23 Reductionism and holism analysis and synthesis, are complementary. (Capra, 
1982: 267) 
24 Deconstruction was initiated by Jacques Derrida in France, who, in a series of 
books published beginning in the late 1 960s, launched a major critque of 
traditional Westem metaphysics. He introduced the words deconstruire ('to 
deconstruct") and deconstruction ('deconstruction") in De la grarnmatologie 
(1 967). Derrida's deconstructive strategies have subsequently established 
themselves as a n  important part of postmodemism, especially in poststructural 
literary theory and text analysis. (Encyclopaedia Britannica) 
deconstructivist approach, primarily by referring to postmodernist analysis of 
Jean Baudrillard, but also, to a limited extent, in my own discussion of dualism 
and domination. However, in the last chapter, I will point to limitations of 
deconstruction, and to the necessity of a re-construction, consequent to the 
integrative systemic approach to an  ecological culture. 
An interesting linguistic connection between the notions of whole, healing and 
health points to the reductionism of the current medical model which has aban- 
doned the traditional meaning of health as  a state of wholeness of the organism 
in an integrative, systemic sense - its integration into the eco-systemic web of 
interrelations with the comprehensive social and natural environment 25. 
More than the Sum of Parts 
The great shock of twentieth-century science has 
been that systems cannot be understood by 
analysis. I... ] Thus the relationship between the 
parts and the whole has been reversed. In the 
systems approach the properties of the parts can be 
understood only from the organization of the 
whole. Accordingly, systems thinking 
concentrates not on basic building blocks, but on 
basic principles of organization. 26 
The realization that reductionist and analytical methodology is inadequate 
has not by itself made it easy to adopt a new way of thinking. The tendency to 
break reality into components has been so deeply ingrained in our way of 
thinking, that it becomes difficult to conceive what wholeness really means: 
The question is then how to understand this wholeness. The entire lan- 
guage of physics is now analytic. Zfwe use this language, we are committed to 
analyzing into parts, even though our intention may be quite the opposite. 27 
25 The biomedical model [ . . . I  of modem scient~j% medicine [regards] human body as a 
machine that can be analyzed in terms of its parts: disease is seen as 
malfunctioning of biological mechanisms [ . . . I  The doctor's role is to intervene 
physically or chemically to correct the malfunctioning [ . . . I  
The term 'healer" is viewed with suspicion and the concepts of health and 
healing are generally not discussed in medical schools [ . . . I  Healing I . . . ]  cannot be 
understood in reductionist terms. I...] The broad concept of health I . . . ]  needed for 
our cultural transformation [ . . . I  includes individual, social and ecological 
dimensions.(Capra, 1982: 123- 124) 
26 Capra, 1996: 29-30 
27 Bohm, op.cit.: 350 (emphasis mine) 
The analytic thinking leads us  to perceive reality as  if it is composed of frag- 
ments, rather than considering wholes as  primary states, which can be divided 
into parts. When we assume that components are the basic units, we fail to un- 
derstand that properties of wholes cannot be derived from observing the parts. 
'The mechanistic physicist says that light consists of seven basic colors, 
that it is "composed" ofthern Thefunctionalist says: $1 put a ray of light 
through a prism it takes on the appearance of a seven-colored scale. Without 
prism or without a screen formed by rain, ie., without any artificial 
interference, light is a unitary phenomenon. [...I I can kill an animal and 
dissect it this way or that. No one would say that the animal consisted ofthe 
parts into which I have dissected it. 28 
According to the systems view, the essential properties of an organism 
or living system, are properties of the whole, which none of the parts have. 
They arisefrom the interactions and relationships among the parts. 'These 
properties are destroyed when the system is dissected, either physically or 
theoretically, into isolated elements. Although we can discern individual 
parts in any system these parts are not isolated, and the nature ofthe whole is 
always d~zerentfrom the mere sum ofits parts. 29 
It is in the inquiry into life processes that the inadequacy of the analfical, 
reductionist approach became most apparent. Fragmentation of life processes 
results in losing sight of coordinating and integrative activities which make 
systems the units of organization - of interrelations and interactions. The 
properties of the whole, or of the system, emerge from these interactions. The 
whole is not a quantitative category as  it can be implied from the reductionist 
approach which can perceive wholes only as  agglomerations of parts. Whole, or 
wholeness, as Bohm put it, is a quality, a n  emergent property of systems. 
The concept of "organized complexity" became the very subject of the 
systems approach. At each level of complex@ the observed phenomena 
exhibit properties that do not exist a t  the lower level. For example, the concept 
of temperature, which is central to thermodynamics, is meaningless a t  the 
level of individual atoms, where the laws of quantum theory operate. 
Similarly, the taste ofsugar is not present in the carbon, hydrogen, and 
oxygen atoms that constitute its components. 30 
The properties of wholes emerging from their integrity should be perceived 
within nested levels of complexity that characterize the systemic interrelated- 
ness. Consequently, the fact that essential properties of the whole disappear 
when a system is analyzed into its constituent subwholes, does not imply that 
- 
28 Reich, 19491 1973: 100, 102 
29 Capra, 1996: 28 
30 ibid.: 28-29 
the subwholes (or subsystems) will not have their own properties which reveal 
significant information unavailable when observing the whole. These properties 
can provide important information about the whole. It is only critical to 
understand that the properties of components cannot reveal the essential 
qualities of the whole. This is another example of both/and logic and a clear 
indication of the compatibility of analytic and integrative approaches. 
The emergent properties of systems imply a relational logic. It follows from 
the recognition that characteristics of an entity are not derived from that entity 
perceived in isolation, but from its relationship to its environment or context 31: 
Language continually asserts by the syntax of subject and predicate that 
"things" somehow "have" qualities and attributes. A more precise way of 
talkurg would insist that the "things" are produced, are seen as separatefrom 
other "things," and are made "real" by their internal relations and by their 
behavior in relationship with other things and with the speaker. 32 
Arne Naess points out the fundamental significance of relational thinking for 
the ecological and environmental context: 
All statements "about the thing" are relational statements: statements 
like "thing A is B" are I...] abandoned infavour of "thing A is B in relation to 
C" [...I Relationalism has ecosophical value because it makes it easy to 
undermine the belief in organisms or persons as something which can be 
isolated from their milieux. [...I Organisms and milieu are not two things. 
Organisms presuppose milieux. 33 
From all the characteristics of the systemic perspective presented above, it 
is possible to arrive at a definition of wholeness. The essential alternative to the 
analytxal/reductionist view is the integrative approach - from wholes toward 
parts, rather than the other way around: 
Fragmentary thinku-g is giving rise to a reality that is constantly 
breaking up into disorderly, disharmonious, and destructive partial 
activities. Therefore, seriously exploring a mode of thinking that starts from 
the most encompassing possible whole and goes down to the parts (subwholes) 
in a way appropriate to the actual nature of things seems reasonable. 34 
The distinctive character of the integrative approach is that it starts from 
the undivided whole and thus enables the comprehension of the holistic quali- 
31 Systems thinking is "contextual." which is the opposite of analytical thinking. 
Analysis means taking something apart in order to understand it; systems 
thinking means putting it into the context o fa  larger whole. (ibid.: 30) 
32 Bateson, 1980: 67 
33 Naess, op.cit.: 55-56 
34 Bohm, op.cit.: 350 
ties which disappear with disintegration into constituent sub-wholes. This 
makes the integrative approach substantially different from synthesis. Synthe- 
sis connotes an a posteriori recombination of previously fragmented pieces into 
a new (artificial) whole. Therefore, synthesis is a typically reductionist proce- 
dure. It can be selective in the composition of the new whole and some sub- 
stantial aspects can be neglected - consciously, unconsciously or inadvertently. 
The term synthetic conveys the meaning of artificiality, indicating that the 
distinction from an integrative approach is important for the context of human 
interventions into natural processes. This aspect of human interaction with the 
environment is salient for the discussion of an ecological culture. 
What is even more important, according to the systemic perspective, a 
posteriori synthesis cannot arrive at the essential qualities of the undivided 
whole because they cannot be reassembled from the qualities of the parts. 
Bergson perceives that the gist of the reductionist method is that it does 
not enable the grasping of duration - which is an essential holistic quality. He 
likens reductionism to cinematograph which reassembles an artificial duration 
out of irnrnobilities 35. This reduction of duration, movement, or change - or 
becoming - into broken fragments of immobility is characteristic of the mathe- 
matical concept of infinitesimality. (Bergson discussed Zenon's rabbit and turtle 
aporia from the viewpoint of duration and its artificial representation 36.) 
An infinitesimal quantity is the result of a limiting process; it is typical- 
ly the variation in a quantity occuning between two successive instants when 
the time elapsing between these instants tends toward zero. In this way the 
change is broken up into an infinite series of infinitely small changes. [...I 
The qualitative diversity of changes in nature is reduced to the study of 
the relative displacement of material bodies. 37 
35 ibid.: 329. See quote at footnote 106 in chapter 9. 
36 Kitchin, 1914: 64 
37 Prigogine and Stengers, op.cit.: 57. 62 
Complexity, Hierarchy and Dualism 
Systems theory generates a comprehensive understanding of holism as  a 
concept of organized complexities. From the fact that a system can be 
perceived a s  a whole in one context and as  a part in another, and that systems 
are interrelated wholes/parts (or holons), it ensues that they can be integrated 
at  different levels. So we can speak of levels of integration of different 
complexity which are stratified and nested, or embedded within each other. 
An outstanding property of all l$e is the tendency to form multileveled 
structures of systems within systems. Each of these forms a whole with 
respect to its parts while at the same time being a part of a larger whole. I.. .] 
Throughout the living world wefind living systems nesting within other 
living systems. 38 
The organism-in-environment is further d~fferentiated in terms of 
levels of integration At the least complex level, we refer to the organisrn-in- 
environment as respondent-in-ambience.[ . . . I  At the next level, the organism- 
in-environment is referred to as an agent-in-habitat [...] (e.g., social and 
nonsocial objects and resources) I...] At the most complex level, we 
characterize the organism-in-environment as a person-in-world. 39 
This classification offers a possible view of how different levels of complexi- 
ty can be distinguished. Rupert Sheldrake situates his theory of morphic fields 
in the framework of systemic levels of complexity: 
Living organisms show a similar hierarchical arrangement, with 
organs, containing tissues, containing cells, containing organelles such as 
nuclei and mitochondria, containing complex molecules, and so on. 
Arthur Koestler has proposed the term holon for such organisms I...] 
Another term with a meaning equivalent to holon is morphic unit. The 
word morphic emphasizes the aspect of form, and the word unit emphasizes 
the unity or wholeness. 40 
This concept of interconnectedness implies a perception of the whole uni- 
verse as  an interrelated system of different levels of complexity and integration. 
It presents an  essential conceptual framework for understanding the key 
issues of ecological culture. 
Bubolz and Sontag (1 993) have found it useful to conceptualize 
environments as natural physical-biological human built, and 
38 Capra, 1996: 28 
39 Wapner and Demick, 1990: 48-50 
40 Sheldrake, 1988: 94-96 
social-cultural environments. While conceptually distinct, these 
environments are actually embedded within each other. 41 
It is important to realize that the interrelatedness of systems at different le- 
vels can divers@ beyond mere increases of size or scale. More complex wholes 
or systems are not necessarily always bigger. Different levels of complexity 
interact in a web-like framework of intricately interwoven relationships. 
Furthermore, the levels of complexity that we choose to regard are merely 
foci of observation 42. Particularly when living systems are concerned, it is irn- 
possible to put sharp boundaries between interacting units and their complex 
environments. Therefore, the levels of complexity are really a matter of percep- 
tion, and we can concentrate our attention on different interactions. Bergson 
argues that we can only talk of partial views: 
The diviswn of unorganized matter into separate bodies is relative to our 
senses and to our intellect, and matter, looked at as an undivided whole, must 
be a flux rather than a thing. I .  .I 
The only question is whether the natural systems which we call living 
beings must be assimilated to the art~fiial systems that science cuts out 
within inert matter, or whether they mus t not rather be compared to that 
natural system which is the whole of the universe. I...] The real whole might 
weU be, we conceive, an indivisible continuity. The systems we cut out within 
it would, properly speaking, not then be parts at all; they would be partial 
views of the whole. And, with these partial views put end to end, you will not 
make even a beginning of the reconstruction of the whole. 43 
This is indeed a controversial epistemological issue of the subjectivity/objecti- 
vity relationship 44. David Bohm offers a compelling way of looking at the issue: 
I f  you watch a whirlpool or a vortex, you see the water going around and 
you see that the movement gets weaker the farther away it isfrom the center, 
but it never ends. Now the vortex does not actuaUy exist; there is only the 
moving water. The vortex is a pattern and a form your mind abstractsfrom 
the sensations you have of moving water. I f  two vortices are put together, they 
will aflect each other; [...I You can say that two exist, but this is only a 
convenient way of thinking. I.. .I When you have flowing water with patterns in 
them, none of those patterns actually has a separate existence. 45 
41 Sontag, et al., 1993: 152 
42 Capra, 1982: 282 
43 Bergson, op.cit.: 186, 30-3 1 
44 I will address it in the last chapter. 
45 Bohm. op.cit.: 345-346 (emphasis mine) 
Ken Wilber establishes his very elaborate and comprehensive theory of 
holism on an extremely opposite assumption about the character of the 
systemic levels of complexity: 
Reality is composed, not of things nor processes nor .wholes nor parts. 
but of whole/parts, of holons. [...I Before an atom is an atom, it is a holon. 
Before a cell is a ceU, it is a holon. Before an idea is an idea, it is a holon. 46 
His argument seems at  first sight to be congruent with the systems theory 
perspective which postulates as  object of inquiry the unity of entities-in-their- 
environment, rather than isolated things. However, Wilber's fascination with 
the concept of holons is such that he promotes them into a fundamental 
ontological category. It is quite absurd (although consequent to an extreme 
idealistic viewpoint which Wilber fully endorses) that a mode of perception, or 
an intellectual construct should be identified as  reality. It is a s  absurd as  to 
assign reality to meridians and parallels of the globe and deny it to physical 
and biological structures and processes of the planet. 
From there, Wilber constructs a complex and intricate intellectualistic sys- 
tem which offers some interesting insights into the ways of contemplating ho- 
lism and related problems, but it turns into a rigid logical speculation. His point 
of departure is the understanding that holons are entities which can be wholes 
in one actuality and at  the same time parts in another. Holons thus form a sys- 
tem of concentric nested hierarchies, which he calls holarchies, and he percei- 
ves absolutely everything consisting of these interrelations and interconnec- 
tions. From this premise, Wilber logically derives the question: what is inside 
what? How to deliberate which holon contains which? He offers an  extremely 
speculative causal criterion: 
We could destroy all humans and the biosphere would still exist (but not 
vice versa), showing that the biosphere is a lower and shallower, not deeper or 
higher, reality. his profoundly confuses ecotheorists; they seem to have no 
coherent way to honor the biosphere without absolutizing it. [...I 
his allows us to easily determine what is lower, and what is higher, in 
any holistic sequence: destroy the particular holon, and everything else that 
is also destroyed is higher; those holons not destroyed are lower. 47 
46 Wilber, op-cit.: viii, 33 
47 ibid.: 79, 62 
He gets so much carried away with his purely cerebral speculations that 
he fails to notice that he is contradicting the systems theory premise which he 
previously started from: the interrelatedness and interdependency of all pheno- 
mena. His observation that an isolated destruction of one holon, without affec- 
ting others, can only be an intellectualistic hocus-pocus to support a concep- 
tual construct. And his principal conceptual construct is a strict hierarchical 
structure of the universe with transcendental noosphere on the top. 
I will further discuss his views in the context of spirituality in the last 
chapter. Here I will only focus on his notion of hierarchy of holons: 
Hierarchy, then, is the fundamental structural principle. This is also 
why normal hierarchies are ofen drawn as a series of concentric circles or 
spheres or 'nests within nests. " 48 
The notion of nested hierarchies has now become rather carelessly adop- 
ted by many writers, despite the fact that hierarchy has a connotation clearly 
related to domination. This connotation makes the notion of nested hierarchies 
entirely inappropriate for the interactive context of systemic relationships. 
Fritjof Capra is very explicit in rejecting the term on these grounds: 
Since the early days of organismic biology [ . . . I  multileveled structures 
have been called hierarchies. However, this term can be rather misleading. 
since it is derivedfrom human hierarchies, which are fairly rigid structures 
of domination and control, quite unlike the multileveled order found in 
nature. 49 
We may reserve the term hierarchy for [ . . . I  systems of dominion and 
control, in which orders are transmitted from the top down. I . . . ]  Most living 
systems exhibit multileveled patterns of organization characterized by many 
intricate and nonlinear pathways along which signals of information and 
transactions propagate between all levels [ . . . I  A tree [is] a more appropriate 
symbol for the ecological nature of stratifiation in living systems. [ . . . I  
The important aspect of the strahfied order in nature is not the transfer 
of control, but rather the organization of complexity. 50 
Nevertheless, Wilber takes a lot of effort to justifL his adherence to 
hierarchical structures. He puts forth an untenable claim that 
you cannot have wholeness without hierarchy, because unless you organize 
the parts into a larger whole whose glue is a principle higher or deeper than 
48 ibid.: 18 
49 Capra, 1996: 28 
50 Capra, 1982: 282 
the parts possess alone - unless you do  that, then you have heaps, not wholes. 
You have strands, but never a web. 51 
However, webs and networks are metaphors that are meant to convey lateral 
relationships, exactly opposite to the verticality of hierarchies. Furthermore, he 
attempts to assert that his concept of hierarchical holons is entirely different 
from domination hierarchies, which he describes as  pathological hierarchies, 
allegedly distinct from sacred governance : 
Hiero- means sacred or holy, and -arch means governance or rule. [. . .] 
The 'Hierarchies' referred to nine celestial orders, with Seraphim and 
Cherubim at the top and archangels and angels at the bottom [. . .I These orders 
were ranked because each successive order was more inclusive and more 
encompassing and in that sense "higher." "Hierarchy" thus meant, in thema1 
analysis, "sacred governance," or "governing one's l$e by spiritual powers." 
In the course of Catholic Church history, however, these celestial orders 
of contemplative awareness were translated into political orders of power. 52 
Actually arch means supreme, and indicates supremacy or domination rather 
than governance which does not have to imply any hierarchy. However, the 
fact that domination is exerted by spiritual powers (which very much need 
political power agencies of flesh and blood to get implemented) does seem to 
make a difference for Wilber who perceives external spiritual entities as  
decisive determinants of human lives. All these issues are of paramount 
significance for the discussion of complex intricacies of domination which I 
consider essential for the context of ecological culture. 
Hierarchies are directly related to the dualistic way of thinking. Dualism 
establishes not only polarized constructs, but depicts them first as  
hierarchically posited into superior and inferior, then as  antagonistic because 
of their differences, and finally as  mutually exclusive. The ecofeminist writer 
Karen Warren describes dualistic constructs as  
disjunctive pairs in which the disjuncts are seen as oppositional [rather than 
as complementary) and exclusive [rather than inclusive) and which place 
higher value [status, prestige) on one disjunct rather than the other. 53 
Dualism is not merely a logical issue (if logic can a t  all be perceived as  
isolated from its social/cultural context). Dualistic constructs emerge from the 
51 Wilber, op-cit.: 16 
52 ibid.: 17 
53 Warren, 1990: 268 
context of domination and are manifested in the relationships of competition, 
confrontation and subjugation, relationships which shut out any equality, 
closeness, unity, mutuality and coexistence. Therefore. I will examine dualism 
in more detail in the chapter on domination. 
Dualism is incompatible with the interactive and interrelational essence of 
the systemic perspective. Holism therefore implies a transcendence of dualistic 
constructs and the related relationships of domination. Holism has to integrate 
dualized patterns. Such a non-dualistic view of holism is an appropriate 
conceptual framework for the emerging ecological culture. 
A frequent reaction to dualism is the attempt to resolve dualistic constructs 
of antagonistic differences by abolishing the differences. Val Plumwood calls 
this reaction uncritical equality 54. Although it is easy to demonstrate rationally 
the inadequacy of such a strategy, it still occurs because dualistic constructs 
are not logical abstractions. They involve often fiercely affective reactions to 
domination relationships which are the expression of the dualistic mind-set. 
The problem is misinterpreted as one of differences, rather than of positing the 
differences as basis for superiority/inferiority and thence domination. 
What happens in the case of uncritical reactions is that the dualistic 
structure remains unrecognized and unresolved. Likewise, reductionism and 
analysis are often perceived as dualistic opposites to holism. Holism is 
consequently understood as "wholism", which (as I pointed out earlier) equalizes 
all differences and individual distinctions. 
The logic of dualism is always exclusive - "either/or" - because dualism con- 
strues differences as mutually exclusive. A systems/holistic perspective, as 
shown above, entails an inclusive logic of "both/and"55. Furthermore, dualism 
reduces all diversities to polar antipodes and thus abolishes the multitudinous 
variety and gradations of qualities. The result is a drastically impoverished per- 
ception of reality. 
54 Plumwood, 1993: 59 
55 Plumwood offers a more intricate analysis of the dominant logical system and 
demonstrates how it is defined by domination/dualism paradigm (ibid.: 55-57). 
Inclusive logic is dialectical: it does not imply equalization of differences. 
but rather a dialectic interplay between or among contrasting or divergent 
states, levels of integration or processes. The essential characteristic of 
systemic-ecological holism is that it is dialectical. The primary dialectical 
contrast is the tension between integrity and integration. It ensues from the 
fundamental character of systems which are integral wholes and at the same 
time are integrated into other levels of complexity. The relationship between 
individuality and universality, as perceived by Giordano Bruno, is not 
antagonistic, but dialectic. 
The dialectical character of an eco-systemic perspective is primarily 
manifested in life processes which are both the origin of ecological and systems 
theory, as well as its principal object of inquiry. The notion of tension is closely 
associated with this meaning of dialectic: 
Not only can there be no one-sided resolution of the tension between 
opposites (as dialectical thinking has long recognized), but that this tension 
constitutes the very energizing factor keeping the human system in 
continuous motion. 56 
Life processes can be defined as alteration of tension and relaxation- a con- 
stant pulsation. This essential dynamism of life processes is expressed in conti- 
nuous interaction between the organism and its environment. The interaction is 
manifested as exchange of energy and matter - the process of metabolism. 
Metabolism is the essential ecological process, and it will be discussed in 
the following chapters as the basis for understanding sustainability. 
Paradigm Change 
I have already explained why I have chosen to contemplate the emerging 
environmental/ecological consciousness in terms of a new cultural pattern, and 
pointed out that it can also be considered a new world view, or a new 
56 Jantsch, 1975: xviii 
paradigm. Paradigm has emerged as a popular and widely used term, to the 
extent that its connotation has become rather indefinite and flexible. 
The etymology is quite simple and it can actually allow a broad usage of the 
word. It is derived from Greek and means pattern, example, or model 57. 
Therefore, "cultural pattern" and "paradigm" can have the same meaning. 
However, the present usage of the word is closest in meaning to "conceptual 
framework", and thus this whole chapter is an elaboration of the paradigm in 
which the emergent ecological culture will be examined. 
The use of the term in this context has been associated with Thomas Kuhn 
and his renowned study of scientifk revolutions, although he used it in a 
narrower sense of scientific conceptual framework, or even more specifically. 
the basis for current scientific practice 58. He perceived paradigms as related 
to what he qualified as "normal science", and defined them as 
accepted examples of actual scientrfic practice 1.. .I which [. . . I  provide models 
from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientr* research These 
are the traditions which the historian describes under such rubrics as 'Ptole- 
maic astronomy' (or 'Copernican1), 'Aristotelian dynamics' (or 'Newtonian'), 
'corpuscular optics' (or 'wave optics'), and so on. The s M y  of paradigms I...] is 
what mainly prepares the student for membership in the particular scientrfic 
community with which he will later practice. I.. ] His subsequent practice will 
seldom evoke overt disagreement over fwrdamentals. 59 
A paradigm change, or shift in Kuhn's language, does not, in these 
institutional circumstances, occur as smoothly as he seemed to envision: 
Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly. [...I It then 
continues with a more or less extended exploration of the area of anomaly. 
And it closes only when the paradigm theory has been adjusted so that the 
anomalous has become the expected. [. . . I  
The transitionfrom a paradigm in crisis to a new onefrom which a new 
tradition of normal science can emerge is [...I a reconstruction of the field 
from new fundamentals, a reconstruction that changes some of the field's 
most elementary theoretical generalizations as well as many of its paradigm 
methods and applications. I.. .I When the transition is complete, the profession 
wiU have changed its view of thefield, its methods, and its goals. 60 
57 Rupert Sheldrake defines paradigm simply as a model of reality (Sheldrake, 1995: 
166) 
58 Kuhn. 1962: 80 
59 ibid.: 10-11 
60 ibid.: 52-53, 89, 84-85 
Paul Feyerabend, in his controversial book Against Method, seriously questions 
scientific authoritarianism and argues that only creativity can bring about new 
perspectives and progress in science: 
The consistency condition which demands that new hypotheses agree 
with accepted theories is unreasonable because it preserves the older theory, 
and not the better theory. Hypotheses contradicting w e l l c o n ~ e d  theories 
give us evidence that cannot be obtained in any other way. 61 
Rupert Sheldrake points at scientific dogmatism: 
Unfortunately, many committed Skeptics confuse the defense of science 
with the defence ofa particular worldview. [...They] tend to equate the 
mechanistic worldview with reason itself and are passionate in its defense. 
They are scient~fic fundamentalists. I...] 
Because institutional science has become so conservative, so limited by 
the conventional paradigms, some of the mostfundamental problems are ei- 
ther ignored, treated as taboo, or put at the bottom of the scientrfic agenda 62 
And David Bohm argues for a continuously evolving paradigm: 
We constantly must look at our world views as provisional, as 
exploratory, and to inquire. We must have a world view, but we must not make 
it an absolute thing that leaves no roomfor inquiry and change. We must 
avoid dogmatism. 63 
The most recent major paradigm shift (in Kuhnian terms) occurred - accor- 
ding to Sheldrake's compellingly argued account - in the 1960s, following the 
adoption of the Big Bang theory of the genesis of the universe. 
In the 1960s the theoretical universe ofphysics broke out of its eternity. 
It looks no longer like an eternal machine, but more like a developing 
organism Everything is evolutionary in nature. The evolution of lqe on earth 
and the development of humanity are no longer a local Juctuation in an 
eternal physical reality; they are aspects of a cosmic evolutionary process. I...] 
We inherited a dual vision of the world from nineteenth-century science: 
on the one hand a great evolutionary process on earth, and on the other, the 
physical eternity of a mechanistic universe. I...] From this dual perspective, 
life ewlued on earth within a physical eternity. I...] 
What is emerging in its place is an evolutionary vision of reality at every 
level: subatomic, atomic, chemical, biological, social, ecological, cultural, 
mental, economic, astronomical, and cosmic. 64 
The fundamental principle of evolutionary cosmos implies a non-determjnis- 
tic perspective and the concept of "becoming" a s  defined by Bergson: 
61 Feyerabend, 1978: 12 
62 Sheldrake, 1995: 24, dii-xv 
63 Bohrn, op.cit.: 345 
64 Sheldrake, 1988: 7-8, 3 (emphasis mine) 
The universe endures. The more we study the nature of time, the more we 
shall comprehend that duration means invention, the creation of forms, the 
continual elaboration of the absolutely new. 65 
The most profound consequence of this new paradigm in the context of an 
ecological culture is that it establishes a basis for a new non-dualist relation- 
ship between humanity and nature. It involves a new possibility for integration 
of social/humanistic and natural sciences (a human-ecological project 66), and a 
radical epistemological paradigm shift: 
The driving force behind the work of the Greek atomists was not to 
debase nature but tofree menfrom fear, the fear of any supernatural being, of 
any order that would transcend that of men and nature. I...] 
Modem science transmuted this fundamentally ethical stance into what 
seemed to be an established trutk and this truth, the reduction of nature to 
atoms and void, in turn gave rise to what Lenoble has called the "anxiety of mo- 
dem men" H m  can we mxqnke owsetues in the random world of the atoms? 
Must science be defied in terms of rupture between man and nature? I.. I 
The emergence of new conceptual structures 1. .. 1 now appear as essential 
to our understanding of the physical world - the world that includes us. 67 
An essential eco-systemic meaning of this integration of sciences is the 
refocusing on life processes: 
Today the paradigm s h ~ 3  in science at its deepest level implies a ship 
from physics to the life sciences. 68 
It emerges that living matter, while not eluding the 'laws of physics' as 
established up to date, is likely to involve 'other laws of physics ' hitherto 
unknown, which, however, once they have been revealed, will form jus t as 
integral a part of this science as the former. 69 
A summary of the conceptual framework for discussing the issues of an 
ecological culture includes the following essential points: 
eco-systemic holism implies entities-, organisms-, or individuals- 
in-their-environment or context a s  units of inquiry; 
the concept of interconnectedness perceives the whole universe a s  an  
interrelated system of different levels of complexity and integration; 
65 Bergson, op.cit.: 10 
66 as I have indicated in the previous chapter - see text between footnotes 70 and 71. 
67 Prigogine and Stengers. op.cit. : 2-3 (emphasis mine) 
68 Capra, 1996: 13 
69 Schrijdinger, 1943: 73 
the essential dynamism of life processes is expressed in continuous 
interaction between the organism and its environment - the process of 
metabolism; 
the interactive and interrelational essence of systemic perspective implies 
a transcendence of dualistic constructs and related relationships of 
domination; 
the fundamental concept of evolutionary cosmos establishes a basis for a 
new non-dualist relationship between humanity and nature. 
Fritjof Capra and David Steindl-Rast offer another summary of the 
emerging paradigm change: 
The old scientific paradigrn may be called Cartesian, Newtonian, or 
Baconian, since its main characteristics were formulated by Descartes, 
Newton, and Bacon 
The new paradigm may be called holistic, ecological, or systemic, but 
none of these adjectives characterizes it completely. 
New-paradigm thinking in science includes the following five criteria - 
thefist two refer to our view of nature, the other three to our epistemology. 
1. Sht%@orn the Part to the Whole 
2. Sht%@orn Structure to Process 
3. Sht3 ji-orn Objective Science to "Epistemic Science" 
In the old paradigm scientific descriptions were believed to be objective, 
ie., independent of the human observer and the process of knowledge. 
4. Sht3ji-om Building to Network as Metaphor of Knowledge 
The metaphor of knowledge as building -fundamental laws. 
fundamental principles, basic building blocks, etc. - has been used in Western 
science and philosophy for thousands of years. 
In the new paradigm this metaphor is being replaced by that of the 
network. As we perceive reality as a network of relationships, our 
descriptions, too, form an interconnected network representing the observed 
phenomena. 
5. Shifi ji-om Truth to Approximate Descriptions. 70 
The notion of network knowledge is particularly interesting and I find it 
congruent with the method of presentation which I adopted for this essay. 
70 Capra and Steindl-Rast, 1 9 9  1 
Sustainability 
In 1994 Pepsico announced that [...I it would spend 
a further $50 million to reinvent its Doritos- brand 
tortilla chip - intensifying the flavor on the outer 
surface, rounding the chip's comers, and 
redesigning the package. I.. .I The expenditure of 
more than $50 million to ensure that Pepsico's 
Doritos outsell Pepsico's own competing Tos titos, 
represents approximately _five times the total 
annual U.S. investment in community- based 
research A society that can afford $50 million to 
reinvent the Doritos chip can do better than that! 1 
As I have indicated in the Introduction, sustainability is now a widely used 
term with unclear and often controversial connotation. An indication of its terrni- 
nological vagueness is the fact that a notion is defined by an adjective. What is 
or has to be sustainable, or to be sustained does not come immediately into the 
connotational picture. Thus the term becomes susceptible to conceptual confu- 
sion. In the following quotation the use of the word "sustain" shows that it can 
confuse the meaning of sustainability. However, maybe that is exactly the rea- 
son for its appeal and wide-spread use. 
Economists, entrepreneurs, and academics differ over what proportion 
of pro@ constitutes 'surplus' and hence what should be a 'reasonable' rate of 
return on investment, but few deny that some degree of investment is vital to 
sustain economic growth and enhance productivity. I...] 
To many modem economists and businessmen effective management is 
of crucial importance in sustaining economic power and influence. 2 
The term sustainability is derived initially from the notion of sustainable eco- 
nomic development - a development which can be continuously sustained by na- 
tural resources. The sustainability concept thus seems opposed to growth, to an 
1 Sclove and Scammell, 1998 
2 O'Riordan, 1976: 38-39 (emphasis mine) 
economic development which depletes the natural resources and disregards its 
impact on the physical, biological and social environment. However, sustainable 
development and sustainable growth are often connoted a s  synonymous: 
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs. 3 
Sustainable growth is a d~fficult concept with which to deal, but it seems 
to be the best guide to thefuture that we have at present. It means economic 
growth that can be supported by physical and social environments for the 
foreseeable future. 4 
This confusion, at  best, indicates a need to contain current economic growth 
within some constraints which are denoted by the notion of sustainability. 
Sustainability and Growth 
It has become increasingly and alarmingly conspicuous that current growth 
is leading to depletion of resources and to pollution of the environment. In 
other words, growth - such as  it is - cannot be sustained by the available 
resources. Consequently, discussion has focused on limits to growth, or how to 
make growth sustainable. 
Economic growth is presently equated with development and, according to 
generally used economic indicators, development is identified by the rate of 
consumption. We are living in a consumer economy, so the more we consume, 
the more economically developed we think we are 5. A consumer economy is 
predicated not merely on consumption, but on a constantly increasing rate of 
consumption. So it seems that sustainable development aims to sustain the 
increasing rates of consumption and at  the same time contain them within the 
constraints of available resources - which does not look very reconcilable. 
The perception of growth and development a s  identified by the rate of con- 
sumption is justified by the conviction that consumption is equivalent to life - 
3 World Commission, 1987: 43 
4 Pirages, 1977: 10 
5 Henderson, 198 1: 6 
i.e. that in order to live humans have to consume. Thesaurus gives the follo- 
wing synonyms for the word consume: exhaust, dissipate, waste, annihilate, 
devour, destroy.. . 
Identifymg growth by rate of consumption explains and justifies increasing 
consumption as causally related to increasing population. At the same time, sus- 
tainablity is often perceived as a demographic issue, or at least an issue of 
interplay between economic and demographic growth. Instead of questioning 
the underlying structure of the economic system within which demographic 
problems arise, some analysts fall back upon a Malthusian strategy of identi- 
fymg demographic growth as a primary issue, and of proposing vigorous 
procedures to control and limit it. 
One of the prominent students of sustainability. Herman Daly, does recog- 
nize the interactive relation between economic and demographic problems, as 
well as the need for a different value system as a basis for addressing them. 
However, his solution on the demographic side does not transcend the values 
which underlie current economic relationships, but rather pushes them to a 
totalitarian extreme: 
I_f; as often happens, the rich limit their numbers and the poor do not, 
then birth control worsens the distribution of income. Both sharing and 
population control are basically moral problems whose solutions require 
sound values far more than clever techniques. I.. .I 
The licenses can be bought and sold on afree market. Thus macrostabili- 
ty is attained, microvariability is permitted. Furthermore, those having more 
than two children must pay for an extra license, those who have fewer than 
two children receive payment for their unused license certijkates. 6 
This intervention would transform natural processes of propagation not only 
into bureaucratic regulation and totalitarian leveling, but also into trade. Such a 
system would practically encourage all sorts of more or less clandestine 
trafficking with children 7. At the same time, it would establish the category of 
illegal children (or re-establish it on different grounds). 
It is now generally believed that one of the major menaces to world surui- 
val, population growth, is linked to poverty, malnutrition, and despair I...] In 
this context, it is now recognised that many 'hard line' solutions to environmen- 
6 Daly,1977:113,118 
7 See the quote marked by footnote 2 in the next chapter. 
talproblems [especiauy such allocative devices as depletion taxes, residuals ta- 
xes, throughput taxes, and the like) are economically and socially regressive. 8 
When demographic problems are recognized as a consequence of the current 
world economy, solutions are not sought at the demographic end. To relate the in- 
crease in consumption to population growth is a misplaced identification of the pro- 
blem, as the levels and rates of consumption are so disproportionally greater in 
the "developed" (or rather consumer-developed) world, where demographic growth 
is vastly smaller(and often even negative) in comparison to the "undeveloped". This 
misplaced focus of analysis indicates a disinclination to ponder the deeper prob- 
lems of the economy which result from unlimited increase in consumption rates. 
The current economy has pushed into a pathway in which the rate of turnover 
is perpetually increased. Such a course expresses an obsession with growth, 
with limitless expansion. This obsession has been so repeatedly presented as an 
inevitable social requirement, that it is not clear any more whether such a justi- 
fication is hypocritical, or has come to be believed by those who perpetuate it 9. 
So what is this growth about? Is it a growth of our desire to consume, or is 
it driven primarily by the striving for continuous enlargement of profits, which 
entails increasing production and consumption? Consumerism, as the present 
(most dominant and prevailing) cultural pattern, is a growth of spending and 
squandering, stimulated to speed up the buying of ever newer commodities and 
to quicken production, turnover and expansion. Once the process is set up for 
perpetual increase, the result is exponential growth and the vicious cycle of 
consumption and profit enlargement. This notion has become so much 
imbedded in the prevailing mindset, that in the thesaurus lo  the word increase 
is identified as synonymous with profit. 
Keynes said. "a little ingation is a good thing." By this he meant that, 
with infrcltion, people are encouraged to spend more, and spending stimulates 
9 Economists have [. . .] built elaborate theories around the dangerously circular 
reasoning that growth is the solution for problems caused by growth" (ibid.: 85) 
Nelson RockefeUer asserted as late as 1976 I . . . ]  "More growth is essential ifaU the 
millions of Americans are to have the opportunity to improve their quality of lije". 
(Capra, 1982: 2 15) 
lo ingredient of Word Perfect software 
the economy. He did not, of course, explain that intation can lead to 
disasters, perhaps worse disasters than unemployment. 1 1  
This perpetual increase in consumption is not only manifested in rewarding 
consumers for spending more - like frequent flyer discounts and other induce- 
ments, the invention of which draws an incredible amount of energy, ingenuity 
and money - but the production/business side is also pressured to rapidly 
increase the turnover rate. This results in faster obsolescence of equipment as  
well as  in loss of value for industries which cannot keep up with the demand 
for turnover increase and therefore become depreciated by the stock market. 
Depreciation is a regular and justified cost of doing business: indeed, a 
high rate of capital consumption is ofen taken as a measure of business ef- 
ficiency and progressiveness. In the stock market it is awarded high price. 12 
The increasing devaluation of goods has obvious detrimental impact on the 
environment - primarily on the depletion of resources and accumulation of 
waste - and is, therefore, incompatible with sustainability-oriented strategies. 
By making the entire world economic system exchangeable on a moment's 
notice, ule have in essence set up anew standard against which all economic acti- 
vity is measured. We have created a common global value system that is measu- 
red in monetary terms alone,one that has little or nothing to do with the search 
for a sustainablefuture that will support human civilization. What should the 
world earn on its money? Seven percent? Five percent? Nine percent? 13 
The consumer culture has become so overwhelmingly pervasive, that 
people are compelled to buy into it, consciously or unconsciously. A retail 
analyst is reported to have declared that "our enormously productive economy ... 
demands that we make consumption our way of lge, that we convert the buying 
and use of goods into rituals, that we seek our spiritual satisfaction, our ego 
satisfaction, in consumption ... We need things consumed, burned up, worn out, 
1 1 Morehouse et al., 1989: 5 
In an eflort to stimulate purchasing power, installment buying, loans, and credit 
card purchases h a v e  become a way of l$e in m y  industrial countries. In the 
United States alone, private consumer debt increased 21 0 percent in the 1960s and 
268 percent during the 1970s. Today it is more than $4 trillion According to a 1994 
reportfrom the Federal Reserve Board, middle-class families are paying nearly a 
quarter of their income to creditors, a substantially higher level than in previous 
periods. (Rifkin. 1995: 34-35) 
12 Bums, 1975: 65 
13 Hawken, 1993: 93 
replaced, and discarded at an ever increasing rate." 14 Increasing consumption 
becomes identified with life 15. This is not only a vastly reductionist proposition 
from a scientific viewpoint, but is also a hornfylngly impoverished notion of life. 
A depressing number of Americans believe that if only they had twice as 
much, they would inherit the estate of happiness promised them in the 
Declaration of Independence. The man who receives $1 5,000 a year is sure 
that he could relieve his sorrow if he had only $30,000 a year; the man with $1 
million a year knows that all would be well if he had $2 million a ye ar.... 
Nobody ever has enough 16 
It is interesting to note that the word fortune, which primarily means luck, 
has become synonymous with wealth, riches and affluence. Actually this has 
occurred (as far a s  I have found out) only in the English and French languages, 
which derive the word from Latin fortuna, and only since the rise of the 
bourgeois world view. (In Italian fortuna still means only luck.) 
Notwithstanding the popular attitudes, a correlation between wealth and hap- . 
piness is not sustained by data. Despite the doubling of GNP and consumption 
per capita between 1950's and 1990's, national surveys do not indicate any in- 
crease in the number of "happyn Americans in the same periodl?. At the same ti- 
me, it might be important to note that the Census Bureau report of 1994 shows 
that the percentage of Americans workuzgfull time but earning less than a 
poverty level income for a family of four - about $1 3,000 a year - rose by 50 
percent between 1 979 and 1992. 18 
Nevertheless, faith in economic growth has not become much suspect. Jean 
Baudrillard seeks an  explanation in the cultural sphere. He perceives that con- 
sumerism has reached the stage where production of commodities is so exces- 
sive, that production of demand becomes the priority. He argues that, conse- 
quently, production is no longer a purely economic category, but has become a 
cultural reproduction of consumer symbols - "the culture of the signn 19. 
14 quoted in Durning, 1995: 69 (emphasis mine) 
15 Higher levels of consumption or living yield higher levels of satisfaction or well- 
betng. (Magrabi et al., 199 1 : 9) 
16 Durning, op.cit.: 70 
17 ibid.: 71 
18 Rifkin, op.cit.: 169 
19 Baudrillard, 1976: 14, 21 
The Cost of Growth 
Beneath the luster of consumer symbols and the excitement about growth 
prospects, there lurk tremendous environmental and social problems. These 
take the form of pollution; of deterioration of life quality; of psycho-social 
problems like crime, violence, drug and alcohol abuse; of physical, psychic and 
mental disturbances and illnesses; of despair, depression, loss of meaning and 
values. The overwhelming data about these problems have, for the last couple 
of decades, become a daunting pressure on our minds to the extent that we 
are often frightened away from thinking about them. 
Looking both a t  our reactions and our lack of reaction to the perils of our 
time, LU~W three widespread behaviors:disbelief.denial and the double lge. 20 
There is a large and diverse pool of information resources about the status 
of the environment. Among the most renown is the Worldwatch Institute which 
publishes annual State of the Earth reports 21. 
Environmental problems can be classified by different criteria. From the view- 
point of sustaining economic development by available natural resources, the first 
level of concern is the depletion of material and energy resources caused by ex- 
ponential growth of interdependently self-perpetuating production and consump- 
tion. Thus sustainability appears as  primarily a matter of resource managementzz. 
Even if the resource problem is solved by technological breakthroughs which 
would make available hitherto inaccessible terrestrial or extraterrestrial resources, 
exponential growth will still threaten to bury us under heaps of waste. In 1986 
a prognosis of household consumption development for the purpose of market ana- 
20 Macy, 1983: 5 
21 n7e Worldwatch Institute is a n  independent, nonproj3 environmental research 
organization based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to foster a sustainable 
society I...] To this end, the Institute conducts interdisciplinary research on 
emerging global issues, the results of which are published and disseminated to 
decisionmakers and the media. (Flavin and Lenssen, 1994: back flap) 
22 The ability to over-exploit the earth's stored-up supply of resources is what we call 
economic progress. One statistic makes clear the demand placed on the earth by 
our economic system: every day the worldwide economy b u m  a n  amount of 
energy the planet required 10,000 days to create. (Hawken, op.cit.: 21) 
lysis expected the household solid waste, which was then 3.6 lb/capita/day in 
the U.S. (excluding autos and construction debris), to reach 4 lb by 2000 23. 
The waste problem is, of course, not just a matter of garbage and where to 
put it. It is the concern about pollution, climatic disturbances and changes, the 
threat of irreversible impairment of conditions that make life possible on the pla- 
net. Global warming is just one of a disquieting array of interrelated environmen- 
tal imbalances. The ten hottest years according to records have all occurred sin- 
ce 1980. Despite the continuous disinclination of some scientists to draw conclu- 
sions about long-term climatic change, in a 1995 report to the United Nations, 
2500 climatologists from all around the world have agreed that increased com- 
bustion emissions are the major cause of the heating of Earth's atmosphere 24. 
The biological and ecological disruptions seem to be even more far-reaching: 
Today the activities of one species, humans, are reducing the diversity of 
all others and transforming the global environment. Ecosystems subjected to 
the stresses of "gbbal change" (including climate change and altered weather 
patterns, the depletion of stratospheric ozone, deforestation, coastal pollu- 
tion, and marked reductions of biological diversity) become more susceptible 
to the emergence, invasion, and spread of opportunistic species. When subject 
to multiple stresses, natural environments can exhibit symptoms that in- 
dicate reductions in resilience, resistance, and regenerative capabilities. 25 
The promise of technological progress is increasingly contradicted by eviden- 
ce of how artificial interventions into natural processes get out of hand. But even 
when technological advances seem to offer new possibilities of human liberation, 
the current practice indicates that technology is primarily in the service of pro- 
fit growth. While repeatedly reporting the increase of profits and of global compe- 
titiveness, companies are also announcing extensive layoffs of employees: 
In thesingle month of January 1994, America's largest employers laid off 
more than 108,000 workers. Most of the cutbacks came in service industries, 
23 Magrabi et al., op.cit.: 153 
The tale of the garbage barge (attempting what was thought a cheaper solution - to 
_find someone to accept the New York trash in Louisiana, Florida, Mexico, Belize, 
Bahamas, odyssey of 6000 miles, _findly returning to Brcwkly n, where if was 
burned) symbolizes one of the environmental protection problems often 
considered the most neglected issue of the decade - managing waste. (Switzer, 1994, 
102) 
24 Gelbspan, 1997 
25 Epstein, 1997 
where corporate restructuring and the introduction of new laborsaving techno- 
logies are resultrng in greater productivity, larger propts, and fewer jobs. 26 
In his book The End of Work, Jeremy Rifkin gives a revealing cross-section 
of the social impacts of the growth economy (although he does not adopt a'sus- 
tainability perspective). He presents an abundance of very grim data, primarily 
to show the social consequences of technological developments which have, in 
the later decades of this century, reached what he terms the "Third Industrial 
Revolution". After the first Industrial Revolution, which started with steam 
power, and the Second, which was marked by the introduction of oil as energy 
resource and utilization of electricity that expanded immensely the physical 
capabilities of technical devices, the Third Industrial Revolution was unleashed 
by automation and electronic control and communication technologies 27. 
Much of the productivity gains and increased profit margins of the past 
half century since automation and numerically controlled equipment were 
@st introduced have gone into the coffers of top management. I...] In 1979 
CEOs in the United States made 29 times the income of the average mufac tu -  
ring worker. By 1988 the average CEO was making 93 times the earnings of the 
average factory worker [...I Had the nation's manufacturing workers shared in 
the productivity gains and profits to the same extent as management, the 
average factory laborer today would be earning more than $81,000 a year. I...] 
According to the [I993 Census Bureau report], in 1992, 36.9 million 
Americans were living in poverty, an increase of 1.2 million over 1991 and 5.4 
million more than in 1989. [...I One child in four growing up in the United 
States goes hungry. 28 
Although Rifkin discusses the social disruptions in the context of emerging 
automation and communication technologies and their utilization in the current 
economic system, some of the most disturbing data that he presents reflect a 
broader context of dysfunction of the growth- and consumption-oriented 
economy. He finds that the rising unemployment entails hopelessness, and he 
perceives a connection between hopelessness and increasing involvement in 
crime and violence among teenagers: 
Police estimate that more than 270,000 students carry guns to school eve- 
ry day in the United States [...] In 1992 nearly a million young people between 
the ages of twelve and fourteen were "raped, robbed or assaulted, o$en by their 
peers." 
26 Rifkin, op.cit.: xvi 
27 ibid.: 59-60 
28 ibid.: 172-173, 178 
In Washington, D.C, where several hundred young people have been shot 
in the pastfive years, and where random killings on school playgrounds and 
on the streets is a regular occurrence, a growing number of youngs ters are 
planning for their ownjherafs [...I Eleven-year-old Jessica has already told 
parents andfriends what she'd like to wear at herfuneral. 29 
When these dysfunctions of the growth/consumer economy are at all 
acknowledged, they are at best regarded as a cost of growth, i.e. the price that 
has to be paid for economic and technological development. 
The standard economic assessment avoids to take into account environ- 
mental or social disturbances. These costs also have not been reflected in the 
actual market prices of commodities. On the contrary, the principal direction of 
the current economy toward gains induces a practice of economic assessment 
(primarily the Gross National Product indicator) through which the costs of 
social and environmental dysfunctions are perceived as gains. This procedure 
results in a falsified picture of growth and of the entire economy: 
IGNP performs] the inclusion in growth calculations of economic 
activities that only exist because of the malfunctioning ofgrowth Thus 
pollution control, garbage collection, and all the costs of keeping an 
ecologically unstable and delinquent society in order (police, fire services. 
social workers, bulletproof equipment) are all counted in GNP, so serving to 
maintain the illusion that growth is infinite. 30 
GNP does not differentiate between wealth and "illth, it includes all 
social and environmental costs. 3 1 
Hazel Henderson is making her point here by invoking the connotation of 
the word "wealth" that includes its original meaning: well-being, welfare of the 
community. But, in the same way as  it happened with the word fortune 32, 
wealth has come to mean primarily material affluence, which is thus equated 
with well-being. 
Fritjof Capra takes a systemic view of well-being. He perceives social illnes- 
ses as a consequence of a cultural pattern primarily defined by growth, con- 
sumption and competition: 
The acute infectious diseases that plagued Europe and North America in 
the nineteenth century, and that are still the major killers in the Third World 
29 ibid.: 209-2 1 1 (emphasis mine) 
30 O'Riordan. op.cit.: 85-86 
31 Henderson, op.cit. : 34 
32 See the paragraph after footnote 16. 
today, have been replaced in the industrialized countries by illnesses no 
longer associated with poverty and deflient living conditions but, on the 
contrary, with afluence and technological complexity. These are the chronic 
and degenerative diseases - heart disease, cancer, diabetes - that have aptly 
been called "diseases of civilization," since they are closely related to the 
stressful attitudes, rich diet, drug abuse, sedentary living and environmental 
pollution characteristic of modem life. 33 
The endeavors to include environmental and social costs in the current prac- 
tice of economic calculations create fierce confrontations of interests. The 
profit-making interest (most powerful in the current economic system) is defen- 
ded by threatening consumers with increase of commodity prices if external 
costs get "internalizedw. The consumers are the primary target of these threats 
because the fact is thus concealed that the business community is also 
troubled by the prospect of receding consumption rates and consequent 
decline of profit growth, should the external costs become included in market 
prices. In these negotiations, only consumers are considered a s  bearers of the 
environmental and social costs of economic growth (the costs which they have 
not primarily induced). A decrease of profits in order to meet the costs of 
profit-making is never seriously contemplated 34. 
Therefore, the issue of externalities (the term itself reflects the initial 
denial that these costs are an  inherent component of the economy) becomes a 
political impasse. The current policies are stuck up in the attempt - as  an  
ethnic folklore saying goes - to keep the wolves satiated and the sheep intact, 
i.e. to resolve the problems of environmental and social dysfunctions, and at  
the same time leave the profit growth substantially undisturbed. 
There have been different attempts to devise alternatives to the GNP. One 
of these attempts was made in the 1970's by Nordhaus and Tobin. They devi- 
sed a comprehensive inidicator which they termed the Measure of Economic 
Welfare (MEW). It is significant because it emphasizes the distinction between 
waste and growth By applying this indicator for the U.S. in the years 1929 and 
33 Capra, op.cit.: 139 
34 See the quotation related to footnote 28. 
1965, Nordhaus and Tobin concluded that there was a much greater increase 
in social costs than in social gains. 35 
The realization that an increasing number of current economic activities 
are essentially more a waste than gain (not only in terms of producing pollution 
and depleting resources) has become another insight into the dysfunctions of 
the growth/consumer economy: 
Work that produces unnecessary consumerjunk or weapons of war is 
wrong and wasteful. [...I Work that deceives or manipulates, that exploits or 
degrades is wrong and wasteful. Work that wounds the environment or makes 
the world ugly is wrong and wasteful. ?here is no way to redeem such work by 
enriching it or restructuring it, by socializing it or nationalizing it, by 
making it "small" or decentralized or democratic. 36 
Manufacturers spend enormous amounts of money on advertising to 
keep up a pattern of competitive consumption; many of the goods thus 
consumed are unnecessary, wasteful, and often outright harmful. The price we 
pay for this excessive cultural habit is continual degradation of the real 
quality of life - I...] the environment we live in, and the social relations that 
constitute the fabric of o w  lives. 37 
Life Processes and Entropy 
The recognition that there is waste and loss occurring along with gains and 
growth seems trivial, but it is systematically ignored within the current economic 
paradigm. A much less trivial issue is that all the social and environmental costs 
of the growth/consumer economy can be perceived as manifestations of entropy. 
When we read that rounding the comers of Pepsico tortilla chips, intenslfymg the 
flavor on the outer surface and redesigning the package would cost $50 million, 
that can strike us as sheer entropy of industrial, profit-oriented economy. 
The second law of thermodynamics (entropy law) suggests itself as 
applicable when we consider depletion of resources, pollution and other 
environmental disruptions, and social derangements. 
Growth is a process that depletes sources of low-entropy matter Cfossil 
fuels) andflls waste systems with high entropy. 38 
35 O'Riordan, op.cit.: 99 
36 Roszak, 1979: 220 
37 Capra, op.cit.: 2 15 
38 Pirages, op.cit.: 105 
Entropy is the piling up of unusable forms of energy by continuously 
exhausting its available forms, transforming them into less productive ones 
until there remains only the dispersed thermal energy which cannot be turned 
into any work. Gregory Bateson offers a definition of entropy in a context 
broader than that of physics: 
the degree to which relations between the components of any aggregate are 
mixed up, unsorted, undiflerentiated, unpredictable, and random 39 
The concept of entropy was first introduced by Rudolf Clausius in 1865. 
He immediately pointed out the connection to economy and consumption, and 
was one of the first scientists who assumed a sustainability perspective: 
"In economics there is the general rule that consumption in one period of 
a n y  good should not exceed its production in the same period. Therefore, we 
should consume only the fuel that is reproduced through the growth of forests. 
although in practice we go about things in a completely different way [...I 
behaving as happy heirs. So much is takenfrom the soil as human strength 
and technical means allow, and it is consumed as if it were inexhaustible. The 
amount of railways, steam boats and factories equipped with steam engines 
increases astonishingly so that when we look at thefuture the question 
inevitably arises of what will happen once coal reserves are exhausted." 40 
As the current environmental crisis has become rampant, entropy has been 
increasingly a context in which economic dysfunctions and negative social and 
environmental impact of the growth/consumer economy have been described, 
discussed and attempted to be explained. Can social phenomena be regarded 
in terms of natural sciences at  all? This issue has been debated since Clausius. 
Capra contends that economic development which incurs expenditures to 
maintain itself to such an extent that the whole system 'winds down of its own 
weight and complexity" has to be perceived in terms of entropy 41. This price 
of enabling the economic system to function is described by Daniel Brornley a s  
transaction costs 42. 
Small markets are extremely modest entropy producers. And the small 
entropy debt is paid largely by the market participants themselves, and the 
beasts of burden (wives, etc.) who buck the produce to market. The rise of 
complex fully developed economies is entirely another matter. [...I The 
39 Bateson, 1980: 250 
40 from his book On the Energy Stocks in Nature and their Valorization for the 
Benefit of Humankind, published in 1885 - quoted in: Martinez-Alier, 1987: 73 
41 Capra, op.cit.: 395 
42 Brornley, 1989 - his approach will be discussed in the next chapter. 
modem capitalist economy, when looked at in these terms, is a strategy 
premised on an infinite bankroll. 43 
A pertinent example is the government regulation often struggling to support 
the profit-oriented economy - and emerging with what Clausius called the 
happy heir gambit, less evident only because money appears as  a limitless 
resource. For example, the U.S. government used to borrow 
one dollarfor every four dollars that it [spent]. Interest payments on the 
national debt [were] nearly $300 billion per year, or more than 20 percent o f 
government spending. 44 
However, transaction costs can be manifested in a variety of indirect forms. 
For example, when you want to watch a two hour movie on a commercial 
television channel, it takes you three hours because you waste an hour of your 
time avoiding unwanted advertisements. 
Efficiency can, thus, be perceived in terms of entropy. A thermodynamic 
interpretation has been attempted, albeit on a level which abstracted it from 
any social or ecological context. It has been applied primarily for the 
assessment of technical efficiency (exemp-g the current out-of-context 
conception of technology and science): 
The second-law e_fficiency is the ratio of the least available work that 
could perform the task to the available work actually consumed in doing the 
job with a given device or system. 45 
Herman Daly bases his theory of sustainability on entropy. His key con- 
cept is "throughput", which is defined as  an inevitably entropic process - a 
decline of usable resources: 
The eflect of theentropy law is as immediate and concrete as the facts that 
you can't bum the same tank of gasoline twice, that organisms cannot live in 
a medium of their own waste products [...I The entropic_flow, beginning with 
depletion and ending with pollution (the throughput), is the necessary cost of 
maintaining the stocks of commodities and people. Too large a throughput 
can disrupt the biosphere and impair its capacity to assimilate wastes. [...I 
To bum up our fossil capital in trivial and unnecessary consumption (such 
as transporting nonnutritional foods in plastic throwaway containers in tru- 
cks traveling 7Omph acrosspavedover farmland) is folly on wheels, not to men- 
tion the great technological circuses of moon shooting and arms racing. 46 
43 Dyke, 1988: 364 
44 Rifkin, op-cit.: 37 
45 Ford et al., 1975: 4 
46 Daly, op.cit.: 110, 112 
Consequently, he derives a sustainability strategy which is emphatically 
conservationist (seeking to minimize the consumption of resources), but also 
predicated on institutional regulation 47 - itself rather entropic, as  shown 
above. His approach reflects the way he perceives entropic processes - as  
evolving in a closed system: 
From the second law (increasing entropy) it is clear that our rearran- 
gement implies a continual reduction in potential forfurther use within the 
system as a whole. 48 
The second law of thermodynamics has been defined and applied within 
the reductionist and mechanistic paradigm, which primarily means that the 
processes of decline of available energy were perceived in closed and mechani- 
cal systems. The conditions of a closed system actually make it vastly easier to 
observe entropic processes. However, closed systems represent a very limited 
part of reality - it is solely the mechanical artifacts that can be perceived in 
isolation from their environment. And they have become a noticeable part of the 
human environment only during the industrial era - now culminating in an 
environmental crisis which is pertinently debated in terms of entropy. 
While mechanical entities can be viewed a s  isolated from their environment. 
it does not mean that they do not exist in a natural and social milieu or context49. 
This is the key to discussing the issue of the validity of applying natural 
science concepts to social phenomena. As I have pointed out before, the basic 
systemic and human-ecological approach entails an  integrative view of social 
and natural environment. The fundamental issue of human ecology is the 
belonging of humans to nature. The relationship between humans and nature 
has been historically disrupted by the dualistic paradigm which has dominated 
our mindsets for a long time 50. The sharp dualistic divide between humans 
47 His suggested demographic control has been presented earlier - footnote 6. 
48 ibid.: 109 
49 Science is still the prophetic announcement of a description of the world seenfrom 
a divine or demonic point of view. It is the science of Newton, the new Moses to 
whom the truth of the world was unveiled; it is a revealed science that seems alien 
to any social and historical context idenfiiing it as the result of the activity of 
human society. (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984: 76 - emphasis mine) 
50 See text between footnotes 63 and 65 in chapter 1. 
and nature and the corresponding separation between social and natural 
sciences has created confusion which Rupert Sheldrake terms dual vision of 
the world 51. An expression of this dualistic paradigm has also been the 
persistent out-of-context, isolating perspective characteristic of the study of 
phenomena as  closed systems. 
Human-ecological and natural systems, however, cannot be regarded a s  
isolated entities. These systems manifest eco-systemic properties of 
interrelatedness, interconnectedness, interdependence and interaction, and, 
thus, they are open systems. Furthermore, they are characterized by self- 
organization - which makes a substantial difference in terms of entropy: 
To maintain their self-organization, living organisms have to remain in 
a special state [. . .I A clockwork [. . .I needs energy to run, but does not 
necessarily need to interact with its environment to keepfunctioning. Like all 
isolated systems it will proceed by second law of thermodynamics from order 
to disorder until it has reached a state of equilibrium in which all processes - 
motion, heat exchange, and so on - have come to a standstill. Living 
organisms [...I are open systems [. . .I they have to maintain a continuous 
exchange of energy and matter with their environment to stay alive. [.. .] The 
process known as metabolism I...] allows the system to remain in a state of 
nonequilibriLlm, in which it is always 'at work". A high degree of 
nonequilibrium is absolutely necessary for self-organization. 52 
In thermodynamic terms, to stay alive means to avert entropy. Living 
systems thus exhibit a capability to reverse entropy, or at  least to keep it at  a 
level low enough to maintain the energy processes. This counterentropic effect 
is denoted by different terms: negative entropy or negentropy, free energy, or 
ektropy 53. (In this essay, I will be using the latter term.) 
In 1902, the physicist Felix Auerbach proposed the term Ektropismus to 
denote life (including human life) processes as  ucontrary to the dissipation of 
energy - a notion which applied the results of thennodynamics to biology" 54. 
51 See footnote 64 in chapter 2. 
52 Capra, op.cit.: 270 (emphasis mine) 
53 A technical measure of energy available to do work, which decreases with time, is 
free energy, and the technical measure of disorder, which increases with time, is 
entropy. (Frautschi, 1988: 12) 
The opposite [of entropy] is negentropy, the degree of ordering or sorting or 
predictability in a n  aggregate. In physics, certain sorts of ordering are related to 
quantity of available energy. (Bateson, op.cit.: 250) 
54 Martinez-Alier, op.cit. : 78, 123 
The key concept of Bergson's theory of creative evolutionary thrust 
inherent in living nature is the "life impetus" ( k h  vital). He regarded it as an 
essentially ektropic (counter-entropic) capacity of life processes. 
The vision we have of the material world is that of a weight which falls: 
no image drawnfiom matter, properly so called, will ever give us the idea of 
the weight rising. 55 
The self-organizing aspect of open systems is perceived by Bergson as an 
ektropic manifestation of life impetus: 
It is one thing to recognize that outer circumstances are forces evolution 
must reckon with, another to claim that they are the directing causes of 
evolution. This latter theory is that of mechanism. It excludes absolutely the 
hypothesis of an original impetus. 56 
There is a conceptual contradiction between the entropic character of the 
material world, considered as heading toward a decline of energy state and 
eventual standstill, and the evolutionary, ektropic thrust of self-organizing life 
processes. This contradiction is another manifestation of the dual vision of the 
world 57 that was a distinctive feature of the prevailing scientific paradigm 
during the last two centuries - "evolutionary process on earth" against "the 
physical eternity of a mechanistic universe". 
A fundamentally new concept of thermodynamics has been developed by 
the Nobel-prizewinner Ilya Prigogine. He framed the dual paradigm problem in 
terms of entropy: 
Our scient~fk heritage includes two basic questions to which till now no 
answer was provided. One is the relation between disorder and order. The 
famous law of increase of entropy describes the world as evolvingfiom order 
to disorder; still, biological or social evolution shows us the complex 
emergingfiom the simple. How is this possible? How can structure arisefiom 
disorder? Great progress has been realized in this question We know now that 
nonequilibrium, theJow of matter and energy, may be a source of order. 58 
Prigogine indicates that thermodynamic processes appear in three distinct 
regions: the equilibrium, or maximum entropy, where there are no energy 
55 Bergson, 1983: 245 
56 ibid.: 101 
57 pointed out by Rupert Sheldrake - see footnote 64 in the previous chapter. 
58 Prigogineandstengers, op.cit.: 
fluxes nor forces that cause them; the close-to-equilibrium region where the 
relationships are linear; and the far-from-equilibrium, non-linear region 59. 
When the thermodynamicforces acting on a system become such that the 
linear region is exceeded, however, the stability of the stationary state, or its 
independence from fluctuations, can no longer be taken for granted. Stability 
is no longer the consequence ofthe general laws ofphysics. [...I In such a state, 
certainfluctuations. instead of regressing, may be amplrjkd and invade the 
entire system, compelling it to evolve toward a new regime that may be 
qualitatively quite drferent from the stationary states corresponding to 
minimum entropy production. 60 
Prigogine has discovered that it is in the far-from-equilibrium, or non-equilib- 
rium conditions that the self-organizing capability of open systems is manifes- 
ted. Thus, the complexity and amplitudes of thermodynamic interactions offer a 
potential for order and integrated behavior of particles: 
Znfarfrom-equilibrium conditions [. . .I particles separated by macrosco- 
pic distances become linked. Local events have repercussions throughout the 
whole system I.. .I This type of behavior I.. .I gives a molecular basis to the prob- 
lem of communication I...] The system is organized through these long-range 
correlations. [...I Nonequilibrium [is] a source of order. [...]At equilibrium mo- 
lecules behaue as essentially independent entities; they ignore one another. 61 
This is a conclusion of far-reaching significance, not only as  a thermodyna- 
mic basis for the system theory concept of interrelatedness and interactivity, 
but also for epistemological issues, some of which are pertinent to the topic of 
this essay and will be touched upon in the last chapter. The importance of 
Prigogine's conclusion for understanding sustainability and ecological processes 
is consequent to the interrelatedness that is manifested in open systems 
through thermodynamic interactions. The lack of a sustainability perspective 
emerges a s  akin to ignoring interactions and interrelations - a characteristic of 
processes close to maximum entropy, or dead matter. 
Non-equilibrium thermodynamics has generated considerable controversies 
about some notions that have commonly been related to entropy. One set of such 
notions is complexitychaos~rder/disorder. Chaos and disorder, and consequent- 
ly complexity, have been identified with states of high entropy 62. Even Bateson's 
59 ibid.: 137 
60 ibid.: 140- 141 
61 ibid.: 180 (emphasis mine) 
62 Wicken, 1988: 145 
definition of entropy in terms of mix-up, lack of differentiation, unpredictability, 
and randomness, seems to confuse randomness, complexity and disorder 63. 
These confusions reflect the remnants of the mechanistic concept of 
thermodynamics. In the context of non-equilibrium thermodynamics, however, 
increased complexity is characteristic of far-from-equilibrium states where 
entropy is low and ektropic (counter-entropic) processes very pronounced. 
Complexity is thus a potential for the emergence of self-organization and 
spontaneous order. Chaos and order begin to be perceived as states in 
dialectical interplay. On the other hand, the ultimate thermodynamic 
equilibrium as the condition of maximum entropy can be exceedingly orderly in 
the sense of being devoid of any disturbances - a sheer thermodynamic 
boredom. or total lifelessness. 
Another set of notions that has become confusing is equilibrium-balance- 
harmony-stability. Sustainability and ecological processes have been typically 
associated with balance and stability - in contrast to imbalance of exponential, 
boundless economic growth and of the disrupted natural and social 
environment. However, in thermodynamics, equilibrium has apparently an 
opposite meaning - not only as the state of maximum entropy. Furthermore, 
in order to produce equilibrium, a system must be "protected" from the fluxes 
that compose nature. I.. .I In the world that we are familiar with, equilibrium 
is a rare and precarious state. 64 
Here, the word equilibrium is used as a technical term to indicate an absolute lack 
of energy fluctuations, and its usage reflects the mechanistic, static paradigm 
from which it initially originated. In the context of (sustainable) ecological proces- 
ses that behave as open systems, the notion of balance has a dynamic conno- 
tation which is most often implied when sustainability is discussed or defined: 
A [sustainable] society by &$nition would depend not on expansion but 
on stability. This does not mean to say that it would be stagnant; indeed, it 
could well aflord more variety than does the state of un$ormity that a t  
present is being imposed by the pursuit of technological emiency. 65 
63 See the quote related to footnote 39. 
64 Prigogine and Stengers, op.cit.: 128 
65 Goldsmith et al., 1972: 21 (emphasis mine) 
Self-organizing systems have a high degree of stability [... It] is utterly 
dynamic and must not be confused with equilibrium. It consists in 
maintaining the same overall structure in spite of ongoing changes and 
replacements of its components. 66 
In this context, balance emerges a s  a dialectical category. Life processes 
involve a dialectic tension of entropy and ektropy. The necessary constant amp- 
litude of non-equilibrium is the dynamic balance. It is the dialectic opposition of 
entropy and ektropy, the pulsation of breathing and other living functions as  
alternation of tension and relaxation. Both tension and relaxation are the neces- 
sary, dialectic harmony of life processes, of pulsations, vibrations. Pulsation 
and vibration manifest the dynamic existence of all processes above the thermo- 
dynamic equilibrium which is maximum entropy, the total cessation of all activi- 
ty. Life can, therefore, be regarded as  a far-from-equilibrium thermodynamic 
process, characterized by ektropy which results from exchange of energy and 
matter with the environment. 
Life is defied as a low entropic, open thermodynamic system that plays 
a role in creating and maintaining thermodynamic order in the ecosystem. 67 
This view was clearly anticipated by Bergson, in terms of his life-impetus concept: 
Theevolution of life really continues I . . . ]  an initial impulsion: this impul- 
sion I...] has determined the development of the chlorophyllianfunction in the 
plant and of the sensorimotor system in the animal I . . . ]  These I . . . ]  represent 
I . . . ]  a storing-up of the solar energy, the degradation of which energy is thus 
provisionally suspended on some of the points where it was being poured forth 
I . . . ]  It would have been expended sooner if an organism had not happened to be 
there to w e s t  its dissipation, in order to retain it and save it up. 68 
Prigogine and Stengers put the thermodynamic definition of life in the context 
of nested systems: 
We know today that both the biosphere as a whole as well as its 
components, living or dead, exist in far-from-equilibrium conditions. In this 
context life, farfrom being outside the natural order, appears as the supreme 
expression of the self-organizing processes that occur. 69 
66 Capra, op.cit.: 270-271 (emphasis mine) 
67 Wesley, 1974: x 
68 Bergson, op.cit.: 246 
69 Prigogine and Stengers, op.cit.: 175 
A Systemic/Ecological Approach 
to a Definition of Sustainability 
Sustainability could simply be defined as  equivalent to ektropy, to the coun- 
terentropic process which organisms (or systems that exhibit spontaneous self- 
organization) perform to stay alive. In the extremely complex and large scale 
systems characteristic of the current economic and social structures, this 
simple strategy might be overlooked or appear trivial and undeniable. However, 
the current economy is conceptualized and managed a s  a closed system without 
taking into consideration the interactions and interrelations that are distinctive 
of open, living systems. 
When we examine a biological cell or a city I . . . ]  not only are these systems 
open, buf also they exist only because they are open They feed on theflux of 
matter and energy coming to them- the outside world We can isdate a 
crystal, but cities and cells die when cut offfrom their environment. 70 
This means that, although the current practice is predicated on detachment 
from, and negligence of, ecological/systemic interactions - in actuality, what- 
ever we do, open systems (social and economic) will always behave in terms of 
a non-equilibrium thermodynamic regime. Yn such a state, certain _fluctuations, 
instead of regressing, may be arnplzfied and invade the entire system, compelling 
it to evolve toward a new regime that may be qualitatively quite dzfferentji-om the 
stationary states corresponding to minimum entropy production." 71 I am 
repeating here part of the paragraph already quoted before because, in the 
context of the present unsustainable practices, it points out how human- 
ecological systems under stress can conceivably induce unpredictable adverse 
environmental disturbances. This fact tells against a possible argument that. 
since current economic activities are not actually closed-system thermodynamic 
processes, they cannot present an  entropic threat. 
The gist of the ektropic defmition of sustainability (ensuing from non- 
equilibrium behavior) are the perpetual processes of renewal that are implied 
by the counter-entropic activities of living organisms. 
70 ibid.: 127 (emphasis mine) 
7 1 related to footnote 60 - ibid. : 14 1 
The unpredictability of non-equilibrium processes indicates the probabilis- 
tic character of living organisms and other self-organizing systems. It exempli- 
fies the integrated evolutionary paradigm applied to both physical and biological 
processes - thus transcending, as pointed out before, the "dual vision of the 
world". Another controversial issue that surfaces out of this new perspective, is 
the relationship between sustainability and permanence. 
The majority of definitions of sustainability perceive it in terms of indefinite 
maintainance of the status. One of the first comprehensive views of sustainabili- 
ty is the renowned Blueprint for Survival, where "a stable society" is described 
as  "one that to all intents and purposes can be sustained indefinitely while giving 
optimum satisfaction to its membersw72. Pirages also contends that "a sustainable 
society is one in whichfuture growth can be indefinitely sustained by available 
sources of energy." 73 Thayer adopted the definition from the 199 1 United Nations 
publication Caring for the Land: A Stra tev for Sustainable Living, which regards 
sustainability as  "a process or state that can be maintained indefinitely" 74. 
The Worldwatch Institute, however, puts the definition of sustainability in 
more evolutionq terms: 
a sustainable society - in which human needs are met in ways that do not 
threaten the health of the natural environment or future generations. 75 
The thermodynamic perspective brings up the issue of irreversibility and 
time, which has been typically neglected in the current conceptualization and 
practice of economy. For example, Dyke states that 
orthodox economic theory I.. .I makes use of techniques that play down or ob- 
scure the essential time dependence of economic processes I.. .] treat the p r c  
cess of economic exchange as if it were reversible, I... assumes] that there are 
no exogenous constraints on the results of trading. I...] We cannot seal ourselv- 
es offfrom the changes except temporarily and at extremely high cost. 76 
The concept of steady state, which is commonly identified with sustainabili- 
ty, can add confusion to the controversy of permanence and determinism ver- 
72 Goldsmith et al., op.cit.: 23 (emphasis mine) 
73 Pirages, op.cit.: 18 (emphasis mine) 
74 Thayer. 1994: 99 (emphasis mine) 
75 Flavin and Lenssen, op.cit.: back flap (emphasis mine) 
76 Dyke, op.cit.: 356, 364 
sus evolution, indeterminacy and probability. Daly, in his comprehensive argu- 
ment for sustainability, depicts it as  steady state, but some of his defmitions of 
steady state are couched in terms that convey a deterministic view: 
The steady-state economy is a physical concept. It is characterized by 
constant stocks ofpeople and physical wealth maintained at some chosen, 
desirable level by a low rate of throughput. 77 
At other instances, he indicates a more evolutionary perspective: 
Once a steady state is attained at some level ofpopulation and wealth, it 
would not beforeverfrozen at that level. I.. .I Growth (positive or negative) would 
always be seen as a temporary passagefrom one steady state to another. 78 
Bateson understands steady state as  a clearly dynamic process: 
The living thing escapes change either by correcting change or changing 
itself to meet the change or by incorporating continual change into its own 
being. I.. .I When we say that the system exhibits "steady state" fie., that in spite 
of variation, it retains a median value), we are talking about the circuit as a 
whole, not about the variations within it. 79 
And Capra points at a system theory perspective, wherefrom steady state 
emerges as a self-regulatory mechanism of open systems (self-organizing, living) 
based on exchange with environment which is an  ektropic process: 
Bertalanffy correctly identrfled the characteristics of the steady state as 
those of the process of metabolism, which led him to postulate self-regulation 
asanother key property ofopen systems. This idea was refined by Pngogine thir- 
ty  years later in terms of the self-organization of "dissipative structures." 80 
Metabolism and cycles of changes indicate that sustainability and steady 
state cannot be regarded in terms of indefinite permanence in a linear sense. 
The linear perspective consequently generates a notion of eternal growth. Sus- 
tainability rather is a process (and therefore the term steady state can be a rnis- 
nomer) consisting of cycles of renewal - or the dialectic relationship between 
order and chaos, life and death, ektropy and entropy. Thus sustainability does 
not have to be equated with permanence, but with evolution. Eternal (linear, or 
exponential) growth is unsustainable. 
If we can talk of sustainable growth, we have to redefine the notion of 
growth, or rather simply return to its original connotation related to life proces- 
77 Daly, op.cit.: 107 
78 ibid.: 108 
79 Bateson. op.cit.: 114, 120 
80 Capra, 1996: 49 
ses. Wendell Berry offers an argument against using the term growth in the 
current economic context: 
The pattern of industrial "development" on the fm and in the forest, as 
in the coalfields, is that of combustion and exhaustion - not "growth," a 
biological metaphor that is invariably contradicted by industrial practice. 81 
The current notion of economic growth is based on the assumption that if 
something is good, more of it must be better. This is an untenable generaliza- 
tion of the obsession with ever increasing profits, which has come to permeate 
and determine the basic values of our culture. The generalization has become 
so ingrained in the common outlook, that the nonsense is no longer noticed: 
How can an endless increase of anything be possible? 
Desired substances, things, patterns, or sequences of experience that are 
in some sense "god" for the organism - items of diet, conditions of lge, tempe- 
rature, entertainment, sex, and so  forth - are never such that more of the some- 
thing is always better than less of the something. Rather, for a U  objects and 
experiences, there is a quantity that has optimum value. Above that quantity. 
the variable becomes toxic. To fall below that value is to be deprived. 82 
Ivan Illich puts the same argument into a more social context: 
For the primitive, the elimination of slavery and drudgery depends on 
the introduction of appropriate modem technology, and for the rich, the 
avoidance of an even more horrible degradation depends on the effective 
recognition of a threshold in energy consumption beyond which technical 
processes begin to dictate social relations. Calories are both biologically and 
socially healthy only as long as they stay within the narrow range that 
separates enoughfrom too much. 83 
The "more is better" attitude is not just a generalization of a very limited 
aspect of human behavior, it is possible only upon detachment from the 
context of life processes, or natural cycles of renewal. 
The fact of growth adds another order of complexity to the problems of 
bigness in living things. [...I A coconut palm, whose only growing tissue is a t  
the apex of the trunk (the so-called millionaire's salad, which can only be got 
a t  the price of killing the palm), simply gets taller and taller. with some slow 
increase of the bole a t  its base. For this organism, the limitation of height is 
simply a normal part of its adaptation to a niche. The sheer mechanical 
instability of excessive height without compensation in girth provides its 
normal way of death [...I 
Among some higher animals, growth is controlled. The creature reaches 
a size or age or stage a t  whichgrowth simply stops (ie., is stopped by chemical 
or other messages within the organization of the creature). The cells, under 
81 Berry, 1987: 186 
82 Bateson, op.cit.: 59 
83 Illich. 1974: 8; see, in this context, quote at footnote 16. 
control, cease to grow and divide. When controls no longer operate b y  failure 
to generate the message or failure to receive it), the result is cancer. 84 
The utter detachment from the relations and limitations of life processes 
and natural cycles of renewal is exemplified by the abstractness of money: 
This characteristic of biological value does not hold for money. Money is 
always transitively valued. More money is supposedly always better than less 
money. I...] When we consider money, not by itself, but as acting on human 
beings who own it, we may_find that money, too, becomes toxic beyond a 
certain point. In any case, the philosophy of money, the set of presuppositions 
by which money is supposedly better and better the more you have of it, is 
totally antibiological. 85 
Baudrillard perceives this characteristic of money as consequent to its basic 
meaning as a sign and therefore one of the most salient expressions of the 
current culture which is dominated by signs: 
The monetary sign is severedfrom every social production and then 
enters a phase of speculation and limitless inflation. I. . .] 
Purged ofjinalities and the affects of production, money becomes 
speculative. [...I Money can thus be reproduced according to a simple play of 
transfers and writings, according to an incessant splitting and increase of its 
own abstract substance. 86 
With his controversial concept of life (orgone) energy, Wilhelm Reich 
developed one of the most integral systemic inquiries into life processes as 
ektropic interrelations of organisms with the environment. In that context, he 
perceived the natural regulation of growth as an issue of undisturbed 
charge/discharge function of organisms - their energy metabolism: 
Each type or species of organism possesses its spea$ic energy levek it has 
a special "orgonotic capacity." Otherwise, the lwing organism would not stop 
accumulating energy and would burst or grow indefinitely. All swplus of 
energy is discharged I.. . I  in mechanical movement, in orgastic convulsions, in 
radiation of heat, etc. 
There exists, accordingly, an orgone energy metabolism, a continuous 
exchange of energy in the cohesive unit called organism. To summarize its 
mainfunctions: maintenance of a certain capacity level by means of charging 
from the surrounding orgone ocean and from foodstuffs, and by energy 
discharge into the surrounding energy ocean. I...] In the dying organism the 
capacity to charge and to maintain the level offunctioning is slowly lost. 87 
Metabolism is the essential ecological characteristic and, thus, the 
principal determinant of sustainability 
84 Bateson, op.cit.: 63-64 
85 ibid.: 59-60 (emphasis mine) 
86 Baudrillard, op.cit: 2 1-22 
87 Reich, l949/ 1973: 144- 145 
Themw in NET [non-equilibrium thermodynamics] tenns [requires] a 
sink as wel l  as a sowce. ?2ash, soot, and sZudge seem an annoying and 
inconvenient by-product of our lives and activities rather than a necessary 
feature of then But without a gradient down which materialmw can cascade, 
no dissipative structure can remain stable. 88 
The essential thing in metabolism is that the organism succeeds in 
freeing itselffrom all the entropy it cannot help producing while alive. 89 
A primary criterion for a successful culture is to realize a balanced 
relation between the processes of growth and the processes of decay. [ . . . I  Our 
society, which exclusively values growth and looks upon the processes and 
products of decay as waste, is radically out of balance. 90 
This chapter will conclude by suggesting a definition of sustainability as 
life processes characterized by cycles of renewal and metabolism which main- 
tain the dynamic balance of entropy and ektropy. Sustainability thus entails 
interaction between organisms (and other self-organizing systems) and their 
natural and social environment which supports their metabolic processes. 
Sustainability is distinguished by creativity and liveliness - ektropy 91. 
Consequently, the term sustainability is not entirely appropriate. Sustain is 
synonymous with endure, tolerate, bear, withstand, and with uphold, support. 
bolster, maintain, preserve. These notions indicate a possible initial intention 
that the meaning of the term should convey endurance and tolerance - but of 
what? Environmental and social costs? Restrictions on consumption? The 
maintenance and preservation of profit-oriented economic growth? 
Whatever the level of approximation this might be, it is evident that a 
systemic definition of sustainability is largely contradictory to the meaning of 
the word. The best alternative would probably be the word ecological (or 
integrative, systemic) - economy, technology, social organization. However, a s  
stated in the Introduction, the term is retained in this essay because of its 
wide-spread use. The following chapters will discuss the economic. 
technological and social aspects of sustainability as  life processes. 
88 Dyke, op.cit: 364-365 
89 Schrtidinger, 1943: 76 
90 Van Der Ryn, 1980: Introduction 
9 1  The etymology of the word entropy is lethargy, from Latin lethum = death, by 
association with Greek lethe = oblivion (Oxford Dictionary). 
Purpose of the Economy 
How can one buy or sell the air, the warmth of the 
land? That is d ~ m u l t  for us to imagine. If we don't 
own the sweet air and the bubbling water, how can 
you buy itfi-om us? 1 
Posner concludes the analysis [of baby-adoption 
market] by suggesting that "the baby shortage and 
black market are the result of legal restrictions 
that prevent the market fi-om operating as fi-eely in 
the sale of babies as of other goods. " 2 
Money may not continue to be the ultimate 
criterion of wealth because the nonmaterial 
aspects of l$e seem to be becoming increasingly 
important. 3 
The evidence of the deep problems of the current unsustainable practices 
indicates a need for questioning the purpose of the consumer/profit-oriented 
economy. 
Purpose of the economy?! Such a question is not commonly asked. 
Economics is a value-free discipline. It does not inquire into purposes and 
goals. Shunning the social and (more recently) environmental impacts of profit- 
making, economics has gradually excluded any ethical considerations and has 
proclaimed itself the science of means. 
Emiency is appealing to economists because it seems to require the 
fewest value judgments. I...] Doing what is e m n t  requires the strong 
assumption that income is optimally distributed, not just  acceptibly 
1 How Can One Sell the A M :  A Manifesto for the Earth - the renown Native 
American message (from unknown source) to the White Man 
2 Lutz and Lux, 1988: 195 
3 Craig and Levine. 1982: 4 
distributed. Hence the common belief that by advocating e m n c y  the 
economist is avoiding value judgments is clearly false. 4 
It is a confusion or a hypocrisy that a discipline, whose basic 
preoccupation is to study how value of things is determined, should declare 
itself value-free. The confusion seems to arise over what is meant by value. In 
the compound 'value-free", the word value obviously connotes the world view, 
the social and ecological context, ethical considerations. It is interesting (or 
indicative of the confusion I am talking about) that my word processor's 
thesaurus does not offer these meanings of the word value, but gives the 
following synonyms: caliber. merit, significance, worth, cost, expense, price. 
benefit, advantage, utility. It is evidently in tune with the current utilitarian 
concept of the economy, where valuing is identified as  willingness to pay: 
Posner proudly makes willingness to pay the very bedrock of his wealth- 
maximizing emiency. In [...] The Economics of Justice (1981) - and by 
"justice" he means nothing other than wealth maximization - we read: "The 
individual who would like very much to have some good but is unwilling or 
unable to pay anything for it -perhaps because he is destitute - does not value 
the good in the sense in which I a m  using the term 'value'." The only 
preferences that have ethical weight in his system of wealth maximization 
are the ones backed up by money. 5 
Despite the overt focus on means (rather than purposes or goals) - which 
is manifested as preoccupation with efficiency, indicated also in the previous quo- 
tation - utilitarian economics obviously perceives wealth-maximization (or profit- 
growth) as  the purpose of the economy. However value-free this utilitarian 
orientation might look to economists who purport it, utilitarianism is itself the 
basic underlying value of current economics. The broader value-system from 
which it emerges has actually been stated quite clearly by no less than one of 
the greatest authorities of the economic mainstream, John Maynard Keynes: 
Keynes admitted that before this blissful state [economic progress] could 
be attained (he forecast soberly that it might take a hundred years) a quite 
opposing morality would hold sway: "For at least another 100 years we must 
pretend to ourselves and to everyone that fair is foul and foul is fair; for foul is 
useful and fair is not. Avarice and usury and precaution must be our gods for a 
- 
4 Brornley. 1989: 2-3 
5 LutzandLux,op.cit.: 190 
little longer still. For only they can lead us out of the tunnel of economic 
necessity into daylight". 6 
A s  opposed to Keynes' delayed bliss, the maximized utility - wealth, 
consumption - is already equalled with well-being and happiness 7, so 
justifications of moral transgressions do not seem to be relevant any more. 
[Roy] Harrod is advising caution, but he concludes nevertheless - equal 
capacity for happiness should be assumed, unless the contrary can be shown 
I . . . ]  and I . . . ]  that application of the concept of diminishing marginal utility 
recommended moves towards the equalization of wealth, 8 
I have already touched upon the tendency of consumer culture to turn 
consumption into ultimate pleasure in life. However, standard economics 
operates with utility rather than pleasure, a s  the former appears to be a more 
objective notion - which primarily means that it is quantifiable in monetary 
terms. So consumption is perceived as "extraction of utility": 
Economists tend to give [the notion of lifestyle] a quantitative meaning - 
a count of material goods and assets. Indicators are the purchased stocks of 
appliances, homes, automobiles, and other goods, as well as monetary assets, 
including income, savings, insurance and bene_fits. [ . . . I  
Another way would be [. . .I to discern to what ends the things and assets 
are used and, further, the subjective feelings about what the things do to 
contribute to happiness, convenience, comfort, feelings of self-worth, control 
over one's destiny, and in general, satisfaction with lge. 9 
In equating "living weU" with living affluently, capitalism has made it 
extremely d~fficult to demonstrate that freedom is more closely identljkd 
with personal autonomy than with afluence, with empowerment over l$e 
than empowerment over things. 10 
Utilitarianism is succinctly defined a s  the behavior of the "rational economic 
man" (women seem to be exempt). An unbelievably ludicrous example of utilita- 
rian consumption (or extraction of maximized utility) emerges from a mainstream 
source of the "science of means" (another "gem" found by Lutz and Lux): 
A paragraph from The New World of Economics I...] concerns itself with 
the rational way to die: "It is only humanfor one tofeel sympathetic toward 
the person who dies with everything going wrong: a malfunctioning liver, 
6 O'Riordan, 1976: 50 (emphasis mine) - It is hard to resist noticing that the same 
promise of a better world predicated on reversed morality was characteristic of 
communist ideology and practice: until freedom could be achieved, a (lengthy?) 
period of dictatorship of proletariat (institutionalized in a totalitarian state) was 
deemed inevitable. 
7 Magrabietal.,1991:5 
8 Lutz and Lux, op.cit: 133 
9 Gladhart et a]., 1986: 6, 9 
10 Bookchin, 199 1: 26 1 
arteriosclerosis, a defective kidney, ulcers, respiratory problems, and waning 
eyesight. However, such a tumultuous exit may indicate that the individual 
involved has more thoroughly enjoyed life than the person who dies with only 
a failing heart and everything else in perfect order. If this is the case, the 
sympathy may be misplaced. The fact that all of one's organs are 
malfunctioning at the time of death may indicate that one has fully utilized 
his organic capital assets in the pursuit of utility; the person who dies with a 
perfect liver may have foregone a number of drinks during the course of his 
life that could have contributed signifxantly to his own welfare: a liver in 
good order is useless if the heart goes first. " 1 1 
Value as  utility is determined by exchange value - the willingness to pay. 
Standard economics uses only these two meanings of the word value. However, 
apart from ethical, social, ecological and other non-material values, the value of 
things should primarily make sense as  use value - which involves purpose and 
its social and ecological context. Taking these contexts into consideration is 
avoided by current economics as  a "value-leadenn approach (letting in the 
ethical meaning of value for the occasion). Exchange (and utility) value is 
defined by the market, which is perceived with disregard of social and 
ecological contexts, and such perspective is notably reductionist. 
Some critics of conventional economics use the notion of inherent value. It 
seems to present an opposite to exchange value which ignores the qualities that 
things might have outside of the market context. Inherent value implies qualities 
that things have in or by themselves. However, as  the systems theory indicates, 
quality or value of an entity can only be defined from its relation to the environ- 
ment or context 12. Therefore, inherent value is also a reductionist notion. 
It is important to emphasize that market exchange should not be confused 
with exchange in terms of systemic interactions - with metabolism. Market 
exchange is certainly part of social exchange, of social metabolism - but that 
context is excluded by the current economic conceptualization and practice. 
Metabolism inevitably involves the state of enough - there is charge/discharge, 
in/out, source and sink, take and give. With the concept of exchange value, 
which is defined by utility maximization, there is only more and more, without 
limits put by any context or interaction with the environment. 
1 1 quoted in: Lutz and Lux, op.cit.: 180 
12 See text and quotes between footnotes 30 and 32 in chapter 2. 
Exchange value is certainly determined in the market, which thus repre- 
sents a context - or, more precisely in systemic terns,  one of the nested levels 
of context. Exchange value was initially an  abstraction, a reduced view for the 
purpose of determining relative value or worth in the process of exchange, but 
it gradually became pervasive, prevalent and almost exclusive, as  the market 
assumed the position of the sole context for determining any value. 
For the whole of the modem era, people's worth has been measured by the 
market value of their labor. 13 
Turning a partial view into an  exclusive view is a typical reductionist 
approach. Yet, it is upheld either as  the illusion or hypocrisy (or both) that 
markets represent an  environment which presumes and entails full freedom of 
choice, and where, consequently, exchange value is determined spontaneously 
and "naturally" by willingness to pay. As willingness to pay is considered a 
rational decision of the "rational economic man", markets are, thus, regarded 
as  utterly objective. 
These assumptions stem from a heavily stretched generalization which 
perceives the complex markets of the capitalist economy as  an  extension of the 
mechanisms characteristic of simple barter relationships. However, barter 
relationships involve direct personal interactions which cannot possibly result 
in unlimited wealth maximization, nor be intended toward such a goal. 
It is often easy to imagine that market processes, because they are so 
conducive to the purposeful and volitional behavior of millions of buyers and 
sellers, are vast unstructured arenas in which anything goes. Nothing could be 
furtherfrom the truth. The essence of markets is order, predictability, 
stability, and reliability. 14 
Daniel Brornley has elaborately demonstrated the falsity of the view upheld 
by conventional economics that it is the market which spontaneously enables - 
and is the best possible environment to support - the maximization of profits. 
He turns the picture upside down and shows that the market economy is not 
only an  expression of a social system oriented toward wealth maximization, but 
that it is an institutional structure to enable and maintain such a system. 
13 R i f ' n ,  1995: xviii 
14 Bromley, op.cit.: 46-47 
The role of the legal foundations of an economy is to provide a 
predictable structure within which exchange activity might occur and 
_flourish. This legal foundation is required whether the economy is organized 
along lines that give the government a dominant role, or whether it is 
organized so that the private sector is the dominant active agent. 15 
Furthermore, this institutional structure has to be paid for: 
D~serent forms of property rights (institutions) will require d~fferent 
levels of supporting infrastructure to deme rights and duties, to demarcate 
boundaries, and to enforce that structure of rights; [ . . . I  therefore the 
economically appropriate structure, whether private property, state property, 
or common property, is afunction of the economic surplus available to 
support those d~serential costs. [. . . I  
The economic surplus available from the summer pastures of 
Switzerland is insumient to make it economically feasible to divide those 
pastures into privately held parcels. To do so would require extensive fencing 
and water development so that each small parcel would be self-contained. [ . . . I  
The current level of economic surplus from the summer pastures makes 
common property the most efficient property arrangement. [ . . . I  
It seems more plausible to argue that rather than private property giving 
rise to wealth new wealth possibilities provide the economic surplus 
necessary to further articulate institutional arrangements. 16 
Brornley identifies these costs of the institutional structure as transaction 
costs because they reflect the institutional transactions which necessarily exist 
along with commodity transactions that are the overt and primary manifesta- 
tions of economic activities 17. 
Most often transactions costs are internalized external costs. In other words, 
the internalizing of social or environmental costs is typically interpreted as recog- 
nizing them as costs of doing business. This interpretation entails a metamorpho- 
sis of the essential character of the quality or value that is expressed by the cost 
- a transformation from social or environmental value into exchange value. That 
is to say, a social or environmental value - which is defined by a broad context 
of social meanings and attitudes, and which reflects complex human-ecological 
interactions, interrelatedness and interconnections - is translated into value 
defined solely in monetary terms. The following example is seemingly extreme 
in its audacity and impact, but nevertheless illustrative of this transformation: 
WMX,  Inc. I.. . I  the largest trash hauler in the world [ . . . I  has dumped PCBs 
[a highly toxic component of lubricants] in lagoons, mixed PCBs with waste 
oil and resold it as heating oil, and contaminated groundwater with chemical 
15 ibid.: 48 
16 ibid.: 16 (emphasis mine) 
17 ibid.:49;LutzandLux,op.cit: 185 
and nuclear wastes. The legal entity and a number of its executives haue been 
convicted of bid-rigging, jked for price-fixing, fined for conspiracy against 
trade, fined by the EPA numerous times for numerous violations of 
environmental laws, and jailedfor bribes. All the while. WMX continues to 
grow nicely, returning 20 percent pretax profits that have made its top 
executives rich. It has paid approximately $45 million in_Fzes and settlement 
costs to resolve litigation in the Last ten years. But those costs can be written 
oflagainst p r o m  - essentially, as a cost of doing business. In other words, the 
freedom of the outsized global marketplace means that corporations are even 
free to break the law, especially when the penalties and litigationfees are far 
outstripped by th12 material advantages gained by illegal practices. 18 
This transformation mechanism shows that internalizing should not be chara- 
cterized as recognizing the costs, but rather as refusal to recognize their real mea- 
ning, and readiness to pay that refusal in order to continue business as usual. 
Because markets are a price-based system, they naturally favor traders 
who come to market with the lowest price, which often means the highest 
unrecognized costs. 1.. .I 
The more able acompany is to externalize its cost ofdoing business and to 
be ruthless in its practices, the greater return on capital it may achieve in the 
short term. 19 
The typical way of recognizing the social and environmental problems and 
dysfunctions of the current economic system is to turn them into new 
businesses and s e ~ c e s  which are perceived as needed in order to alleviate 
the problems - or rather cater to their symptoms. This is (most of the time) a 
perfectly human and humane purpose and motive. However, the frenzied 
competition for profits (cut-throat is the grim, but usual adjective) - into which 
the prevailing orientation of the current economy pushes every entrepreneur - 
has the effect of the value transformation that I have described above. Costs 
are, thus, converted into gains (the GNP and other accounting procedures 
support this conversion, as I indicated in .the previous chapter) and, actually, 
turned into additional cost of living borne by consumers. 
Life as the Purpose of a Sustainable Economy 
The characterization of market mechanisms as "natural" - which Hawken 
too uses in the previous quote - manifests the erroneous perception of the 
18 Hawken, 1993: 78-79 (emphasis mine) 
19 ibid.:79.96 
position of the market in the current economic system demonstrated by 
Bromley. It also presupposes that the reductionist view of the utilitarian 
("rational economic man's") willingness to pay is the sole criterion for 
determining value. Cost/benefit analysis is performed in this narrow context of 
profit making, where the only benefit is the profit. Everything else - quality, 
beauty, liveliness - is either external, or relevant to the extent that it affects 
profits. From there emerges the utterly reductionist and rather hornfylng 
exercise of defining the exchange value of human life, or life in general: 
Because industry insists that poisonous compounds are economically 
vital, it compares the "need" for toxins with the "cost" of the estimated number 
of fatal forms of cancer that will resultfrom human exposure. Companies 
claim that the cost of saving lives has become prohibitive. 20 
Because some forms of pollution are harmful to human health and may 
increase mortality, economists have had to confront the question of the 
economic value of lge.21 
This ultimately anti-life orientation, stemming from utilitarian economics, 
points to the broader context of human relationships - the issue of domination 
over humans and nature (which will be discussed in chapter 8). 
The destruction of lives devoid of value," I...] was the official overall 
designation of the Nazi project aimed at the administrative mass killing of 
mental patients. 22 
In the case of external costs, administrative regulation attempts to solve 
the problem within the market economy - by retaining the reduction of social 
and environmental values to exchange value. Thus, solutions are sought 
through the same process of internalizing which transforms problems into 
transaction costs: 
Pgou's solution was to impose a "tau to correct maladjustments" on 
producers, a tau that would be comparable to the avoided cost or unbome 
expense I...] the actual damage caused by one production system to another 
system, person, or place. I...] Harder to measure but equally important, is the 
cost tofuture generations, as in the case of global warming, deforestation, 
erosion, and depletion of groundwater. Not surprisingly, most environmental 
harm - such as the harm caused by radiation, persistent pesticides, and clear- 
cutting - cuts across the two categories. 23 
20 ibid.: 50 
21 Freeman, 1983: 312 
22 Chorover, 1979: 6-7 
23 Hawken, op.cit.: 82-83 
When turned into taxes, social and environmental problems are no longer per- 
ceived as what they really are, but as additional payment burden. Furthermore, 
the extremely reductionist (or, rather, impossible) task of interpreting systemic 
human-ecological interactions in monetary terms, requires an enormous and cost- 
ly bureaucratic apparatus - on top of what is already a Babylonian structure 
(thus also adding to the transaction cost, with addition internalized in the tax). 
As money is the measure of exchange value, the pervasive and daunting 
characteristic of the current economy is that all human activities are expressed 
and represented by and turned into money. This perversion is a manifestation of 
detachment of the economy from eco-systemic processes - a disconnectedness 
from life. 
The shift of focus from life to money has now begun to reveal its Franken- 
steinian character. Money becomes the goal in itself, and turns against the 
values that it was supposed to express or measure. 
We are turning over thefinancing of the world, if we haven't already, to 
money lenders whose interests and incentives revolve around minute 
increments gained in the sale of abstracted financial instruments. 24 
Hawken contends that, with the predominance of money, there actually is no 
longer any commerce, any trade, just financial transactions: 
Let us say a company owns a forest in which if has chosen for many gene- 
rations to selectively harvest the trees. [...] It consistently delivers to sharehol- 
ders a 9 percent return on equity, considered below average for the forest pro- 
ducts industry. Meanwhile, world financial markets have heated up. [. . .] The 
price of lumber is 30 per cent lower than in previous years. Now our company's 
return on equity is just 6 percent, and its stock has been hammered by traders 
who no longer see it as a valuable company to own With its stock price cut in 
half, shareholders angry, and analysts baying at the door, management does 
the "rational" thing. It clear-cuts large sections of timber. [...I In short, the 
money the forest represented became more valuable than thefirest itsew So 
theforest is gone, and the money it has earned has entered the international 
pool of capital, thereby putting just a little more pressure on the owners of 
a n o h  fores t to conuert their assets on the ground into cold cash 25 
Money has undergone a transformation from a measure of value into value 
by itself. Baudrillard argues that the domination of signs (primarily the 
monetary signs, but also the other symbols of consumer culture) have effaced 
24 ibid.: 94 
25 ibid.: 94  (emphasis mine) 
the meaning of exchange value. Dominant values become fictitious, what he 
calls simulacra - deceptions and substitutes. 
A revolution has put an end to the 'classical' economics of value, a re- 
volution of value itself, which carries value beyond its cornmodityform [...I 
Referential value is annihilated I.. .I The s ys terns of reference for production, 
signification, the affect, substance and history, all this equivalence to a 'real' 
content, [. . .I all this is over with. Now the other stage of value has the upper 
hand, a total relativity, general commutation, combination and simulation - 
in the sense that, from now on, signs are exchanged against each other rather 
than against the real [ . . . I  The annihilation of any goal as regards the contents 
ofproduction allows the latter tofunction as a code. 26 
The economy has, thus, lost its connection with life processes and natural 
cycles. By stepping over into the virtual reality of money-defined values, the 
economy has "freed" itself from the real social, environmental and ecological 
limitations, and flung itself into limitless growth. This "freedom" is manifested 
as irresponsibility for the social and natural context of the economy. 
A redefinition of the economy should primarily involve a questioning of its 
purpose - questioning the goal of the economy in which every human activity is 
perverted into money making, commodity selling, consumption and profit; 
questioning the utter utilitarianism, materialism and reductionism, the utter 
rejection of any spiritual as  well as biological content and context of life. 
The narrow conception of lge which consisted in thinking that profits 
are the only leading motive of human society; and the stubborn view which 
supposes that what has existed yesterday would last for ever, proved in 
disaccordance with the tendencies of human lije. 27 
Why would the market be the only expression of the economp Even with- 
out the virtuality into which the dominance of money has pushed it, the market 
has become corrupt and dysfunctional - and inflated out of proportions. 
Can we imagine a market system that achieves exactly the opposite 
result, that creates, increases, nourishes and enhances lge on earth? Can we 
imagine competition between businesses that improves living and cultural 
systems? 28 
Despite his very critical insights and severe exposures of business 
malpractices, Hawken does not look beyond the market and business as the 
primary purposes of the economy. Yet, the market economy is only a 
26 Baudrillard, 1976: 6-7 
27 Kropotkin, 1899: 3 
28 Hawken, op.cit.: 8 1 
component of a broader process. Scott Bums has argued for a concept that 
would perceive three basic components of the economy - the household, the 
collective and the market economy - and he has contended that the present 
disproportional prevalence of the market component is a major imbalance 29. 
According to the systems view, the economy is a living system composed 
of human beings and social organizations in continual interaction with one 
another and with the surrounding ecosystems on which our lives depend. 30 
Furthermore, even in such a broader perspective, the economy itself is 
still only one aspect of complex human-ecological interactions. Capra's view 
clearly indicates the systemic approach. In such a context, it would be 
necessary to define an integrative purpose of the economy. The most succinct 
definition points at life processes - or simply life - as an integrative purpose of 
the economy. I have concluded in the previous chapter that sustainability is 
manifested in interactions between humans and their social and natural 
environments - interactions which support life processes. A sustainable or 
ecological economy has, consequently, to be conceived and practiced as part of 
natural cycles of renewal. In that sense, the purpose of the economy is life 
processes as natural cycles of renewal. 
Such an integrative purpose of the economy brings back its original 
meaning: 
The Greek notion of economics referred to the science of administering 
the household (oikos) and its propern. 31 
Daly and Cobb argue that the economy still has to be identified as "oikonomia" 
and thus distinguished from chrematistics - "manipulation of property and 
wealth to maximize short-term monetary exchange value to the owner" 32 - which 
describes much more correctly the practice currently denoted as the economy. 
Their argument is based on the key issue of the meaning of value: 
Chrematistics deals with exchange value in the short run. Oikonomia 
deals with use value in the long run. 33 
- 
29 Burns, 1975: 72-73 
30 Capra, 1982: 390 
31 Netting, et al., 1984: xx 
32 Daly and Cobb, 1989: 138 
33 ibid.:151 
This meaning of the economy is adequate to its integrative purpose defined 
above, as  life processes in the household are primarily to be perceived in their 
integrity - and not as fragmented and divided into unrelated aspects, as  it has 
been characteristic of the current reductionist concept and practice of the 
economy. 
A sustainable, ecological economy can be again defined as  household mana- 
gement, but the connotation of the household in this re-definition - still starting 
from the actual primary household - extends to wider human-ecological units. 
This extended view perceives the economy as an interrelated management and 
care of a nested range of interconnected units or levels of complexity: the house- 
hold - the neighborhood - the community - the bioregion - the planet. According 
to this integrative, holistic meaning, the economy and ecology emerge as almost 
synonymous notions, as  the morphology of the two words suggests 34. 
The argument for an integrative concept of the economy and against its 
modem meaning and practice has been ongoing along with their development. 
The following quotes present two examples: 
[Ruskin's] Munera vuluer& 118633 is a crihque of economics as the study 
of transactions in the market, pointing out that economics really should 
mean the study of material provisioning in human societies. 35 
Ellen Swallow Richards [...I proposed an interdisciplinary view of 
Oekology which focused on the human organism and its relationships with 
the environment. [ . . . I  She referred to Oekology as the "science of living [ . . . I  the 
worthiest of aU the applied sciences which teaches the principles on which to 
found ... healthy ... and happy @en. 36 
Identifymg the economy with life processes presents an eco-systemic 
approach as life is a continuous and constant exchange of energy and matter 
with the environment. The process of exchange, of metabolism, is the 
prerequisite for the existence of life - it is, indeed, vitality itself. 
Energy/matter metabolism is, therefore, the central concept of 
sustainability. It entails a perception of the energy/matter flow, rather than 
34 Ristic, 1990a 
35 Martinez-Alier. 1987: 91; see also the quote marked by footnote 27. 
36 Griffore and Phenice, 1993: 143-see also the section of the text related to footnote 
56 in chapter 1. 
expenditure or use. This encompasses the whole process of energy/matter 
flow: intake - functioning - output. This basic matrix should be the starting 
point of a sustainable (or ecological) economics - the analysis of the economy of 
life processes. As Prigogine and Stengers contend, "theflow of matter and 
energy, may be a source of order" 37. 
In the remainder of this and in the following chapters, I will discuss the as- 
pects of an integrated, or integrative economy, consisting of: the economy of 
(human) life processes - human needs; the technology of life processes - the 
ecology of technology; the social organization of life processes - the community 
and the household. 
Human Needs 
The discussion of the economy of human life processes should first 
address the issue of anthropocentrism that seems to be related to such a 
formulation. The absence of the context of human life processes from the 
current concept and practice of the economy (demonstrated earlier) appears to 
make the anthropocentrism issue less obtrusive. However - while the current 
economy (or chrematistics) can definitely be described as entirely 
anthropocentric, or maybe more correctly as not even concentrated at human 
(or any other) lives at all - the integrative (sustainable, ecological) economy (or 
oikonomia) can be easily argued out of the anthropocentrism objection. I will 
examine this issue in more detail in chapter 8. Here I will only indicate that the 
economy of human life processes is certainly focused on the exchange with the 
environment (social and natural) performed by humans, but the systernic-eco- 
logical perception of the unity of a human-in-her/his-environment or context 
and its interrelatedness and interdependence, resolves the dualistic/oppositio- 
nal conceptualization of humans versus the eco-system of which they are part. 
37 See the end of the quote marked by footnote 58 in the previous chapter (emphasis 
mine). 
Analysis of the economy of human life processes has to focus on life 
functions - human needs. Human needs are, however, completely disregarded 
by the current mainstream economics. 
he main subject of social economy, ie., the economy of energy required 
for the satisfaction of human needs, is consequently the last subject which 
one expects tofind treated in a concrete form in economical treatises. 38 
The objection is still being raised after almost a century: 
Undeniably, human material need is part and parcel of everyday human 
existence and yet, paradoxically, human material need is uniuersally rejected 
as an authentic concept by mainstream economics. 39 
Why does the current mainstream economics disregard human needs? Alle- 
gedly, because the notion of need is considered value-leaden and, therefore, un- 
scientific 40. AS I pointed out earlier, this methodological approach contains an 
underlying evasiveness about taking into consideration social dysfunctions and 
disruptions caused by the current practice of the profit-maximization economy. 
There is, behind this attitude, a significant conceptual controversy, or, rather. 
a connotational reduction of the word need. It is perceived merely as the condi- 
tion of bare survival in the context of poverty and welfare care for those 
segments of population which are incapable of partaking in the consumer 
culture 41. Thus, if need as  deprivation were included in the vision range of 
economics, it would entail the examination of social distribution of wealth which 
is considered to involve value judgments, or rather a questioning of the current 
socio-economic system. 
However, a prevailing number of theoreticians of human needs - who 
argue for introducing the social economy into economics - accept this negative 
definition of need a s  equated to deprivation or disadvantage 42. 
This understanding of need is fundamentally an  expression of the dualistic 
construct of humanity and nature. Biological need is reduced to survival, and 
38 Kropotkin, op.cit.: iv 
39 Davis and O'Boyle. 1994: xiii 
40 ibid. : xviii 
41 Davis and O'Boyle, op.cit.; Meyer. 1982; Singer, 1979 
42 There is no social economics or social economy without the principle of 
subsidiarity. (Davis and O'Boyle, op-cit.: xxvi) 
considered - as a sphere of nature within and without ourselves - a lower level 
of satisfaction which humanity has to rise above 43. Remaining on the level of 
biological need has, thus, been identified with bare survival, poverty and 
deprivation. Conversely, the ascendance from this level has come to be viewed 
as a liberation from the lower and disgraceful state of neediness. 
Furthermore, this liberation is considered a display of human ability to 
control his or her biological self and to subordinate it. (This is a key issue of 
domination over nature which will be discussed later.) 
In the consumer culture, this liberation has been interpreted as riddance 
of the natural, ecological (and social) constraints, but it should rather be 
perceived as licence to disregard the eco-systemic interrelatedness of 
individuals and their social and natural environment. Thus, the road has 
become open to limitless consumption and wealth maximization. 
As I explained before, the vehicle for this trip to "freedom" has been the 
distortion of the concept of value. 
Since water and diamonds sa t i s -  two quite different kinds of needs it is 
ridiculous to talk about their units as comparable and to say that the 
consumer consumes more water than he does diamonds. There is simply no 
commensurability between these two goods. I . . . ]  The point of view of standard 
economics [is] that if we take a supposed need, such as water, and we increase 
its price, then people will use less of it, just like anything else. Therefore, the 
economist reasons, it is not a need. 44 
What standard economics does not reveal is that it performs an "illusio- 
nist's trick of converting needs into commodities. I have discussed the "scien- 
tific methodology" of that process - the modification of use values into ex- 
change values. Here, it is important to understand the underlying psychological 
mechanism and its purpose. The following situation describes what happens 
when any need - like water, mentioned in the previous quote - is turned into a 
commodity: 
One partner [in the transaction] is compelled by need, the other 
motivated by want; the latter can wait while the former, pressed by needs, 
cannot. As a result, the tenns of trade will mirror the distribution of power. 
43 Plumwood, 1993: 21. See also quotes at footnotes 63, 64 and 65 in chapter 1. 
44 Lutz and Lux, op.cit.: 49, 23; relevant in this connection also Henderson, 1981: 9, 
Capra, op.cit.: 225, and Martinez-Alier, op.cit.: 92. 
This type of problem remains inuisible within the theoretical apparatus of 
mainstream economics. 45 
This is indeed the gist of the issue of need in the wealth-maximization 
economy - showing that the whole hocus-pocus with needs a s  value-leaden 
category identified with deprivation is performed to conceal the underlying 
power relationships. Once it is turned into a commodity, a need can be 
manipulated. It takes at least one party to step out of perceiving it a s  a need. 
This can be achieved by sacrificing one's own need. For example, here's what 
my grandmother told me was an occasional "transaction" between my father 
and his brother when they were kids: They would both get a piece of, say, 
watermelon heart for lunch, and my father would eat it up, while his brother 
would put it in the ice box and, in the evening, tease my father for not having it 
any more, and offer to sell it to him 46. 
The other way of stepping out of the position of need is to claim more of the 
resource than is necessary to satisfy one's need. In both cases, the motive is to 
gain a position of advantage in order to be able to manipulate with the need. In 
the context of the consumer economy this manipulation becomes a market 
mechanism: 
The market has a built-in tendency to under-supply the needs of a 
population, while at the same time over-supply its desires. 47 
The purpose of manipulation with needs is to instigate unlimited 
consumption of commodities, and, thus, enable unlimited profit-maximization. 
Needs are, however, defined by natural limits of satiation. Therefore, to justlfy 
unlimited consumption of commodities, standard economics 
denies that the concept of need has any legitimate standing in economics 
whatsoever. I.. .I In [its] place, conventional economists substitute the concept 
of indiuidud wants, or tastes and preferences. Wants, it is assumed, may be 
identied, analyzed, and discussed without eualuation orjudgment. They 
require no interpretation, are regarded as pure data, and are thought to be 
factual in nature. 48 
- 
45 ibid.: 27 
46 My father became an artist, and my uncle an accountant and a gambler. 
47 ibid.: 27 
48 Davis and O'Boyle, op-cit.: xvii-xviii 
This pretended objectivity of wants stems from the objectivity of exchange va- 
lue which is considered guaranteed because exchange value is expressed in quan- 
titative terms and the translation is preformed by utilitarian interpretation49. 
Heyne tells us that The 'law of demand' is preferable to the concept of 
need, because demand relates the amounts that are purchased to the sacnfies 
that must be made to obtain these amounts. " 50 
This "conceptual" distinction is supported by acceptance of the reduced 
connotation of needs as deprivation and condition of bare survival. Thus, 
anything above survival is no longer a need, but a want. This delineation is 
deeply based on the dualistic construct of humanity and nature, as  I pointed 
out earlier, but at the next layer, it plays with the psychological effect of 
polarization of need versus want as  deprivation versus abundance. Wants are 
thus identified with unlimited abundance, boundless consumption and 
maximized utility. Wants are detached from the constraints and determinants 
of social and ecological contexts, from eco-systemic interrelatedness of life 
processes and natural cycles of renewal. Wants depend entirely on the market 
mechanisms of offer and demand. They are fully controllable by the profit- 
making, growth economy. This control is possible because, abstracted from the 
context of needs as life functions, wants become malleable and impressionable, 
completely susceptible to advertising propaganda. Consumerism is not based 
on what we need, but on what we are impelled to want. 
Exploitation of wants becomes a major strategy for those who seek power 
and wealth when industrialization causes society to become strahjied into 
competitive socioeconomic classes. 51 
This strategy is applied at  the earliest age, implanting the consumerism mo- 
del into young impressionable psyches. It  is done, not only at the level of 
concerted efforts of business advertising, but, most effectively at the level of 
cultural reproduction: 
Brother Bear was just crazy about Space Grizzlies. Space Grizzlies were 
little toy actionfigures that you could couect. Brother cared about them a lot. 
He cared about them so much that he did chores for neighbors to make extra 
49 See the text and quotes between footnotes 8 and 1 1. 
50 Lutz and Lux, op.cit.: 23 
51 Bennett, 1976: 11 
money so he could buy more. He had quite a few. But the store had more. A lot 
more. He was saving up to buy Sleezo's Cloud Castle. Sleezo was the evilest of 
all the Space Grizzlies, and the wicked-looking Cloud Castle was where he 
planned all his evil deeds. 52 
Growth of consumption and profits requires constant creation and rearing 
of new wants or increasing satisfaction of the existing ones. Wants seem to 
imply something that one can consume but does not need to. However, 
consumerism and imposition of wants create addictions. Addictions are based 
on constant reccurent dissatisfaction, and it is systematically created by the 
consumer economy: 
'The key to economic prosperity, " said Kettering, "is the organized 
creation of dissatisfaction." The economist John Kenneth Galbraith put it 
more succinctly years later, observing that the new mission of business was to 
"create the wants it seeks to satis&." 53 
This strategy creates an addictive vicious circle which expresses the psychologi- 
cal basis of the growth paradigm: 
Wants mangestly exceed our means. 54 
If wants are perceived as a departure from the level of bare survival and 
deprivation, and from the constraints of biological relations and limits - this 
'freedom" has as its counterpoint the slavery to imposed consumer needs (or 
wants). Thus it turned out to be a failed hope that consumerism as a liberation 
from poverty would be an achievement of the freedom to have control over our 
own lives 55. The previous forms of reducing large sections of population to 
dependent social status by deprivation have now been largely (not yet entirely) 
replaced by dependency to imposed consumption. Rather than recognizing 
their own needs, people have become slaves to commodities. 
Ivan Illich discusses this issue in the context of transportation as a 
commodity: 
52 Berenstain. Stan and Ian. The Berenstain Bears and the Bad Dream, Random 
House. (one of the serial story-books for American children from 1990s) 
53 Rifkin, op.cit.: 19-20 
54 Davis and O'Boyle, op-cit: xix 
55 As long as we remain within thefiamework of a civilization based on inequality, 
growth will necessarily appear to the mass of the people as the promise - albeit 
entirely illusory - that they will one day cease being "underprivileged." (Gorz, 1980: 
7-8) 
Addicted to being canied along, [man] has lost control over the physical, 
social and psychic powers that reside in man's feet. [. . . I  He has lost faith in the 
political power of the feet and of the tongue. As a result, what he wants is not 
more liberty as a citizen but better service as a client. He does not insist on his 
freedom to move and to speak to people but on his claim to be shipped and to 
be informed by media. 56 
The imposition of needs (or wants) in the consumer culture generates a ma- 
jor aspect of alienation which is a characteristic of the current cultural pattern. 
This has been argued by the members of the "Frankfurt School" 57 and their 
contentions to some extent anticipate the postmodem accounts of the consu- 
mer culture, particularly Baudrillard's simulacrum theory 58. By imposed needs 
(or wants), consumers are alienated from their genuine needs, and consequent- 
ly from natural cycles of renewal and from natural processes in general: 
Holiday brochures promise us tropical sun or winter snow all year 
round, feeding to the illusion that we can ignore the cycle of the seasons. Even 
birth and death, the paramount events of natural time, have lost their 
inevitability and become products of medical and social intervention. 59 
A very simple example of our detachment from natural processes is the' current 
food consumption pattern. As a child, I used to identify the year's seasons by 
(locally available) fruits I liked: strawberries in May, cherries in June, apricots 
in July, watermelons in August, grapes in September, apples in October, tange- 
rines around Christmas. Now you enter the supermarket and there is always 
everything available, shipped by airplanes from all over the world (not to com- 
ment upon the unsustainability of such production/consumption approach). 
Consumers' disconnectedness from natural cycles of renewal is also 
manifested in their significant contribution to the wastefulness of the current 
economy: 
56 Illich. 1974: 25-26 
57 The economic apparatus [...I equips commodities with the values which decide 
human behavior. Since, with the end offree exchange, commodities lost all their 
economic qualities except for fetishism, the latter has extended its arthritic 
influence over aU aspects of social lqe. Through the countless agencies of mass 
production and its culture the conventionalized modes of behavior are impressed 
on the individual as the only natural, respectable, and rational ones. (Horkheimer 
and Adorno, 1944: 48-49) 
58 See footnote 26. 
59 Melucci, 1996: 17 (I have emphasized the connection to Baudrillard's theory of 
simulacra.) 
Prosperity rests on the fas ter and fas ter trans formation of mountains of 
junk into mountains of debris. And the happy agents of this transformation, 
known as consumers, are the same ones who joylessly give their energy to 
make these things they hope t o w  time to use between coming home and 
going to sleep. 60 
The alienation from our genuine needs - from identifymg and acknow- 
ledging them without the mediation and distortion by consumerist pressures 
and impositions - results in psychological and psychosomatic disturbances. 
They constitute a large portion of the social disruptions caused by the current 
economy. The following account by Melucci presents these consumption 
syndromes as an expression of the pressures for limitless growth of the profit 
maximization economy: 
If there are so many opportunities, if things change so rapidly, then we 
must pursue everything, consume everything as fast as we can and forgo 
nothing. A kind of Don Giovanni syndrome impels us to chase afer every 
opportunity, only to then sw~j?ly abandon each one of them in favour of 
another one beckoning next to it. The tension induced in the process produces 
stress symptoms, as the body's response to the lack of time and to ow fear that 
we may have missed our chance. In its most severe form, stress may 
precipitate a breakdown of the selJ and ultimately schizophrenia. 61 
Twisting needs into wants thus generates consumption disorders 62 (or 
imbalances of metabolism) from obesity to limitless greed for endless 
quantities, endless possessions. Consumerism has a debasing effect on the 
quality of life. Needs are part of metabolism - of exchange of energy and matter 
with the environment. Consumerism does not involve that kind of exchange, 
just gobbling up, grabbing more and more, and returning only garbage. The 
metabolic imbalance occurs on the level of individuals, as  well a s  of social and 
ecological systems - consequently to systemic interrelatedness. 
Consumption disorders have the function of a cultural basis and cultural 
reproduction of the notion of growth as utility/consumption/wealth 
maximization. This notion becomes the overbearing cultural model and thus 
creates a general myopia for the relationships of domination and exploitation 
that wealth maximization (still achieved only by very few) is based on. 
60 Gorz, op.cit.: 82-83 
61 Melucci, op.cit.: 20 
62 Lutz and Lux, opxit.: 30 
I have concluded above that the economy of human life processes is prima- 
rily characterized by eco-systemic interactions - metabolism of matter and ener- 
gy. These metabolic processes are determined by life functions, by human 
needs which require the exchange of matter and energy. 
Theories and Classifications of Human Needs 
There is an array of theories and classifications of human needs. I will 
restrict my attention here to three issues around which some of these theories 
are developed. These issues, which I find pertinent to the discussion of human 
needs in the context of an ecological culture, are: objectivity, hierarchy and a 
non-dualist concept of needs which overcomes the hierarchical perspective 63. 
Much ink is spilled to discuss the possibility of perceiving human needs as 
objective 64, and to dispute the position of standard economics which denies 
that needs are a scientific category (i.e. objective) because they are value- 
leaden. These attempts to establish the objectivity of needs do not address or 
question the meaning of objectivity - not even its positivist connotation of a 
value-free approach. Thus, this argument leaves untouched the whole problem 
of values that is implicit in the denial of needs by standard economics. 
Beyond the framework of the value-free approach, the claim of objectivity 
of human needs runs into the epistemological problem of the objectivity/sub- 
jectivity relationship 65. With human needs, this problem becomes apparent as 
the analysis moves from basic physiological needs to those that are described 
as psychological 66. This problem is rarely addressed in depth by theories of 
needs, but the distinction between physiological and psychological needs 
typically leads to the other issue: the hierarchy of needs. 
63 I have shown in chapter 2 - between footnotes 47 and 52 - that the hierarchical 
perspective is closely related to the dualist paradigm. 
64 Doyal and Gough, 199 1 
65 I will discuss this issue in more detail in chapter 9. 
66 Maslow. 1968: 152 
A want/need distinction would to Leiss suggest that needs are objective 
and in principle quantitatiue, while wants are subjective and ephemeral. 
liable to ebb andflow in rhythm with satisfactions. He rejects all attempts in 
the literature to establish either lists of or hierarchies of needs, or to 
distinguish cultural from biological needs. 67 
Maslow's basic classification of human needs (the physiological needs - the 
safety needs - the belongingness and love needs - the esteem needs - the 
needs for self-actualization) 68 does not indicate a sharp divide between lower 
and higher needs. The notion of hierarchy rather reflects a conception of levels 
of priority, as the satisfaction of the needs positioned lower in the classification 
is perceived as a prerequisite for expressing the "higher" needs. 
It has been argued and demonstrated that this priority principle does not 
always apply strictly and invariably to all human situations and relationships 69. 
The deviations are not merely individual exceptions, as the following quote 
suggests; they reflect diverse cultural meanings attributed to survival and 
priority needs. 
Some individuals, provided they have once known satisfaction of 
physiological and safety needs, will sacrifice the former for love, for self- 
esteem or for truth Thus a man such as Gandhi may deny himself food 
because "higher" needs have become more important but, according to 
Maslow, a person who has never had enough to eat, could not activate or 
articulate his "higher" needs. I...] The specific form that all these needs take 
will vary greatly from person to person. 70 
The exceptions, deviations and cultural interpretations do not, however, 
deny the fact that some needs are more biologically essential for survival than 
others, and are, therefore, prioritized in most situations. Yet this biological 
determination in no way implies that some needs are "lower" and less worthy of 
human esteem because they reflect the biological necessity to keep the bodily 
functions going, while some other needs are "higher" because they represent 
humans' ascendence from the biological level of existence into "higher" spheres 
of spiritual fulfillment. Nevertheless, a number of theoreticians of human needs 
- 
67 Fitzgerald and Bay, 1977: 6 
68 Maslow, 1954: 80 
69 Maslow himself expressed such a caveat (Maslow, 1968). 
70 Fitzgerald and Bay, op.cit.: 38 
(including previously quoted Fitzgerald and Bay) adopt such an interpretation of 
the hierarchy of needs: 
Maslow's original conception of a hierarchy of needs is really an exten- 
sion of the idea that the human being has two poles or endpoints in his or her 
motivational makeup I...] a material pole [deficiency needs) on one end of 
human nature to a spiritual pole @rowth needs) on the other end. I...] For Plato 
there were two categories of human motives, the passions and reason, and the 
human being had to use the latter to subdue and override the former. [...I We 
are not just one harmonized integrated self, but face conflict between parts of 
ourselves, or d~flerent values, or a dual-self. 71 
This hierarchical concept of needs is clearly based on the dualist paradigm 
(and its origin in Platonic philosophy, indicated in the previous quote, will be fur- 
ther discussed in the later parts of this essay). The sharp divide between the 
sphere of nature, of biological necessity, and the realm of spirituality is the 
core of dualist constructs, and it establishes anything belonging to nature with- 
in or without humans as inferior. The basic dualistic split of humanity versus 
nature has as one of its primary expressions the body/soul schism. It is here 
explicitly manifested in considering food, sexuality and procreation as lower 
bodily functions (or even despicable indulgences of the flesh), above which 
humans have to rise with spiritual pursuits and thus achieve self-actualization. 
Another manifestation of the dualistic perspective is the distinction 
between cultural and biological needs 72. It typically tends to identify 
physiological needs as biological and all other needs "above" the biological level 
of existence as the sphere of culture. Thus, the culture/nature duality (as an 
extension of the basic dualist pair of humanity/nature) is brought into the 
perception of human needs. 
Malinowski's functionalist definition of culture is based on perceiving 
human needs as biologically defined, but culturally interpreted 73. The dualized 
construct of culture versus nature is thus entirely rejected and replaced with a 
perception of an interactive, or dialectical relationship between culture and 
71 Lutz and Lux, op.cit.: 16- 17. See also the paragraph after footnote 42. 
72 Fitzgerald and Bay, op.cit: 6 - see the quotation above marked by footnote 67 
73 Malinowski, 1944: 37 - see the quotation at footnote 18 in chapter 1. 
nature, consequent to the eco-systemic approach and its "both/andw, rather 
than "either/orw logic74. 
The perception of human needs as  biologically defined, but culturally 
interpreted, is the basis for understanding both the consumer culture we are 
grappling with now and a possible transition to an  ecological culture. Such a 
perception regards the ways of how human needs are satisfied a s  the essential 
determinant of culture. Therefore, these ways - the ways of life - are also the 
core of the emerging ecological culture. 
Mahowski's theory of human needs is derived from the analysis of life 
functions. He classifies life functions/human needs along with their cultural 
interpretations - cultural responses 75: 
BASIC NEEDS 
1 .  Metabolism 
2. Reproduction 
3. Bodily Comforts 
4. Safety 
5 .  Movement 
6. Growth 
7. Health 
CULTURAL RESPONSES 
1 .  Commissariat 
2. Kinship 
3. Shelter 
4.  Protection 
5 .  Activities 
6. Training 
7. Hygiene 
Even his classification is not entirely free from the bias of prevailing 
cultural patterns, but it emphasizes the concept of cultural interpretation of 
basic needs. Most of the other classifications do not convey the awareness of 
this fundamental characteristic of human needs 76. 
McHale and Cordell have developed one of the most comprehensive 
theories of human needs. They touch upon the key issues, but yet, they 
somehow lack a clear conceptual framework to base their different and 
complex classifications and categorizations on. Thus, they come up with very 
74 See the paragraph around footnote 55 in chapter 2. 
75 Malinowski, 1944: 91 
76 e.g.: Doyal and Gough simply offer a (rather random) list of human needs which 
confuses the basic life functions and the culturally created needs: 1 food and water 
(nutritional intake); 2 housing (shelter, sanitation facilities); 3 work; 4 physical 
environment (air, water, land, radiation, noise pollutants); 5 health care; 6 
childhood needs (security in childhood: safety from abandonment, abuse, neglect; 
child development: stimulation, positive feedback, responsibility); 7 support 
groups (significant others, social contacts); 8 economic security; 9 physical 
security (crime safety, safety from state violence); 10 education; 11 safe birth 
control and child-bearing (Doyal and Gough. 199 1: 2 19) 
intricate divisions and matrices that present an elaborated mapping of diverse 
aspects of understanding human needs, and yet they still convey some 
confusions and inconsistences. 
McHale and Cordell do dispel the concept of strict objectivity of needs by 
introducing the notion of felt needs - needs that they describe as, for example, 
sense of welfare, or sense of participation 77. They do not elaborate this as far 
as even putting it clearly into the context of the objectivity/subjectivity issue, 
but, nevertheless the notion of needs in terms of feeling and sensing indicates 
what I consider the fundamental epistemological aspect of ecological culture - a 
sensitivity for nature within and without ourselves as a basis for an environ- 
mental/ecological consciousness. 
On the other hand. McHale and Cordell implicitly retain the Maslowian 
approach by making the distinction between biophysical and psychosocial 
needs. Although they do not explicitly adopt a hierarchical concept of needs, 
this distinction still reflects the dualist construct of humanity versus nature 
which is further manifested in the confusion between basic needs and their 
cultural interpretations, evident in the following classification: 
biophysical needs (basic needs): food, health, shelter (and clothing); 
psychosocial needs: education, employment, communications, mobility, 
recreation, security 78 
It is clear that employment cannot be a basic need, but only a cultural 
interpretation emerging in certain cultural patterns. This problem is less overt 
with their other categories in this classification, but when they elaborate them 
into a list of "human functions to be served", the confusion of basic 
needs/functions and what Malinowski terms secondary, or culturally derived 
needs 79 becomes quite obvious. I will, however, reproduce that list in its 
entirety here despite its deficiences because attempts to devise a categorization 
77 McHale and Cordell, 1977: 3 1 
78 ibid.: 30 
79 A theory can be developed in which the basic needs and their cultural satisfaction 
can be linked up with the derivation of new cultural needs; [. ..] these new needs 
impose upon man and society a secondary type of determinism (Malinowski, 
1944.38) 
of human needs/functions are important for understanding sustainable (or 
ecological) economy, technology and social organization: 
physical needs/functions: 
eating, sleeping, bathing, excretion. 
cooking, laundering, cleaning, waste disposal. 
storage for food/utensils, clothes, personal household and work 
equipment, books, etc. 
psychosocial needs/functions: 
sexual relations, privacy, sociability, conversation, reading, religious 
practices, personal and child care, creative pursuits, communications, 
play, recreation and entertainment, overall aesthetic amenity of 
dwelling and surroundings. 
environmental control: 
management of heat and cold, protectionfrom extremes of sun, wind, 
rain, dust and other external impingements such as insects, vermin, 
rodents, etc.; energy for lighting, cooling, heating and ventilation 
internal structures and surfaces: 
furnishings and equipment for physical and social needs. 
surfaces of floor, walls, ceiling to aid internal environmental control. 
external structures and surfaces: 
to control externally impinging environmental factors - walls, roojhg, 
screened windows /doors, porches and balconies. 
drainage, waste disposal, sewage, energyfuel storage, work/play 
equipment storage. 
play and recreation areas. 
adjacent kitchen garden and livestock area where appropriate. 
walls, fences, etc.. where required for physical security and for cultural 
purposes. 
external service aspects: 
ease of access to roads, shops, markets, transportation, work place; to 
neighbors and community; to health, education, communications and 
other services. 80 
I contend that it is impossible to make a categorization of human needs 
that would be entirely free from the bias of the culture within which the catego- 
rization is made. The way of defining categories has necessarily to reflect the 
current views that determine how we define what life processes depend on and 
consist of. Furthermore, from the eco-systemic viewpoint (another culturally- 
defined perspective), it is important to realize that the integrity of life process is 
broken by analyzing it into its constituent elements. As I pointed out before, 
analysis is a complementary approach to the integrative view, and it can 
provide important additional information only as far as one keeps in mind that 
it is not the only source of knowledge about a phenomenon - particularly when 
80 McHale and Cordell, op.cit.: 50 
the phenomenon is life process. Otherwise, analysis becomes a reductionist 
procedure. When applied to human needs, it most often leads to providing for 
fragmented, isolated needs and treating them symptomatically - i.e. without 
perceiving the integrity of life process and the interdependency of its 
interrelated functions. 
I have, consequently, undertaken to suggest a categorization of human 
needs which would reflect a perception appropriate to an ecological culture. 
The key principle upon which such an analysis has to be based is metabolism. 
McHale and Cordell introduce the notion of metabolism and establish the 
distinction between internal and external metabolic processes, but through a 
rather complicated and confusing matrix titled 'needs environment", and 
without a deeper elaboration of the meaning of metabolism in the context of 
human needs 81. 
Human needs have to be conceived of a s  a metabolic process - exchange 
of energy and matter between the human and her/his environment. The analy- 
sis of human needs thus emerges from the basic matrix of metabolic processes 
- the energy/matter flow: intake - functioning - output. This metabolic flow 
can be also perceived as  charge - functioning - discharge 82, and, pertinent to 
the consumer culture context, as  acquisition - use - disposal. Such an 
analysis will be truly complementary to the initial eco-systemic view, starting 
from metabolism as the integrative characteristic of living systems. In that 
context, the flow can be most generally perceived a s  birth - life - death. 
Malinowski's theory of human needs is substantially based on metabolism83 
and he even introduces a notion of vital sequence which indicates the flow of 
matter (energy is not explicitly mentioned) related to human needs: 
81 ibid.: 30 
82 See the quote marked by footnote 87 in the previous chapter 
83 All human beings [...I as organisms must exist under conditions which not only 
secure survival, but also allow of healthy and nonnal metabolism I . . . ]  We can 
&_fine the term "human nature" by the fact that all men have to eat, they have to 
breathe, to sleep, to procreate, and to eliminate waste matterfrom their organisms 
wherever they live and whatever type of civilization they practice. (Malinowski, 
1944: 75) 
PERMANENT VITAL. SEQUENCES INCORPORATED IN ALL CULTURES 84 
IA) Impulse Act IC) Satis-faction 
Drive to breathe 
Hunger 
Thirst 
Sex appetite 
Fatigue 
Restlessness 
Somnolence 
Bladder pressure 
Colon pressure 
Fright 
Pain 
Intake of oxygen 
Ingestion of food 
Absorption of liquid 
Conjugation 
Rest 
Activity 
Sleep 
Micturition 
Defecation 
Escape from danger 
Avoidance by effective act 
Elimination of CO2 in tissues 
Satiation 
Quenching 
Detumescence 
Restoration of muscular energy 
Satisfaction of fatigue 
Awakening with restored energy 
Removal of tension 
Abdominal relaxation 
Relaxation 
Return to normal state 
If the metabolism/flow principle of intake - functioning - output, or charge 
- functioning - discharge, is applied, Malinowski's chart presents some 
inconsistencies. Another problem that becomes conspicuous from the viewpoint 
of the metabolism/flow principle, and which appears in Malinowski's matrices, 
as  well as  in most of the other classifications of human needs, is health 
conceived as a need. Health in the form of a service (or in its worst form as  a 
commodity) is certainly a culturally derived need. However, its initial meaning 
originates from whole, healing, and in that sense health implies unimpeded 
energy/matter metabolism and it includes all life functions 85. 
My suggestion for a categorization of human needs/functions follows 
primarily Malinowski's conception of human needs, and is based on the 
integrative metabolic flow matrix of intake - functioning - output, or charge - 
functioning - discharge: 
breathing/drinking/eating/personal care 
taking space (and time) - living space/environmental control and cornfort/ 
84 ibid.: 77; also: ibid.: 137 
85 See footnote 25 in chapter 2. 
Sustainable Technology 
A sound man is good a t  salvage, 
At seeing nothing is lost. 
Lao Tze, 500 B.C. 
The major component of a n  ecosystem, that is, 
interaction, involves attention to the 
measurement of inputs and outputs of 
matter-energy and information to and from the 
ecological unit, respectively. 86 
I have indicated above that sustainable (or ecological) technology should be 
conceived as a component of an integrated economy of life processes - i.e. as 
technology of life processes. It is, thus, perceived in context. The conventional 
view, by contrast, perceives technology as isolated from and independent of 
social and natural milieu in which it develops, and, therefore, as another value- 
free discipline. (It is solely linked to the economy, and only in terms of costs in 
the market, i.e., exchange value.) 
Conceptualization, practice and assessment of sustainable technology has 
to be established on the basic principle of energy/matter flow, the intake + 
functioning + output matrix 87. This means that technology is conceived as 
technical solutions to energy/matter exchange with the environment, or to the 
fulfillment of human needs/functions. Technology is, thus, defined as 
culturally determined ways of satisfying human needs/functions. 
Consequently, the basic metabolic flow matrix expands to include technology: 
culturally culturally 
intake + defined + life function + defined + output 
technology technology 
of intake of output 
This matrix should be the starting point for the design and implementation 
of sustainable (ecological) technology, as well as for the assessment of its 
impact on the natural cycles of resource renewal. 
86 Sontag, et al., 1993: 152 
87 I prefer to use the word intake than input. Input can connote external agency and 
passiveness of the recipient. This issue of passiveness is pertinent to the 
discussion of alienation in the next chapter. 
Renewal is a key notion for understanding sustainable technology. It is 
primarily a characteristic of metabolic processes which are depicted by the 
intake + functioning + output matrix. Metabolic processes are repetitive 
cycles. Breathing (the first life function from the classification I suggested 
above) is an intake-output, or charge-discharge repetitive metabolic cycle which 
can be described as a pulse (charge/discharge) - a pulse of continuous 
renewal. Every metabolic process can be perceived as a pulse - with different 
frequency of charge-discharge, or intake-output. 
After each breath, we need to breathe again - after each intake/output 
cycle, metabolic processes need available intake resources. Sustainability has 
been mainly concerned with availability of resources, which has become a 
conspicuous problem with the expansion of economic and technological 
practices that entail steep rates of resource depletion. 
One of the determinants of sustainability has been termed "carrying 
capacity" and defined as: 
capacity of an ecosystem to support healthy organisms while maintaining its 
productivity, adaptability, and capability of renewal. 88 
Consequently, in the majority of texts that discuss sustainability, the distinction 
has been introduced between renewable and non-renewable resources 89: 
The environment is man's supplier of resources. We can distinguish 
between renewable and non-renewable resources. The environment's ability 
to renew resources has the character of a capital good. By overuse or 
investment it can be negatively or positively affected by man. 90 
This distinction is often presented in terms of income versus capital 
sources - a terminology which obviously reflects the current utilitarian 
economic paradigm invading the "objective scientific perspective" of physics: 
[Energy sources] may be grouped into two general categories - celes tial or 
income energy, which is the energy reaching the earthfrom outer space, and 
capital energy, which is energy that already exists on or in the earth 91 
88 From Caring for the Land: A Stratew for Sustainable Living, a 199 1 
IUCN/UNEP/WWF publication - quoted in Thayer, 1994: 100 (emphasis mine) 
89 Flavin and Lenssen, 1994; Henderson, 1981; Martinez-Alier, op.cit.; Thayer, op.cit. 
90 Faber, et al., 1987: 14 
91 Culp, 1991: 7 
The renewable/non-renewable distinction can, however, be taken only as 
provisional because, at the cosmic level, neither of the material/energy 
resources is non-renewable. The ultimate pulse of renewal is the Big Bang: 
Most cosmologists now believe that the universe began in a primordial 
explosion sornejjteen billion years ago and that it has been growing ever 
since. [...I The speed at which the galaxies are rushing apart is gradually 
declining under the in-tuence of gravitation. I f  the matter density of the 
universe is sumiently low, the expansion will continue forever. But if there 
is more than a certain amount of matter in the universe, the expansion will 
stop, and the universe will begin to contract ultimately resulting in a reversal 
of the Big Bang in a terminal implosion called the Big Crunch. Most physicists 
seem to favour continued expansion; but some prefer the Big Crunch, a n d f i d  
in it a way to return to a repetitive eternity: for the Big Crunch could be the Big 
Bang of the next universe, and so on forever. 92 
Consequently, rather than considering renewable/non-renewable resour- 
ces, one has to perceive them in terms of the rate and scale of renewal. In the 
context of sustainability, the relevant scale is the human-ecological level of inter- 
actions (which is part of the nested levels of renewal cycles, up to the cosmic 
level) 93. Renewability rate is thus one of the aspects of the impact of a techno- 
logy assessed by analyzing its intake-functioning-output sequence. Expenditure 
in excess of the rate of renewal creates ecological imbalance. Unsustainable 
practices can, thus, be described as discomectedness from, or ignoring the 
natural cycles of renewal. 
Human-ecological scale and the level of deliberating the renewal processes 
is represented by the intake+life function+output matrix. The forms of energy 
and matter usable as intakes for each functioning process typically differ from 
the forms in which they are available as sources. Therefore, some technology is 
necessary to convert resources into the needed form of energy or matter. Accor- 
dingly, the matrix takes the following form 94: 
92 Sheldrake, 1988: 7-8 (emphasis mine) 
The debate between proponents of these two views is, of course, very speculative. 
but the notion of eternal expansion is most probably a reflection of the linear 
paradigm, which is likewise expressed in the concept of endless and limitless 
economic growth (albeit on a vastly different scale). To me, the idea of a pulsation 
(explosion/implosion) on a cosmogenic scale seems much more consequent to a 
new paradigm. 
93 AS I have already pointed out, such a focus does not have to imply an 
anthropocentric perspective. 
94 Ristic, 1986 
energy/matter 
resource 
technology for technology 
+ conversion + life function + for + output 
into usable sustainable 
form of intake output 
The energy intake presents some controversial issues. In mainstream 
physics, the availability of resources and their conversions are related to the 
categorization into two types of energy: 
transitional energy and stored energy. nansitional energy is energy in 
motion, and as such can move across system boundaries. Stored-energy 
forms, as implied, are energy forms that exist as mass, position in a force 
field, etc. These stored forms can usually be easily converted into some form 
of transitional energy. 95 
In this context, energy is very rarely discussed in connection with life 
processes. In the following quote, a link between the realms of biology and 
physics is indicated by the use of the same concept of stored energy: 
On earth the ultimate source of animal food is plant lge, which acts as a 
potential energy store. I.. .I Photosynthetic plants may thus be considered the 
major source of food, and hence energy for heterotrophs. 96 
I have repeatedly pointed out that the divide between physical and living 
spheres is one of the most consequential characteristics of the current scien- 
tific paradigm and the world view in general 97. Their reconnection is a key 
issue of ecological culture. 
The role of life in storing energy, presented in the previous quote, is 
exactly what has earlier been described as the ektropic (or counter-entropic) 
effect of life processes. 
Furthermore, the systemic conception of life functions or (human needs) as 
exchange of energy (and matter) with the environment has to apply to all 
human life functions. If "non-physical" interactions are to be perceived as 
energy exchange between the individual human system and its environment 
(social and natural), such a perspective introduces the most controversial issue 
of life energy 98 as the form of energy that is exchanged in such interactions. 
95 Culp, op.cit.: 4 
96 Philipson, 1966: 2-3 
97 See the dual vision problem at footnote 57 in the previous chapter 
98 It will be discussed more extensively in the last chapter. 
Human interactions have been described in terms of energy, particularly in 
humanistic psychology and psychotherapy, and attempts have been made to dis- 
tinguish these forms of energy from those encountered in the non-living realms: 
Subtle energy connections I...] link us not only to the natural world but 
also to other humans. 99 
Rupert Sheldrake indicates this issue in his theory of fields, which he applies 
both to living and non-living realms (thus overcoming the "dual vision" 
controversy): 
Fields are the medium of "action at a distance," and through them objects 
can aflect each other even though they are not in material contact. I...] Fields 
cannot be explained in terms of matter; rather, matter is explained in terms of 
energy within_fietds. 100 
However, it was Wilhelm Reich who developed the most comprehensive theory 
and experimental practice of life energy which he named "orgone energy". He 
also framed the concept in terms of reconnection of the dual vision of the world 
- as "thefunctional law that merges organic and inorganic nature into 
onew 101. Reich's work is not yet fully acknowledged because his insights were 
too radical for the time when they were made. However, there have recently 
been indications of direct and indirect acceptance of, and continuation of 
research on the life energy concept: 
Today, there is a growing awareness that the body expresses a vital 
energy which brings us into contact with reality and with others, an energy 
which enables us to create and to transform reality. 102 
In 1987, German scientist, Arnim Bechmann, founded the Institute for 
Ecological Perspectives of the Future which 
under the title of post-material natural science, deals with concepts of 
theoretical and empirical levels that target the comprehension of lge's 
vitality. I...] 
Nature, and especially living systems possess at least two dimensions: 
(1) a material dimension, meaning the matter level in the sense of existing 
natural science (mangestation level); (2) a transmaterial dimension of 
organising energies, forces or working factors (transmaterial 
organisation-level) I...] 
It is obvious that Reich's work can be interpreted from the viewpoint of 
post-material natural science. In dealing with the two-level schemata, 
99 Goodison, 1992: 259 
100 Sheldrake. op-cit.: 97-99 (emphasis mine) 
101 Reich, 1949/ 1973: 78 (emphasis mine); see also footnote 87 in the previous chapter. 
102 Melucci, op-cit.: 71-72 (emphasis mine) 
orgon-energy shapes the organisation-level. That means that orgon-energy 
generally organises the material world. 
Besides Wilhelm Reich there have [...I been other attempts to describe this 
organisation-level [...I RudolfSteiner or Viktor Schauberger, [...I holistic 
biologists Cfor example Adolph Meier-Abich, Hans Driesch or Jakob von 
Uexkiill) or traditional far-eastem teachers of vitality or inner energy. 103 
Bechmam has continued some of Reich's experiments, but it is also important 
that he perceives the concept of life energy in terms of the self-organizing 
capability of life processes which has been studied by Prigogine 104. 
In this essay, I have adopted the concept of life energy, and the concep- 
tion of human life functions (or human needs) as  exchange of energy (and 
matter) with the environment - including life energy. Consequently, the basic 
forms of intake sources can be distinguished as: 
air 
water 
land 
energy: ** from physical environment 
** from other living beings: *** food 
*** contacts with living nature 
*** social/sexual/love interactions 
organic matter. 
Metabolic Cycles of Technology 
When the intake + function +output matrix with technologies of conversion 
is applied to this inclusive perspective of life functions, the assessment of 
technologies can offer more comprehensive (or systemic/integrative) insights. It 
becomes possible to assess the impact of technologies that mediate human 
interactions and to reveal how some aspects of those interactions are enhanced 
- but also how technologies can impede, or otherwise affect the flow of life 
energy. This kind of assessment will be increasingly salient as human 
interactions get more and more mediated by technology, and as  the quality of 
the environment (social and natural) is perceived in more comprehensive terms. 
103 Bechrnann, 1997: 3-5 
104 See the text and quotation marked by footnote 61 in the previous chapter. 
The integrative quality of the environment is assessed by the energy/mat- 
ter flow matrix. The matrix looks equally at  intakes and at  outputs. Technology 
has usually been more concerned with resources that enter the processes of 
production. Sustainable technology has to be conceived of in terms of source 
and sink - intake and output. Therefore, in the matrix that introduces 
technologies of conversion into usable forms of intake, the technologies for 
conversion into sustainable output are equally essential. The insight into the 
metabolic flow of matter and energy enables the assessment of the inclusion of 
technologies into natural cycles of renewal. 
This examination of technology is integrative or holistic in the systemic sen- 
se as  it starts from the integrity of the metabolic process and then proceeds to- 
ward the ramifications of the intake + life function + output sequence into its in- 
terrelated subprocesses. In other words, each technology of intake or output also 
involves its own metabolic flow of intake +technological process + output. Thus 
the assessment of sustainable technology becomes a comprehensive control of 
the impact of all the energy/matter flow involved in human life processes. 
Technology assessment may be d e N d  [...I as an analysis of the total 
impact of a technology on society. 105 
The metabolic approach has been increasingly adopted in sustainable 
building: 
A green approach to the built environment involves a holistic approach 
to the design of buildings; all the resources that go into a building, be they 
materials, fuels or the contribution of the users, need to be considered i fa  
sustainable architecture is to be produced. [...I Everything used in the 
construction of the houses is biodegradable. Should a house reach the end of 
its useful life, all its materials can be re-used, or be allowed to rot naturally, 
without environmental harm. 106 
However, this kind of thinking is not as new as Brenda and Robert Vale seem 
to think. Juan Martinez-Alier points to Patrick Geddes (1854- 1932). the 
Scottish biologist, sociologist and urban planning theoretician, who perceived 
the matter/energy flow in terms of the stages of production: 
Geddes also proposed the construction of a type of input-output table in 
physical tenns [. . .I Energy and materials are transformed into products in three 
stages: the extraction of fuels and raw materials; the manufacture; and the tran- 
sport and exchange. The intermediary products used for the manufacture or tran- 
sport of thefial products must be subtractedfrom thefial products. We need 
an estimate of the losses (dissipation and disintegration) at each stage. 107 
The metabolic flow assessment expresses the basic question: what 
happens to matter and energy on their "path" through technological processes. 
The intake + life function + output matrix, which I propose here as the basic 
cycle, focuses the assessment on human life functions, or human needs, in 
contrast to the majority of assessment approaches which focus on technologies 
or production processes. The basic matrix can be expanded to include the 
production phases, but still keep the life functions as the conceptual focus. In 
an earlier study 108, I have established a technological sequence through which 
matter or material passes in the process of use for human needs: 
(1) natural resource + (2) element or component (semi-final product) +(3) com- 
modity (final product) + (4) use (life function) + (5) recycling (returning the rnat- 
ter/material back to technological process, or to natural cycles of renewal). 
As I have indicated above, every stage of this sequence involves a subprocess 
of energy/matter intake + technological process + output which can also be 
expanded into resource-through-recycling sub-sequences. 
The phases of the sequence after the use/life function are most questiona- 
ble in the current economy and technology, and they are generally addressed by 
the theory and practice of sustainability as the issue of recycling. Furthermore. 
these phases are commonly considered as a separate concern of waste manage- 
ment 109, organizationally disconnected from resource management. The entire me- 
tabolic flow should be conceived of as integral, and the intake + functioning + 
output matrix is meant to express that integrity. By contrast, in the current con- 
sumer culture, this integral flow is divided into three separate activities: produc- 
tion, consumption and communal services which are supposed to solve the 
waste problem. 
107 Martinez-Alier, op.cit. : 94 
108 Ristic. 1986 
109 Porteous, 1977 
Despite continued fears about hazardous waste, communities throughout 
the nation we_finding that their most pressing disposal problems were caused 
by ordinary garbage. There was nowhere to put it. Low prices ofraw materials 
had rendered recycling by and large economically infeasible. Increased public 
opposition had made siting new dumpsites extremely d ~ m u l t .  1 10 
Only 20% of the landflls in operation in 1986 are expected to be open in 
the year 2008, despite increasing amounts of waste. I.. .I 
Refuse-derived fuel plants have advantages over other municipal dispo- 
sal options because they require no change in waste collection patterns. 1 1 1 
However, change in waste management practice should rather be seen as  
requisite. The current idea that garbage has to be removed and placed (hidden) 
somewhere out of sight is most questionable and ecologically untenable 112. 
Actually, the very notion of refuse after use is a misconception: 
Nature admits no waste. Nothing is left over; every thing is joined in the 
spiral of lge. Perhaps other cultures know this better than we, for they have 
no concept of; no word for, waste. 1 13 
Recycling is a different technological approach, not a waste disposal 
option. The recycling phase in the technological sequence should be considered 
in terms of: 
reuse (in different context) - returning into the sequence at phase 4 
disassembly in order to: 
** reassemble into new final products 114 
- returning into the sequence at phase 3 
** recycle into secondary resources 
- returning into the sequence at phase 2 
recycling into natural cycles of renewal 
- returning into the sequence at phase 1 
The introduction of the notions of assembly and disassembly, as  relevant 
for the integrally conceived technological sequence, involves the assessment of 
the impact of technologies at  different phases of the sequence. In simplified 
terms, if the final product is designed and produced so that it involves exces- 
sive energy and pollution at disassembly, then such technology is not sustain- 
able. The assessment of what is recyclable is currently based on market evalu- 
ations which externalize most of the human-ecological assessment criteria. The 
110 Landy. et al.. 1990: 256; see also quote in footnote 23 in the previous chapter. 
11 1 Switzer, 1994: 106-107 
1 12 Ristic, 1989~ 
1 13 Van Der Ryn, 1980: 1 
114 The notion of new product has to be redefined and rid of the consummerist 
obsession with new commodities. See in this connection the quote at footnote 127. 
current extremely low recycling practices are the result of the current technolo- 
gical solutions along the whole technological sequence which do not assume the 
imperative of recycling or inclusion into natural cycles of renewal 115. Of 
course, such negligence of the current technology is dictated by the market- 
economy criteria of what is economically feasible to recycle. 
The following figures for average composition of municipal waste 
illustrate the potential for materials recovery, particularly for paper and 
board, glass and metals: 
20 - 45% paper and board 
15 - 3096 vegetable and animal wastes 
6 - 13% glass 
4-11% metals (mainly ferrous; aluminium 0.5-1%) 
3-896 plastic materials 
3 - 5% textiles and wood 
remainder: various and small particles. 1 16 
The assessment of technology as a metabolic cycle can ascertain how it 
achieves reinclusion of matter and energy into natural cycles of renewal. On 
the cosmic level, as I have already pointed out, everythmg eventually enters 
into a cycle of renewal. Therefore, both at the output and the resource end of 
the input + functioning + output flow, the inclusion into natural cycles of 
renewal has to be considered in terms of rate of renewal. Sustainable 
technology thus involves the human-ecological scale of the renewal rate, which 
defmes the assessment of the impact of pollution and environmental disruption 
that technologies can have at the human-ecological level of life processes. 
To suppose that we can ensure thefunctioning of the ecosphere ourselves 
with the sole aid of technological devices, and thereby dispense with the elabo- 
rate set of self-regulating mechanisms that has taken billions of years to evol- 
ve, is an absurd piece of anthropocentric presumption [...I If, for instance, the 
insecticides we use to replace the self-regulating controls that normally ensu- 
re the stability of insect populations were to destroy nitrogen-fiwing bacteria 
orpollinating insects -all the money and all the technology in the world would 
not suffie to replace them and thereby prevent l$e processes from grinding to 
a halt. Yet this substitution is implicit in the aim of industrial society. 117 
The human-ecological determination of technology has to be interpreted in 
terms of culture. I have established earlier that technologies of conversion into 
115 Some of the more recent solutions, like the industrial ecology concept and practice 
(see between footnotes 239 and 241 in chapter 8), are still addressing only the pre- 
consumer recycling involved in the production stages of the sequence. 
116 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1983: 9 
1 17 Goldsmith et al., 1972: 73 
usable forms of matter or energy. as well as into sustainable forms of output, 
are culturally determined. In fact, cultures are most often defined by these 
technologies. Consequently, consumer culture uses technologies which entail 
considerable problems both at the intake end (resource depletion), and at the 
output end (pollution and environmental disruption). 
Sustainable technology, or technology for an ecological culture, would there- 
fore have to be designed, implemented and assessed according to the 
metabolic cycle principle. This principle has to be applied in evaluating entire 
technological sequences involved in satisfymg human life functions. Of course. 
such an analysis becomes very complex and entails a reconsideration of human 
needs, and their emancipation, so to speak, from consumption disorders 
created by consumer culture - an analysis along the lines of insights into the 
problems of human needs that I presented earlier in this chapter. 
There is no human activity, concerted or individual, which we could 
regard as purely physiological, that is. "natural" or untutored. Even such 
activities as breathing, the work of internal secretions, digestion, and 
circulation happen within the arkficial environment of culturally 
determined conditions. I...] There is a constant interaction between the 
organism and the secondary milieu in which it exists, that is, culture. I...] 
In the case of breathing, this occurs within enclosed spaces, a house, a 
cave, a mine, or a factory. [...I The organs of breathing are also, to a large 
extent, organs of speech I...] It would be equally easy to show that fatigue, 
somnolence, thirst, and restlessness are determined by such cultural factors 
as a call to duty, the urgency of a task, the established rhythm of activities. 
Similar factors obviously also affect bladder and colon pressure and impulses 
of pain and fear. 1 18 
I will suggest here a possible pattern of an analysis of technology for ecolo- 
gical culture based on metabolic cycle principle and technological sequence ap- 
proach. I will show this analysis on exemples of only two of the basic human 
needs/functions which I listed in my suggested categorization 119: 
air intake + breathing + discharge: 
Technologies involved are for air purification (indoors and outdoors) and 
ventilation. The current overuse of artificially ventilated spaces in the 
"developed countries" is an obvious example of unsustainable technologies 
118 Malinowski. 1944: 68. 85 
119 See text after footnote 85 above. 
which consume enormous quantities of energy and infrastructure and result in 
health hazards from colds and flues to allergies and respiratory problems. This 
seeniingly very simple living function can involve rather complex technological 
sequences, where the outputs are material waste, entropy and environmental 
impact resulting from technological processes involved in the production and 
functioning of air purification and ventilation infrastructure. 
water intake + drinking + urine discharge 120: 
Technologies involved are for water accumulation, storage and distribution (if 
spring or aquifer water is considered), a s  well as  water purification (now 
prevalent technology of converting available resources into usable form). The 
principal reason for complex water purification is the current technical solution 
to the output of the drinking function: the waste water treatment. Before it 
comes to that, there are toilets which have to satisfy the culturally defined 
needs for privacy and comfort, and the necessary infrastructure. 
The predominant cultural mode of resolving the output of human excretory 
functions (and that involves also the next basic function of food intake + eating 
+ excretion) is to use water as the medium for removing human waste from the 
living space. This solution entails most difficult ecological problems. Their 
complex interrelatedness is best summarized by Sirn Van Der Ftyn: 
Mix one part excreta with one hundred parts clean water. Send the 
mixture through pipes to a central station where billions are spent in futile 
attempts to separate the two. Then dump the effluent, now poisoned with 
chemicals but still rich in nutrients, into the nearest body of water. The 
nutrients feed algae which soon use up all the oxygen in the water, eventuaUy 
destroying aU aquatic li$e that may have survived the chemical residues. 
All this adds up to a strange balance sheet: the soil is starved for the 
natural benefits of human manure, garbage and organic materials that go 
down the toilet, the drain and to the dump. So agribusiness shoots it up with 
arti_ficial fertilizers made largely from petroleum These synthetics are not 
absorbed by the soil and leach out to pollute rivers-and oceans. We each use 
eight b ten thousand gallons offresh water to flush away material that could 
be returned to the earth to maintain its fertility. Our excreta - not wastes but 
misplaced resources - end up destroying food chains, food supply and water 
quality in rivers and oceans. 121 
120 This is, of course, a simplification as urination is not physiologically related only 
to drinking. 
121 Van Der Ryn. op.cit. : Introduction 
The interrelatedness and interdependency of technology and human needs 
it satisfies becomes so obvious, and the systemic approach to its analysis so 
appropriate, when the basic resources like air and water are considered. As 
they are the principal media of life processes, they are also the main vehicles 
for transmission of pollutants. And both aspects are relevant for the human- 
ecological context of perception of these physico-chemical entities. 
Water, at once the most vital and the most abused urban resource, best 
illustrates the precarious relationship that now exists between cities and 
natural systems. [...I Few incentives exist to conserve water or protect itfrom 
pollution. Toxic heavy metals and organic chemicals now threaten to taint 
urban water supplies in much the same way that waterborne diseases did 
during the Industrial Revolution a century or more ago. Neurological damage 
and mutagenic birth defects may increase as more and more toxic wastes are 
assimilated and concentrated in urban environments. 122 
A major issue with water is that the current practices do not consider it at 
all in terms of natural cycles of renewal, but largely regard it as an inexhausti- 
ble resource. It is indicative of our present view of the environment and natural 
processes that such a striking misconception is adopted of a natural element 
whose circulatory movement in nature is so conspicuous and so much part of 
our everyday experience. Sustainable approaches have, however, recently 
begun to consider the recycling of water and the categorization of different 
kinds of water requirements in terms of its purity. (This issue is particularly 
pertinent to the human life function which I classified as personal care.) 
Of the water used by urban development, more than half is spent on 
irrigating ornamental landscapes, and most oflen this water is of potable, 
drinkable quality. [. . .I An American household of four people typically uses 
about one acre-foot of water per year [...I 
Water for landscape irrigation can be reclaimed and partially treated if 
necessary for landscape use after being used initially for "higher quality" 
functions in kitchen and bathroom sinks. 123 
All these issues overlay with the life function of living space which involves 
complex technologies of building and using built space. In a sustainable or eco- 
logical cultural mode, these technologies include consideration of energy flow. 
- 
122 Brown and Jacobson, 1987: 36-37 
123 Thayer, op.cit.: 257-258 
Solar technologies have been regarded as  particularly appropriate 124. Special 
attention has been paid to building materials used for enclosures and their im- 
pact on inhabitants. Furthermore, enclosures themselves should be assessed 
as  energy systems (taking into consideration also life-, or subtle-energies). 
Buildings should be designed to work with climate and natural energy 
sources. 125 
A pertinent aspect of considering built space in terms of the metabolic cycle 
is the shift of perspective to regarding buildings themselves as  metabolic proces- 
ses - not only a s  changeable physical enclosures in the way that the following quo- 
tation depicts them - but as integral infrastructures for human life processes 126. 
It is useful to remember that traditional buildings last for centuries not 
because they are so sound, but because they are continually repaired. 127 
The above examples of the analysis of technology based on the metabolic 
cycle principle should suffice to present the assessment approach that I 
consider appropriate in the context of sustainability or ecological culture. It is 
important to reiterate that this analysis should never loose sight of the integrity 
of life processes and natural cycles of renewal. 
124 Some of the vast array of literature on sustainable building technologies includes: 
Boyle and Harper, 1976; Crowther, 1977; Mazria, 1979; Olkowski, et al., 1979; 
Bainbridge, 1980; Butler, 198 1; Andrejko, 1989; Walter and Crenshaw, 1992; Potts, 
1993; National Audubon Society, 1994; Vale and Vale, op.cit. 
125 Vale and Vale, op.cit.: 84 
126 See also quote at footnote 86 in chapter 7. 
127 Alexander and Jacobson. 1974: 45 
Chapter 
Alienation 
Matters of li$e and death did not worry Ippolit Mat- 
veyevich Vorobyaninov, although by the nature of 
his work he dealt with themfrom nine till$ve 
every day, with a half-hour break for lunch 
Ilf and Petrov, The Twelve Chairs 1 
The social crisis we are living through is basically 
due to the inability of people in general to govern 
their own lwes. 2 
Problems of Alienation 
in the Context of Sustainability 
The insights into the ecology of technology offered by the metabolic cycle 
analysis are entirely alien to consumers in the current cultural setting. Consu- 
mers are typically aware of matter or energy only in the form of commodities 
that are sold to them. In the culture where there is a sharp divide into produc- 
tion, consumption and communal services (waste management), consumers 
1 Ilya Ilf (1897- 1937) and Yevgeny Petrov (1903- 1942). Russian (Soviet) satirists 
2 Reich, 195 1b: Introduction 
have no involvement in the phases of technological sequence before or after the 
use (consumption) of final products. Consequently, they are disinterested in 
and negligent of where the energy and matter that they use to satisfjr their life 
functions come from and go to: 
The typical technology of urban water supply and wastewater treatment 
is [...I located out of sight and as farfrom the center of town as possible, 
hopefully somewhere people rarely go. It is no wonder that few people. when 
asked, can tell you where their wastewater goes once their washing machine 
cycle is operated or their toilet &_flushed. "Out-of-sight, out-of-mind" is the 
guiding principle. 3 
A most important issue about human needs and the ways by which they 
are satisfied, is the problem of involvement and control. That emerges as  an 
issue of alienation. Humans have become thoroughly alienated from the ways of 
satisfying their own vital needs. They have lost control over the process 4: 
Unlike our ancestors we have little control over the creation of our 
power, food, clothing, or shelter and this loss may be harmful to the human 
psyche. This oversimplification and impoverishment of the lives of most of 
us could lie close to the rmts of much of the chaos, violence, and 
disintegration that threatens modem society. 5 
The loss of control over the process of satisfymg one's own needs is a 
disconnection from the basic eco-systemic relationship - the exchange between 
individuals and their environment. In the current cultural pattern humans have 
become alienated from their awareness of and control over this basic eco- 
systemic interaction, and, consequently, from natural metabolic cycles of 
renewal. This alienation is both an expression and a reinforcement of the 
dualized construct of humanity versus nature, and it is closely related to the 
distortion of human needs into commodities 6 which I elaborated in the 
previous chapter. 
The loss of control over the ways humans satisfjr their needs has been a 
gradual process - a process of escalating institutionalization of human lives. 
For important matters in their lives, humans have been increasingly dependent 
3 Thayer, 1994: 259, 261 
4 Ristic, 1982; Ristic, 1985; Ristic, 1989 
5 Todd. 1977: 364 
6 Gorz, 1980: 77 
on more and more complicated, and less and less intelligible social and 
technological mechanisms. 
The rnos t important dimension of advanced technological institutions is 
the social one, that is, the institutions are agencies of highly centralized and 
intensive social control. 7 
Any industry exercises this kind of deep-seated monopoly when it 
becomes the dominant means of satisgijng needs that formerly occasioned a 
personal response. 8 
Humans are increasingly detached from the immediate functioning of the 
social environment in which they used to be competently involved in the pro- 
cess of satisfymg their own needs. This immediate social environment - which 
is the essential part of the systemic unity of the individual and her or his envi- 
ronment - has now turned into impersonal and depersonalizing institutions 9. 
Different forms of institutionalized provision for human needs - care, service, 
commodities - have not only distorted to various degrees the character of 
needs, but have created social, economic and technological relationships where 
humans no longer have control over their own lives. In the context of an 
ecological culture, this is the central issue of alienation. Alienation was extensi- 
vely discussed in these terms by the members of the "Frankfurt School" 
(especially Marcuse lo). They expanded upon the initial Marxist concept of 
alienation which primarily implied estrangement of proletarian work that was a 
result of their exclusion from sharing the surplus-value created by their labor. 
Jean Baudrillard's postmodernist analysis of alienation is based on a re- 
evaluation of the basic Marxist laws of value 11, and on his argumentation that 
the overt and direct forms of exploitation have been blurred and surpassed by 
a pervasive domination of the symbols of consumer culture over the entire 
scope of everyday life. He compellingly conveys a picture of the current stage 
7 McDermott, 1969: 158 
8 Illich, 1974: 45 
9 Ristic, l99Oa 
1 0  The decisions over l$e and death [...I are made at places over which the individuals 
have no control. (Marcuse, 1964: 32) See also footnote 57 in the previous chapter. 
1 1  See quote at footnote 26 in the previous chapter. 
of Western civilization where humans are entirely devoid of personal control 
over and responsibility for all aspects of their lives: 
From birth control to death control, whether we execute people or compel 
their survival, [...I the essential thing is that the decision is witMrawn from 
them that their life and their death ate m f i e e l y  theirs, but that they live 
or die according to a social visa. It is even intolerable that their lijie and death 
remain open to biological chance, since this is still a type of freedom [...I 
Death proper has been abolished to make room for death control and 
euthanasia [...I It m t  be possible to operate death as a social service, 
integrate it like health and disease under the sign of the Plan and Social 
Security. [...I 'You die, we'U do the rest' is already just a n  old advertising slogan 
used forfuneral homes. 12 
Alberto Melucci puts the issue in terms which emphasize the loss of 
personal experience that is the utter consequence of depersonalizing alienation 
of the institutionalized social and technological environment: 
Intensive and unremitting care, unequalled in human history, is thus 
taken of our everydq lives. No longerfields of experience and of relations, 
our lives have turned into spaces for attention and manipulation by teams of 
specialists circumscribing problems and manufacturing solutions. 13 
The perception of institutions and of institutionalization as  an imposition of 
control over human lives, requires an examination of the meaning of the term 
institution 14. Malinowski uses a broader definition which conceives all forms of 
human organization for the purpose of satisfymg their needs as  institutions, 
but he also observes that the term is "not a lways  clearly defined or  consistently 
used" 1 5. 
Daniel Bromley distinguishes two types of institutions: conventions; and 
rules or entitlements 16. The second category should entail the regulatory 
character of institutions which he elaborated in the context of economic 
structures 17. However, he subsequently confuses the regulatory aspect of 
institutions with more spontaneous forms of social organization and behavior: 
Regularizing institutions exist and they are called habits or norms [...I In 
most countries individuals respect the sanctity of queues. 18 
12 Baudrillard, 1976: 174 (emphasis mine) 
13 Melucci, 1996: 83-84 (emphasis mine) 
14 instihere - stituere - statuere (Latin) = set up (Oxford dict.) 
15 Malinowski, 1944: 38 
16 Bromley. 1989: 41 
17 See the quote marked by footnote 15 in the previous chapter. 
18 Bromley, op.cit.: 38 
The example Bromley has chosen can point exactly to the difference betwe- 
en institutionalized regulation as an imposition of behavior (or ways of satisfjmg 
human needs), and spontaneous personal responsibility for the relations and 
interactions between individuals and their social and natural environment. The 
respect for queues reflects an individual sense of responsibility for others. The 
moment the queue becomes institutionalized, prescribed by an institution, that 
sensitivity is lost and substituted by authoritarian obedience. 
The key criterion for understanding institutions and institutionalization in the 
context of alienation is responsibilityl9. Marcuse offered a definition most 
pertinent to this perspective. He distinguished institutions as formalized, 
inflexible structures that do not exhibit, nor enable spontaneous, direct and 
unmediated social relationships and that are, therefore, prone to creating 
alienation: 
Society I . . . ]  exercises its independent power over the individuals, and this 
Society is no unidenhjiable "ghost." It has its empirical hard core in the 
system of institutions, which are the established andfiozen relationships 
among men. 20 
The spontaniety of following one's own genuine needs. and the related 
individual reasponsibility are contrary to the purposes and interests of the 
current economy - as I showed in the previous chapter. Therefore, alienation 
from control over the ways of satisfjmg one's own needs takes the form of 
distortion of needs into manipulatable wants. 
The idea is always the same. People have to be keptji-om satisjijng their 
needs in a spontaneous and independent way. They must depend for their 
satisfaction on institutional and industrial objects that they can only get by 
buying or rentingji-om institutions that control them in what nlich calls a 
"radical monopoly. " 2 1 
Although human needs are turned into wants and treated as extremely 
malleable, they are still a form- however perverted- of life functions. The mostly 
unconscious internalization of these imposed wants is a crucial aspect of 
alienation: 
19 The issue of individual responsibility is crucial for my view of ecological culture 
and I will further elaborate on it in the following chapters. 
20 Marcuse, op.cit.: 190- 19 1 (emphasis mine) 
21 Gorz, op.cit.: 88; see also quote at footnote 8. 
Most of the prevailing needs to relax, to havefun to behave and consume 
in accordance with the advertisements, to love and hate what others love and 
hate, belong to this category of false needs. Such needs have a societal content 
andfunction which are determined by external powers over which the 
individual has no control I...] No matter how much such needs may have 
become the individual's own, reproduced and fortiified by the conditions of his 
existence; no matter how much he identifies himself with them andjinds 
himself in their satisfaction, they continue to be what they werefrom the 
beginning - products of a society whose dominant interest demands 
repression. 22 
Marcuse's comprehensive analysis of alienation in the current social systems 
of Western civilization is based on revealing the dependency on and slavery to 
imposed needs of a totalitarian consumer culture. He perceives the necessity 
for humans to regain control over their own needs and their own lives as  a 
requisite for their growth toward freedom, self consciousness and 
responsibility. 
The distinguishing feature of advanced industrial society is its eflectiue 
suffiation of those needs which demand liberation - liberation alsofrom 
that which is tolerable afluent society. Here, the social controls exact the 
overwhelming need for the production and consumption of waste; the need for 
stupefying work where it is no longer a real necessity; the need for modes of 
relaxation which soothe and prolong this stupefiation; the need for 
maintaining such deceptive liberties as free competition at administered 
prices, afree press which censors itself, free choice between brands and 
gadgets. 23 
Baudrillard's analysis 24 presents a more pessimistic picture of the consu- 
mer culture, without much room left for liberation that Marcuse still held to. It 
seems that alienation has developed further and deeper, and has reached a 
stage when reality is dominated by consumer symbols which pervade the entire 
span of life functions. So people not only adopt and internalize the ways of life 
over which they have no control, but the consumerist life style effectively gives 
them an illusion that they participate in a world of consumer symbols which 
renders their control and responsibility utterly irrelevant. They buy into a sys- 
tem of images and symbols which creates a simulated reality that Baudrillard 
identifies by the term simulacra 25. 
Marcuse discussed the possibility that 
22 Marcuse, op.cit.: 4-5 
23 ibid.: 7-8; see in this context the quotes at footnotes 36 and 37 in chapter 3. 
24 Baudrillard, op.cit. 
25 simulacrum (from Lat. sirnulare) = deceptive substitute (Oxford dict.) 
the concept of alienation seems to become questionable when the individuals 
identify themselves with the existence which is imposed upon them and have 
in it their own development and satisfaction. 
But, here, he had in mind the concept of alienation derived from Manrism - an 
alienation which involves a direct repression by institutions that impose control 
over human lives. However, he concludes that this further development is "a 
more progressive stage of alienation" 26. Marcuse perceived that this new stage 
of alienation was characterized by a new language of imposed images which 
does not search for but establishes and imposes buth and falsehood. [...I It 
seems unwarranted to assume that the recipients believe, or are made to 
believe, what they are being told. The new touch of the magic-ritual language 
rather is that people don't believe it, or don't care, and yet act accordingly. 27 
This passivity and indifference becomes a most disheartening aspect of 
alienation. Baudrillard ascribes it to the abolition of referential systems, 
including even the exchange value, which, he argues, has been replaced by 
what he depicts as symbolic exchange, or a system of simulacra 28. This 
system is based on mediated and manipulated reality, where media become the 
means of control over human needs, opinions and ways of life. 
In order to persuade the citizen that he controls his destiny, that 
morality informs decisions, and that technology is the servant rather than 
the driving force, it is necessary today to distort information. The ideal of 
informing the public has given way to trying to convince the public that forced 
actions are actually desirable actions. 29 
The mediated reality, however, goes beyond information; it invades our experi- 
ence and our affective reactions: 
To feed ourselves we consume symbols, to love and reproduce we resort to 
the advice of experts, to desire and dream we use the language provided by the 
26 Marcuse. op-cit.: 1 1 
27 ibid.: 103 
28 The era of simulation is announced everywhere by the cornmutability of formerly 
contradictory or dialecticauy opposed terms. Everywhere we see the same 'genesis 
of simulacra': the commutability of the beautijid and the ugly in fashion, of the left 
and the right in politics, of the true and the false in every media message, the useful 
and the useless at the level of objects, nature and culture at every level of 
sign~fication All the great humanist criteria of value, the whole civilisation of 
moral, aesthetic and practical judgement are effaced in our system of images and 
signs. Everything becomes undecidable, the characteristic effect of the domination 
ofthe code, which everywhere rests on the principle of neutralisation, of 
indifference. (Baudrillard, op.cit.: 8-9, emphasis mine) 
29 Illich, 1973: 18 
media. Even the threat of nuclear war, the very survival of our planet, hinges 
uponthecontrol ofinformation. [ , . ] E ~ x T ~ c ~  beannes an art- COT IS^^&.^^ 
We are now living entirely within the 'aesthetic' hallucination of reality. 
[. . .] Reality has passed completely into the game of reality. Radical 
disaffection, the cml and cybernetic stage, replaces the hot, phantasmatic 
phase. The consummate enjoyment of the signs of guilt, despair, violence and 
death are replacing guilt, anxiety and even death in the total euphoria of 
simulation. This euphoria aims to abolish cause and efect, origin and end, 
and replace them with reduplication. 31 
The current stage of alienation in the consumer culture is thus 
characterized by virtual social reality which is achieved by disconnection from 
or neutralization of our direct affective response and interaction with "real" 
reality: 
We are presently living with a minimum of real sociality and a maxi- 
mum of simulation. [ . . . I  A televised event [...is] a cold event warmed up by a 
cold medium for masses, themselves cold, who are going to experience only a 
posthumous emotion, a tactile and dissuasive shudder that will enable them 
to let the catastrophe slip into oblivion with a sort of aesthetic good conscien- 
ce. I . . . ]  Immense energies [are] spent in maintaining this simulacrum at arm's 
length, to avoid the brutal dis-simulation that would occur should the reality 
of a radical loss of meaning become too evident. [...I The masses respond to the 
simulation of meaning with a kind of reverse simulation; they respond to 
dissuasion with disafection, and to illusions with an enigmatic beliej 32 
In this way, alienation becomes a detachment from and loss of sensitivity 
for the reality, for our social and natural environment 33. 
Systemic Perspective of Alienation 
Alienation emerges as an increasing rift between individuals and their 
social environment. The systemic interrelatedness of individuals and their 
environment (social and natural) is based on active interactions, on involvement 
in the processes of exchange which constitute the systemic unity of individual- 
30 Melucci, op.cit.: 1-2 (emphasis mine) 
31 Baudrillard, op.cit.: 74-75 (emphasis mine). In this connection, the problem of 
virtual violence which pervades the media and entertainment products is 
particularly pertinent. This issue will be relevant in the chapter on domination. 
32 Baudrillard, 1979: 155, 160- 16 1 ,  163 (emphasis mine) 
33 TO have seen all there is to see is to have become totaUy desensitized and 
habituated [ . . . I  As the pace quickens and the intensity escalates, have we lost the 
capacity to notice what actually lies directly before us? (Melucci and Chorover, 
1997: 82) 
in-her/his-environment. This social environment has been transformed into 
institutions which turned individual interactions into passive consumption. 
The alienation effect of institutionalization is further intensified with the per- 
vasive growth-orientation of the current economic and social system. Growth 
extends to proliferation of ever bigger and larger economic, technological and 
organizational structures and institutions - a tremendous increase in scale and 
complexity. These large-scale organizational structures seem to operate by 
themselves, by some unstoppable inertia, irrespective of particular cases and 
individual needs. From the systemic perspective, there is no more possibility 
for individual interaction with the social environment on such a scale, so the 
basic systemic interrelatedness of individual-in-her/his-environment is broken. 
Systemic interrelatedness of individuals and their environment (social and 
natural) does extend to very broad levels of complexity, but this extended 
relation is manifested through nested levels of interaction. The social and 
economic organization based on large-scale institutional structures annihilates 
the immediate and intermediate levels of interaction. The pattern of 
relationships is thus redbced to isolated individuals and large-scale structures 
+ - 
which are practically inaccessible to individual interactions and insensitive to 
individual needs. 
We find highly mobile individuals (or nuclear families) within an almost 
undifferentiated and unbounded mass extending to cover the globe. There is 
no sense of scale, or intermediate levels of organization. 34 
Vital human needs are satisfied in a centralized way - for their satisfaction. 
individuals depend entirely on large-scale institutionalized structures. Because 
of their disproportionate size, these structures operate practically independently 
from the needs. The needs being so many, it seems they cannot any more be 
satisfied without the large-scale systems, but, at  the same time, every individual 
case has no influence on their functioning. There is a dehumanizing shift: humans 
and their needs exist for the sake of maintaining and sustaining the functioning 
of large-scale institutional structures with all the comprehensive gigantic 
34 Booth, 1984: 74 
technical and social machinery that serves them 35. Thus people become 
passive consumers without any control over the ways of satisfymg their own 
needs 36. 
Technology [can be perceived] as a self-enclosed, totalitarian system. In 
this totalitarian system, true human values are lost and technology becomes 
a n  autonomous force guided by internal values that bear no necessary 
relation to the needs of humanity. Means become ends, and every aspect of 
society - the individual, the family, the state - becomes subservient to the 
system 37 
This kind of social organization disrupts the basic systemic quality - the 
simultaneous integrity and identity of individual systems and their belonging to 
broader levels of interaction and complexity. This disruption is the fundamental 
characteristic of the current progressive stage of alienation. The social 
environment has transmuted into impersonal bureaucracy, into a mechanism 
devoid of any humaneness, insensitive to differences and uniqueness of each 
particular expression of life 38. 
It  is not commonly realized that this dehumanizing effect occurs on both 
sides. Those who are more directly involved in the operation of the large-scale 
institutional systems, usually hold to the illusion that they are in control. 
However, they are only in service of, and are just as  enslaved by the 
institutional structures. 
As re~fcation tends to become totalitarian by virtue of its technolo- 
gical form, the organizers and administrators themselves become 
increasingly dependent on the machinery which they organize and 
administer. And this mutual dependence is no longer the dialectical 
relationship between Master and Servant, which has been broken in the 
Generally irresponsible, the individual becomes, whatever happens to him, a 
pretext for bureaucratic structures I.. .I (Baudrillard, 1976: 170) 
Ristic, 1989b 
Teich, 1981: 3 
A branch of industry does not impose a radical monopoly on a whole society 
by the simple fact that it produces scarce products, or because it drives cornpetmg 
industries 08 the market, but rather by virtue of its acquired ability to create and 
shape the need which it alone can satisfy. I...] Each citizen of a motorized Utopia 
would be deprived of the use of his feet and dra$ed into the servitude of 
prolgerating networks of transportation. (Illich, 1974: 47-48) 
The progressive stages of alienation (in Marcuse's terms) are emerging from do- 
mination of institutionalized systems over humans. Alienation and 
institutionalization are, therefore, issues of domination and will be further 
discussed in chapter 8. 
Ristic, 1990a 
struggle for mutual recognition, but rather a vicious circle which encbse both 
the Master and the Servant. 39 
Bigness encourages me (even forces me) to treat you like a cipher, an 
inconsequentialfraction of the masses I must deal with. It licenses me to 
impose an abstract policy upon yourflesh-and-blood particularity, and then 
to hidefrom the consequences behind a wall of red tape and procedural 
protocol. So we become unreal to one another, mere phantoms moving 
through a maze of impersonal rules and statistical formulas.40 
The ways of satisfying basic human needs are less and less under the con- 
trol of those who are directly, vitally and ardently interested, whose needs are 
being satisfied, and more and more in the hands of professionally obligated wor- 
kers or officials, who most often plod through tasks indifferently, unemotionally 
and inefficiently. The loss of personal involvement in the ways of satisfying the 
person's own needs - in processes of exchange and in direct interaction with 
the immediate social and natural environment - that loss induces the passivity 
and disinterestedness which are characteristic of the current consumer 
culture. This aspect of alienation is manifested in increasing loss of meaning in 
work. Lutz and Lux perceive in this context the importance of technologies for 
satisfymg human needs that put directly involved people in control over the 
entire ecology of the process: 
Work occupies only a peripheral place in contemporary economics texts, 
where it is ordinarily referred to as "labor" and analyzed as one of several 
inputs (or 'yactors of production") in the making of consumable commodities 
and services. I.. .I 
Meaningful work is the primary avenue towards afully human economic 
system. I...] Any work that does not albw us to satish our social and moral 
needs of self-esteem has to be described as alienating. 41 
In the current cultural and socio-economic context, work is alienating in its 
increasing meaninglessness, rather than directly enslaving as it was in earlier 
historical stages. The alienation of work is not direct any more, as it was in 
strictly Marxist terms 42; it is rather part of a virtual social reality and of the 
fused production/consumption (as depicted by Baudrillard) of things no longer 
connected to real human needs and to life processes. 
39 Marcuse, op.cit.: 33 
40 Roszak, 1979: 310-31 1 
4 1 Lutz and Lux, 1988: 153. 150 
42 See text around footnote 26. 
Labour power is no longer brutally bought and sold, it is designed, 
marketed and turned into a commodity - production re-enters the sign system 
of consumption. [...I Labour (even in the guise of leisure) [. . .] pervades every 
aspect of life in the form of a control, a permanent occupation of spaces and 
times regulated according to an omnipresent code. Wherever there are people, 
they must be&ed, whether in schools, factories, on the beach, in front of the 
TV, or being retrained. 43 
The pervasive control over human lives, perpetuated by large-scale 
institutional systems, results in loss of responsibility as the key aspect of 
alienation. By loss of control over the ways of satisfymg their own needs. 
humans are deprived of their responsibility for their own lives. The mode of 
operation of large-scale institutional systems actually induces and stimulates 
individual recklessness and irresponsibility 44. And institutional systems seem 
to take over the responsibility for all aspects of individual lives. 
This rationalist culture sufiers, like no other, from a collective 
paranoia. Something or someone must have been responsible for the least 
accident, the slightest irregularity, the least catastrophe, an earth tremor, a 
house in ruins, bad weather; everything is an assassination attempt. [...I The 
new social contract: society as a whole, with its science and technology 
becomes collectively responsible for the death of each individual. 45 
This obsession with institutional responsibility, which has become so 
overwhelming, actually indicates the negative aspect of responsibility: 
individual responsibility has mutated into institutional liability. If individuals are 
deprived of responsibility, and the systemic interactions between individuals 
and their social environment has been disrupted, there can be no genuine 
responsibility at any level any more, a s  responsibility is based on interactions 
between individuals and their social and natural environment. 
The erosion of trust in an economy leads to the development of ever 
complicated and extensive legal procedures in which each party tries to 
protect itself against being sold out or taken advantage o$ This multiplies the 
red tape involved in economic transaction. Contract requirements 
proliferate, and litigation over their interpretation correspondingly 
increases. [. . .] Thus the "transaction costs" of doing business increases and the 
economic system becomes more cumbersome and infixible. 46 
43 Baudrillard, 1976: 14 
44 Here are some very simple examples (also illustrative of more complex situations): 
at home you most probably turn off the light as you come out of the bathroom; at 
work you tend to leave it on - the larger the company/institution you work in, the 
more likely. Similarly, you are extremely unlikely to throw a candy wrap on your 
floor, but not so unlikely to do it in the street. 
45 ibid.: 161- 162 (emphasis mine) 
46 Lutzand Lux, op.cit.: 85 
The lack of control over and responsibility for individual's own life - as well 
as the incapacity to affect the operation of the large-scale institutional systems 
- can create the feelings of futility of individual efforts and of helplessness, 
passivity and apathy. These feelings can become a chronic disturbance of 
behavior when individuals are repeatedly exposed to vital situations which 
affect them adversely, but are entirely beyond their ability to exert any 
influence upon. This chronic disturbance has been a subject of extended 
research by psychologist Martin Seligman, and he described it as "learned 
helplessness": 
When experience with uncontrollable events gives rise to the expectation 
that events in Urefuture will also elude control, disruptions in motivation. 
emotion, and learning may ensue. "Learned helplessness" refers to the 
problems that arise in the wake of uncontrollability. First described in the 
1960's among laboratory animals, learned helplessness has since been 
applied to a variety of human problems entailing inappropriate passivity and 
demoralization. 47 
Joanna Macy discusses apathy as a reaction to helplessness against the 
overwhelming threat of environmental and military destructions 48, but I 
contend that the gist of the problem is the disruption of direct interaction 
between individuals and their social environment and the resulting lack of 
individual control and responsibility. 
The feeling of futility and helplessness would probably be lessened if large- 
scale institutional systems were entirely successful in fulfilling their apparent 
role which seems to be a logical consequence of their takeover of responsibility 
for human lives. However, they are typically dysfunctional and inefficient and 
their failure results primarily from lack of responsibility and its transformation 
into liability. 
The inefficiencies and dysfunctions stemming from irresponsibility (or 
fictitious, pseudo-responsibility) of large-scale 'institutional systems is most 
obtrusive in organizational and administrative institutions. 
The system of separation of powers [leads] to no one being exclusively 
accountable, leaving plenty of room to pointmgers. Outcome is division and 
deadlock. There are power -  inducements for politicians to avoid dealing 
47 Peterson, Maier and Seligman, 1993: 7 
48 Macy, 1983: 4; Macy. 1995: 248 
with d ~ m u l t  problems [...which] lead to incoherent and inemiently targeted 
policies. 49 
Social problems tend, therefore, to be evaded and substituted by 
technological issues: 
Since technological problems are intrinsically easier to solve than 
social problems, I . . . ]  we transform our social problems into technological 
ones. For example, faced with a shortage offresh water, one can either try 
social engineering - altering lge-styles and the ways people use water - or a 
technological j?x, such as the provision of additional fresh water through 
nuclear-powered desalting of sea water. 50 
Consequently, "technological fixes" are given high societal priority and we end 
up in a culture of domination by technology 51. The evasion of social problems 
results in new social problems created by "technological fixes" 52. 
Large-scale technological, economic and administrative institutional 
systems present vast social and ecological problems. Scale is one of the central 
issues of sustainability. It ensues from growth devoid of connectedness with 
life and natural processes of renewal, growth as  occupying and colonizing ever 
larger expanses of human and physical resources. Large-scale technological 
and organizational structures, resulting from such growth orientation, present 
managerial and decision-making problems, and produce huge operating costs, 
apart from their harmful social and environmental impact. And the current 
economic system is conceptualized to hide these costs. 
There may be many situations where decentralized technologies are 
substantially cheaper to the society than centralized ones, especially when 
the full set of social costs is taken into account. 53 
The unsustainable inefficiencies and dysfunctions of large-scale centralized 
technological systems primarily result from the entropy of complex and oversize 
infrastructures, and from the systemic irresponsibility (or elusive responsibility) 
of their organizational and managerial structure. These deficiencies or 
diseconomies of scale translate into excessive costs. 
49 Weaver and Rockman. 1993: 2 
50 Teich, op-cit.: 2 
51 This issue will be discussed in chapter 8. 
52 See quotes and text between footnotes 28 and 29 in chapter 3. 
53 Craig and Levine, 1982: 7 
Most of these enormous sums is going into building huge regional 
systems of pipes and interconnectors with single large treatment plants. 
Builders and bureaucrats seem to favor these super sewers even though much 
of the money is spent simply moving wastewater around, rather than treating 
it. This means not only high construction costs but also high operating costs, 
since water is heavy and it takes e n o m u s  electrical energy to pump it. Single 
large treatment plants also tend to put all the eggs into one basket. Plant 
breakdowns can be disastrous; moreover, the movement of so much water 
Jiom its natural course creates ecological imbalances. 54 
Even apparently sustainable technologies can be dysfunctional and 
inefficient if they are based on large-scale, centralized institutional mode of 
organization 55. The key to sustainability are not only ecologically sound 
technologies, but also the issues of control and responsibility. 
Any waterless system represents a technical and psychological departure 
Jiom the thinking and practice of many sanitarians. Their concern is to 
minimize individual involvement and responsibility for waste management. 
They tend to favor the "out of sight, out of mind" approach to waste 
management that centralizes the disposal of wastes in facilities run by public 
agencies. Systems which require maintenance by individual householders are 
discouraged because they create a control problem for local officials. 56 
One of the human-ecologically most dysfunctional institutional systems - 
one that went out of control and beyond responsibility - is the corporation. 
Corporations present in a n  overwhelming form the characteristics of 
unsustainable growth. institutionalized domination and economic control over 
increasing aspects of human lives. 
Corporations are the dominant institutions of our time, exercising the 
sort of power wielded by the church during the Middle Ages or by the 
nation-state in more recent times. In fact, some corporations are actually 
bigger than nations in terms of money. Mitsubishi is the 22nd largest 
economy on earth, ranked ahead of Indonesia. 57 
The development and operational features of corporations indicate that 
technological, economic and organizational systems cannot be conceived as  
separate. Hawken correctly perceives the corporation as  a piece of technology 
(although he doesn't explicitly discern its alienating aspect) - as  a large-scale. 
- 
54 Van Der Ryn, 1980: 100 
55 Ristic. 1990a 
56 Van Der Ryn, op-cit.: 73 
57 Hightower, 1997: 60 
The one hundred largest corporations have more economic power than 80 
percent of the world. (Hawken. 1993: 108) 
alienated institutional system which operates as  a mechanism served by its 
human and infrastructural parts: 
A corporation is a social machine with interchangeable parts and 
processes that can be I.. .I bought and sold, broken up and reassembled. Because 
managers manage corporations, it is dimcult to see that corporations also 
run themselves. They have a powerful inertia toward given goals, and if one 
manager cannot accomplish those goals, he or she is very likely to be replaced 
until one is found who can. [...I A corporation, although created and peopled by 
human beings, does not depend on any of them in order to exist. Founders die. 
so do their families; directors and managers come and go; workers have 
become essentially interchangeable components. 58 
Money is also a piece of technology. The emergence of institutional 
dysfunction, irresponsibility and detachment from social and ecological reality 
is best exemplified by developmental evolution of money 59 from an exchange 
tool and convenience, to an  entirely fictitious symbol in the current consumer 
culture, dominated by what Baudrillard defines as simulacra (deceptive 
substitutes) 60. 
Today there is no longer any commitment by the banking system to 
convert paper money into any unit of production, be it a commodity or a 
service. As a result, there is no longer a n y  basis for conflence that the 
banking system is subjected to a n y  checks and balances to maintain either its 
stability or relevance in organizing society to produce and consume. 61 
Money was initially a commodity (mostly gold, silver, etc.) commonly used 
as  a reference unit, or measure of exchange value, and a convenience which 
enabled the transactions of goods to be mediated and deferred. Banks first 
appeared as  depositories of the commodity that served as money, and a s  
places where its quality was checked and tested. Soon banks started issuing 
deposit notes which were conveniently accepted as  substitute money, but they 
58 ibid.: 120 (emphasis mine). Corporations and their discomectedness from 
human-ecological processes will be further discussed in the next chapter. 
59 lucidly and succinctly presented by Shann Turnbull (Morehouse et al., 1989: 138- 
145) 
60 See footnote 28 above. 
61 Morehouse et al., 1989: 138- 139 
To avofd declaring a country bankrupt, further loans are made to provide the 
foreign exchange to allow interest payments to be met. In many instances, the new 
loans are made by multilateral governmental banking agencies, such as the World 
Bank, or with the support of govenunent guarantees. In this way, the cancer of 
compounding bad loans is spread throughout the national governments of the 
world's strongest economies and their banking systems. (ibid.: 139) 
also made it convenient for the banks to create money for their own profit- 
making purposes 62. 
In many cases, one cus tomef s deposit of gold or tobacco would be used to 
back a note issued to a new borrower without the consent or even knowledge of 
the depositor. Unless you are a banker, such action is called embezzlement. [...I 
The practice of a bank only holding afraction of the "hard" or reserve currency 
for which it created paper claims became known as 'Ifractional banking." It 
might also be viewed as duplicity, especially when carried out so excessively 
as to provoke the failure of the bank. 63 
The most important point here is the ensuing centralization of the banking 
system and the emergence of large-scale institutional structures which led it 
toward dysfunction and utter detachment from any tangible production 
processes, or human-ecological processes of exchange of matter and energy 
with the environment. 
The issue of paper money became a monopoly of national governments 
and their central bankers. I. ..I In 1971, the U. Sgovemment announced that its 
ownpaper money would no longer be convertible to gold. Paper money through- 
out the urortd had now lost its one last contact with mdity. [.. .] It has now 
become undefinable and therefore unmeasurable. It is d ~ m u l t  to see how such 
a concept can have for long much relevance or use as the key mechanism for 
organizing economic activity in society. [ . . . ] 
As money is nowadays nothing but ink marks on paper or patterns of 
magnetism in a computer tape, the remittance of money no longer requires 
the transfer of valuable commodities. When one country borrows money from 
another, nothing is transferred. 64 
Alienation in the current stage of the prevailing mode of cultural 
development appears as  disconnectedness from real interactions with social 
and natural environment and from human-ecological metabolic processes. It is 
a consequence of the dysfunction of institutional structures that operate 
beyond human scale - a result of unsustainable social organization. 
62 ibid.: 139-141 
63 ibid.: 141 - 142 (emphasis mine) 
During the nineteenth century, [...I as it was a decentralized system, the failure 
of even large banks did not endanger the whole system Failures were created o#en 
through note holders demanding conversion of their paper claims to physical 
delivery of reserve currency. This practice, however, resulted in checks and 
balances on the creation of excessive and infitionmy note issues. Today there is 
no longer any such discipline. (ibid.: 142- 143) 
64 ibid.: 143-145 (emphasis mine); see also quote at  footnote 25 in the previous chapter. 
Community 
As many as 500,000 Cali$ornians are currently 
living in walled-in communities, and fifty new 
developments are under construction [...I The 
growth in walled-in communities reflects both a 
concern for personal safety and "a retreatfiom 
civic responsibility. " 1 
A society made up of decentralized, self-sufficient 
communities, in which people work near their 
homes, have the responsibility of governing them- 
selves, of running their schools, hospitals, and 
welfare services, in fact of constituting real commu- 
nities, should, we feel, be a much happier place. Its 
members, in these conditions, would be likely to 
develop an identity of their own, which many of us 
have lost in the mass society we live in 2 
The alienating disconnection of interactions between individuals and their 
social environment, brought about by large-scale technological, economic and 
administrative institutional systems, has had its manifestation of most far- 
reaching consequences in the disruption of the local community. The local 
community has been considerably destroyed 3 by the development of the 
growth, profit-making, consumer economy which turned away fiom concrete 
life processes into virtuality and apparent limitlessness of profits and money. 
Community destruction has been identified as  the core of the social 
1 Rifkin, 1995: 212 
2 Goldsmith et al., 1972: 157 
3 Berry, 1987: 183 
disintegration in the current culture. Manifestations of this disintegration are 
different social dysfunctions, from crime, to mental and physical illnesses. The 
destruction of community is the consequence of removing economy and politics 
from it, and reducing it to suburbia where people return after work 4. 
The destruction of community is a crisis of historic momentum as 
humankind in all races and cultures has chosen to live in these aggregates 
throughout its evolution, right down to the current era. 5 
In his comprehensive analysis of human social organization and the relevance 
of its scale and size, Kirkpatrick Sale has distinguished 
two basic kinds of community that humans have apparently found the most 
useful and successful over their many millennia as social creatures. One is the 
face-to-face community, or association group, with somewhere between 400 
and 1,000 people I.. .I - what we might call the common neighborhood; the 
other is the extended association, a wider alliance of some 5,000 to 10,000 
people I . . . ]  - what we would think of as the standard community. 6 
These units of social organization - the neighborhood and the community - 
represent two of the basic nested levels of social interaction between humans 
and their social (and natural) environment, and they have both been very much 
destroyed in the process of alienating institutionalization that I discussed in the 
previous chapter. A very important characteristic of both is that they make 
sense only in relation to locale - to the local social and natural environment in 
which humans live. When the destruction of community is discussed, it is both 
the neighborhood and the local community that are referred to. I find it 
important to emphasize that it is the local community which is considered in 
this context (as the term is also often used to denote other groups with a 
common denominator, like the business community, the academic community, 
the international community, etc.). The destruction of the neighborhood and the 
local community thus manifests the discomectedness of economic and social 
organization in the consumer culture from life processes as natural cycles of 
renewal. 
4 ibid.: 184 
5 Sale, 1980: 188 
6 ibid.: 188 (emphasis mine); also: Dobriner, 1969 
The revitalization of the local community is, therefore, a key process in de- 
alienation, in undoing the social disintegration and (re)creating a sustainable 
social organization a s  part of a comprehensive economy of life processes 7. The 
revival of the local community has been perceived by many analysts as the 
prerequisite for establishing a sustainable economy; moreover, sustainability is 
most often defined and identified with community development. 
Development of sustainable community indicators can provide a 
theoretical and practicalframework for defining the meaning of a 
sustainable community and for measuring progress towards that goal. 8 
Kline defines four indicators: Economic Security, Ecological Integrity. Quality of 
Life and Empowerment with Responsibility 9 .  Community development therefore 
involves the decentralization and de-alienation of the economy and politics and 
their re-connection to life processes. 
Revitalization of the local community is a principal way out of the 
progressive alienation which has been identified as  a characteristic of the 
postmodern stage of consumer culture. The critics of the postmodemist social 
theory explicate how it leaves no hope of a reconstruction of social interactions 
which have been effectively disrupted, and how postmodernist analyses imply 
an inevitable conclusion that the community is not possible any more. In 
previous chapters, I have presented to some extent Baudrillard's analysis of 
disconnectedness from reality and of the virtuality of consumer culture based 
on exchange of signs which have become progressively devoid of meaning 
(simulacra). Bill Martin refutes the despair-provoking inevitability of such 
conclusions and contends that 
the community will be possible only aBer the impasse of postmodernity is 
broken and aBer the notion and the reality of community is recreated. [...I The 
new community will be the community of radical diversity - radical 
conjluence. I...] Either this community will emerge and the impasse of 
postmodernity will be broken or there will not be afuture for humanity. 10 
- - 
7 In chapter 4 (between footnotes 33 and 34) I have proposed that a sustainable, 
ecological economy can be again defined as  household management, where this re- 
definition encompasses a nested range of interrelated levels of interaction with 
the environment: household - neighborhood - community - bioregion, etc. 
8 Kline, 1995: 1 
9 ibid.:4-5 
10 Martin, 1993: 189 (emphasis mine) 
The Community Economy 
The community economy - as  the basis of a sustainable economy - implies 
primarily returning the economy to the community: re-connecting work, 
management and control over the economic process and its effects. This means 
a move toward repairing the impact of disconnection of the current economy 
from locale and from natural cycles of renewal. 
In the development of the current economy, this diconnection has taken 
two principal forms: urbanization and the colonial/corporate economy. Both 
phenomena have a long history, which now - with economic growth and 
institutionalization - upsurgingly culminates in metastases of megalopolises and 
multinational corporations. 
Cities have become foci of ecological imbalance and dysfunction resulting 
from unsustainable growth and disconnection from natural cycles of renewal: 
Cities require concentrations of food, water, andfuel on a scale not found 
in nature. Just as nature cannot concentrate the resources needed to support 
urban lqe, neither can it disperse the waste produced in cities. The waste 
output of even a small city can quickly overtax the absorptive capacity of 
local terrestrial and aquatic eco s ys terns. 1 1 
Modem urbanization has been dependent on industrial agriculture which 
has enabled unprecedented growth of cities. Urban growth and proliferation 12 
was primarily spurred by the development of industry which required an  influx 
of work force into cities. This influx could only be achieved - in the 
contemporary, a s  well as  in historically earlier urban growth - to the extent 
that the small number of people remaining in agricultural production could feed 
the growing city population. Therefore, the recent expansive growth of cities 
has been possible only with industrialization of agriculture 13. 
The amount of energy it takes to satisb food needs increases in urban 
settings. Not only are supply lines longer for cities, frequently extending 
across national borders, but food shipped long distances needs more 
1 1 Brown and Jacobson, 1987: 34-35 
12 The present wave of growth has started with the Industrial Revolution, but has now 
reached the steepest escalation: ugrowth in the world's urban population from 600 
million in 1950 to 2 billion in 1986. " (ibid.: 45) 
13 Schumacher, 1975 
processing and packaging. Fresh fruits, vegetables, and livestock products 
often require remerated transport. Of the total energy expended in the food 
system of the United States, roughly one-thud is used in the production of 
food; one-thud in transporting, processing, and distributing it; and one-thud 
in preparing it. [ . . .I 
Petroleum has also enabled cities to lengthen their supply lines and draw 
basic resources, such as food and raw materials, from distant points. Cheap 
oil and economic policies encouraging rapid industrialization together led to 
a phenomenal surge in urban growth that is still rippling through developing 
countries. 14 
Disconnectedness of the economy from the local community and inclusion 
into world markets has had most disruptive impact in the Third World. 
Degradation of life quality in the Third World urban agglomerations, and the 
destruction of urban communities in general, is where the unsustainable 
character of the current world economy is manifested in its extreme form. 
Population growth in Third World cities is outpacing city and national 
budgets and straining urban institutions. The result is a profusion of 
sprawling, unplanned cities in which access to adequate housing, 
transportation, water supplies, and education is severely limited. This 
pattern of uncontrolled growth reduces urban productivity and efficiency. 
anecting not only urban areas but entire national economies. 15 
The economic disconnection from the local community thus entails an 
economy of alienation and of dependence on and domination by 
institutionalized, large-scale technological and organizational systems. This 
characteristic is even more pronounced in the other manifestation of economic 
disconnection from locale - the colonial economy which is now epitomized in 
multinational corporations. 
The relation between colonial economy and the destruction of the 
community economy has its historic development and it is now manifest in the 
inclusion of the Third World economies into world markets described above. 
The historic perspective and its modem implications are clearly shown in 
Wendell Berry's analysis: 
The economy of a colony exports only "raw material" and imports only 
_finished goods. It buys and sells on markets over which it has no control; 
thus, both markets drain value from the colony. [...I 
14 Brown and Jacobson, op.cit.: 14- 15, 5 
Major cities I...], such as Leningrad. Moscow, Cairo, Lagos, Dacca, Hong Kong, 
and Tokyo, depend heavily on grain produced in North America. [. . .I In Africa, 
formerly a grain exporter, some of the world's fastest-growing cities are being fed 
largely with imported grain. (ibid.: 24-25) 
15 ibid.: 11 
7'he way that a national economy preys on its internal colonies is by the 
destruction of community - that is, by the destruction of the principle of local 
self-sumiency not only in the local economy but also in the local culture. 
7'hus, local life becomes the dependent - indeed, the victim - notjust of the food 
industry, but the transportation industry, the power industry [...I and so on  16 
An essential component of the colonial "economy" is pillage of distant, alien 
communities, and this mode of acquiring goods, or of wealth maximization, 
originates quite some time back in history. The following example is related to 
the third millennium B.C. : 
When there was a shortage of necessary material, the response of 
Sargonid Mesopotamia, as of Egypt, was not merchant venturing but the 
mounting of a military expedition. Such were the Sargonid 'campaigns' 
among the timber-yielding mountains of the Lebanon, and the Egyptian 
excursions to the copper mines of Sinai 17 
Corporations as a legal form are a product of the colonial economy - of 
detachment from locale (social and natural) where economic activities are going 
on, and, consequently, of irresponsibility for social and natural environment 
and context of the economy. 
7'he early state-chartered corporations of Europe and England were estab- 
lished to sponsor exploration of the New World. [. . .] If they did not sail under 
the charter of a state corporation, they and their families could be ruined for 
l$e if bad weather or piracy struck en route. By establishing the corporate 
form, limiting shareholders to liabilities no greater than their investment, 
Europeans were able to create a form of commerce that could absorb the hard 
knocks of trading and exploring, encouraging both risk-taking and 
speculative investment at the same time. [...I In the early years of the republic, 
the citizens of the United States were keen to prevent a n y  institution, foreign 
or domestic, commercial or religious, from dominating or suppressing their 
newly won rights. [...I Even then, citizens openly and presciently expressed 
concern that corporations with specijk rights granted under charters would 
nevertheless become so powerful that they could take over newspapers, public 
opinion, elections, and the judiciary. [...I Despite these efforts, legislatures 
inevitably began to lose their control over big business, state by state. 18 
The legal framework of corporation enabled that "ownership of an enterpri- 
se was separatedfrom responsibility for the enterprise." Thus, corporation is a 
"structure that invites mischief" because it can relieve the owners or investors 
from accountability even if the business "loots, pollutes, or otherwise behaves 
illegally" 19. This was reinforced 
16 Berry,op.cit.: 186 
17 McEvedy, 1975: 26 
18 Hawken, 1993: 105- 107 
19 Hightower, 1997: 59 
in 1886, when the U.S. Supreme Court I...] decreed I...] that a corporation is "a 
person," with the same constitutional protections that you and I have. Dr. 
Frankenstein could not have done better I...] In only a century, the 
corporation was transformed into a superhuman creature of the law I...] 
because it has civil rights without any civil responsibilities. It is legally 
obligated to be selfih: it can not be thrown into jail; it can deductfrom its tax 
bill a n y  _tines it gets for wrongdoing; and it can live forever. 20 
Currently, large-scale corporations, particularly multinationals, with their ex- 
territoriality, exist primarily to avoid the responsibilities which are unavoidable 
at the local community level and scale, in direct interactions and transactions. 
The key to this irresponsibility is detachment from locale and the community in 
the form of absentee ownership which is the inherent mode of property in the 
corporate economy. Absentee ownership has the potential to emphasize the 
irrelevance of any economic assets or resources other than money 21, thus 
reinforcing the complete disconnection of such an economy from the local 
community, from any tangible production, from the natural cycles of renewal. 
Absentee capital ownership I...] characterizes virtually all large 
companies in the United States today, and is not likely to be changed until 
workers, rather than investors, achieve not only ownership but also control 
of the places where they work. 22 
The community economy should involve a different distribution of wealth, 
different shareholding patterns and it should do away with absentee interests 
which are indifferent toward the community and careless with its environment: 
The present approach to local economic development leads to solutions 
dicerent from the orthodox ones which typically involve creating industrial 
parks with tax breaks to lure outside businesses. Local resource optimization 
leads naturally to such non-market mechanisms as barter, community deve- 
lopment corporations, community investment funds, and cooperatives - all 
of which combine an economic with a socialfunction. In the process, they 
eliminate the need to pay tribute to large centralized government and business 
systems. They are also consumer- and local producer-oriented and can be 
community controlled. 23 
The community economy and its broader framework of the sustainable or 
ecological economy involves a questioning of the current notion of property 
which is reduced to two aspects - property as a resource for extracting profits 
and maximizing them; and property as commodities bought to be used up and 
20 ibid.: 60; See also quote at footnote 18 in chapter 4. 
21 See quotes at footnotes 25 and 64 in chapters 4 and 5 respectively. 
22 Morehouse et al., 1989: 93 
23 ibid.: 174 
discarded. In both cases the relationship and the attitude to the inherent 
metabolism of matter and energy are essentially that of absentee ownership: 
the notion of property is fundamentally disconnected from any concern and 
responsibility for the economy of life processes characterized by cycles of 
renewal and exchange of energy and matter with the environment. 
Most analysts of sustainability identlfjr responsibility for the land and the 
environment as  the key issue of property and an  essential component of its 
concept which can be traced back to the thinkers of the Enlightenment. 
Each person should possess and control the means of his sustenance, a 
principle which underlies the institution of privately ownedproperty. The ideal 
Hamngtonian form of property is the selj=sufficient freehold estate in land. 
But "property," in the Language of civic humanism, had a somewhat 
d~serent meaningfrom what the term implies today. To ~arring'ton, and to 
Thomas Jeflerson after him, property had a moral connotation. It implied the 
personal and moral supervision of a responsiblefreeholder. 24 
Locke is often acknowledged as  a most influential source of both the current 
misinterpretation of the property concept and its reinterpretation in the context 
of sustainablity. 
Lmke made property a natural right preceding civil society and not 
created by it. By merely applying his labor to the g~fts of nature man creates 
property. Lmke limits the amount of property to which a man has a natural 
right to -as much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use 
the product of. " 25 
Probably the most controversial idea in this context is the "property right". 
particularly when it is deemed "natural". When it is not questioned altogether, 
efforts are put to distinguishing its current misinterpretation from a more 
environmentalist notion of husbandry or stewardship of the land and its 
resources. Robert Goodin's analysis of the logic of property right - which is 
based on udecornposing [it] into basic: 1 right to use, 2 right to use exclusively, 3 
right to transfer at will," - is primarily uconcerned to show that the right to 
destroy is a separate right in no way derivabkfrorn any property rights" 26. 
24 Bryan and McClaughry, 1989: 20 (emphasis mine) - referring to -James 
Harrington, whose masterpiece, The Commonwealth of Oceana, appeared in 1656 
in England. " (ibid. : 20) 
25 Locke, 1690: xiv - introduction by Thomas P. Peardon 
26 Goodin. 1990: 401 
Few analysts of the property issue, however, identifl clearly the connec- 
tion of the current concept of property to economic and social structures which 
have for a long time through history been based on domination over nature and 
over people 27. This connection makes the current property concept rather 
incompatible with notions of stewardship and husbandry, and essentially with 
responsibility for the social and natural environment. The problem with the two 
basic aspects of the current notion of property - profit resource and 
commodity - is that consumer culture has effectively neutralized the 
consciousness of the domination-oriented character of property 28. 
The issue of the (at least implicit) interpretation of property right as a freedom 
to destroy is very much relevant to the position of consumers in what I have 
previously described as technological sequence 29. Disconnection from involve- 
ment in the process of production - the technological sequence - has reduced 
people to consumers who have the illusion that, by buying matter and energy 
in form of commodities, they have full liberty to do whatever they want with 
them. And, by now, practically everything has been turned into commodities 30. 
Consumers are in no position to have any responsibility (or to be aware 
that it is necessary) for the metabolic process of matter and energy involved in 
satisfymg their needs and for the impact of that process on the environment 
(social and natural). The fragmentation of the process of technological sequence 
into separate activities and concerns of production, consumption and waste 
management hinders the possibility of anyone having a true responsibility for 
the process in its integral impact. Once the products are sold as commodities, 
the producers shed every responsibility (if they had any at all) for the further 
flow of matter and energy incorporated in those products. 
27 the issues I will discuss in chapter 8 
28 See Marcuse's quotation in the previous chapter at footnote 23. 
29 See chapter 4, after footnote 108. 
30 See quotes by Melucci at footnotes 59 in chapter 4, and 30 in the previous chapter. 
There have been attempts to remedy this situation. Most of them effective- 
ly tackle the problem at the production end, but fail to address the passive and 
irresponsible position of consumers: 
What we want from these products is not ownership per se, but the service 
the product provides: I.. .] Under the intelligent product system, these products 
would not be sold, but would be licensed to the purchaser, with ownership 
retained by the manufacturer. 31 
A more comprehensive change of ownership pattern has been attempted 
by the community land reform movement which seeks to alter the speculative 
practices that tie up land of enormous ecological and community value because 
its exchange value under current market conditions is prohibitive for purposes 
like forest management or farming 32. 
In the U.S.. a [...I community approach to land reform referred to as the 
Community Land Trust has been gaining momentum in the face of public 
apathy over land reform in general. Both the Community Land Trust 
movement and the environmental movement have in common the notion of 
trusteeship or stewardship of land rather than the traditional concept of 
ownership. [...I What is d~perent about the Community Land Trust is that the 
ownership, and therefore the power to determine ultimately how the land is 
used, is vested, through the Trust, in the community as a whole. 33 
Connection to Local Processes 
The key to a sustainable, community-based economy is the social and 
economic organization which relies on decentralized initiatives. They entail 
decentralized responsibility for social, biological and physical environment, 
qualitatively different because of connectedness to locale. And this 
connectedness is more than just an economic issue in a narrow sense: 
Psychological health is essential for social harmony, and [...I the evi- 
dence is strong that the small, cohesive community is by far the most bene- 
31 Hawken, op.cit.: 68 
When you buy a television today, you are purchasing some 4,000 chemicals, 10 
to 20 grams of mercury, and a n  explosive vacuum tube. There is no safe place to 
dispose of a television. If you transport twenty televisions in a truck, you are 
technically required to be licensed by the EPA as a toxic waste hauler. A television 
is not toxic waste, however, if you return it to Sony to be assembled into another 
television. (ibid.: 68) 
32 Morehouse et al., op.cit.: 22-24 
33 ibid.:20.33 
_ficial unit because it provides a spirit of belonging, of place I. . .] suggestmg the 
inner well-being that comes with knowing a particular spot as your home. 34 
A broader context of reconnection to locale can be found in bioregionalism 
which presents itself as a most appropriate framework for the human- 
ecological project of healing the conflicting conception of humanity and nature. 
Bioregionalism perceives social structures in their natural, biological and 
physical environment. It offers an  ecological, integrative perspective, where 
geographical wholes, and consequently jurisdictions and responsibilities, are 
not defined by distribution of economic and political power, but by ecological 
commonality and interconnectedness. 
Ifthere is any scale at which ecological conxiousness can be developed, 
at which citizens can see themselves as being the cause for the environmental 
efect, it is at the regional level; there all ecological questions I...] are dealt 
with as immediate and personal. I...] 
Bioregion [..J is a n y  part of the earth's surface whose rough boundaries are 
determined by natural characteris tics rather than human dictates, dis tingui- 
shablefrom other areas by particular attributes of mra,  fauna, water, clima- 
te, soils, and Zand forms, and by the human settlements and cultures those 
attributes have given rise to. The borders between such areas are usually not 
rigid - nature works withflexibility andjuidity - but the general contours of 
the regions I .  . .] are generally felt, understood, or in some way sensed, by many  
of the inhabitants of the area. I.. .I There is an advantage in keeping borders 
vague, even i f  it goes against the scientistic love ofhedness, for it tends to 
encourage a blend, a cross-fertilization of cultures at the bwregwnal edges. 35 
Among different bioregional systems, watersheds are most significant, not 
only because they are unique in having clearly definable boundaries: 
A watershed is in many respects afundamental ecological unit we are 
only beginning to appreciate. It is often d ~ m u l t  to accurately define the 
boundarics of a n y  ecosystem I...] But the path that water takesfrom the top of 
a ridge downhiU to the sea is a defining feature, because watermws in only 
one direction, sustaining all forms of life on its way to the sea. 36 
Water is a most essential substance, resource and medium for ecological and 
metabolic processes, both living and non-living, on all levels from molecular 
and cellular to planetary. Water is basis of life, but also a most wide-spread 
medium to transfer pollution - linking other media as  it captures pollutants 
from the air and conducts them into the soil. Watersheds offer a pertinently 
34 Sale, op.cit.: 485 (emphasis mine) 
35 Sale, 1991: 54-55, 59 (emphasis mine). A fundamental issue for the context of this 
essay is presented in the quoted explication of the bioregional paradigm - the 
sensitivity for natural processes which I will discuss in the last chapter as the 
principal basis of my concept of ecological consciousness. 
36 Conkling, 1995: 7 
systemic, integrative perspective, not only because of the interconnecting 
capacity of water, but also because they are interrelated as  nested systems of 
progressively larger and inclusive bioregional wholes. 
The continuous cyclical flow of water is a basic natural (physical and biolo- 
gical) given, and also a paradigm for an  awareness of and inclusion into natural 
cycles of renewal. Throughout history, rivers used to divide people a s  they 
offered natural boundaries in confrontational human relationships. Conversely, 
watersheds exemplify and emphasize both the integrativeness/interrelatedness 
and the collaborative necessity dictated by the shared waterflow which 
connects the entire ecology of a watershed into a common metabolic process. 
The most important aspect of establishing the economy on a bioregional 
basis is the re-connection to both the natural cycles of renewal and to the local 
community. The community is conceived of as part of a bioregion, as  one of the 
nested level of human-ecological interactions and integrity. As a re-connection 
of currently disjointed and dualized humanity and nature, this concept emphasi- 
zes the interrelatedness and unity of the social and natural environment, and 
thus essentially overcomes the traditional anthropocentrism of the economy. 
A community economy involves a redefinition of how the economic effects 
are measured and consequently valued. In chapter 4, I have already discussed 
the reductionist concept of value in the current economics, limited to exchange 
value which abolishes every difference in use value, and also ignores the social 
and ecological context of economic processes. 
Ten dollars' worth of coal equals ten dollars' worth of bread, 
transportation, shoes, or education. The only criterion for determining the 
relatiue ualue of these goods and services is their monetary market ualue; all 
ualues are reduced to the single criterion of priuate projit making. 37 
What is it that is valued in economic processes? According to conventional 
economics, it is the willingness to pay - the expression of solely the utilitarian 
(profit-maximizing) purpose of economic transactions 38. In the context of an  
ecological or sustainable economy - an  economy of eco-systemic exchange of 
37 Capra, 1982: 225 
38 See at footnote 5 in chapter 4. 
energy and matter with the environment - it is this exchange of energy and 
matter that has to be the measure of economic value. 
Since the early 1970s economists have paid increasing attention to the 
ecological analysis of economic processes [. . .I systematic examination of the 
pattern o fmws  ofenergy and materials in the economy I...] Ecology studies 
themw ofenergy and the cycles of materials in ecosystems. 39 
Energy has been often proposed as  an alternative to the present alienated 
monetary system. 
Nature has an economy of its very own. While we do our best to ignore or 
disguise it, the main purpose of human society is to cope with the very real 
demands of the natural world. The currency of this natural economy is not the 
dollar. It is the simple calorie. If we don't eat, we die. 40 
Such a way of assessing economic processes would be congruent with the ener- 
gy/matter flow which I have proposed as  a basic principle for analyzing ecologi- 
cal processes. 
The matrix (shown in chapter 4) represents a sequence which involves ener- 
gy exchange with the environment (natural and social) at each of the four phases: 
1 2 3 4 
energy/matter + conversion + life function + conversion + output 
resource into usable into sustain- (energy/ 
form of intake able output matter) 
(technological (technological 
process) process) 
The resources for all these exchange processes include energy from : 
the physical environment 
the biological environment 
the social environment (work, know-how, psycho-social conditions). 
I include psycho-social conditions as a form of energy in the sense of life 
energy involved in human interactions - a perspective I have adopted in this 
essay 41. Thus, a comprehensive analysis of economic processes in terms of 
energy can include psycho-social as well as ecological disturbances which are 
now the characteristically 'unrecognized" (or externalized) aspects of the 
"output" stage in the sequence presented above. By perceiving these aspects of 
39 Martinez-Alier. 1987: viii, 1 
40 Burns, 1975: 71 
41 See the discussion and quotes between footnotes 97 and 104 in chapter 4. 
comprehensive economic processes in terms of energy, "internalization" is also 
avoided in its current form which typically entails their interpretation in terms 
of money, and thus substantially distorts and compts  their life-qualities 42. A 
comprehensive analysis based on energy reveals a different picture of our 
current economic processes: it exposes aspects which are obscured by the 
existing monetary systems of valuationand measurement 
In all western nations it is currently more costly (in energy terms) to pro- 
duce food than to benefit by its consumption. In the United States the energy va- 
lue of food is on average only one-tenth of the energy value of the inputs required 
toproduce it I...] Nearly three quarters of the United States food energy budget is 
consumed in o f f - j i i  distribution, storage, packaging, and retailing (including 
the gasoline consumption of purchasers driving to and from the supermarkets). 
By way of comparison, it has been estimated that cultures practising 'primi- 
tive' agriculture eyoy food energy efficiencies of unity or higher. 43 
In his resourceful book Ecological Economics, Juan Martinez-Alier offers an 
exhaustive analysis of the problems of introducing a method of measuring econo- 
mic effects and processes in a way appropriate to a sustainable or ecological eco- 
nomic paradigm 44. The book presents a comprehensive history of arguments 
which demonstrate the deficiencies of the mainstream economic methodology. 
and of suggestions of alternative approaches which include the consideration of 
both human and natural resources. Energy has been the most frequently propo- 
sed medium for exposing and assessing the flow of resources. Martinez-Alier em- 
phasizes the arguments about counter-entropic (or ektropic) effect of life proces- 
ses and its significance in the context of an ecological perspective of economics45. 
42 See text between footnotes 17 and 18 in chapter 4. 
43 O'Riordan, 1976: 78 
The typical American male devotes more than 1,600 hours ayear to his car. He 
sits in it while it goes and while it stands idling. He parks it and searches for it. He 
eams the money to put down on it and to meet the monthly instalments. He works 
to pay for petrol, tolls, insurance, taxes and tickets. He spends four of his sixteen 
waking hours on the road or gathering his resources for it. And thishure does not 
take into account the time consumed by other activities dictated by transport: time 
spent in hospitals, traffic courts and garages I...] The model American puts in 1,600 
hours to get 7,500 miles: less thanJive miles per hour. In countries deprived of a 
transportation industry, people manage to do the same, walking wherever they 
want to go, and they allocate only three to eight per cent of their society's time 
budget to traffic instead of 28per cent (Illich, 1974: 18- 19) 
44 Martinez-Alier. op.cit. See also at footnote 107 in chapter 4. 
45 Human work, and the work of animals directed by humans, were able to 
increase the energy budget on the surface of the earth by agricultural activity. I.. .] 
Man has the capacity to transform one-fi$h of the energy gainedfrom food into 
muscular work I...] Giving to this ratio I...] the name of 'economic coefficient', 
However, the adoption of energy as  a criterion for assessing economic 
processes does not resolve the problem of commensurability of economic 
effects and transactions 46. Energy rather presents a possibility of resurrecting 
the referential value system as  the current monetary system has become 
entirely fictitious. Money has lost its reference to any tangible values and has 
become a value by itself. This metamorphosis has created the profound 
alienation of economic and social processes which I discussed earlier 47. 
Community-relevant Valuation System 
The disappearance of a referential value system is actually one of the most 
salient manifestations of the disconnection of economy from the community and 
from local processes. Reconnecting the economy to the local community invol- 
ves addressing the problem of currency and creating a community-based 
banking system 48. The goal is to overcome the dependency of economy on 
hierarchical institutional systems and on a currency system which no longer 
has any relevance to the community economy. Thus, a systemic interdepen- 
dence and web-like interactions would be achieved - community-based 
economic units would have (or rather regain) their integrity, and at  the same 
time be part of the broader interrelated economic system. This systemic 
simultaneity of interdependence and integrity assures a much more viable and 
stable economic functioning as it is not hierarchical, but horizontal and web- 
like, so that each unit retains its self-sustainability. 
[Podolinsky remarked] that man was a more efficient transformer of energy than 
a steam engine. I.. .I 
[Serhii] Podolinsky [ 1850- 189 11 measured human (and animal) work, that is, 
he counted the energy input as the equivalent to work done, and not as the fd 
energy intake, which is the measure sometimes taken in contemporary studies in 
ecological anthropology. I...] Energy accounting thus gave a scientii  basis to the 
labour theory of value, a point that neither Marx nor Engels appreciated. (ibid. : 49- 
50) 
46 ibid.: 232 
47 See quote at footnote 64 in the previous chapter. 
48 Morehouse et al., op.cit.: 153 
The need to deJine a unit of economic value between communities 
increases in proportion to their economic interdependence. As our current 
highly centralized economic systems create community dependency, there is 
at  present a strong need to deJine stable units of economic value. 49 
In order to have a self-sustainable community-based banking system, the 
currency has to be a commodity which is produced locally in the community 
and at  the same time universal enough to be a referential unit of value 50. 
As scarcity creates value and abundance reduces value, we need to select 
a commodity, the availability of which remains relatively stable in relation 
to all the other goods and services traded for money in the community. 51 
Energy appears as the most adequate unit, but it can take different forms 
- including human work. Human labor (or work) in the form of senice 
rendered has been considered as  a referential unit: 
An individual could create a contract note to provide specified hours of a 
spectfwd service. If these services were deliverable to the bearer of the note, 
the note could be exchanged [sold) by the creator of the note for other goods 
and services. This is the essence of the LETSs [Local Exchange and Trading 
System) which have been established in British Columbia and are emerging in 
other communities in North America. 52 
Work has the same physical dimension a s  energy. However, as  a referential 
unit, human work (or labor - which typically connotes saleable, and also often 
alienated work) is conventionally expressed by time (hours of work). This 
already indicates a problem with human work as  a unit 53. It does not only 
ignore different energy levels needed for different types of work (let alone the 
problem of measuring creativity and other psychological components of human 
work), it presents a serious commensurability issue which has been the 
stumbling block of socialist and communist economies 54. 
Kilowatt-hour of electrical energy seems to be a more suitable unit a s  
electricity is now a rather universal commodity and can be produced in 
pp 
49 ibid.: 159- 160 
50 ibid.: 154 
51 ibid.: 153- 154 
52 ibid.: 155 
53 A usual unit for energy or work is kwh, where kW is the unit for power, obviously 
disregarded in this case. 
54 Commensurability of human work is not at all an issue of the choice of the 
monetary system, but a problem of cultural definition of value, as I discussed in 
chapter 4. Therefore, no currency can resolve it. 
practically every local community. Gold was the most universal referential 
commodity for quite a long time 55, although other products and commodities 
were also used (like tobacco in Virginia in the 17th century 56). In our times, 
electricity compares to gold much more favorably in terms of relevant criteria 
for a community-based banking system: 
Evaluation Kwh Dollars Gold Dollars 
Unit of value Kwh 
Quality testing Not required 
Intrinsic consumable value 100% 
Ounces/grams 
Density 
10% 
Subjective value 
Changes in consumption 
Global activity 
Changes in production 
Rate of change 
Cost of production 
Cost of s torage 
Cost of insurance 
Cost of distribution 
Nil 90% 
Related to total economic Little relation to eco- 
activity nomic actiu~ty 
Universal Haphazard 
Related to consumption Little relation to 
consumption 
Relatively stable Less stable in production 
Relatively stable by region Fluctuates with region 
and in time and time 
Not required 1% of value per annum 
Not required 1 % of value per annum 
Increases with distance Changes little with 
dis tam 
The most important aspect of electricity a s  a referential value system is 
that it makes most sense if its production is decentralized and if 'renewable" 
resources are used (or rather resources with a sustainable renewability rate 58). 
This mode of production fosters the reconnection of the economy to the local 
community and to natural cycles of renewal, and averts the large-scale, 
centralized, institutionalized systems of domination, control and monopoly, 
which, in the manner of 'the colonial economy", create dependent communities. 
Modem technology, using renewable energy sources, has made the cost of 
production relatively constant throughout the world. [...I The renewable 
energy d o h  would be far more democratic than gold dollars, as sun. wind, 
and/or wave energy is available to all communities in the world, whereas gold 
is not. It is also very democratic within communities since each individual 
55 It is still believed to be the 'basis" of money, albeit it has lost this function both 
practically and legally as money can no longer be converted to gold (see at footnote 
64 in the previous chapter). 
56 Morehouse et al., op.cit.: 139 
57 ibid.: 157 
58 See the paragraph after footnote 92 in chapter 4. 
could own his own renewable electrical energy source to supply his own needs 
and/or to supply to others. 59 
A different monetary system and a different form of ownership (discussed 
earlier) are two essential aspects of an economy reconnected to the local com- 
munity. They also entail a different pattern of management. The key approach 
suggested by George Benello involves a reversal of the relationship between 
capital and work: 
Where the capitalistm is made up of workers who hire labor, the self- 
managedm is made up of workers who hire capital. 60 
This management pattern impedes the control over the firm which is typically 
exerted from outside by absentee providers of capital. The control is retained 
by those who are directly involved in the production process and in the inter- 
actions with the local environment (social and natural). It is not the abstract, 
impersonal, uninvolved control led only by profit-maximizing interests, but a 
management responsible to the local community as  a human-ecological system. 
A major breakthrough has been occurring during the 1980s in the United 
States with the adoption in several states of statutes embodying the principles 
and characteris tics of atruly democratic worker-owned and managed business. 
Thefirst of these was enacted in Massachusetts in 1982 I...] A crucial d~fference 
betweena general business corporation and a worker cooperative under Massa- 
chusetts law is that the latter must issue a class of voting stock to its members, 
which are limited to persons employed by the corporation. The statute further 
provides that membership shares be cast on a one-person/one-vote basis. 61 
This approach to the economy (in its primary meaning of household 
management - or management of human-ecological systems) presupposes a 
form of democracy which is 
59 Morehouse et al., op.cit.: 156- 157 
Non-renewable power sources are less suitable for defiing units of value as a 
substantial proportion of their costs arefuel and labor the value of which, relative 
to the original investment cost, may change over the life of the plant. Auther 
technological advances could make small, decentralized, environmentally 
compatible energy sources even more competitive. (ibid.: 158) 
A new generation of technologies, including gas turbines, wind turbines, fuel 
cells, and solar generators I..] is a small-scale, potentially mass-produced means of 
generating power, with the capacity to create a less expensive and more decentrali- 
zed electricity system I...] It will soon be common to generate power within indivi- 
dual buildings, reducing energy conversion and transmission losses, and increasing 
the overall reliability of the entire power sys tern (Flavin and Lenssen, 19947) 
60 Morehouse et al., op.cit.: 93 
61 ibid. : 99- 100 
people-based, not property-based or capital-based. Democracy is thus a 
method for people to govern themselves, not a method for property owners to 
govern their property. 62 
Such a concept of democracy entails direct participation and involvement, and 
consequently a de-institutionalized responsibility which is a n  essential aspect of 
de-alienation - of overcoming and casting off the dependence on inaccessible 
and dehumanized social, technological and economic mechanisms. Direct 
participation and responsibility are possible and make sense only in the context 
of the local community, of connectedness to local processes of social 
interactions and natural cycles of renewal. Such a responsibility is the core of a 
sustainable social and economic organization. 
Enhanced participation increases worker satisfaction and commitment 
to the job. This results in increased efectiveness, and allows workers to feel 
they have control over their working lives. I...] Successful participation and 
seljhanagement requires changes in attitudes and behaviors, and the 
development of an active rather than a passive orientation toward one's work 
and its organizational context and goals. 63 
Decentralizing the economy to the level of the local community entails a 
smaller scale, which considerably reduces the entropy of large systems - waste 
and pollution, as  well as  organizational inefficiencies. 
It has become rather apparent [...I that the existing formalized 
institutions and their accompanied bureaucratized arrangements have been 
loosing ground in providing the necessary resources for the people and their 
government to nourish life. Diierent people for d~ierent reasons are 
beginning to connect the relevance of inforn-zal economy, unstructured labor 
markets, and grass-root participation to their lives. 64 
Reconnection of the community and the economy, a s  well as  decentraliza- 
tion and small-scale of the local community, enable a closer relationship 
between the working place and residence 65. Furthermore, these processes 
result in an integrated life, where working and living are not sharply segregated 
as  they are now by the division between production and consumption. Another 
outcome is less division of labor and more creative initiatives. Reconnection of 
the community and the economy is also a move toward an integration of life 
-- 
62 ibid.: 90 
63 ibid.: 89.94 
64 Danesh, 1991: 1 
65 Bryan and McClaughry, op.cit.: 62 
and the economy - reaching closer to an  "oikonomia", an  integrated economy of 
life processes pertinent to the emerging ecological culture. 
A congruent integrative idea was put forth by Petr Kropotkin. He has been 
perceived by a number of analysts in the general area of sustainablity, environ- 
mentalism and human ecology 66 as  a thinker whose work presents an  essen- 
tial background to the current discussion of the issues of the community and 
cooperation-based ethic 67. In addition to these more famous concepts, he has 
developed a comprehensive vision of and an  argument for integration of the eco- 
nomy and life - established on the fundamental principle of integrated work: 
Thegreatest sum total of well-being can be obtained when a variety of agri- 
cultural, industrial and intellectual pursuits are combined in each community; 
and man shows his best when he is in a position to apply his usually-varied 
capacities to several pursuits in the farm, the workshop, the factory, the study 
or the studio, instead of being riveted for life to one of these pursuits only. 68 
This is a holistic concept of life and of work - favoring an  integration of 
manual and intellectual work in order to achieve a meaningfulness and 
creativity which has, particularly recently, been increasingly waning. 
When we [...I examine human life as a whole, we soon discover that, while 
all the benefits of a temporary division of labour must be maintained, it is 
high time to claim those of the integration of labour. Political economy has 
hitherto insisted chiefly upon division. We proclaim integration, I...] a society 
composed of men and women, each of whom is able to work with his or her 
hands as well as with his or her brain, and to do so in more directions than 
one. 69 
This perspective offers a reversion of the profound alienation of work in the 
current economy and social organization. This alienation is characterized by 
disconnectedness from the local community and life cycles, and from direct 
involvement of people in the processes of identifymg and satisfying their needs 
in unmediated interaction with their social and natural environment. The 
reconnection and integration of work is thus a part of the process of the local 
community revitalization. 
66 e.g.: O'Riordan, op.cit: 7-8; Roszak, 1979: 120, 275 
67 Kropotkin, 1902; Kropotkin, 1922 
68 Kropotkin, 1899: iv-v 
69 ibid.: 2-4, 182-183 
Kropotkin's views were developed contemporaneously to one of the promi- 
nent concepts in the history of urban planning - the garden cities of Ebenezer 
Howard 70. Howard's model may be the most appropriate starting point of a 
new ecological urban planning because it is based on a balanced relationship 
between work and dwelling, on cooperative economic organization, and on 
combined local, small-scale industry and agriculture. As physical structure, the 
model entails individual housing with gardens/farmsteads. During the first half 
of this century several small towns were built in England according to this 
model, applying, however, merely its physical structure aspect, and regrettably 
failing to achieve the new paradigm of socio-economic organization, which 
required a more profound change. Only the form, the physical appearance was 
attained, and the essence remained unaccomplished 71. 
Decentralization: 
The Community and Sustainable Social Organization 
To put future development on paths that are sus- 
tainable I...] is simply beyond the reach ofpresent 
decision making structures and institutional 
arrangements, both national and international. 72 
Decentralization and reconnection to the local community, as a move toward 
a sustainable social organization, can enable a more integrated economy of life 
processes. By contrast, the current mode of social and economic organization 
is characterized by fragmentation. Large-scale, centralized organizational 
structures operate disjointedly, incapable, because of scale and organizational 
complexity, to provide an interrelational and interconnected management of life 
processes in their integrity. 
Most of the institutions facing [environmental and economic] challenges 
tend to be independent, fragmented, w o r k q  to relatively narrow mandates 
with closed dedsion processes. Those responsible for managing natural 
resources and protecting the environment are institutionally separated from 
those responsible for managing the economy. I... ] The mandates of ministries 
70 Howard, 1902 
71 Ristic, 1990b 
72 World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987: 22-23 
of industry include production targets, while the accompanying pollution is 
leji to ministries of environment. Electricity boards produce power, while the 
acid pollution they also produce is leji to other bodies to clean up. I.. .] 
Sectoral organizations tend topursue sectoral objectives and to treat their 
impacts on other sectors as side e&cts. 1. ..I Many of the environment and 
development problems that confront us have their roots in this sectoral 
fragmentation of responsibi ti@. Sus tainabk development requires that such 
fragmentation be overcome. 73 
The key issue (as I pointed out in the previous chapter) is the intrinsic lack of 
integrated responsibility. It is a consequence both of organizational inefficiency 
and fragmentation, and of the disinterested attitude of employees who are in posi- 
tions of cogs in unfathomable and elusive bureaucratic machines, and who lack 
vital involvement necessary for an integrated sense of responsibility. Such an 
alienating organizational pattern is inherently non-cooperative; it is rather based 
on hierarchical, dominational relations which typically discourage responsibility. 
Issues ofpolicy were enmeshed in issues of power! The formulation of 
questions became en tang led in competition. To demonstrate and reinforce 
their autonomy, units felt compelled to reject the suggestions of others, 
hindering strategic thinking. 74 
Institutional fragmentation is thus a form of disconnection from local com- 
munity, from integrity of life processes and metabolic cycles of renewal. In the 
context of social and environmental policy, the most exacerbating manifestation 
of institutional fragmentation is the fundamental and apparently eternally irre- 
concilable fracture between community needs and market economy interests, 
or between the public sector and the private sector (meaning private property 
maximization). As  long as the problem of this fracture is addressed within the 
institutionally fragmented political sphere, it remains unresolvable because, as 
a consequence of the fragmented perspective, the two sectors are perceived as 
conflicting and incompatible: 
The administrator had to decide how important it was to protect various 
kinds of sensitive persons from dzfferent nonpermanent decrements in lung 
function I.. .] At the opposite end of the spectrum, OPM was impressed by the 
high cost of achieving dubious gains for only a small minority of citizens. 75 
73 ibid.: 9-10. 63 (emphasis mine) 
74 Landy. et al., 1990: 284 (emphasis mine); see also at footnote 49 in the previous 
chapter. 
75 ibid.: 63 
When the regulation is institutionalized and centralized, the link is lost not 
only between the two interests, but also among various aspects of communal 
life. The result is inefficiency and deadlock: 
Reducing pollutant emissions by 99 percent can cost ten or more times as 
much as a 90% reduction. No political system will be able to ratchet down 
more stringent regulatory requirements inde_finitely. As the goals of 
regulations become increasingly divorced from the economically and 
politically feasible means of attaining them, policy goals become npolicy 
_fictionsn routinely ignored both by the regulators and the regulated, 
undermining the legitimacy of the regulations altogether. 76 
Institutional regulation operates primarily at  the level of power negotiations 
between the conflicting interests, detached from the reality of life at  the local 
community level (or the level of individual human interactions, as  the local com- 
munity has been already quite destroyed). And yet, this regulation indirectly 
affects the everyday life in a way that leaves lay individuals helpless and 
powerless to keep control over their own lives. This situation has led to a 
profound loss of confidence 77, to 
erosion of public trust as lies build up into vast institutional practices I...] 
From 1966-76 the con$dence in people in charge of running major 
institutions droppedfrom 73% to 42% for medicine; for major companies 
from 55% to 16%; for law firms from 24% to 12%; and for advertising 
agencies from 2 1 % to 7%. 78 
The deep distrust is a result of both the feeling of exclusion from and 
disillusion about the regulation of the vital matters of human lives. These 
matters are perceived as  someone else's responsibility, under jurisdiction of 
some impersonal officials with whom people have no direct contact 79. At the 
same time people have a gut feeling, if not always a clear awareness of the 
inefficiency and irresponsibility of these officials - the feeling that responsibility 
is only a pretence, a simulacrum, and a need for legitimacy: 
Central to the [bureaucratic paradigm] was recruiting experts in 
accountuzg, engineering and social work, not only to achieve results, but to 
legitimate actions. 80 
76 Ringquist. 1993. 200 
77 Ristic, 1982. Ringquist, op.cit.: 96 
78 Bok, 1978: xiii, xviii 
79 Ristic. 1990b 
80 Banelay, 1992: 117; see also at footnote 46 in the previous chapter. 
The helpless acceptance and the simultaneous distrust and disillusion 
creates a schismatic attitude which can reinforce the cleavage between 
individual and public interests. And it certainly strengthens the deadlock of 
institutional regulation: 
For thepast 15 years poll afer poll has recorded the American people's 
desire for increased environmental protection, yet the majority of the 
population participates in the industrialized worlds rnos t wasteful and rnos t 
polluting style of lge. The values are there; the appropriate motivations and 
institutions are patently inadequate or nonexistent. 81 
Mark Sagoff perceives this incongruity as  a "schizophrenic" behavior: 
The question arises whether what we want for ourselves individually as 
consumers is consistent with the goals we would set for ourselves collectively 
as citizens. Would I vote for the sort of things I shop for? Are my preferences as 
a consumer consistent with my judgements as a citizen? They are not. I am a 
schizophrenic. 82 
This situation points to a fundamental incapability of the political sphere to 
induce (from "above") any environmental/ecological consciousness. In the con- 
text of this essay, this is a key issue: sustainability can be attained only with a 
conscious involvement of people at every level of social interactions. And con- 
sciousness cannot be built on mistrust and on lack of responsible involvement 
in governing our lives. 
Historian Bany D. Karl puts our condition in brilliant perspective: [. . .] -At 
a moment in history when the technology of communications is improving by 
quantum leaps, our suspicions of the truth of what we are told and what we 
know are greater than they have ever been. These suspicions have their source 
in our oldest and most profound need: our need to govern ourselves. " 83 
The "need to govern ourselves" is the crucial point of a sustainable social 
organization. It involves decentralization of governance. Decentralization and 
the revival of the community mean returning politics back to the local 
community. This evokes the initial meaning of politics - the managing of the 
polis. Polis was originally almost of a size that Sale establishes for local 
communities 84, SO it is a scale appropriate to human and humane proportions 
and to direct interactions with the local environment, both natural and social. 
81 Ruckelshaus, 1989: 35 1 
82 Sagoff, 1981: 317 
83 Bryan and McClaughry, op.cit.: 3 
84 See at footnote 6 above. 
That means the scale of direct, decentralized democracy 85, without the 
alienated, impersonal bureaucratic apparatus and the fragmented and 
disconnected institutional regulation. Above all, direct democracy entails direct, 
immediate, decentralized responsibility - connected to life processes and to 
their social, biological and physical environment. 
While organization theory often argues that coercion is an essential 
element in all formal, purposive-rational organizations, there is a strong 
counter trend represented by people such as Bennis, Argyris, McGregor, Likert, 
and others who argue that autonomous work groups and other non- 
bureaucratic forms are more effective and free of the rigidities and 
dysfunctions of bureaucracy. 86 
Sustainable social organization - (re)connected to the local community and 
based on direct, decentralized involvement and responsibility - presupposes 
cooperative and collaborative relationships which draw on primordial human 
inclinations: 
The mutual-aid tendency in man has so remote an origin, and is so 
deeply interwoven with all the past evolution of the human race, that it has 
been maintained by mankind up to the present time, notwithstanding all 
vicissitudes of history. 87 
These collaborative inclinations traditionally entail spontaneous organization to 
address problems of common or communal life processes. A colleague of mine 
who worked in Africa in a newly established urban planning and regulation 
agency, told me the story of a remote village under their jurisdiction where an 
elementary calamity destroyed a number of houses. The experts went 
immediately to the rescue in a jeep. However, when they arrived, the villagers 
had already begun to mend the houses by themselves, spontaneously initiating 
the traditional self-organization for mutual help. They did not even imagine, not 
only to wait for help from experts, but to expect that any other people, outside 
their local community, should take care of their problem. 
However, soon (in the sense of cultural 'development") they will learn that 
- in Kropotkin's terms - under the auspices of the state, one should not 
85 In the ancient polis, though, democracy was quite partial as only a rather limited 
segment of the society was acknowledged and permitted to have any right to 
participate in governance. 
86 Morehouse et al., 1989: 88 
87 Kropotkin, 1902: 223 
meddle into the matters which officials are responsible for 88. Institutionaliza- 
tion has thoroughly discouraged and suppressed individual initiative and spon- 
taneous organization 89. I s  it possible to regain it? 
I consider ecological culture inseparable from the personal involvement of 
people in the processes that are vitally important for their lives. In political 
science this kind of involvement is termed participation, but it is perceived 
almost exclusively within the political realm - as  getting citizens involved in the 
decision making processes about common, political issues 90. 
A reconnection of politics (and economy) to the local community - communi- 
ty politics - would, therefore, involve direct participation in management of 
economic and social processes in the local community, thus reviving the 
involvement and responsibility which have been disrupted by the alienating and 
disconnecting impact of institutionalization. 
In architecture, participation gets a more everyday-life connotation - as  in- 
volving the users of buildings and of urban space in some phases of design and 
construction processes 91. My own research in this field 92 has turned my atten- 
tion to initiative of people, rather than participation, because participation typi- 
cally means that the initial incentive for involving people in the decision making 
processes comes from experts and institutions. This is evident even in the for- 
mulations which typically use passive voice, such as  "getting people involved". 
Indeed, that reflects the basic problem of participation techniques, which 
always dispense to people small doses of responsibility. That often turns out to 
be a way of sharing the burden of responsibility for the decisions that are 
88 ibid.: 227 
Community l$e is by definition a l$e of cooperation and responsibility. I...] As our 
communities have disintegrated from external predation and internal 
disaffection, we have changedfrom a society whose ideal of justice was trust and 
fairness among people who knew each other into a society whose ideal ofjustice is 
public litigation, breeding distrust even among people who know each other. 
(Berry, 1992: 12 1-122) 
89 Ristic, 1989a: 167 
90 Crowfoot and Wondolleck, 1990 - examine participation in environmental issues. 
91 Habraken, 1972 
92 Ristic, 1989a 
initiated and conceived in domaines that have power. Also, the dispensing of 
responsibility "from above" implicitly sustains the patronizing relationship 
toward lay-people. 
The term participation was actually introduced when people have long lost 
the initiative and spontaneity of self-organization. It has been introduced not 
only because of the awareness of the alienation of laymen, but also because it 
has become intolerably complicated for experts and officials to handle the 
matters and problems of complex social systems, so that the pride of 
accomplishments has been almost completely overtaken by responsibility for 
failures. Therefore, experts and officials are now often eager to get rid of part 
of the responsibility - to have laymen participate. Having been deprived for too 
long, laymen are not much capable to do it any more. But experts are ready to 
teach them how to participate - and thus keep the power and a t  the same time 
get rid of too much responsibility 93. 
As an  attempt from "above" to improve involvement of directly interested 
people in decision making, participation retains the process within the scope of 
the initiative of experts and officials. So, in a way it misses the initial goal - 
fails to achieve direct responsibility if the initiative and inception come from 
experts and officials. "Participants" accept the experts' model or plan, either 
reluctantly, because they would rather have their own initiative, or "obediently", 
and then there is little of their own initiative left. 
In order to achieve truly de-alienating conditions, it would be necessary to 
regard and practice participation processes in a way that would primarily enable 
people to exert their own initiative, their control and responsibility for their own 
lives. Initiative has to emerge from the people, those who are directly and 
vitally involved. Only then they cease to be passive participants. It is actually 
the question of: either participants or initiators - initiators a s  people who can 
identify and define their own needs, goals and priorities by themselves. Having 
one's own initiative, control and responsibility changes substantially the attitude 
93 Ristic, 1985 
towards things, products and resources. People become more careful about their 
immediate and wider environment. 
In other words, initiative cannot be an imposed procedure or attitude. 
Therefore, conditions of truly direct democracy and responsibility do not 
primarily involve participation of people, but rather initiative of people with 
participation of experts 94. 
A sustainable social organization has to be based on decentralized initiatives 
which are inherently less entropic because they do not entail the huge, energy in- 
efficient institutional apparatus (and energy inefficiency is here considered in a 
broader sense which includes the human inefficiency). Decentralized initiatives 
which are less entropic also because they benefit from the direct impact of indivi- 
dual interest of humans in their own lives, as  this interest and enthusiasm taps 
the counter-entropic effect of life. It will be a process of some length to achieve 
these degrees of initiative and involvement at  the local community level, but the 
process seems to be ongoing. The following example indicates some initial 
accomplishments in decentralization of control and responsibility: 
The JECIO [Jay Environmental Control and Improvement Ordinance] 
establishes local regulatory controls by the Town of Jay over air emissions, 
waste water discharges and solid waste disposal.[ . . . I  to apply them better and 
enforce them better via implementation at the local level. I...] The Ordinance 
embraces the notion that people should haue some local control over the 
condition of their own environment. Afer all it is us who breathe the air in 
Jay.. . When one sees a problem, it is reassuring that one need only call the 
Town O m e  for immediate attention, rather than calling an agency in 
Augusta for a response that might take days or weeks. 95 
Decentralization is one of the key issues of sustainability and ecological cultu- 
re. It is more complex than it might seem from the often unreserved fascination 
with small-scale as  the only viable level of operation for a sustainable society 96. 
Such a view is inclined to reverse uncritically the current situation perceived a s  
oppressive and alienating. So anything centralized and largescale tends to be con- 
94 Ristic, 1989a: 24, 27-28 
95 Dawson, 1994 (emphasis mine). (Jay is a small town in the state of Maine. It has 
had some excessive pollution problems due to the local - but multinationally 
owned - paper industry.) 
96 Schumacher's 'cult-book" Small is Beautiful (Schumacher, 1974) could be 
identified as primarily 'responsible" for this fascination, although he never 
expressed his concept in so exclusive terms. 
sidered bad, and everything small-scale and decentralized is seen a s  good. Such 
a perception posits centralization and decentralization a s  a dualized pair 97. 
Centralized policies and decisions - even when they do not completely 
disregard the local community and environment by following the big-business 
interests - have to be based on compromises, on averaging and levelling the 
diversity and uniqueness of particular communities and locales. They, 
therefore, usually result in solutions which suit no one adequately, and can 
even do harm 98. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of the local community 
interest, more general impacts of some actions cannot be visible and 
assessable, so a n  exclusively decentralized perspective can easily miss the 
integrative, holistic context. 
Democracy is risky business. We would not dream of letting the towns 
along the Connecticut River decide whether or not to allow chemical wastes to 
be dumped into the water. This is not because the quality of the decisions made 
by these towns [...I It is the range of impact of a decision that is of concen~ I.. .I 
An entire river is at stake. 99 
At the same time, the current centralized regulation with its fragmented 
procedure, detached from the locale and life processes, does not quite assure 
the integrative perspective either. 
In approaching this problem, centralization and decentralization are usually 
perceived a s  confronting and competing with each other. This perception 
unintentionally emerges in the previous quote with the undefined "we" who "let" 
decentralized decision-making happen or not. The "we" could only indicate a 
"higher", more centralized authority, which, in the current mode of social 
organization, almost invariably has the upper hand. 
In a systemic and holistic context, the dualized notion of centralization and de- 
centralization is a misconception and it can be transcended by the perception of 
97 Uncritical reversal is what Val Plumwood denotes as one of the two basic reactions 
to dualist constructs (see text at footnote 53 in chapter 2). It does not address the 
dualistic framework, but only reverses the established dualist hierarchy - replaces 
the dominant category by its polar opposite (Plumwood, 1993: 6 1-62, l26), and thus 
leaves the dualistic mind set unchanged. I will further discuss the important issue 
of dualism and of uncritical reversal in later chapters, in the context of post- 
domination and spirituality. 
98 Bryan and McClaughry, op.cit.: 99 
99 ibid: 97 
nested levels of interrelated and interdependent social and ecological (human- 
ecological) interactions of different scale and complexity - the individual, the 
household, the neighborhood, the local community, the bioregion, etc. Within 
this whole range, I will differentiate two basic levels: local and general. They 
are perceived a s  necessary, but in a non-competitive relationship - a s  
coexisting, cooperating and complementary. In the systemic sense, this 
perspective does not confront the two levels, it does not view them as  
contradictory, or conflicting; it presupposes the integrity of the unit and the 
integrity of the whole at the same time. 
In human ecology thefunctioning of a system in its environment is 
frequently of concern to the researcher; therefore, the researcher needs first to 
address the levels of system to be investigated [. . .I to assess the 
interdependence between the micro- and macro-system levels. 100 
The essential importance of this perspective is its emphasis on the 
coexistence and cooperation, the non-power basis of the two levels of the 
collective sphere - the local and the general. The local level is defined by the 
immediacy of relevance, as  the individuals involved are vitally interested and 
can directly experience the impacts of their actions. The general level serves 
best a s  general policy guidance and expert help, with capacity and capability of 
a wider contextual overview. 
In the domain of responsibility for the environment (natural and social), the 
two levels can be perceived a s  the political sphere (general level) and the life 
sphere (local level) - the sphere of environmental policy (general level) and the 
sphere of immediate vital interest and individual responsibility for the environ- 
ment (local level). The integrative character of the systemic interrelatedness of 
the two levels transcends the fragmentation of the current organizational mode 
of the political sphere and its disconnection from life processes. 
This integration also offers a possibility of overcoming the schism between 
market economy interests and community needs, or between the institutional 
and the local community spheres - a s  the life sphere is a common factor for 
the now confronted domains of the private and the public sector. The 
100 Sontag, et al., 1993: 152 
individuals, who are linked by their professional commitment to either of the 
two sectors, all belong to the sphere of everyday life. The life sphere also gives 
a different, non-dualized perception of impersonal and alienated officials of the 
institutionalized bureaucracy: they are not some other people, on the other side 
of a barrier; they belong to the same life sphere, but they are just in a role 
imposed by the institutionalized systems, which equally alienates them. 
Bureaucracies are not evil, but they are inhuman. They are fashioned 
that way: they work because they are capable of inhumanity on a massive 
scale. This is not to criticize bureaucrats. In fact the greatest complaints 
bureaucrats have about being bureaucrats is that they are forced by routine to 
treat people as numbers. 101 
Nested Levels of Technology 
Reconnection of the economy to the local community involves an integrated 
concept of economy which includes sustainable social organization and 
sustainable technology. Reconnection of technology to the local community 
means decentralization and smaller scale as an alternative to inefficiency and 
entropy of large-scale systems. 
Large-scale systems entail substantial losses in distribution. I have already 
presented examples of this problem when I discussed industrialized agricul- 
ture 102, but it is, of course, more generally manifested: 
According to engineers at the Pact@ Gas and Electric Company, it 
sometimes costs the company twice as much to distribute power as it does to 
generate it in the f i s t  place. 103 
Diseconomy of large-scale systems is more clearly disclosed with analysis of 
comprehensive energy consumption across the entire technological process 104. 
Such an analysis is, however, still slow in becoming more widely applied. It 
would shake the conventional assumption about the advantages of the large- 
101 Bryan and McClaughry, op.cit.: 93. See also at footnotes 39 and 40 in the previous 
chapter. 
102 See at footnote 14. 
103 Flavin and Lenssen, op.cit.: 42; see also at footnote 54 in the previous chapter. 
104 See at footnote 43 above. 
scale and centralized technological and organizational mode. Hopefully, another 
promising challenge to the confidence in the current centralized practices is 
presented by the development of small-scale power-generating technologies like 
photovoltaic solar cells, small gas, wind and hydro turbines: 
Soon the traditional model may be obliterated entirely by fuel cells 
mounted in basements, and rooftop solar systems that allow residential 
customers to generate their own power and sell excess supplies to other users 
through the grid. 105 
Inefficiency of large-scale technologies is also manifested in loss of quali- 
ty 106, again apparent most obtrusively, but certainly not solely, in industriali- 
zed food production. A relatively simple example is milk: After it is pumped out 
of cows which are treated as machines, then processed mechanically and 
chemically, and finally transported and stored for quite some time before it is 
consumed - it can barely retain much of its biological quality. 
The mechanization of the agricultural sector was heralded as a triumph 
of industrial society. One leading agriculturalist of the day boasted. "We no 
longer raise wheat here, we manufacture it.. . . We are not husbandrymen, we 
are not farmers. We are producing a product to sell. " 107 
A frightening scope of different forms of tampering with natural biological qua- 
lity of food has most recently included genetic and other bio-engineering technolo- 
gies. In the last decade or two, this development has induced a widening reac- 
tion in the form of the increasing popularity of "organicallyw-grown food, which. 
if genuine, cannot be produced by large-scale, industrialized methods 108. 
In the case of decentralized energy-generating technologies, as well a s  of de- 
centralized food production, the essential importance is in the reconnection to lo- 
cale and to the local community. It involves decentralized control over technologi- 
cal processes -a key issue of de-alienation of institutionalized largescale systems. 
In the current centralized and institutionalized mode of operation and organi- 
zation, control over and responsibility for the technological sequence are kagmen- 
105 ibid.: 40; see also in footnote 59 above. 
106 Ristic, 1990a; Turner, 1975 
107 Rifkin, op.cit.: 109 
108 It is, however, still kept price-uncompetitive by the current economic practice 
which externalizes and disregards most of the social and environmental (and 
health) costs - as I have demonstrated in chapter 4. 
ted 109. Jurisdictions are divided into production, consumption and waste manage- 
ment, and production is further dispersed into separate enterprises without any 
cooperation in terms of concern for the integral metabolic process of the techno- 
logical sequence. The principal disconnection of the sequence is that production 
and waste management are run by different an uncoordinated institutions, and 
lay people are competent only for the phase of use of final products. Lay people 
have neither interest in, nor responsibility for the phases before or after the use 
of final products. Even the use, which traditionally included maintenance (by 
users themselves, and/or by neighborhood- or local community-based shops), 
is now restricted solely to consumption 110. The obsession to value only new 
things and to keep buying and discarding the "old" ones has been induced by 
the consumer culture propaganda, and thus maintenance has been reduced to 
a negligible presence in the technological process, if not completely abolished. 
Consequently, the process of use, or rather consumption, is regarded as  
destructive, a s  a sharp and rapid loss of value. And technological processes in 
general are perceived and practiced as  destruction of resources, rather than as  
a metabolic flow, as  part of natural cycles of renewal 111. 
Fragmented responsibility (or rather irresponsibility) for the technological 
sequence and its consequences is part of the disconnection of technology (and 
of the economy) from the local community. Decentralization and reconnection 
would instigate a different attitude toward consumption/use, and would estab- 
lish a community responsibility for the environment based on awareness and in- 
volvement in the technological sequence. This would mean primarily the return 
of the production phase of the technological sequence to the local community. 
109 I have defined technological sequence as the 'path" that matter or material passes 
in the process of use for human needs, and which includes the essential phases of: 
(1) natural resource; (2) element or component (semi-final product); (3) commodity 
(final product); (4) use (life function); and (5) recycling (returning the matter/mate- 
rial back to technological process, or to natural cycles of renewal). See text after 
footnote 108 in chapter 4. 
110 Ristic, 1989a: 16 
1 1 1 Alexander and Jacobson, 1974: 45 
Returning the production phase to the local community does not involve 
just decentralizing the production and retaining the same economic structure. 
There would be no substantial change if only the scale were reduced to local 
facilities and s e ~ c e s  - owned, managed and operated at  the community level. 
but still used only to produce commodities for the consumer/market economy. 
The alienated conditions of the consumer culture would thus be kept unchan- 
ged, and the position of the community would remain in the framework of the 
colonial economy which exploits and depletes the community's natural and 
human resources 112. and which has led to its destruction. 
If the community economy is to be sustainable, the community has to produ- 
ce for its own needs, at  local scale for the local level of social and economic organi- 
zationlls. However, this cannot be realized by turning back to the pre-industrial 
technological and economic mode. Sustainable, or ecological, alternative technolo- 
gy has been at  some point contemplated in terms of autonomy from the current 
largescale economic and technological structures, a s  emancipation from dependen- 
cy and alienation created by institutionalization of human needs. However, techno- 
logical autonomy is impossible unless we revert to the most primitive technolo- 
gies and most rudimentary needs - which means returning to very early stages 
of cultural development. That is obviously unfeasible, and it is unnecessary. 
It is unfeasible because in the current stage of cultural development 
community cannot produce by itself everything that it needs. Furthermore, 
autonomy implies an  isolation from the broader human-ecological milieu, a non- 
systemic perspective which disregards the interrelated and interdependent 
nested levels of social and natural environment - different in scale and 
complexity. Technological processes too have to be perceived and organized in 
terms of nested levels of interaction. The technological sequence with its 
complex ramifications involves interconnected processes which constitute an  
integrated process of exchange of matter and energy with the environment. 
112 See at footnote 16. 
113 It is the same argument as for establishing a community-based currency system - 
see at footnotes 49, 50 and 51. 
Autonomy is unnecessary because the return of production and of 
responsibility for technological process to the local community can be 
established within the system of the two basic levels of interaction and 
organization (social, a s  well a s  economic and technological) - the local level, or 
the level of immediate relevance for concrete life processes, and the general 
level of the broader contextual framework. 
In the sphere of technology, the two levels are clearly distinguishable in 
the technological sequence matrix. A slightly expanded version is necessary 
here (it still reduces complex technological processes to basic phases, omitting 
often numerous intermediary stages; likewise, the given examples are very 
simplified, in order to illustrate the basic concept) 114: 
matter (or energy) examples: 
as  natural resource forests ore in Earth crust 
+ + + 
semi-raw material logs raw iron 
(or applicable form of energy) 
+ + + 
component /element /part cut lumber, steel beams, steel tubing, 
plywood, etc. sheet metal, complex parts 
+ + + 
final product houses, structures, vehicles, 
(or directly usable form of energy) furniture, etc. appliances, etc. 
+ + + 
use 
+ + + 
recycling (returning the matter back to different phases of the sequence) 115 
In the consumer culture, only the phase of use is performed on the local 
level. All the production phases are now situated at the general level, in the 
technological and economic mode of organization which is large-scale and 
institutionalized. The phase of recycling has been only recently acknowledged, 
and it is still malfunctioning in a confusion of jurisdictions. 
In the early stages of historic development, in the pre-industrial, pre- 
institutionalization period, most of the technological sequence was going on at  the 
local community level. The general level differentiated when the initial phases 
of production began to be performed independently from the concrete, 
114 Rstic, 1986: 25; Rstic, l986/ 1989: 16 
1 15 See text around footnote 114 in chapter 4. 
particular needs at the local level - like extracting the resources from nature 
and converting them into the forms usable a s  elements or components, or the 
forms of energy, necessary for producing the final products. The phase of 
making the final products remained for a very long time exclusively at the level 
of the local community. Only with the onset of industrialization, the phase of 
final products began to pass over to the general level, until the stage of total 
industrialization and institutionalization was reached, when the concrete, local 
needs became completely irrelevant for the process of industrial production, 
and the community was reduced to an agglomeration of consumers 116. 
Reconnection of technology (and of the economy) to the community can be 
best acomplished if the final phase of production, the making of final products, 
is returned to the local level - the level of the local community 
Ralph Borsodi, the [. . .I economis t and decentralis t philosopher who 
championed self-reliant homes teading I...] proved by both theory and example 
that breakingfree of marketplace dependence was a comparatively easy - not 
to mention cheap and healthy - thing to do. A few years ago, in an interview in 
Mother Earth News not long before his death at the age of 91, Borsodi said: 
" Probably one half to two-thirds I...] of all the things we need for good 
living can be produced most economically on a small scale ... either in your 
own home or in the community where you live ... You can't make electric wire 
or light bulbs, for example, very satisfactorily on a limited scale. Still, 
virtually two-thirds of all the things we consume are better off produced on a 
community basis. " 1 17 
The local level is defined by immediate relevance to concrete life 
processes, so making final products in the local community means a 
production appropriate to concrete needs. This can entail a de-alienation of the 
consumer economy which manipulates human needs for profit-maximization 
purposes. Such a development would also re-establish a community-based 
responsibility for the ways of satisfying individuals' own needs and enable them 
to regain control over their own lives. 
116 Ristic, 1989a: 17- 18 
The bureaucratization and centralization of nation-states in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries reduced the amount of control that everyone had in their 
lives at the local level. As the loci of power became more and more remotefrom the 
community as a whole [...I it eroded the community life on which home 
manufacturing had previously depended. (Biehl, 199 1 : 54-55) 
1 17 Sale, 1980: 404-405 (emphasis mine) 
Why do I have to give my child cereals with food coloring and preserva- 
tives? I can go to a health-food store and make myself a mix that I want, out of 
pre-prepared ingredients. There are many other possible examples with 
vehicles, houses, computers and other things which can be made from 
components produced in previous phases of the technological sequence, and 
finalized at the local level, in the local community. 
The previous phases remain at the general level. The post-industrial 
development - or, in Rfkin's tenns, the Third Industrial Revolution 1 18 - 
involves an increasing automatization and computerization of production. The 
phases of the technological sequence before the making of final products are 
exactly where these new production methods are most beneficial: 
Workers in clean, crisp unvonns program and monitor the computers 
that oversee and control the production process. None of the men handle the 
s teel directly. The process itself is nearly fully automated and produces cold 
rolled s teel in less than one hour. The same process in an older integrated 
steel mill used to take as much as twelve days. 119 
Rfkin presents this image of advanced technological process of 
production, not primarily to show an obvious improvement of work comfort and 
ease, but as part of his comprehensive argument that this kind of technological 
innovation leads to enormous decrease in the role of humanpower in 
production processes, and thus to imminent lay-offs of vast number of 
industrial workers 120. However, in the context of the two-level organization of 
technology and the economy, instead of lay-offs, this development can be 
perceived as liberation of people from the slavery to hardships and unhealthy 
conditions of working in basic industries (or in the phases of the technological 
sequence before the making of final products). 
1 18 See paragraph between footnotes 26 and 27 in chapter 3. 
119 Riflrin, op.cit.: 133-134 
120 The quickening pace of automation is fast moving the global economy to the day of 
the workerless factory. Between 1981 and 1991, more than 1.8 million manufactu- 
ring jobs disappeared in the U.S. I.] In the 1950s, 33 percent of all U.S. workers 
were employed in manufacturing. By the 1960s. the number of manufacturing jobs 
had dropped to 30 percent, and by the 1980s to 20 percent. Today, less than 1 7 
percent of the workforce is engaged in blue collar work. (ibid.: 7-8) 
People will thus be liberated to have time and energy which they can em- 
ploy to get more involved in control over and responsibility for their own lives - 
by engaging directly or indirectly in making, at  the level of their local communi- 
ty, the final products that will satisfy their own concrete needs. This work will 
be much more fulfilling a s  it will have the relevance of concrete life processes 
of the community. It will involve creativity in making almost each particular 
final product. Creativity has by now become completely alienated from every- 
day work and limited to professional efforts which are mainly oriented toward 
satisfying the consumerist and profit-maximizing criteria, rather than the 
quality of concrete human needs. Furthermore, at the local level, the combina- 
tion of manual and intellectual work would enable a more integrated life: 
The worker whose task has been specialized by the permanent division 
of labour has lost the intellectual interest in his labour, and it is especially so 
in the great industries: he has lost his inventive powers. Formerly, he 
invented very much. Manual workers - not men of science nor trained 
engineers - have invented, or brought to perfection, the prime motors and all 
that mass of machinery which has revolutionised industry for the last 
hundred years. But since the great factory has been enthroned, the worker, 
depressed by the monotony of his work, invents no more. 121 
The two levels - the local and the general - can only function as  
interrelated, so technological organization has to enable their interaction. An 
appropriate technological approach can be based on so-called "open 
prefabrication" 122. It means that production at the general level is primarily 
aimed at supplying semi-final products - elements or components from which 
the most diverse final products can be made at  the local community level, 
according to specific and real needs. Open prefabrication is "open" because it 
is independent of concrete final products. Prefabricated elements or 
components are designed to enable maximum flexibility, combinability and 
compatibility for the assembling of a greatest variety of products 123. Open 
prefabrication is a horizontal, network system of technology, compatible with 
121 Kropotkin, 1899: 186; see also quotes at footnotes 4 1 and 43 in the previous 
chapter. 
122 Otto, 1975; Schulitz, 1975; Schulitz, 1977 
123 Ristic, 1986: 27-28 
the open systems of social and economic organization, and interrelated a s  
nested levels of interaction. 
This technological system practically exists already - it only has to be 
further developed and rendered appropriate and convenient for the two-level 
social and economic organization. A small producer of computers or audio 
equipment, for instance, actually only assembles the ready made components 
(chips, resistors, switches) into a specific design. It is only in the interest of big 
businesses to hinder such a production pattern because they do not primarily 
want to make good products, but to control the market, often by pushing out 
better designs and by aggressively preventing any independence, openness 
and creativity. 
"Barriers" to energy conservation cue attitudes or institutions that 
prevent or discourage investments which are economically optimal. 124 
Small business is the seedbed for innovation and increased productivity. 
Studies have shown that far more innovations are created by small 
entrepreneurs than big corporate research departments. 125 
This control by the competing big businesses is also achieved by avoiding 
compatibility and standardization of components and parts, along with a 
planned and imposed obsolescence and reduction of quality and durability by 
design - all resulting in increased waste and entropy. 
Consumption of material goods is driven by advertising, planned 
obsolescence, technophilia, and a style-conscious culture. The amount of 
physical material, energy expenditures, and costs to produce the packaging 
"required" for marketing purposes often far exceeds that needed for the 
product itself. Packaging material has a short lifespan; after successfully 
enticing the consumer to buy the product, it goes directly to the landfill. Often 
the product is not far behind. Consumer products themselves cue often 
intended to go out of style or fall apart rapidly, encouraging replacement 
purchases. Material "newness" is worshipped. 126 
A sensitive issue of open prefabrication (and prefabrication in general), 
particularly in the context of social and technological sustainability, is the 
problem of assembly and disassembly 127. Open prefabrication systems have to 
124 Craig and Levine, 1982: 6 
125 Morehouse et al., op.cit: 14 
126 Thayer, 1994: 254 
127 I have already mentioned the problem in relation to the recycling phase of the 
technological sequence - after footnote 114 in chapter 4. 
include carefully designed joining and bonding devices, so that they enable 
both assembly and disassembly which is operationally and ecologically 
sustainable and appropriate to the two-level social, economic and technological 
organization 128. 
Now that the responsibility to reuse and reprocess materials is reverting 
to the manufacturer, [...I companies are scrambling to redesign their products, 
building in recycled materials, changing product and material composition, 
and designing for disassembly. Matsushita's new washing machines can be 
completely disassembled with a single screwdriver. 129 
Decentralization of technology and the two-level organization are the basis 
for a true sustainable community economy. The orientation of such an economy 
toward making final products a t  the local level induces social relationships 
whereby control over the ways of satisfymg vital needs is no longer alienated 
from people. These changed conditions would create a framework which 
encourages and fosters a social and ecological responsibility based on direct 
involvement in production processes. This responsibility has been identified by 
the theorists and activists of the community-revival movement, known in 
England in the 1970s as "community action". It was noted that children 
playgrounds which were built by direct involvement and initiative of the 
residents of the local community - both children and their parents - suffered 
no vandalisim at  all, in contrast to the council-built playgrounds which were 
often completely vandalized 130. 
Making final products at  the local level provokes a different attitude toward 
the process of use. Such an attitude involves more care and responsibility for 
the commodities which satisfy human needs, as  well as  for the environmental 
and social context of the whole process of production, use and renewal. This 
responsibility is the key component of an  ecological culture. 
128 Ristic, 1986: 28 
129 Hawken, op.cit.: 73 
130 These data were publicized in the locally distributed materials by the 'community 
action" groups in London, in 1977. 
Chapter 
Household 
It is increasingly evident that thefuture of the 
species and of the ecosystem is a problem that 
a.ects the lives of each and every one of us. Change 
can therefore no longer be dissociatedfrom 
individual responsibility. [. . . ] Granting that the 
ecological question signals these transformations, 
it is also necessary to accept the fact that we cannot 
address the problem of the planet without 
addressing the problem of ourselves. 1 
Ecology -from the Greek oikos ("household") - is 
the study of the I.. .I relationships that interlink all 
members of the Earth Household. 2 
In discussing the issues of decentralization and de-alienation. I have 
repeatedly mentioned the importance of control by people over the ways of 
satisfjrlng their needs, individual interest in their own lives, their creative 
initiatives within the community economy, and particularly their individual 
responsibility. All this points to the individual as  the ultimate level of 
decentralization and de-alienation. 
However, in the eco-systemic context, individual cannot be viewed or exa- 
mined in isolation, but as an integral unit of individual-in-her/his-environment. 
Individual's immediate social, natural and built environment is the household. 
It is the sphere of the most direct vital relevance for the individual's life, 
a social unit that is closer to the ground, in which changes are comprehended 
by  reference to the motives and actions of individual human beings. 3 
Household is thus the basic unit of eco-systemic interrelatedness and 
interaction between individuals and their environment, the fundamental unit in 
the range of nested levels of complexity 4, which comprise the Earth household 
depicted by Capra in the above quotation. 
I have indicated in previous chapters that this interaction between 
individuals and their social environment has been disrupted by the alienating 
processes resulting from the institutionalization of social, economic and 
technological structures. This disruption is most conspicuously manifested by 
the sharp difference in individuals' attitude toward their own household and 
toward the broader levels of their environment. For example, it is absolutely 
and immediately clear to everyone who takes care of maintaining one's 
apartment or house -just as well as to those who never think about it - that, 
by pushing garbage under the carpet, one will very soon jeopardize both 
physically and hygienically one's survival in that environment. By contrast, 
people typically behave toward anythlng beyond their threshold as if it belongs 
to someone else, because indeed - in the all-inclusive alienation of the 
institutionalized world we live in - it is always someone else who is authorized 
to be responsible. Thus, environmental and ecological problems are being 
constantly pushed under the carpet 5. 
Within these conditions of alienation in the current culture, household still 
remains the basic unit where ecological consciousness is rooted in the 
awareness of and the responsibility for the immediate life processes, and 
wherefrom it can extend to broader levels of interaction with the social and 
natural environment. 
Household is the most appropriate unit of eco-systemic inquiry because it 
includes both the social structure and the immediate physical environment. 
- 
3 Wilk. 1989: 7 
4 encompassing, as I pointed out before, the household, neighborhood, community. 
bioregion, etc. 
5 Ristic, 1989c 
Household usually incorporates the family as  the basic social structure (but it 
is still a household, even if only one person lives in it), and it also means the 
locus, the physical space, the house, as  well as  the everyday life functioning, 
the process of satisfymg vital needs. It includes all the functions that notions of 
home, house and dwelling signify and consist of, like shelter, living space, 
relaxation and sleep, sexuality and reproduction, common meals, personal care 
and waste management, as  well as  categories like love, creativity, sociability, 
privacy, security. 
The words family, household and home are three power -  notions in 
western culture which have also been used as conceptual tools in cross-cultu- 
ral studies of domestic organization. [. . .] The three words have been used in 
many, ofen overlapping ways, not only to describe socioeconomic or genealo- 
gical categories and units of residence but also as images, metaphors, and 
symbols. 6 
So household means the individual in her or his social, biological and physical 
environment, which makes it the basic human-ecological unit. 
The defintion of household established by the U S  Bureau of Census (from 
1990) is rather simplified as  
all persons who occupy a housing unit. A house, an apartment or other group 
of rooms, or a single room is regarded as a housing unit when it is occupied or 
intendedfor occupancy as separate living quarters; that is, when the 
occupants do not live and eat with any otherpersons in the structure and there 
is direct access from the outside or through a common hall. 7 
But sharing the living space is the most basic definition: 
By household I refer to a group of people coresiding in a dwelling or 
residential compound, and who, to some degree, share householding activities 
and decision making. 8 
Analysis of activities is the ground for the definition of the household 
purported by Wilk and Netting (two of the foremost anthropological authorities 
on household issues). They group these activities into five categories which 
characterize the household as  a social unit: production, distribution, transmis- 
sion, reproduction and coresidence 9. They refer to this approach as  functional 
- distinguishing the household as a place of activities and tasks from the family 
6 Lofgren, 1989:446 
7 quoted in Magrabi et al., 199 1 : 6 
8 Blanton. 1994: 5 
9 Wilk and Netting, 1984: 5 
which involves psychological, moral and symbolic aspects. Such an approach 
offers a possibility of differentiating the household from the family. This 
differentiation has been identified by a number of anthropologists as  a major 
problem of reaching an acceptable defmition of the household. 
The dtference between our approach and that in the diverse literature of 
family history and psychology was that we avoided the topic of the quality of 
personal interaction and aflective behavior within the family I...] con.ning 
ourselves to the observable and ofen quantitatively veniible behavior of 
individuals in households. 10 
Wilk and Netting establish their approach on "the common productive, con- 
sumptive, and reproductive activities directed toward the satisfaction of needs," 1 1 
which is obviously derived from Malinowski's functionalism 12, although he did 
not frame it in reductionist terms which exclude the psychological, moral and 
symbolic side. The exclusion of psychological aspects - and primarily values - 
follows the current paradigm of "value-free" economics, as  Wilk and Netting 
explicitly ident@ their approach as  functional or economic 13. 
Despite the purpose of making a clear distinction between the household 
and the family, the task-oriented character of the former is not always 
presented in sharp isolation from its other aspects. It is actually questionable 
whether and how functional aspects, or tasks/activities, can be clearly 
separated from the psychological, moral and symbolic aspects. Analysts with a 
more feminist perspective, like Peggy Barlett, include both facets. She presents 
a more comprehensive defmition of the household which consists of 
personnel and household composition; production activities and the division 
of labor; consumption activities and inter- and intra-household exchange; 
and patterns of power and authority. 14 
Another characteristic of the household that has been identified as  a 
problem is its universality. It has two aspects: the fact that household is 
ubiquitous, universally present in all cultures; and the perception of the 
Western type of household as  a universal model for cultural development. 
10 Netting, et al., 1984: xx 
11 ibid.: xx 
12 See at footnotes 18, 19 and 20 in chapter 1 .  
13 Netting, et al., op.cit.: xx 
14 Barlett, 19894 
Notwithstanding the unquestionable fact it presents, even the first aspect has 
been questioned as an inconsistent basis for statistical relevance 15 because of 
diversity of household forms in different cultures, and their fluidity in the 
process of cultural change. However, the predominance of the Western 
perspective, if not the Western household pattern, still induces, more or less 
unconsciously, the adoption of some of its stereotypes as universal values, or 
at least referential models in studying the households in other cultures. This 
anthropological universalism has been identified as a bias which distorts 
perception and research results, so the strategy of excluding the underlying 
values from household inquiry may have seemed appropriate. 
Yet, the changes and transformations in relationships within the household 
are undeniably of paramount importance for its study, which, therefore, cannot 
exclude the issue of values - of household's psychological, moral and symbolic 
aspects. Particularly the gender roles, based on the deeply rooted patriarchal 
structure and values - which have been almost universally present in human 
cultures for quite a long period of civilizational development - have been of 
central interest for researchers with feminist orientation. 
The traditional position of women is most often revealed in economic 
terms: 
As unpaid labor carried out in near isolation, household work does not 
share the formal characteristics of "real" work and thus has been 
systematically excluded from the purview of most traditional organizational 
research. 16 
The economic position of women in general is established in the household 
relationships, which are not merely economic. They are based on the 
patriarchal structure which is one of the fundamental forms of social 
relationships of domination. The household is thus the core unit of domination 
- as Victoria Lockwood succinctly demonstrates: 
Women's labor in reproduction and domestic activities is devalued and 
unremunerated because, in capitalist systems, the concept of labor is reserved 
for activity that produces surplus value (ie.  cash-earning activities). [...I A 
critical facet of this pattern of intra-household gender strahiation is that 
15 Hammel, 1989: 40 
16 Berk, 1980: 16 
d~Terentia1 power (Le. decision-making and authority) in the household is 
derivedfrom, and inextricably linked to, control of the means and rewards of 
production (as in all capitalist systems). Thus, the material foundation of 
male domination in commodity producing peasant households is male 
control of capital. This foundation may be reinforced by social institutions, 
religious beliefs, or ideolqies which socially  just^& male pre-eminence. 17 
I would put it less mildly: economic domination is invariably directly 
interrelated to the cultural paradigm of domination over women in particular, 
and over humans in general (as I will explicate in the next chapter). 
These relationships are changing at an extremely slow pace: 
As the United Nations State of the World's Women 1985 points out, 
globally women are half the population, perform two thirds of the world's 
work in terms of hours, earn one tenth as much as men e m  and own one 
hundredth the property that men own. 18 
The most conspicuous change is caused by the infusion of market economy 
and consumer culture into the traditional pattern of household economy: 
In the commodity producing peasant household, a form generated by the 
penetration of capitalist relations of production, men control major market- 
oriented economic activities and wealth producing resources, and women are 
usually economically dependent and politically subordinate. 19 
This change does not substantially alter the patriarchal structure, but it does 
introduce an initial step to cultural transformation: 
Women's economic power is also bolstered where women make major 
labor contributions in the production of commodities and male household 
heads are dependent on these contributions; wives may be able to make claims 
to some portion of the product of their labor, although it is "owned" by men. 
Because male economic control is not absolute, women may also be able, at 
least on a situational basis, to chaUenge male authority when their own 
interests dictate it. 20 
All this points to close interrelatedness between household activities and 
tasks, and inter-personal relationships that belong to the family sphere, with 
the complex issues of gender, marriage, love, sexuality, reproduction, children- 
rearing, education - which are all expressed and manifested through household 
activities and functions. This interrelatedness exemplifies the comprehensive 
systemic context of individuals-in-their-(immediate) environment. 
17 Lockwood, 1989: 200 
18 Eisler, 1987: 197 
19 Lockwood, op.cit.: 197 
20 ibid. : 20 1 
However, the distinction between the family and the household is neces- 
sary, not because of any advantage in reducing the household to quantifiable 
economic/functional aspects in terms of activities and tasks, and excluding the 
qualities of inter-personal relationships, values and psychological, moral and 
symbolic aspects - as  Wilk and Netting contend 21 - but because the two units 
do not overlap completely. All the members of a family rarely belong to the 
same household throughout their lifetime, and, on the other hand, a household 
can include persons who belong to different families (traditionally, the servants, 
farmhands or other members of large households, and, nowadays, mixtures 
and blends of different families due to divorces and other manifestations of 
instability or transformation of the nuclear family). 
The word family is  also ambiguous, since it refers to the extended kin 
relations of a particular individual, or kinship as a network in itself, as well 
as a coresident domestic group. 22 
In strictly anthropological terms, family is a social group defined by 
kinship relationships, whereas household is characterized by shared functions 
and coresidence 23. This distinction, however, does not imply that there is no 
overlap. The overlap is of key importance for the integrative systemic context 
mentioned above. 
Household types generally are defied in terms of the number of nuclear 
families in a household, their completeness (whether they contain widowed or 
divorced persons), the manner in which one nuclear family is connected to 
another lfor example, by a sibling or a parent/child bond), and the degree to 
which they are extended by having attached to them persons who currently 
belong to no nuclear family. 24 
The form of family overlapping with the household - i.e. living together in 
the same household - has been in the state of intense change since the onset 
of industrialization, urbanization and development of consumer culture. The 
prevalent form in the industrial/consumer culture is the nuclear family, and it 
21 See quotation at footnote 10 above. 
22 Laslett, 1989: 356 
23 Netting, et al., op.cit.: xx. The only problem with this definition is that co- 
residence does not make sense in the household consisting of a single member. 
which still undoubtedly involves its basic functions. See in this connection the 
2nd paragraph after footnote 5 above, and text before and quote in footnote 34 
below. 
24 Carter, 1989: 58 
has likewise been in a process of transformation a s  the patriarchal structures 
are being shaken, but its instability is also a result of its isolation from immedi- 
ate levels of social interaction - entailing from the destruction of the neighbor- 
hood and the local community which I described in the previous chapter. 
Household as the Basic Unit of Cultural Change 
Household includes the basic elements of family structures, and their 
changes are certainly important for its development, but they cannot affect its 
distinction as  a unit. In a way household has a broader meaning than family, a s  
it integrates the individual's most immediate social environment (which in most 
cases means the primary family), and the basic life functions. In the context of 
my discussion in this essay of an  integrated economy of life processes, 
household can be best defined as  the locus of the processes of s a t i s w g  
individual's basic needs, the processes which imply the immediacy of 
interactions with the social, natural and built environment. 
In chapter 4, I have suggested the following categorization of the basic 
human needs, or life functions: 
breathing/drinking/eating/personal care 
motility/relaxation/sleep 
taking space (and time) - living space/environmental control and cornfort/ 
shelter/clothing/maintenance 
sexuality/love/sociability/peace/privacy/security/comunication/coope- 
ration 
creativity/reproduction/education. 
These are all processes of exchange of matter or energy with the social and 
natural environment, and they amount to the fundamental metabolic flow of 
intake + functioning + output. The functioning - or the satisfying of a need - 
occurrs in all cases entirely, or at  least in its essential, rudimentary form, in 
the household. That is to say, household is the focus and the center of the 
basic life functions. 
These life functions involve social, economic and technological interactions. 
so household has to be comprehended as a technological, economic, social and 
political unit - or, in integrative, systemic sense, as the basic human- 
ecological unit. 
Pooling and sharing of resources, food processing, cooking, eating, and 
shelteringfrom the elements tend to take place in the household, which has 
therefore become a standard unit of analysis for ecological and economic 
purposes. 25 
As the basic human-ecological unit, household is the most important 
sphere of cultural change. Thus it has the potential to be the basic and 
principal sphere of change toward an ecological culture - which is one of the 
central arguments of this essay. 
While social change viewedfrom the distance of history can be envi- 
sioned as abstract forces acting upon each other, change that is observable in 
daily life is generated by patterns of individual and group decisions. The 
household unit has become recognized as the most important and informative 
level of analysis for understanding how individual and group action leads to 
structural transformation on a larger scale. 26 
The importance of the household as a sphere of cultural change is based 
firstly on its universal presence in all societies and cultures 27. Furthermore, 
as the locus of satisfying the basic human needs, household is the fundamental 
cultural unit - and the principal sphere of cultural reproduction. 
Culture is defined as the ways of satisfymg human needs - the cultural 
interpretations of the primary biological needs and the secondary needs which 
emerge from these interpretations 28. This interaction between the biological 
and cultural spheres (or between nature and humanity) is a dynamic process. 
It represents a crucial aspect of the evolution of human species, which unfolds 
25 Netting, et al., op.cit.: xxii (emphasis mine) 
26 Wilk, op.cit.: 7 
27 Household is identified by almost all researchers as  ?society's most commonplace 
and basic socio-economic unit. " (Netting, et al., op.cit.: xiii) 
28 The problems set by man's nutritive, reproductive, and hygienic needs [. . . ] are 
solved by the construction of a new, secondary, or artificial environment. This 
environment, which is neither more nor less than culture itself, has to be 
permanently reproduced, maintained, and managed. (Malinowski, 1944: 37) - this 
is a part of the quotation already used in chapter 1, footnote 18 
as an interplay of its social (environmetally influenced) and innate (biological, 
genetic) facets 29. 
The culturally defined ways of satisfymg human needs are reproduced 
through education, primarily within the basic parental relationships which are 
invariably situated in a household - "aprirnary arena for the expression of age 
and sex roles, kinship, socialization, and economic cooperation where the very 
s tu .of  culture is mediated and transformed into actionw 30. So the basic social, 
economic and technological relations are culturally reproduced principally in 
the household, in the educational process which is neither only rational nor 
scholastic, nor specifically targeted at any of these relations as separate 
disciplines or issues. It is an integrated learning of life processes, not only 
because of the non-academic character of early education, but, most 
importantly (for the issue I am discussing), because of the integrative character 
of the household as a unit of basic life processes. 
Household is thus the fundamental unit of cultural reproduction and 
change, but it does not fulfill this role in isolation. The mechanism of cultural 
reproduction and particularly of cultural change is manifested in interaction 
between the household and its environment - the broader nested levels of 
social, economic and technological organization. 
These interactions, however, have been much disrupted, as I argued befo- 
re, by the alienating processes of institutionalization and consumerism. The in- 
termediary levels of interaction - which played a crucial role in the integrated 
process of cultural reproduction - have been eradicated with the destruction of 
the community and the neighborhood. The gap has been filled in by the inva- 
sion of media, which are an integral part of the consumer culture, and which 
have become the overwhelmingly predominant vehicle of its reproduction. 
This change of sphere of cultural reproduction is not just a matter of social 
structure; it entails substantially and qualitatively different content and context 
29 Chorover, 1990: 99-101-see also in chapter 1: quote at footnote 27, and Malinowski, 
at footnote 44. 
30 Netting, et al., op.cit.: xxii 
- the virtual reality of consumerism and detachment from concrete Life proces- 
ses - which have been comprehensively addressed by Baudrillard's theory of 
simulacra: 
Under the sign of the commodity, culture is bought and sold - under the 
sign of fashion, all cultures play like simulacra in total promiscuity. 31 
What is particularly important in the context of household as  a unit of 
integrative life processes, is that 
information societies develop a cultural production not directly connected to 
the needs for survival or for reproduction. 32 
In this alienating disruption of the levels of social organization which invol- 
ve direct interactions and connectedness to the integrity of human life proces- 
ses, houshold has remained the last resort, the sanctum of individual identity: 
Home became a n  antipole to the growing anonymity, rationality, and effi- 
ciency of the outside world. In this dialectical process the sweetness of home 
increased as the outside world became more complex and problematic. 33 
The alienation of institutionalized consumer culture has also considerably 
affected the household. The disruption of the relationship between work and 
residence has reduced the household to a dormitory and tv-lounge (principal 
meals, except in increasingly rare social occasions, are Linked to the tv-function 
in form of unhealthy tv-dinners). In the Third World, the disintegration of the 
household is even more intense as  migratory workforce typically lives in 
disjointed conditions (which have been a continuous curse of the lowest class 
of industrial proletariat since the beginning of industrialization). The basic 
criterion of coresidency thus becomes almost unsubstantial in the "dormitory" 
households of the "developed world" - or even hard to apply with certainty in 
societies where there is much economic migration 34. All in all, the role of the 
household as  a unit of integrated life processes and direct involvement in and 
31 Baudrillad, 1976: 88; see also at footnotes 28, 3 1 and 32 in chapter 5. 
32 Melucci, op.cit.: 144 
33 Lofgren, op.cit. : 46 1 
34 In many developing countries substantial numbers of households send one or 
more members out in temporary emigration to urban areas and other employment 
centers. [. . .I In a great many ethnographic settings it cannot be assumed therefore 
that each residential unit corresponds to a n  independent household or that a 
household contains only those persons resident in its principal domicile a t  any 
particular moment. (Carter, op.cit.: 53) 
control over the ways of satisfymg the individual's own vital needs has much 
diminished. But, despite the extreme conditions just described, it is still not 
entirely abolished. 
Most theories of sustainability are mainly focused on the local decentrali- 
zed community and perceive its revitalization as  both the prerequisite and the 
goal of change toward a sustainable society. However, the local community has 
been almost completely disintegrated, so its revitalization will be an arduous 
process. Household, on the other hand, has preserved enough of its integrity, 
vitality and non-institutional position to remain the principal unit of cultural 
change and a much more viable sphere of transformation toward an ecological 
culture. Furthermore, a revived household (as a more fundamental unit) will be 
the germ and the basis for a renaissance of the local community. 
If the primary sphere of an emerging ecological culture is to be perceived 
in the household, the diversity and fluidity of household forms imposes the 
question of the type of household which can be identified a s  the possible and 
probable focus of such a process of cultural change. A tentative classification 
appropriate to this context of inquiry should include the following types of 
households: 
typical Western middle-class consumer-culture household; 
** urban/suburban subtype 
** rural subtype; 
low-class - poverty (urban slum); 
third world transition; 
third world slum. 
It can be argued that, generally, all the later types aspire - mostly allured by 
the intricate consumer-culture propaganda - to the "Western" type. Currently. 
it is the predominant model, and it has become the most prevalent type for the 
middle-class (in the most general terms) world-wide, not only in the 'West". 
A very marginal number of households world-wide has, of course, as  yet 
achieved to various extent a form of an  ecological household. For the rest. 
although it is certain that, in some cases, the transition is conceivable from the 
last three types, the consumer-culture household is the primary departure for 
the change toward a n  ecological household. 
When I say departure, I have in mind primarily that an  ecological house- 
hold, and an  ecological culture in general, present a n  integrated alternative 
(both practically and conceptually) to the currently prevailing comprehensively 
unsustainable mode of household organization and operation, and to the related 
cultural basis: the industrial, consumerist and profit-oriented economic and 
social structure. Furthermore, it is important to note that the present condi- 
tion, if not also the form, of the other types of household from the above 
classification is substantially the result, or the underside, of the dominant 
world economy. And the consumer-culture household is its expression and its 
glossier side. 
The contribution of the household in the economy a s  it is currently 
organized is reduced to consumption. Conventional household economics 35 
identifies the household a s  a consumption unit 36, and its field of inquiry 
amounts to the study of consumption behavior and is intended for market 
analysts and policy makers 37. 
This perspective reflects the framework of consumer culture and growth- 
oriented economy, where perpetual and increasing consumption is the 
prerequisite of expansion of production and profits 38. What is particularly 
implicative is that consumption is identified with use: 
Consumption is the use of commodities by  households. 39 
Or, rather, use is reduced to consumption. Use is equalled to using up, 
exhausting and expending matter and energy. The role of the household in 
economic processes thus emerges a s  destructive. 
35 e.g., Magrabi et al., op.cit.; Lareau and Darmstadter, 1983; Gladhart et al., 1886 
36 Bryant. 1990 
37 Magrabi et al., op.cit.: xiii, 3 
38 I have mentioned this issue under Sustainability and Growth in chapter 3. 
39 Magrabi et al., op.cit.: 9 
Buildings are either designed to last only a few years with the idea that 
they can be tom down then; or they are designed to last forever, and made of 
materials which never have to be repaired. I...] In both cases, living and 
working in buildings are seen as destructive activities - buildings are only 
thought good when they are new. 40 
This example demonstrates the consumptive role of the household in the 
context of the building industry, but this condition extends practically to 
everything else, as  almost all life functions have by now transmuted into 
commodities. 
In protoindus trial economies as well as in agrarian communities. 
households generally function both as units of production and as units of 
consumption, while in industrial economies households tend to lose their 
role as productive units. 41 
As I discussed in the previous chapter, in the consumer culture all the pro- 
duction phases in the technological sequence are situated a t  the general level of 
social, economic and technological organization, while the local level is reduced 
solely to consumption. The two levels present only the basic distinction within 
the range of nested levels of interaction which includes the household, the 
neighborhood, the local community, the bioregion, etc. When the technological 
sequence is viewed in relation to this more discrete categorization of levels of 
human-ecological organization, things take on a different aspect. The distinction 
between production and consumption becomes less clear-cut at  the household 
level. Even without that insight, Magrabi et al., observe from the standpoint of 
conventional household economics that 
the value of the household commodities consumed is likely to be greater than 
the value of the market goods and services used to produce the commodities. 42 
Here lies an essential conceptual misunderstanding. If the life functioning 
in the household is conceived of in terms of metabolism, of exchange of matter 
and energy with the environment, as part of the comprehensive technological 
sequence - then we cannot speak of consumption, but of the production of 
final products and services in the process of satisflmg the vital needs of 
household members. 
40 Alexander and Jacobson, 1974: 45 
41 Carter, op.cit.: 52 
42 Magrabietal., op.cit.: 8 
The producer produces for the household, the consumer produces within 
the household. That is the real diserence between producer and consumer. 43 
In this context, the technological sequence phase of use (or of life function) in 
the household is no longer perceived of as  destroying, using up the material 
and energy resources, but as  a process of transforming them within the 
human-ecological cycles of renewal. 
So household emerges as the basic economic unit, which is actually a 
tautology when the original meaning of economy is evoked - and I have defined 
an integrated, ecological (or sustainable) economy in these terms. 
The Economy as Household Management 
If the context of an ecological culture implies an integrated economy of life 
processes, then the household is the basic unit a s  it is the locus of production 
processes which enable the satisfaction of vital needs and the fulfillment of life 
functions. However, these productive or economic activities are unrecognized 
as  such by conventional economics because they do not involve monetary 
exchange 44. 
Traditionally, household activities which were not aimed at  yielding 
products to be sold outside, in the market, consisted of the sustenance of life 
processes in the household and were almost exclusively performed by women. 
This division of labor by gender has been a manifestation of the patriarchal 
cultural pattern. Therefore, women's unpaid work in the household as  a form 
of gender-based domination has been comprehensively analyzed, particularly 
by feminist authors 45. The meaning of women's unpaid work is that they were 
deprived of participating in economic activities which procured monetary gains, 
and consequently excluded from the social position of power. However, the 
ongoing change in these socio-economic relationships with the gradual 
43 Bums, 1975: 60-61 
44 ibid.: 61-62 
45 1 presented some of these issues above - related to footnotes 17-20. 
dissolution of patriarchal structures, does not alter the essential placement of 
household activities outside of the economy defined by monetary exchange. 
When, with the slowly transforming gender relationships, household activities 
have become more shared, they still remain unpaid, whether performed by 
females or males. 
The economy at the household level is distinctly characterized by direct 
involvement of its members in the processes of satisfymg vital needs and 
fulfilling life functions. This is the gist, the focal point of the economy of life 
processes, of metabolic exchange of matter and energy between the basic 
human-ecological unit and its natural and social environment. In this process, 
household members are directly engaged in work for their vital purposes, as  
differentiated from professional service which involves primarily monetary 
exchange. Bums describes the difference - and its manifestation in the current 
economic perception - in the context of the traditional view of women's work in 
the household: 
The woman who decides to get a job outside the home hires a maid to 
clean her house. Both her income and that of her maid are then included in 
GNP and national income accounts, because they involve the exchange of 
money. In reality, the only real addition to the economic product is the job 
outside the home. The work of the maid is included in the GNP not because it is 
done but because if is paid for [...I ?he value offriend's services on her own car 
is excludedfrom GNP. But the cost of her accident, ambulance ride, and the 
hospital stay is not. Indeed, a multitude of entirely negative economic events - 
the cost of police, prisons, pollution, accidents, etc. - are included in GNP, 
while the value of home production, volunteer work, and the services of 
consumer-owned capital are excluded. 46 
Direct involvement can be exchanged between households without 
monetary mediation. That is the friendly help mentioned in the previous 
quotation and it extends the non-market form of economic activities to 
neighborhood and local community levels - the local levels of social, economic 
and technological organization characterized by direct interaction 47. 
The activities which fall outside of perception of the current mainstream 
economics are generally denoted as  the informal economy. The term covers a 
46 Burns,op.cit.:61-62 
47 as explicated earlier - see text between footnotes 60 and 61, and between 129 and 
130 in chapter 6. 
broad and indeterminately defined range of economic processes which elude 
the institutional control of monetary exchange for a variety of reasons. It also 
indicates the inadequacy of the institutional sphere to respond to and resonate 
with different aspects of life processes 48. The household economy is typically 
considered an informal economy 49 because of its "invisibility" to GNP and other 
formal indicators of economic activity. However, the "invisibility" of the house- 
hold economy ensues from its essential inconsistency with any form of moneta- 
ry exchange, while the other types of the informal economy imply unambiguous 
orientation toward monetary gain and can involve informal markets. Direct 
involvement in the process of satisfying vital needs characterizes both the 
household economy and the essential purpose of the community economy, 
although the later includes local markets and monetary exchange. 
A lot of work has been done to translate housework into the market 
economy terms 50 in order to demonstrate by mainstream indicators - 
particularly for the purpose of feminist arguments against the "invisibility" of 
women's housework - that 'the household economy is about one third the size of 
the market economy." 51. However, this quantitative evidence does not reflect 
the non-market quality of the economy at the household level. The economy at 
the household level cannot be included into the overall picture of the economy 
by expressing its activities in terms of monetary exchange. Instead, a 
comprehensive, integral economy has to be perceived as  consisting of what 
Bums defined as  the basic triad of the household, the collective and the 
market economy. He observed that 
both the collective and the household economy are so structured that it is 
impossible to disentangle the economic aspects of these organizations from 
their social and biological functions. They are exceedingly natural 
economies, evident in the operation of wolfpacks, bees, and porpoises as well 
as of human societies. [. ..] 
48 See quotation by Danesh, 1991 at footnote 64 in the previous chapter. 
49 e-g.. Danesh, op.cit.; Smith and Wallerstein, 1992 
50 Burns, op.cit.: 19 
51 ibid.: 24 
Two hundred years ago, the market was of little importance to anyone. 
Now the market is predominant, to the virtual exclusion of the original and 
more natural economies. 52 
Although the characterization of household and collective economies as  
natural in contrast to the market economy may be inappropriate and somewhat 
dualistic, it indicates the current imbalance generated by the overwhelming 
dominance of the market component 53, which Bums believed would be 
regulated by a natural tendency toward a balanced economy. If this prognosis 
sounds too optimistic, it can certainly be argued that the current ill-balanced 
economy is untenable and unsustainable. 
This imbalance is manifested by increasing commodification of life 
functions and the reduction of direct involvement of people in satisfying their 
own needs. This is a key aspect of alienation in the consumer culture which I 
discussed before. However, a s  long as  the household exists, it will remain, in 
whatever degree, the basic unit of economic processes demarcated by direct 
involvement and vital purpose - by direct control over and responsibility for 
individuals' needs and their own life. The household is, thus, the germ of a 
process of de-alienation and emancipation from the consumer culture, and of 
reestablishment of a balanced, sustainable economy in its integral scope. 
It is necessary here to clarify the definition of the economy at the 
household level. I have been consistently using the expression "the economy at 
the household level" to emphasize that it is only one (the basic) of the nested 
levels of eco-systemically interrelated economic processes which comprise the 
integrated economy of life processes (which is the definition of a sustainable or 
ecological economy I developed in chapters 3 and 4). The current perception 
creates a confusion about what defines the economy at the household level 
primarily because monetary exchange is the exclusive criterion for iden-g 
economic activities. Therefore, household consumption which involves the pur- 
chase of commodities in the current market economy is identified as the house- 
hold economy because it entails monetary exchange perceived to be performed 
52 ibid.: 74, 78 
53 I have already mentioned this issue in chapter 4 at footnote 29. 
by people in their position as  household members. However, it is the imrnedi- 
ate satisfaction of vital needs and fulfilment of life functions - the economy as  
a metabolic process of exchange of matter and energy with the (natural and 
social) environment - that defines the economy at  the household level. It pre- 
sents some essential differences from the market economy. Firstly, life func- 
tions cannot be expressed in terms of market exchange value, despite the alie- 
nation and distortion of needs by the pressures of the consumer culture 54. 
Bums explains the difference with an example: 
The man who operates a laundromat will likely see the regular 
replacement of his machines as the most emient route to proJits. But he will 
also resent the inevitable deterioration of the same machines used by his w$e 
at home [...I A washing machine offers nothing but clean clothes in the here 
and now. And the ultimate service of a car, whatever its psychic satisfactions, 
is delivered in miles, not dollars. Household investments, by nature, are 
discrete and real. They lack entirely the magic of capital. Their returns are 
rigid, immediate, and non-transferable. The phenomenon of compound 
growth does not exist in the household. 55 
Consequently, the notion of economic growth, based on the primary economic 
purpose of profit maximization, is also incompatible with the essential metabolic 
processes of life functions. Likewise, competition as  the basic social interaction 
of the market economy is not characteristic of economic processes at the house- 
hold level. 
The common denominator of these forms of economic activity, beyond 
their failure to use money, is that they are organized around the idea of giving, 
of mutual need, and of cooperation rather than competition ?hey assume 
that productive activity is a social as well as an economicfunction and that 
the competitive drive for individual gain is not necessary the best drive to har- 
ness in order to accomplish a given task. Perversely, ow  system of economic 
accounts excludes all motives but the competitive desire for money. 56 
The issue of the purpose of economy, which I discussed in chapter 4, 
becomes clear with this essential characteristic of the economy at  the 
household level. The purpose of monetary gains and of profit maximization is 
entirely incompatible with the economy of life processes, of which the 
household is the focal point. The interactions of the economy at the household 
level are based on mutuality and cooperation. They work on giving-and- 
54 which I discussed in chapters 4 and 5 
55 Burns,op.cit.: 67 
56 ibid.: 67 (emphasis mine) 
taking, on common and mutual vital needs, on exchange of energy. Give-and- 
take is a truly metabolic process. It is the key to the eco-systemic definition of 
sustainability: the exchange with the social and natural environment as  
interconnectedness, interrelatedness and interdependence means mutuality, 
rather than a perception of the environment as  confrontational and competitive. 
Mutuality and cooperation are the fundamental issue of the sustainable 
economy and ecological culture. They are primarily manifested and evident at  
the household level, but they are the essential characteristic of the integrated 
economy of life processes 57. They involve giving and taking as  a two-way 
relation, in contrast to confrontation of gain and loss - the competition for 
profit gains at  the expense of recognized or unrecognized social and 
environmental losses. 
Currently, the consumer culture has reached the stage where the growth 
paradigm and its public image of boundless consumerism has effectively 
obliterated the awareness of losses. Consumer culture has become a happy-go- 
lucky trance of endless gains. However, metabolic processes are an inevitable 
ecological and bio-physical given. At the level and scale of direct interaction, 
losses are conspicuous, so they cannot be entirely detached from gains, and 
the interrelatedness of give-and-take stays much in evidence. The concealment 
of the simultaneity of give-and-take, or gain-and-loss could have only been 
achieved by the alienating detachment from life processes and from direct 
interactions and involvement. In the course of this detachment, local 
community has been disrupted and the household invaded by consumerism. 
Mutuality and cooperation involve and require direct interaction. They 
involve synergy of the group which works together toward a common purpose. 
Moreover, mutuality and cooperation seem to be possible only at  the levels of 
small-scale groups: 
57 In his famous book Mutual Aid, Kropotkin (1902) argues that mutuality is 
primordially a crucial characteristic of all social animals, and the fundamental 
condition for the development of humanity as a basic system of social and 
economic support. See quotation at footnote 87 in the previous chapter. 
A sense of cooperation and mutuality arise among those who continually 
rub shoulders - it is d~ficult o think of "cooperation" among millions, but 
very easy to conceive of it among hundred. 58 
The essence of social l$e is cooperation. People can only exchange 
services, work together, and rely on supplementing each other as regards task 
and ability, when they are within reach. And conversely, people who are close 
neighbors must come to some agreement on a whole number of points. 
Obviously the smallest neighborhood group is the household I...] Yet 
invariably we have also some forms of organization which embrace a number 
of families and other kinship units. The local group I .  ..I territorial unit of 
potential cooperation, exchange of services, and community of interest I...] 59 
Cooperative and collaborative relations obviously work across the nested 
levels of social and economic interactions - but within the scope of local direct 
involvement. Martine Segalen perceives this systemic interrelatedness in terms 
of networks: 
Work cooperation was often based on neighbor networks. The 
organization of work also associated richer and poorer domestic groups; the 
small holder would come and help the larger farmer during the ploughing 
period and the latter would lend his horse and plough implements to the 
former to till his small plot of land. [...I The work force was formed inside the 
household but at times required pooling between households, either kinfolk 
or neighbors, according to the stages of the annual labor cycle. 60 
However, she refers here to traditional social and economic relationships 
which are now mostly a thing of the past. Collaboration and cooperation have 
been very much reduced to smaller groups which externally seem to operate in- 
creasingly in competitive mode - as  collaboration for group gain against other 
groups, or social/economic structures. This external confrontation is always ea- 
sier if the other group is alien, or perceived as  such, either by sincerely accep- 
ted propaganda, or by the consensus of a game (typically in sports, which histo- 
rically have had a social function of reproducing social conflicts in game form). 
The prevalence of intergroup confrontation and competition indicates a lack 
of awareness of eco-systemic interrelatedness of nested levels of social and 
economic interaction. The intermediary levels of social organization - the local 
community and the neighborhood - have been eradicated from the continuum 
of nested levels of interaction (as I demonstrated in the previous chapter). The 
58 Sale, 1980: 485 
59 Malinowski. op.cit.: 56 
60 Segalen, 1989, 170 
disrupted sense of interrelatedness makes space for the detachment necessary 
for separation of gain and loss into gain versus loss. The dualistic and 
hierarchical opposition between the units of social and economic organization is 
thus emphasized, and they operate in a competitive, conflicting relationship. 
The question is whether the awareness of eco-systemic interrelatedness 
has historically been the factor that made the household the basic unit of 
mutuality and cooperation. 
Household as a Sphere of Change 
Toward an Ecological Culture 
An answer to this question can be found in the concept of the moral 
economy which 
was first introduced by the historian E. P. Thompson, in connection with his 
studies of transitions ffom pre-capitalist to capitalist societies. In pre- 
capitalist societies, economic exchanges appear to be regulated by traditional 
norms that define both an individual's social status, and the support to which 
he or she is entitled in order to maintain a n  appropriate level of subsistence. 
[...I In economic anthropology, households have usually been understood as 
intimate economies based on sharing, rather than on the economic exchange 
that is found in more distant relationships. Rights to goods and services are 
therefore thought to be defined by social obligations rather than by 
calculations of retwns, and they are described as being patterned by the role 
structure of the group. 61 
Cheal's analysis of the social and economic relationships in the household 
indicates that the organization of its economic activities around mutuality rather 
than competition has been traditionally based on the compulsive morality of 
domination over women (at the level of family relationships) and over servants 
(as non-kinship members of a household). They were simply not in a position to 
get involved in economic activities which would permit competition for 
monetary gains 62. 
Thus, the traditional role of the household as  a basic unit of mutuality and 
cooperation is not established on any social and ecological consciousness, but 
quite contrarily, on an external, culturally imposed morality of domination. This 
61 Cheal, 1989: 13 
62 See text around footnote 45 above. 
historical background makes the household a basic unit of social and gender 
domination, and thus the cradle of cultural reproduction of authoritarian 
relationships. Moral values have been reproduced in the household through its 
basic family relationships and through its life functions and activities. 
This points to a rather controversial position of the household as a sphere 
of change toward a culture based on a human-ecological consciousness. 
However, moral economy has completely disappeared from the other nested 
levels of direct social and economic interaction. The neighborhood and the local 
community as  social and economic units have disintegrated and competition for 
profit maximization and monetary exchange has become the pervasive and 
almost exclusive form of economy. 
I have discussed at length the negative impact of the destruction of the lo- 
cal community and the neighborhood, and the socially and environmentally dis- 
ruptive and alienating effect of the current economy and consumer culture. If, 
however, these developments are perceived in the context of a moral economy. 
they present another side of cultural evolution - a process of liberation from 
the compulsive morality of domination which was a cohesive factor of the local 
community, but also a stifling safeguard of its authoritarian social structure. In 
that sense, detachment from direct interaction brought about by institutionaliza- 
tion and urbanization has also loosened up the social relationships based on 
the compulsive morality of tight, small-scale groups. The large-scale market 
economy has thus developed a s  a detachment from direct social interactions. 
This process of transformation from the moral to the market economy is 
now affecting the last remnants of the traditional household: 
A s  more traditional communities are incorporated into market systems, 
households are transformed into petty commodity producers for regional and 
world markets. In many rural areas of the Third World these commodities are 
agricultural products (e.g. coflee, copra, cocoa, etc.). The typical peasant 
household economy is mixed and generalized, combining subsistence- 
oriented production of indigenous crops with the cultivation of cash crops. 63 
A s  I have pointed out above, the infusion of the market economy into the 
gender division of labor in the household indicates a change in the economic 
63 Lockwood, op.cit.: 199 
position of women, but it does not substantially affect the relationships of 
domination. It only extends them outside of the household. Generally, the 
liberation from the moral economy has turned out to be just a change of scale. 
Domination has not disintegrated, it is now enacted at a larger scale. 
Domination is detached from direct interactions and has thus become even 
more oppressive because of its alienating elusiveness. 
There is a cleavage between the revival of economic and social relation- 
ships of direct interaction at the local community, neighborhood and household 
levels, and the emancipation of women from their social and economic position 
defined by the compulsive morality of domination in the household. This 
emancipation means the empowerment of women to gain control over their 
work and its products, and they seek it through a position in the market 
economy. Bums perceives the cleavage when he contends that 
women are abandoning the household at precisely the wrong time; they are 
transferring from lgeboat to sinking ship. [...I Rather than fwhting for 
position in a declining institution, women should be learning to extend the 
household economy. 64 
But he does not seem to understand that women can only return to a redefined 
economy in the household from a post-emancipation status. At this stage of 
their emancipation, women prefer to accept an alienated, detached domination 
in the institutionalized sphere instead of (and as  a step out of) the direct 
interaction of domination within the household. 
Of course, the household undergoes transformation along with this change 
in the social and economic position of women. The initiation of the process of 
dissolving the compulsive morality of gender domination sets the stage for the 
next level of human-ecological emancipation: regaining the control over and 
responsibility for the immediate life processes. 
Rapid growth of countereconomies is a spontaneous devolution as 
citizens bypass paralyzed institutions and their bottlenecks and simply begin 
recalling the power they once delegated to the state and executives of giant 
corporations. 65 
64 Burns, opxit.: 7 
65 Henderson, 1981: 60 
Recalling the control and responsibility is the reaction to the alienating insti- 
tutionalization of social, economic and technological organization. Henderson 
identifies this reaction with informal economies in general, but it is the house- 
hold as  a unit of the integrated economy, or as  a human-ecological unit, that is 
the basic locus of this next level of emancipation. It will be based on mutuality 
and cooperation. They are not lost with the dissolution of compulsive morality 
(or the moral economy) of the traditional household. Mutuality - as the 
simultaneity of giving and taking - is the economic expression of metabolic 
processes that are basic to eco-systemic interrelatedness and interdependence. 
Mutuality is the awareness, the sense of interrelatedness of individuals-in- 
their-environment, and thus it becomes the essential basis of responsibility for 
immediate life functions as processes of exchange of matter and energy within 
the human-ecological systems. 
In terms of a sustainable technology, this becomes an awareness of and res- 
ponsibility for the metabolic flow, the intake + functioning + output involved in 
the life functions going on in the household. The household is the basic technolo- 
gical unit as  it entails immediate involvement with technologies as  technical solu- 
tions to the ways of satisfylng vital needs and fulfilling life functions. These tech- 
nologies are culturally defined (as I pointed out in chapter 4). and the house- 
hold is the basic unit of cultural reproduction, so the sustainable technology of 
an  ecological culture is primarily established at  the level of the household. 
For household members, such a cultural change would mean a de-aliena- 
tion from the passive position of consumers who are manipulated by the enti- 
cements of consumerism, and who are only aware of matter or energy in the 
form of commodities that are sold to them. They are therefore entirely unaware 
and uninterested in the metabolic flow of intake + functioning + output invol- 
ved in the process of satisfylng their needs in the household 66. Taking into 
consideration the intake + functioning + output process places the household 
in a different position from merely a consumption unit that it has held in the 
66 See text and quotation between footnotes 2 and 3 in chapter 5. 
consumer culture. Household becomes the central and crucial point where the 
two basic technological processes of production and waste management meet 
and integrate into an  indivisible flow of matter and energy which is fully 
conspicuous to the members of the household. Furthermore, the distinction 
between production and consumption is a misconception in this context 67. 
Metabolic flow - the exchange of matter and energy with the environment - 
is the basic principle of a sustainable or ecological technology of the household. 
It necessitates the inclusion into natural cycles of renewal, which is applicable 
to all the life functions that take place in the household. 
The functions of dwelling, shelter, living space, relaxation and sleep, 
common meals, personal care and waste management involve technological 
solutions which include: 
building and maintenance (space, personal care and dishwashing) 
materials which are non-toxic and which involve ecologically sustainable 
production and recycling processes 68; 
environmental control (temperature and ventilation), primarily using 
passive solar approach 69; 
lighting and electrical appliances - using energy resources which are 
decentralized and ecologically sustainable in conversion processes and in 
renewal rate, including photovoltaic solar cells, small gas, wind and hydro 
turbines, and fuel cells 70; 
food production relying on organic and decentralized processes - at  the 
level of the household, neighborhood and local community; 
waste management which uses composting and full recycling of all 
material output of the household; 
67 See footnotes 42 and 43 above. 
68 Some of these issues are covered in Burall, 199 1 ; Butler, 198 1 ; Vale and Vale, 199 1. 
Audubon House (National Audubon Society, 1994) includes in appendix a 
comprehensive list of agents with carcinogenic risks to human beings. 
69 Andrejko, 1989; Bainbridge, 1980; Butler, 1981; Crowther, 1977; Mania, 1979 
70 See quotes by Flavin and Lenssen in the previous chapter: in footnote 59, and at 
footnote 105. 
water supply and waste management with water recycling systems that use 
different levels of water purity for appropriate functions in the household71. 
Most of the ecologically sustainable technologies operate much more 
efficiently on a small scale because they do not require expensive and wasteful 
infrastructures, nor complex structures which typically house or hold the 
cumbersome large-scale systems 72. Centralized systems in general usually 
necessitate a condensed structure to be efficient or viable a t  all. In order to 
generate energy from solar-based resources - by solar cells, for example - it 
would be utterly impractical to concentrate all the cells in one place and then 
distribute energy by infrastructure to each user. And that is entirely 
unnecessary as at  least some of the solar-based resources (sun, wind, hydro- 
power) are readily available almost everywhere. Yet, conventional energetics 
sticks to the concept of centralized systems, so condensed mega-power plants 
are devised even for solar-based resources and they are huge and complex 
structures with existing or new infrastructure networks 73. 
It is, however, even more important that the immediate presence of techno- 
logical processes at  the household level enables the awareness and responsibi- 
lity for the metabolic flow which are impossible with the detachment and 
remoteness of the centralized systems where individuals only know that they 
pay for them and have no idea where from and how the resources like water, 
food or energy come to them, and what happens to the waste. Centralized 
systems are actually upheld (and claimed to be more efficient) primarily 
because of the control which they'exert over economy and technology. It is the 
issue of control and responsibility of people at the household or other local 
level, against the monopoly and liability of institutionalized systems 74. 
71 The issues of the last three bullets are covered in: Olkowski, et al., 1979; Todd, 
1977; Todd and Todd, 1980; Van Der Ryn, 1980. 
72 See at footnotes 14,43 and 105 in the previous chapter. 
73 The usual claims by advocates of centralized systems that solar technologies are 
uneconomical are based not only on the disregard for subsidies and 
externalization of social and environmental costs of conventional systems, but 
also on estimates for alternative systems that reflect complex centralized 
structures and infrastructures. 
74 See quote and text at footnote 56 in chapter 5. 
Metabolic flow - matter and energy exchange with the social and natural 
environment - is the essential manifestation of systemic interrelatedness 
among nested levels of social, economic and technological interaction. Thus the 
control over and responsibility for the metabolic flow in the household can only 
be achieved if there is a continuous interaction across the nested levels of 
social, economic and technological organization. Therefore, the household is not 
viable as  an isolated unit, although that is the prevailing traditional notion: 
Managing one's own household, living on one's own, now stand as 
important symbols of individual freedom in contemporary society. I...] 
Setting up an independent household is in some ways a ritual statement of 
independence. 75 
The single house on a suburban lot allows more control over one's 
temto ry... The American Dream is notjust a box on a lawn. It's a chance for a 
small portion of creative independence." 
Collaboratiue communities require organization and interdependence 
among households that does not need to be dealt with in the typical detached 
home. Decisions that are generally made within the family or by the 
individual now move into the sphere of the group. Residents in these 
communities need d~fferent social and communication skills than 
individuals living in a typical neighborhood. 76 
A s  a human-ecological, eco-systemic unit, the household cannot be conceived 
of as  an independent (and isolated), but as  an interdependent unit. This 
interdependency is expressed by mutuality and cooperation as  the basic 
characteristics of social, economic and technological interactions at  the level of 
the household, wherefrom they extend to the broader nested levels of social, 
economic and technological organization. 
The very idea of community comes from the sheltering of people 
together, whether to provide maximum areas of shade and cooler air between 
buildings or to reduce the external surface area of the community as it faced 
the hostile weather. People constructed their buildings together because of the 
mutual benefit to be obtained. A policy of cheap energy removed this generator 
of traditional community as surely as did the automobile. 77 
Mutuality and cooperation have been perceived in terms of pooling and sha- 
ring a s  a distinctive attribute of households 78. Pooling and sharing, or mutuality 
and cooperation, also define collaborative housing (or cohousing) which has gra- 
75 Lofgren, op.cit.: 466 (emphasis mine) 
76 Fromm, 199 1 : 9 1-92 (emphasis mine) 
77 Vale and Vale, op.cit.: 70 
78 Smith and Wallerstein, 1992: 15; and also at footnote 25 above. 
dually emerged in the sixties, seventies and eighties79, primarily in Holland and 
Scandinavia, but also in other western-European countries and the U.S. Cohou- 
sing is a new form of collective living which attempts to balance the individual 
integrity of households with their closer interaction a s  a collective sphere: 
In collaborative housing, each household has its own house or 
apartment and one share in the common facilities, which typically include a 
fully equipped kitchen, play areas, and meeting rooms. Residents share 
cooking, cleaning, and gardening on a rotating basis. [...I I t  creates not only a 
home but a small community as they actively participate in its development 
and management. 80 
Cohousing invariably involves full participation (or rather initiative) of co- 
dwellers in the planning, design and management of their living space 81. Thus, 
cohousing presents a true opportunity for full commitment to, control over and 
responsibility for the entire process of metabolic interaction between the 
household and its social and natural environment in a close systemic 
interrelatedness with an immediate broader level of social organization. 
Cohousing has definitely emerged from the movement of communes and 
cooperatives of the sixties 82, but it has not involved the comprehensive and 
radical questioning of the conventional household and family structure which 
characterized these other two alternative forms of living. Cohousing is only a 
reaction to the isolation of the nuclear family and of the household, but it does 
not imply any internal changes. So rather than an extended household (which 
would be a return to its traditional structure), cohousing is a tighter, more 
cooperative neighborhood - a level of integrative social interaction between the 
household and the local community. 
Likewise, cohousing did not follow the strong intent of the communes and 
cooperatives on integration of living and working. It remained restricted to 
residential functions. The reason is partly the compliance with existing zoning 
79 although there are some developments from the twenties and thirties which 
been identified as cohousing when the concept became an object of research 
(Fromm, op.cit.: 95) 
80 ibid.: 7 
81 ibid, 12. 14 
82 ibid.: 15 
have 
regulations 83, as  cohousing projects have not been the extreme counter-cultu- 
83 Zoning often places limits on "mixed occupancy, " such as combining living areas 
with work spaces or a childcare center. [...I Exactly where certain types of 
collaborative housing arrangements can be built is a matter of how the residential 
zoning categories are interpreted. (ibid.: 190- 192) 
84 ibid.: 34, 36 
85 ibid.: 95 
86 Thayer, 1994: 287-289 
Village Homes has a highly successful open or "natural" drainage system 
Instead of buried storm drains, frequent curb cuts in the streets empty water into 
common area swales interrupted by numerous check dams or weirs. This system 
allows winter stormwater to collect and percolate into the local soil profile [...I 
Combined with the general deemphasis on chemical herbicides and pesticides, the 
open drainage system allows for a rich ecological diversity - there are toads, lady 
re like the communes, but have developed within the existing social and econo- 
mic relationships. 
More recently, larger units of interdependent social, economic and techno- 
logical interaction have emerged, and they include a rudimentary integration of 
work and residence: 
The urban neighborhood is away to tie cohousing to the larger community, 
enhancing both. The idea is to integrate housing, businesses, and commercial 
services in an old-fashioned market town. [...I The residents should have the 
opportunity to open up shops in their homes and walk down the block to the 
grocery store or hair dresser's. Child care should be a short walk away. 84 
Cohousing projects- which were primarily created around the social, rather 
than ecological issues of housing - have only recently started to apply a more 
comprehensive implementation of ecological technologies 85. It is still, however, 
limited by restrictions of urban setting where cohousing projects appear. 
Eco-villages, on the other hand, are essentially developed with the purpose 
of achieving a completely sustainable functioning, of integrating a community of 
ecological households and their natural environment into a fully interdependent 
and interconnected human-ecological system. 
The community of Village Homes in Davis, California represents a con- 
vergence of several dimensions of sustainability in one 70-acre landscape [...] 
a community of 220 clustered solar homes, naturally drained open space, com- 
munity gardens, orchards, and vineyards. [. . .] Each group of eight households 
owns a contrguous "common area" awayfrom the street, which might typical- 
ly contain a small grassy area. fue pit, toddler's play area, vegetable gardens, 
fruit trees, and percolation ponds for stonn runoff. A third category of land 
ownership is the "greenbelt" -jointly owned by all 220 households, which 
includes a solar community center building and swimming pool complex, 
central play field, large orchards, vineyards, playground, garden center, and 
many acres of community garden plots available to any resident 86 
The household has thus to be perceived as  the basic unit in the interrela- 
ted system of nested levels of interaction with the social and natural environ- 
ment. If sustainability is defined a s  life processes in their metabolic cycles of 
renewal, and if it is identified with community development (or revival), a 
process of change toward sustainability, or toward an ecological culture, starts 
at  the household as the basic unit of life processes. At the level of the 
household, as  I have shown in this chapter, the key issues of sustainability 
and ecological culture are manifested in modes relevant to individual's life. 
This relevance entails the awareness of and the responsibility for the 
process of metabolic interaction between the individual and her or his 
environment. Awareness and responsibility are based on an  individual's 
involvement in the processes of satisfymg vital needs - on the sense of control 
over her or his own life. The involvement entails individuals' initiative, 
enthusiasm, emotional engagement and vital interest. 
It is argued that ifpeople are to grow intofull adulthood and become 
responsible human beings, they must be able to make sign~ficant decisions in 
matters that aflect their Lives. 87 
Individual responsibility is the key issue of an  ecological culture. It invol- 
ves an  awareness of the ecological context of the individual's life process, the 
awareness of the impact which the ways of satisfymg the individual's needs 
have on the immediate, and also on the wider social, biological and physical 
environment. Individual responsibility is thus the basis of an  ecological 
consciousness. As an eco-systemic unit of individual-in-her/his-environment, 
household is the locus of individual responsibility and the basic sphere of an  
ecological consciousness. 
The individual's life processes evolve in eco-systemic interrelatedness and 
interdependence along the nested levels of complexity, interaction and responsi- 
bility. Responsibility is thus interrelated and interconnected with wider levels, 
starting and emerging from the household as the level of vital and immediate 
beetles, owls, dows, mockingbirds, killdeer, cedar waxwings, crows, magpies, 
owls, and numerous flocks of migratory birds I. ..I A large portion of the Village 
Homes landscape is "edible." (ibid.: 290) 
87 Morehouse et al.. 1989: 87 
relevance. Individual responsibility therefore involves an awareness of this 
interconnectedness with nested levels of interaction. 
Two essential levels of responsibility are individual responsibility for life 
processes of immediate relevance at  the household level, and direct collective 
responsibility at the level of the local community. They are interdependent: indi- 
vidual responsibility is the prerequisite for a true direct collective responsibili- 
ty, but it only makes sense if there is a local level of direct interaction, a s  I 
have demonstrated in the context of alienation in the previous two chapters. 
Responsibility cannot be further contemplated without addressing in more 
depth the issues of domination - which have already imposed themselves once 
the discussion came to the level of the household. 
Are individuals in our present culture capable of achieving an ecological 
consciousness and responsibiliv Do they have the inner potential to perform 
cultural transformation into a new ecological culture based on responsibility? 
These questions lead to the next chapter - to the problems of domination and 
post-domination. 
Domination and Post-domination 
Domination is one of our century's most fruitful 
concepts for understanding human-human and 
human-nature relationships. The theme of 
domination and its reversal through liberation 
unites critical theorists and environmental 
philosophers whose work spans the twentieth 
century. 1 
We are nearing the possibility of a second social 
transformation - this time a shij?ji-om a 
dominator society to a more advanced version of a 
partnership society. 2 
Sociability and need of mutual aid and support are 
inherent parts of human nature. 3 
In this essay, I have decided to use the compound "post-domination" even 
though it is not in common use, comparable to the widely accepted terms "sus- 
tainablity" and "spirituality". It seems there is no term in wide use that would 
denote and connote the exact meaning directly and affirmatively, without 
recourse to invertion of an opposite meaning. Yet, I have chosen the prefm 
"post-", rather than "non-", thus indicating transition and cultural 
transformation. There are some terms with affiiative meaning, but they seem 
to describe only part of the issue: partnership, mutuality, coexistence, 
cooperation, co-evolution. And they are not in wide use either. 
The [model of society] in which social relations are primarily based on 
the principle of linking rather than ran-, may best be described as the 
partnership model. 
1 Merchant, 1994: 1-2 
2 Eisler, 1987: 59 
3 Kropotkin.1902:152 
At a 1985 New Paradigm Symposium [. ..I new paradigm thinking was 
spec~@ally described as "postpatriarchat, " and the new epis ternology was 
seen as representing a "shiftJiom domination and control of nature to 
cooperation and non violence." 4 
The reenchantment of nature called forth by the Frankfurt school's 
analysis of domination implies a partnership with nonhuman nature. Nature 
is an equal subject, not an object to be controlled. A partnership ethic means 
that a human community is in a sustainable ecological relationship with its 
surrounding natural community. 5 
Another term, possibly closest to the connotational scope of post-domina- 
tion, is anarchism. However, besides a similar inverse morphology (an-archy), 
its meaning as  rejection of subordination and subjugation, has been blurred by 
politicizing and has gained an ill reputation by connections to political nihilism 
and terrorism, Links which are fundamentally inconsistent with its meaning 6. 
The reason for a lack of a widely accepted term that would hit the right 
comprehensive connotation, is that relationships of domination have prevailed 
over human civilizations for a very extended period, spanning different patterns 
in cultural evolution. We are facing the task of naming what for a long time has 
been unnamed. 
Domination has lasted so long that it is hard to describe any conditions 
without it. Consequently, there are theories that, in various guises, claim 
domination to be a natural relationship - biologically, and even "cosmically" 
determined 7. Most notorious of them is Social Darwinism 8. It is still present 
in more or less mutated forms despite continuous refutations of its scientific 
credibility ever since Herbert Spencer put forth the first statement of the 
concept. In the latest revamping, this social theory is envisioned as  practice 
through genetic engineering: 
4 Eisler, op.cit.: xvii, 169, emphasis mine 
5 Merchant, op.cit.: 20, emphasis mine. Also, in the quote above, Merchant indicates 
liberation as  "reversal" of domination. 
6 Guerin, 1970; Bookchin, 1980. A similar situation occurred with communism 
which turned into totalitarianism when put into practice. Yet one of the central 
issues of sustainability is the community, but the concept is hardly associated 
with communism. 
7 Ken Wilber purports socio-biological stereotypes within a broader context of 
cosmic determinism: &In the biosphere, might makes right. In the biosphere, big 
fishes eat littlefishes. In the biosphere, muscle rules. And in the biosphere, men 
dominate other men, and men dominate women" (Wilber, 1995: 382-383) 
8 See text after footnote 37 in Chapter 1. 
Molecular biologist Lee Silver of Princeton University looks forward to a 
future in which I.. .] society will segregate into the "GenRich and the "Naturals" 
I.. .I All aspects of the economy, the media, the entertainment industry, and the 
knowledge industry are controlled by members of the GenRich class ... 
Naturals work as low-paid service providers or as laborers ... [Eventually] the 
GenRich class and the Natural class will become entirely separate species with 
no ability to cross-breed. 9 
Overcoming domination is the key issue for resolving the conflicting 
relationship between humanity and nature (which I have emphasized as the 
principal underlying theme of this essay lo). It is also the prerequisite for 
achieving individual responsibility as  a basis of ecological consciousness. 
Responsibility as an Issue of Empowerment 
Even more efficiently than police force, it is 
distrust of self that makes people vulnerable and 
obedient. 1 1 
Why should I listen to a Utopia? There is nothing 
that can be done. I am, and I am going to remain, 
the poor little man of the street, who has no 
opinion of his own. Who am I anyhow ... 12 
Our revulsion does not do away with the question: 
how can the people who have been the object of 
eflective and productive domination by themselves 
create the conditions of j?eedom? 13 
The discussion of sustainability in the five previous chapters has yielded 
two essential concluding points. The first is that ecological culture (and 
sustainability as  its component) has to rely on individual responsibility. This 
means responsibility for the processes of metabolic interaction between 
individuals and their immediate environment - social, biological and physical. 
Through systemic interdependency between the immediate environment and its 
broader levels, the individual's responsibility extends to include more general 
spheres of concern. The second concluding point is that the loss of almost 
9 Hayes, 2000: 6 
10 It is also explicitly stated by Carolyn Merchant in the opening quote for this 
chapter. 
1 1  Roszak, 1979: 96-97 
12 Reich. 1948/ 1979: 99- 100 
13 Marcuse, 1964: 6 
every form of individual responsibility has been the most distressing aspect of 
comprehensive alienation in the current consumer culture. The lack of 
individual responsibility is both caused by and expressed in domination 
patterns. Therefore, without addressing the issues of domination, sustainability 
and ecological culture cannot be fully understood. This chapter will revolve 
around empowerment for responsibility and its obstacles. 
In order to address the capability of individuals to reclaim their responsibility 
as a key condition of change to an  ecological culture, it must be ascertained why 
they have lost the responsibility in the first place. Why is it that individuals gave 
up their control over and responsibility for their own lives, for the ways of satis- 
fymg their vital needs, for their immediate and wider environment? Why have 
they relegated their responsibility to others, to institutions that have power? 
Power is obviously the key issue here. The increasing complexity of 
managing the life processes in the new conditions of industrialization might 
have necessitated a general level organization 14, an  assistance to individuals 
from a wider perspective. If that is so, why have individuals had to empower 
that general level to have control over their lives, and disempower themselves 
and lose a possible chance to share the responsibility315 Was this a matter of 
conscious relegation of responsibility3 
Evidently, it did not happen that way. The conditions of disempowerment al- 
ready existed before industrialization and institutionalization. And the preexisten- 
ce of these conditions made it possible for institutionalization to turn into power 
and control over people's lives. Viewed from a different angle, power and control 
over people's lives took the form of institutionalization and extended to control 
over the ways of satisfymg all their needs, and to defining the needs themselves. 
In the social reality, despite all change, the domination of man by man is 
still the historical continuum that links pre-technological and technological 
Reason 16 
14 in terms of what I have discussed in chapter 6, between footnotes 99 and 101, 1 15 
and 122; and between 129 and 130. 
15 Ristic, 1986/1989: 167 
16 Marcuse,op.cit.: 144 
Therefore, to de-alienate from the conditions created by institutionalization, the 
much older conditions of disempowerment have to be addressed. 
Without empowerment to have and keep responsibility, individuals cannot 
break the vicious circle of irresponsibility and disempowerment, which is 
manifested in paternalistic attitudes and doubts about the viability of 
responsibility at the level of community and household. Doubts are often 
expressed that a decentralized community may easily drift into irresponsible 
behavior, thus jeopardizing the wider social and physical environment. 
Citizens will be required to do the work of gouenment as well as making 
the decisions. An oficer like the environmental constable, a local citizen with 
the power to poke around the shire and make sure laws designed to keep the coun- 
tryside clean are being obeyed, is an example. I.. .I A whole range of administra- 
tive services now run by the state will become the work of local people. 17 
Visions of decentralized local communities, like this one, can provoke 
carping about the flip side: the misuse of power to "poke around", the social 
environment of small, provincial communities that are stifling and rife with 
intolerance and petty politics. Doubts about a smooth path to decentralization 
can be quite justified: 
Once big systems have been broken down into many small units [...I how 
do we make certain that what we have will be beautiful small units, not ugly 
onesflled with animosity, envy, and intrigue? 18 
Roszak touches - in the specific context of community decentralization - 
upon what less benevolent observers would phrase as  the old misgiving that 
people, left to themselves, are prone to create chaos. Unless there is a "ruler", 
or 'rulers" of some kind to control and check them, people will revert into 
asocial behavior and violence. Regulation is supposed to have become 
, 
necessary because people are irresponsible. 
This view denies the possibility of individual responsibility as  an inherent 
human trait, and it is essentially congruent with Social Darwinism. Peter 
Kropotkin criticized most comprehensively such a view, and generally argued 
17 Bryan and McClaughry, 1989: 94-95 
18 Roszak, op.cit.: 308 
(primarily a s  a response to Social-Darwinist statements and writings 19) against 
domination as  a necessity because of "human nature". 
There always were writers who took apessimistic view of mankind I...] al- 
wctys watchful of wars, cruelty, andoppression. I...] and they concluded that man- 
kind is nothing but aloose aggregation of beings, always ready to fight with each 
other, andonly prevented from so doing by the intervention of some authority. 
Hobbes took that position; and while some of his eighteenth-century fol- 
lowers endeavoured toprove that at no epoch of its existence I...] mankind lived 
in astateof perpetual warfare [...I his idea was, on the contrary, that the so-call- 
ed "state of nature" was nothing but a permanentfight between individuals. 20 
The reality, however, in most cases seems to support the more pessimistic view, 
and ideas like Kropotkin's are often deemed utopian. Yet, Kropotkin, a s  well a s  
other anthropologists who have studied the problem 21, point to examples of "pri- 
mitive", or pre-institutionalized human groups where there has been no loss of res- 
ponsibility. These findings indicate that we are endowed with a natural predispo- 
sition for responsibility which is somehow thwarted in our social development. 
A developmental psychology experiment with babies at  crawling stage offers 
an interesting insight into a child's inborn ability to act responsibly. The experi- 
ment is known a s  "Visual Cliff' because it uses a special surface, half of which 
drops down with a sheer precipice. The deeper part is covered with thick 
glass. The anthology of developmental psychology, which I used as  the source, 
refers to this experiment as  an argument in the old educational dilemma: 
Common sense might suggest that the child lean- to recognize falling- 
oflplaces by experience - that is, by falling and hurting itselj But is 
experience really the teacher? Or is the ability to perceive and avoid a brink 
part of the child's original endowment? 
To investgate the question, Gibson and Walk developed a special 
experimental setup [...I An infant on the visual c l ~ f  crawls to its mother 
across the shallow side, but refuses to do so on the deep side, even though it has 
tactual evidence that the cltpis solid. 22 
However, this natural endowment is lost (or suppressed, numbed 23), and 
a new endowment of institutional regulation has been imposed instead. It has 
-- 
19 See quotes related to footnotes 149 and 165 
20 Kropotkin, op.cit.: 77 
21 e.g. Bronislav Malinowski, Ashley Montagu 
22 Liebert, Wicks, and Strauss, 1974: 182- 183 In the accompanying photographs, the 
child is seen touching the glass with its finger, but still declining to cross over it. 
23 This is related to the issue of sensitivity. which is central for my discussion in the 
last chapter - between footnotes 25 and 29, and 141 and 153. 
been fully adopted, and has become a superstructure without which people 
cannot imagine their Lives any more: 
The individuality that learned order and subordination in the subjection 
of the world soon who& equated truth with the regulative thought without 
whose fixed distinctions universal truth cannot exist. 24 
People have become used to regulatory restrictions. These offer them a 
possibility of revolt and defiance, which are often stimulants to action because 
they enable irresponsibility. Altogether, the result is an  immoral attitude toward 
the environment (social and natural) 25. Kropotkin, on the other hand, argued 
that humans are naturally endowed with an  inclination to mutual help and care 
(also amply evident in the non-human biosphere), and that authoritarian 
relations often induce, provoke and sustain confrontation and aggressiveness, 
rather than dissuade such behavior: 
The absorption of all socialfunctions by the State necessarily favoured 
the development of an unbridled, narrow-minded individualism I...] As the 
obligations towards the State grew in numbers the citizens were evidently 
relieved from their obligations towards each other [...I In barbarian society, to 
assist at afght between two men [...I and not to prevent itfrom taking a fatal 
issue, meant to be oneself treated as a murderer; but under [. . .] the all- 
protecting State the bystander need not intrude: it is the policeman's business 
to interfere, or not. And while I...] among Hottentots, it would be scandalous to 
eat without having loudly called out trice whether there is not somebody 
wantug to share the food, all that a respectable citizen has to do now is to pay 
the tax and to let the starving starve. 26 
The Visual Cliff experiment is also important because it draws attention to 
parental practice which is the opposite of what the experiment teaches. The pa- 
rents are, of course, by vast majority unacquainted with this proof that their over- 
protective concerns are unwarranted and that their typical constant cries - Don't 
go there! Don't lean over! Careful! Don't run! You'll fall and hurt yourself! - have 
actually an  opposite (and arguably undesirable) effect. By repeating persistently 
such fear-inspiring alerts, parents discourage and deaden the child's instinctive 
sense for assessment of reality and its natural predisposition to rely on its own 
responsibility and initiative - and thus educate irresponsibility. I have argued. 
24 Horkheimer and Adorno, 1944: 48, emphasis mine 
25 Ristic, 1989b 
26 Kropotkin, op.cit.: 227. See also the African example in chapter 6, between 
footnotes 87 and 89. 
risking a simplification, that this educational prejudice is a fundamental germ 
of disempowering people for initiative in and responsibility for their own lives 27. 
I said that the effect of the prejudice is arguably undesirable, but many 
parents would contend that it is advisable to discourage initiative - as they 
have themselves so much internalized the unquestionable necessity of external 
authority (as indicated by Horkheimer and Adonlo in the above quote), that 
they cannot bear to have their own children free from it 28. 
The term "paternalism" has two very d~ferent uses. One is to idenhh an 
adult's sheltering relationship toward a child who could not survive without 
such protection. The other is to characterize an adult's ostensibly sheltering 
but actually stulti_fjling relationship toward another adult who probably muld 
- and should be able to - survive without such protection. 29 
Paternalistic attitude and practice extend beyond childhood. Adult 
individuals are also typically given or denied the freedom to have their own 
responsibility - because of professed fear that, without control, they might not 
behave appropriately. Paternalism stems from the conditions of disempower- 
ment, control and domination. Both the paternalistic education of children and 
treatment of adults enhance what is known as learned helplessness 30. 
The overwhelming presence of paternalism opens up the central question - 
how to empower the irresponsible and helpless with responsibility3 How can 
individual responsibility be achieved in an  authoritarian culture? If people are 
treated as irresponsible and their lives are controlled, they cannot become 
responsible. It is a vicious circle, a chicken-and-egg dilemma of whether to give 
people responsibility first, or keep them under control until they become 
"mature enough for it". 
The fact that people cannot become responsible under external control has 
been repeatedly proved in practice. For me, the first experiential proof was the 
Community Action playgrounds (and other activities) in the 70s in Britain, 
which clearly supported the Kropotkinian argument. It was shown that 
27 Ristic, 1989b. I have presented this as a key issue of alienation in chapter 5. 
28 This is the issue of authoritarianism which I will further discuss toward the end of 
the chapter - see text between footnotes 258 and 262 below. 
29 Szasz, 1996: 37-38, emphasis mine 
30 See text and quote between footnotes 47 and 48 in chapter 5. 
playgrounds built and maintained by users (children and their parents) were 
never vandalized in neighborhoods where the City Council-provided facilities 
were typically reduced to ruins. 
Yet, the distinction of individual/institutionalized responsibility is not so 
clear-cut. It is not an  either/or status. Individual responsibility or irresponsibili- 
ty does not exist in a social/cultural vacuum. It is a systemic - relational situa- 
tion. Very often an  individual can internalize an  external, institutionalized rule, 
understand the circumstances in which it is necessary, and find the inner 
sensitivity to respond to these circumstances in a way appropriate to the 
external rule. A good example is the observance of queues referred to by Daniel 
Bromley 31. Apart from the sensibility and flexibility of the rule, the decisive 
difference in terms of individual responsibility is the awareness of the ability to 
rely on one's own judgement, sense and responsibility, independent of 
authoritarian pressure and imposition. On the other hand, inasmuch as  the 
individual's authoritarian attitude is stronger, the fear of authority will impede 
the sense of internal, individual responsibility. In other words, the difference is 
between complying with a rule from an inner sense of individual responsibility 
(in its systemic meaning of interrelatedness of individual and common levels of 
interaction); or from blind obedience to authority. From a behavioral point of 
view, this distinction is immaterial - it doesn't seem to make any difference in 
the outcome, in obeying the rule. And Bromley apparently assumes a 
behavioral perspective as  he uses the queue example to illustrate compliance 
with institutional regulation. But the distinction does make the essential 
difference for exercising individual responsibility as  opposed to the 
irresponsibility of disowning it and relegating it to external authority. 
When systemic interrelatedness of individuals and institutions is recognized, 
it follows that individual irresponsibility necessarily entails the irresponsibility of 
institutions. Institutions are typically dysfunctional and inefficient because res- 
ponsibility is transformed into liability. The dissolution of responsibility works 
- 
31 discussed in chapter 5, between footnotes 15 and 19 
both ways. It does not only disempower the citizens, a s  Kropotkin perceived in 
his times, but it also essentially disables the institutions themselves. 
The lack of an  interrelatedness perspective is also manifested in the 
typical dualization of individual versus institutional irresponsibility. While 
authoritarian institutional imposition ostensibly prevents people from killing 
each other, in reality, institutions (state and religious) have enticed and 
compelled people to mutual bloodshed throughout history in mass scale and to 
a frightening extent. But the two forms of asocial behavior have been valued in 
an entirely different (and essentially dualistic) way: when someone kills by the 
exercise of one's own responsibility, that person is presumed a criminal, a 
murderer; when the responsibility and authority for the killing comes from the 
state, king, army leader, fiihrer, then the person is a patriot (and can become a 
hero), and is fully justified and absolved 32. 
In the further development of the institutionalization of (ir)responsibility, 
criminals have been turned into mental invalids: 
Crime is no longer a problem of law and morals, but is instead a problem 
of medicine and therapeutics. This transformation of the ethical into the 
technical - of crime into illness, law into medicine, penology into psychiatry, 
and punishment into therapy - is, moreover, enthusiastically embraced by 
many physicians, social scientists, and lay persons. 33 
The transformation of penology into psychiatry entails an  essential modification 
of the offender's responsibility status: 
32 A most pertinent reference for this issue is Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment 
(Dostoyevsky, 1993). 
When repression is organized and carried out by those who claim legitimate 
authority, the activity may be labeled "peacekeeping" and o m l l y  praised. As one 
psychiatrist has noted, the uictims of o m a l  violence outtmigh the victims of 
interpersonal violence as the elephant outweighs the rat, yet the power of labeling 
is so strong that o_ficial violence isfiequently redefined to make it appear correct. 
necessary, and just. I...] 
But mental health professionals rarely apply their labels and propose their 
treatments when the violence is committed by individuals acting in a n  o m  
capacity; the high public omials  who ordered the destruction of Indochina by 
aerial and naval bombardment escape such diagnosis and treatment. The mental 
health approach to violence is selective; it tends to be used by the agents of the 
pwe@ to deal with the dissident behavior of the weak. (Chorover, 1979: 139- 140, 
emphasis mine) 
33 Szasz, 1970: 8, emphasis mine 
If the individual is driven to act by antisocial impulses arisingfrom a 
deep-seated biological derangement or behavioral disorder, personal 
responsibility is beside the point. 34 
Individuals are thus entirely deprived of responsibility for their deeds. They are 
pronounced ill, and subjected to behavior control (and custody) - through diffe- 
rent forms of medical technology. Of course, in both cases, the definition of 
what is criminal or insane is in institutional hands, and it is typically reductio- 
nist - disregarding the deeper social and economic causes of crime or men- 
tal/psychic disturbance, and defending the dominant political and economic 
system. This means that the causes of asocial behavior (irresponsibility) are 
outside the vision range of both psychiatry and jurisprudence. The basic goal is 
behavior control, which only reinforces disempowerment. However, if disem- 
powerment with responsibility is to be addressed, a social-psychological thera- 
peutic approach is more appropriate. Individual responsibility makes sense 
only if the offense is defined by inner ethical criteria, not by obligation to ex- 
ternal interests of power structures. And psychological disturbances are often 
caused by the individual's conflicts with institutional structure and norms. 
The exemplars of this humanistic spirit in psychiatry are Sigmund 
Freud, with his deep commitment to understanding "mentally disordered" 
behavior and avoiding coercion, and Wilhelm Reich, with his passion to 
liberate man from his fetters, whether these be forged by his upbringing or by 
his political masters. The direction is [...I awayfrom medicine and toward 
psychology; then, awayfrom psychology and toward a study of man in society 
- that is to say, toward a study of the individual, with a past and afuture and 
an inescapable moral commitment to himself and others. 35 
The interrelatedness of individual and institutional irresponsibility is also 
reflected in this disempowering punitive-to-psychiatric transformation. It is 
manifested in detachment or disconnection, which I have repeatedly indicated 
as a distinct expression in various forms of disrupted interactivity and of 
alienation. In the context of responsibility, it becomes an issue of involvement 
or commitment: 
Whereas the so-called madman is one who characteristically commits 
himself, the psychiatrist is one who characteristically remains uncommitted. 
34 Chorover, 1979: 188, emphasis mine 
35 Szasz, 1970: 234, emphasis mine 
Then, claiming a false neutrality toward the issues at hand, he excludes the 
madman and his troublesome claims from society. 36 
The institutional spheres of control are not only very oflen guilty of 
inflicting much wider and large-scale damage to the social and physical 
environment because of irresponsibility. In Baudrillard's view, at the current 
stage of cultural development, institutional control and regulation also 
necessarily operate on irresponsibility: 
When capitalism rested on merit, initiative, individual enterprise andcom- 
petition, it needed an ideal of responsibility, and therefore its repressive equi- 
valent: for better or worse, everyone, whether entrepreneur or criminal, recei- 
ved his penalty or his credit. In a system that rests on bureaucratic program- 
ming and the execution of a plan, in-esponsible executants are required, and 
so the entire system of values based on responsibility collapses into itself. 37 
This pervasive irresponsibility certainly exacerbates the potential for 
insanity, but also emerges as an essential problem of morality and ethics. The 
relationship of institutional versus individual responsibility becomes an issue of 
institutionalized morality versus an inner ethic. 
Environmental Ethic and Responsibility 
Defining individual responsibility as the central issue of sustainability and 
ecological culture may tend to be regarded as an anthropocentric approach. 
This problem pertains to environmental ethics. Anthropocentrism is considered 
a position whereby the environment, the biosphere or ecosphere, are defined 
from the point of view of human interests. 
An environmental ethic is established as a departure from anthropocentric at- 
titudes. This departure is often defined as extensionism- an attitude of extending 
moral obligation to natural, biospheric, or eco-systemic entities. This typically 
means acknowledgement of the inherent value of entities other than humans. 
As I have pointed out in chapter 4, current economics is even more 
extreme than anthropocentrism in failing to acknowledge inherent value. The 
36 Szasz, 1970: 9. See also the related problem discussed in chapter 5, between 
footnotes 38 and 42. 
37 Baudrillard, 1976: 170, emphasis mine 
critique of anthropocentrism does not usually recognize that the current world 
view is influenced by economic thinking which equates babies with consumer 
commodities 38, and generally exemplifies a utilitarian perspective. In this view 
everything is valued by money/market worth - even human lives 39. Therefore, 
anthropocentrism can be taken a s  a departure from current economics - a 
departure from the disregard of inherent value. 
However, once intrinsic or inherent value is recognized, the concept itself 
comes under scrutiny. 
Deep ecology proclaimed that other living beings had intrinsic value for 
their own sake, independent of their practical utility to humans. The richness 
of other l$e forms and ecosystems was to be considered a necessary 
contributing inj2uence to the realization of self-as-part-of-nature. 40 
When humans are relieved of the current culture's obsession with utility, inhe- 
rent or intrinsic, innate, natural value is typically understood a s  value "by 
itself' (an sich). However, from the systemic perspective, value "by itself' is a 
reductionist concept. There are no isolated entities. Values and qualities are 
determined by relation of entities to their environment, or to the context in 
which they are observed 41. 
Conversely, anthropocentrism and its critiques are typically presented in 
these non-systemic terms, neglecting the inevitable interrelatedness of human 
life processes to their eco-systemic levels of interaction - metabolic exchange 
with the environment. Bioregionalism 42 implies a perception of humans and 
their social structures a s  integrated to their natural, biological and physical 
environment - and thus reconnects the disjointed concept of humanity and 
nature. The departure from anthropocentric attitudes has to be viewed from 
this systemic viewpoint. 
38 See quote related to footnote 2 in chapter 4. 
39 See quotes related to footnotes 20 and 21 in chapter 4. 
40 Thayer, 1994: 183 
41 If we have kept one hand in our pocket, and the other in the cold open air, then put 
both in a bucket of water. water will be both cold and warm. (Naess. 1989: 54) 
42 presented in chapter 6 
This departure can be perceived as  stages on a path of emancipation from 
egoistic positions 43. However, it is usually presented without much emphasis 
on ethic as  individual sense of responsibility, but rather a s  a moral prescript - 
a s  moral extensionism towards natural entities. It sometimes extends only to 
limited realms of nature, as  with the animal rights movement. Here, 
anthropocentrism is denoted by a specific term: 
A speciesist, Singer says, is a person who "allows the interests of his 
species to override the greater interests of members of other species." 44 
In discussing the issues of the ethics of animal rights, Regan and Singer, 
as  well as  Mary Midgley 45 devote much space to various arguments for 
including or excluding animals when human moral obligations are considered. 
Particularly Regan and Singer give a comprehensive historical overview of the 
criteria for defining animals as  a delineated group with moral status. But they 
all pay very little attention to the fact that, what they really are doing, is setting 
up a threshold, a border-line at  some point down the species-evolution line, 
above which the mord obligation can be defined. Does this mean that below 
the threshold we have no moral obligations? Doesn't the term speciesist imply 
moral disregard for all species other than humans? Or, to put it more simply: 
why are the moral obligations extended only to animals? 
This question may seem superfluous because, the way the concept of 
moral obligations is defined in this context - i.e. not to cause pain, not to treat 
cruelly - the concept can be applied only to some animals, and that delineates 
them as  a group for different moral consideration. Yet, this should not imply a 
reductionist negligence - an exclusion of other species, a s  well as  the 
inanimate nature, from moral extensionism. 
We do not ordinarily think we have duties to such beings as clouds or rocks. 46 
Of course, neither Regan and Singer, nor Midgley think that, by isolating 
animals for moral consideration. other realms of nature are denied human 
43 Wenz, 1988 
44 Regan and Singer, 1976: 13 
45 Midgley, 1983 
46 Regan and Singer, op.cit.: 8 
obligations. Nevertheless they give little attention to the wider context of the 
moral status of the whole biosphere, of the entire environment. 
Obviously, partial extensionism - to limited realms of nature - is 
problematic, not only because of the ambiguity of setting the threshold of moral 
obligations 47, even as low on the evolutionary line as micro-organisms, but also 
because it cannot be applied at all if the ecological interrelatedness of all living 
beings is taken into consideration 48. An eco-systemic perspective is not 
compatible with the threshold concept. 
The use of criteria like sensitivity to pain - and generally those, 
established by seeking in animal species some form of consciousness akin to 
human - is in a way an anthropocentric approach. It does not truly 
acknowledge an inherent entitlement to moral standing of a living organism in 
its own right. In that sense, to identlfy the concept as  moral extension might be 
appropriate because it contains an element of paternalism. And such 
paternalistic attitudes pertain to the domination paradigm. 
If there are no limitations to extending moral obligations, the ultimate level 
of emancipation from anthropocentrism is reached at ecocentrism. It is a moral 
principle based on what is considered a holistic view: regarding inherent value 
in interrelated and interdependent eco-systems. On this emancipating path, 
Peter Wenz discerns several steps - based on regarding inherent value in 
beings or systems other than oneself - from egoism, through ethnocentrism 
and anthropocentrism (including Singer's speciesism), to animal rights 
consideration, biocentric individualism, and finally ecocentric holism. Wenz 
distinguishes bio-centrism from eco-centrism, and describes biocentric 
individualism as  a moral concern extended equally to every single living being, 
but failing to consider the interrelatedness and interdependency of biotic 
communities, and of the entire eco-system: 
The existence of diverse species and, more generally, the health of biotic 
communities, should be of direct moral concern This does not imply that 
individual living things should not also be of direct moral concern. [. . .] The 
47 Callicott, 1989: 19 
48 ibid: 25 
only implication of Ecocentric Holism is that we should try to avoid degrading 
ecosystems and causing the extinction of species. 49 
Although Wenz resolves the problems of partial extensionism, his eco- 
centric concern is still couched in the mode of moral obligations. He argues for 
the relinquishing of individual rights for the sake of biotic processes in terms of 
inherent value of biotic communities. However, the concept of moral obligation 
poses some problems. They are already evident in Regan's and Singer's 
difficulty (in the quote above) of establishing duties to clouds and rocks. It is 
very problematic to establish eco-systemic concern based on moral obligation. 
While arguments against domination over animals (and nature in a wider 
perspective) are pretty much the central issue in most discussions of moral 
extensionism, there does not seem to be any attempt to question the deeper 
authoritarian core within which the concepts of moral obligations, duties and 
rights are posited and contemplated. After one has read about all the different 
criteria for establishing moral obligations toward animals or nature as a whole, 
there emerges a crucial question: Who is to decide the right criterion? the 
unnecessary pain? the necessary level of animal suffering? In the eco-centric 
mode as  well, there is a failure to deliberate which institutional body would 
have the authority to decide what are the interests of the eco-system 
processes, and which individual interests have to be relinquished for their 
sake. This approach does not only retain a patronizing (and therefore crypto- 
anthropocentric) attitude toward nature, it is also an  indication of an 
undivulged authoritarian context. 
Typically the terms obligations and duty are used interchangeably, a s  if 
they were synonyms. Who, then, imposes upon us  the duty toward animals? 
Who do we owe it to? This legalistic approach leads into a maze of normative 
(institutionalized) definitions of rights, duties, entitlements, claims. (It can 
become quite a logical tangle if one tries to imagine animals stating their claims, 
- 
49 Wenz. op-cit.: 309 
and the whole business necessarily emerges as a human judgement 50.) What 
is lost in the maze, is individual responsibility as a feeling and understanding - 
as a complex and comprehensive ethical category. In the normative, legalistic 
form, the responsibility for animals, biotic communities, or eco-systems is 
defined by an  outside authority and it actually becomes the responsibility of an 
institution - an institutionalized morality. The individual is left only with the 
duty to obey the rule. Thus this becomes an issue of empowerment for 
responsibility (discussed earlier). 
Ecocentrism in general is not based on the social context of environmental 
responsibility. Responsibility is actually seldom considered in connection with 
the ethics of ecocentrism. Moreover, individual responsibility is put in an 
ambivalent and precarious position by the definition of ecocentric concern. 
Ecocentrism demands that individual rights and interests - of any individual 
organism, human or other - are relinquished for the sake of eco-systemic 
processes 51. Thus, in a way, the threshold is still there - as a dividing line 
between individuals (humans - when we keep in mind the remark a t  footnote 
50) and the rest of the eco-sphere. 
This approach creates a chasm between individualism and ecocentrism. 
which is the crux of the controversy about anthropocentrism versus 
ecocentrism that has bloated into an ideological conflict between Social and 
Deep Ecology 52. 
However, the counter-posing of the individual and the eco-system is not 
eco-systemic. 
[Individual's] instincts prompt him to compete for his place in the 
community, but his ethics prompt him also to co-operate. 53 
50 There can be no value apartjiom an evaluator, all value is as it were in the eye of the 
beholder. The value that is attributed to the ecosystem, therefore, is humanly 
dependent. (Callicott, op.cit.: 26) 
51 Leopold, 1949:217,219 
52 Bookchin, 1980; Chase, 199 1 
53 Leopold, op.cit.: 219 
As I have often repeated, eco-systemic perspective emphasizes the unity of 
individual-in-her/his-environment, a unity which presupposes the integrity of 
the individual, not her/his dilution in the environment. 
The unit of survival I...] is the organism-in-its-environment. An 
organism that thinks only in terms of its own survival will invariably 
destroy its environment and I.. .I thus destroy itselj 54 
The chasm between individualism and ecocentrism emerges from the 
pervasive dualistic paradigm and its basic human/nature split, as  well as  
either/or logic 55. In her comprehensive discussion of dualism, Val Plumwood 
analyzes the position of Deep Ecology from the perspective of deconstructing 
its dualist underpinning, and, in particular, by indicating the problem of 
dilution of individual identity in broader (eco-)systemic levels: 
Theframework on which deep ecology draws represents a psychology of 
incorporation I...] Deep ecology locates the key problem area in human-nature 
relations in the separation of humans and nature, and it provides a solution 
for this in terms of the 'identi.ationf of self with nature. 'Ident~fication' is 
usually left deliberately vague [.. .] It is unclear how [.. .] obliterating any hu- 
man/nature distinction and dissolving self boundaries is supposed to provide 
the basis for a n  environmental ethic. The analysis of humans as metaphysi- 
cally un~fied with the cosmic whole will be equally true whatever relation 
humans stand in with nature - the situation of exploitation of nature exempli- 
fies such metaphysical unity equally as well as a conserver situation. 56 
The inherent external authority of moral extensionism - and the entire insti- 
tutional morality - is derived fi-om a dualized construct of individuals against 
the social and (in the case of ecological ethics) natural environment 57. This 
connection also points to the difference between an institutional (authoritarian, 
imposed) morality and an ethic based on individual responsibility. The 
dualization of the individual versus the eco-system seems to indicate that the 
abandoning of individuality is the condition of environmental morality. In view 
of the precarious position of individual responsibility and the delicate issue of 
empowering humans for it (discussed earlier), such a proposition can be 
considered a counterproductive moral blackmail. The position of the individual 
- -- 
54 Capra, 1982: 289 
55 See text at footnote 54, in chapter 2. 
56 Plumwood, 1993: 175-177 
57 The close connection between dualism and authoritarian structures will be 
discussed later on in this chapter. 
toward nature would remain within the choices of the domination paradigm: 
either patronizing or submissive. 
The fundamental problem with the differentiation of anthropocentrism/eco- 
centrism is that it is conceived as  an  issue of interests. The ensuing ethic is 
therefore based on negotiating the conflicting interests. Such a concept confu- 
ses ethics with the current form of economics and politics, where any issue 
can be a matter of competing interests, of trade-offs, to be negotiated in the 
stock market, or in the political arena. Such ethics is steeped in the relation- 
ships of competition and domination. A true ethic of an ecological culture. 
however, can emerge only when the deep roots of domination are addressed. 
In the ethic of conflicting interests (or of dualism of the individual versus 
eco-sphere), the anthropocentrism/ecocentrism cleavage is interpreted a s  
egoism versus altruism. 
Economics considers egoism a fundamental psychological 
characteris tic, whereas biology shows that altruism makes a contribution to 
the adaptation of species. 58 
The Tragedy of the Commons issue has become paradigmatic for this perspec- 
tive, and its argument is very much based on the economic way of thinking: 
As a rational being, every herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. 59 
Hardin's classic article poses some essential socio-psychological questions 
about everyman's attitudes toward ecological issues - although the choice of 
herdsmen (as one of the first occupations humans have taken) is rather 
inappropriate to illustrate a behavior that is characteristic of less ancient 
cultural patterns, and particularly typical for the current economy of cut-throat 
competition. Yet the way Hardin formulated these essential questions, and. 
consequently, drawn his solutions, reflects an  authoritarian position that is 
very much in tune with the Social-Darwinist ideological framework. Such an  
approach explains Hardin's choice of herdsmen to convey (consciously or not) 
the idea that human behavior has always been basically selfish, that such is 
58 Martinez-Alier, 1987: 96 
59 Hardin, 1968: 1243 
"human nature". Consequently, he can see an environmental morality 
achievable only through institutional coercion. 
In [Hardin's] view a sense of mutual responsibility must be enforced for it 
can never be achieved by voluntary means. The survival of the earth therefore 
depends upon the emergence of an elitist managerial minority armed with 
powers to regulate human behaviour in the collective interest. Freedom must 
be tempered by necessity. 60 
The other subliminal message of this parable (again it is possible that is 
was not consciously intentional) is that it is up to the general public to observe 
the imposed environmental morality. However, in reality, "herdsmen" behavior 
is more typical for the leaders in the cut-throat economy - and with much 
graver environmental consequences. The second part of Hardin's article 
provides another metaphor that has become paradigmatic - the lifeboat, which 
essentially restates the same tenet in a Malthusian context, perceiving the 
demographic problem at the root of the sustainability issue 61. 
In postulating that the rich nations (the occupants of the li$eboats) enjoy 
unilateral power to determine the future of mankind, [the lifeboat metaphor] 
does not faithfully reproduce the real world situation. In fact, the rich nations 
are already subs tantially dependent on some resource-rich poor countries 
whose political influence is already quite impressive and still growing. 62 
The Social-Darwinist position which assumes innate human selfishness 
can result only in an environmental ethic which is conceived of as  an imposed 
(authoritarian or institutionalized) morality. Furthermore, some formulations of 
ecocentrism render it open to totalitarian interpretations 63, which can easily 
gain ground in the culture based on deeply ingrained patterns of domination. 
An ethic, ecologically, is a limitation onfreedom of action in the struggle 
for existence. 64 
With his austere attitude, Leopold might be more suitable as  a "father" of Deep 
Ecology than Naess, who seems to have deserved this "position" by coining the 
term, but who is otherwise, much less harsh in his Ecosophy. This is not so 
60 O'Riordan, 1976: 29. The issue of freedom/responsibility dualism will be discussed 
in the last section of the next chapter. 
61 I have already commented upon the inadequacy of such a perspective in chapter 3, 
between footnotes 5 and 6. 
62 O'Riordan, op.cit.: 30 
63 Callicott, op.cit.: 26. James Robertson perceives it as the totalitarian 
conservationist scenario (Robertson, 1978: 9). 
64 Leopold, op.cit.: 2 17 
much because of all that Leopold has written, but rather because he failed to 
warn against what some of it could imply: 
A militant minority of wilderness-minded citizens must be on watch 
throughout the nation and vigilantly available for action. 65 
The Deep Ecology movement has already turned to some terrorist acts. It is 
difficult to find anything in Leopold's writing that would directly approve such 
interpretations, but neither he, nor Naess have paid attention to the deep 
authoritarian context of morality and ethics. 
There is an arrogance in failing to respect boundaries and to acknow- 
ledge d~zerence which can amount to an imposition of self. Deep ecologists see 
themselves as 'empowered to act on behalfof other beings' by claims of 
merging. [...I Such treatment is a standard part of subordination, for example, 
of women, servants, the colonised, animals. Similarly, respecting the needs of 
the other involves acknowledging the dtfference as well as the connection 
between our needs. 66 
Perceived in the context of the analysis of dualized constructs, ecocentrism 
appears as an uncritical reversal of anthropocentrism (reversing the dualization 
of humans versus nature, where human interests are considered superior) 67. 
Uncritical reversal is rooted in unresolved issues of domination and 
authoritarianism. 
The lifeboat metaphor fails because of its own internal inconsistencies. 
The care of the commons, by definition, requires a communal effort and the 
mutual respect of all participating members. [. . .] The ethics of a lifeboat denies 
the existence of a community and guarantees the persistence of 
discrimination. 68 
In one of the most comprehensive summaries of environmental issues, O'Rior- 
dan points at  the key issue of the cleavage between the individual and the eco- 
sphere. Mutuality and community best epitomize the eco-systemic interrelated- 
ness and interdependency of the individual and his or her social and natural 
environment. In the previous chapter, I have already presented Kropotkin's 
concept of mutual aid69, which emerges as a most pertinently systemic response 
65 ibid: 255 
66 Plumwood, op.cit.: 178 
67 See footnote 97 in chapter 6. 
68 O'Riordan. op.cit.: 31 
69 between footnotes 56 and 61 
to the dualistic deadlock of the chasm between individualism and ecocentrism70. 
The crucial argument of Kropotkin's concept is the importance of solidarity, 
considerateness and cooperation in evolution - as  instinctual endowments 
common (in different forms) to all living beings. Solidarity, considerateness and 
cooperation are based on an  individual's sensitivity towards others. And that is 
a substantially different attitude from the legalistic regulation of moral matters 
based on authoritarian relegation of responsibility to persons, institutions or 
deities that are believed to have power. The paradigm change of rationalism 
and the Enlightenment left the authoritarian basis untouched: the power of 
deities and their spiritual representatives was only handed over to legalistic 
institutions and their rational representatives. But the individual instinctual 
sensitivity remained a neglected and disempowered tool in moral decisions. 
The essence of an ecological ethic is not external authority, but individual, 
inner responsibility, based on a sense of belonging to nature, to the eco-system 
as  a sphere of interrelatedness and interdependence. Mary Midgley points to 
Hume's understanding of ethics which included a human sensitivity: 
Morality was for [Hume] not primarily an affair of reasoning at all, but 
of the feelings, especially the 'sentiment of humanity', which is a natural, not 
an artificial virtue. 71 
John Rodman's review of environmentalist positions is also presented in 
what could be perceived as  stages of emancipation. He describes resource 
conservation and wilderness preservation as anthropocentric and utilitarian 
views, and moral extensionism as considering rights and duties of humans to 
nonhuman natural entities. But he differs from Wenz in putting the last stage 
of emancipation into a new paradigm: 
When perception is sufficiently changed, respectful types of conduct seem 
"natural", and one does not have to belabor them in the language of rights and 
duties. HerefiaUy we reach the point of "paradigm change". 72 
70 Mutual aid inclinations constitute so great a part of our daily intercourse that if a 
stop to such actions could be put all further ethical progress would be stopped at 
once. Human society itself could not be maintained for even so much as the 
lifetime of one single generation. (Kropotkin, op.cit.: 229). 
71 Midgley, op.cit.: 48 
72 Rodman. 1983: 90 
For Rodman, the essential feature of this new paradigm is ecological sensibility: 
The term "sensibility" is chosen to suggest a complex pattern of 
perceptions, attitudes, and judgements which $fully developed, would 
constitute a disposition to appropriate conduct [. . .] Ecological Sensibility. 
then is "holistic" in a sense beyond that usually thought o$ it grasps the 
underlying principles that manqest themselves in what are ordinarily 
perceived as separate "social" and "environmental" issues. 73 
An ecological ethic can be defmed as a sense of inner individual responsi- 
bility for individual's eco-systemic interaction with his or her (social and natu- 
ral) environment. Inception of such an ethic requires a reassertion of 
individuality and individual responsibility. Individual responsibility is in 
jeopardy with ecocentrism taken as  a moral precept based on denial of 
individuality - or "selfhood", in Bookchin's terms: 
We are already living in a period of massive de-individualization. Not 
because deep ecology is making any serious inroads into our own cultural 
ecology, but because the mass media, the commodity culture, and a market 
society are 'reconnecting" us into a n  increasingly depersonalized 'whole" 
whose essence is passivity and a chronic vulnerability to economic and 
political manipulation. It is not an excess of "se1flood"from which we are 
suffering, but rather the surrender of personality to the security and control of 
corporations, centralized government and the military. [...I It is not 
deindividuation that the oppressed of the world require, but reindividuation 
that will transform them into active agents in the task of remaking society 
and arresting the growing totalitarianism 74 
As the "father" of Social Ecology, Bookchin, of course, puts emphasis on 
the social context, which is strikingly absent from Leopold's land ethic, and 
generally from Deep Ecology. Social ecologists argue that ecocentrism is a 
diversion from the acute social problems that are the actual cause of the 
environmental ones. Steven Vogel contends that alienation from nature is only a 
symptom of our social, economic and political alienation: 
If w e j h d  ourselves living in a n  environment of ugly shopping malls and 
endless superhighways, of dangerous nuclear power plants and toxic waste 
dumps, of rotting slums and polluted rivers, it is not because we have violated 
nature, but because our own ads remain powers over and against us: because 
we have not yet exerted conscious social control over our own activity, and so  
that activity remains under the sway of alienation. 75 
The terms humility and humbleness are often connected with ecocentrism 
and with 'new age" spirituality, indicating the emancipation from egoistic 
73 ibid: 88.91 
74 Bookchin, op.cit.: 233 
75 Vogel, 1988: 378 
positions. But real emancipation can only be achieved after passing through the 
full empowerment of individuality. In this overwhelmingly authoritarian 
civilization, the majority of humans is far from even recognizing the need for 
emancipation into individuality, into individual responsibility, into having control 
over their own lives. They remain comfortably (more or less) in the full 
authoritarian position and, therefrom, it is easy to adopt humility as  a 
fashionable attitude, without challenging the deeply ingrained and anxiety- 
defended mechanisms of submission and domination. 
Domination over Nature 
We have, as a culture, been talked into the proposi- 
tion that our security as a species depends upon our 
power over nature; and, in turn, we have been per- 
suaded that our power over nature requires us to 
screen the personhood of nature out of our lives - 
even as a professional torturer must begin by 
denying the personhood of his victims in order to 
gain total control over them. 
But now, that proposition turns out to be exact- 
ly wrong, and blatantly so. The power upon which 
it is predicated is rapidly proving to be illusory; the 
environment deteriorates in its supposed master's 
hand, and our promised security dwindles. 76 
All things are bound together. All things connect. 
What happens to the Earth happens to the children 
of the Earth. Man has not woven the web oflve. He 
is but one thread. Whatever he does to the web, he 
does to himself. 77 
Extreme anthropocentrism is manifested in the hyper-expansionist growth 
of the current profit-oriented economy. It is based on regarding nature as  re- 
sources to be exploited for human use 78. The underlying purpose can be defi- 
ned as  a quest to conquer nature, to restrain it a s  a force that can endanger 
humans in various ways, from illnesses (which are perceived as  external 
76 Roszak,op.cit.: 49 
77 HOW Can One Sell the Air?: A Manifesto for the Earth - the renown Native 
American message (from unknown source) to the White Man 
78 For social ecologists, our environmental dislocations are deeply rooted in an 
irrational, anti-ecological society I...] that nourishes a view of the natural world as 
a mere agglomeration of "resources" for human production and consumption 
(Bookchin, 1 9 9  1 : xiv) 
attacks on human organism), to elemental calamities. This conquest would 
enslave nature and make it work for human benefit. And this enslavement 
would supposedly help humanity to develop toward an independence from 
unpredictable chaos and limitations imposed by nature. Nature is regarded as a 
stint to limitless growth and expansion of humanity. Perceived in this manner, 
nature has to be conquered and exploited by humans. That is the external level 
of the meaning and practice of domination over nature. 
There are, therefore, two basic attitudes toward nature (which are inter- 
twined and interconnected): one of use and exploitation, the other of 
conquering and taming. The first has developed to an  overwhelming magnitude 
in the capitalist economy; but the other attitude has existed long before. They 
represent different perceptions of nature. 
The attitude of use and exploitation reflects and requires human confiden- 
ce that nature may be tampered with. It involves daring to question, intervene 
in and probe into natural processes - and the conviction that any problems 
arising from the interference can be solved by science and technology. 
What has especially changed for the intellectual with the rise of 
technology (especially weapons technology) since the twelfth century is not so 
much the separateness and inferior moral status of nature, but the confidence 
in controlling it. This s h ~ 3  in perceived human power in relation to nature is 
implicit in Descartes' images. I...] A role is envisaged for reason, the role of 
exercising power over the natural world rather than escapingfrom it or rising 
above it. 79 
At the same time, this attitude has made possible the development of modem 
technology, regardless of the negative consequences that it has brought about. 
The present Westem ideology of dominating nonhuman nature has 
distant roots in the history of humanity itsew Indeed, human beings of 
whatever culture must use nonhuman nature instrumentally for their 
survival to some extent or other. 80 
Of course, it is not a revelation that humans have always utilized nature as 
a resource - like all other living organisms do, as  life is a process of metabolic 
exchange of matter and energy with the environment. The difference is 
obviously in the extent and impact - and in the related attitude. 
- - 
79 Plumwood, op.cit.: 1 0 9 -  1 1 0  
80 Biehl. 1 9 9  1: 53 
Classical Marxist critique of capitalist economy did not include concerns 
about the negative consequences of the development of modem technology, 
but, rather considered only its progressive role, and believed it a prerequisite 
and empowerment for the emergence of a post-capitalist society. It was the 
members of the "Frankfurt school" who offered 
a fundamental challenge to the orthodox Marxist view concerning the progres- 
sive march of history, which had emphasized the libera tory po tentiat of the 
increasing mastery of nature through the development of the productive for- 
ces. Farfrom welcoming these developments as marking the "ascent of man 
from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom offreedom" (to borrow Engels's 
phrase), Horkheimer, Adomo, and Marcuse saw them in essentially negative 
terns, as giving rise to the domination of both 'buter" and f'inner" nature. 81 
The perception of the liberatory aspect of human interventions into natural 
processes is a heritage of the Enlightenment which brought about the change 
in human attitude to dare to interfere in what had before been considered the 
province of deities, of powers beyond human reach - and to dare beyond 
human capacity to grasp the consequences of their intrusion. This reverence 
for superhuman realms was rife with fear, and, therefore, the license won by 
the Enlightenment had a progressive significance of a liberation from fear. 
The Enlightenment has always aimed at  liberatug menfrom fear and 
establishing their sovereignty. Yet the fully enlightened earth radiates 
disaster triumphant. The program of the Enlightenment was the 
disenchantment of the world, the dissolution of myths, and the substitution 
of knowledge for fancy. I...] 
What men want to learnfrom nature is how to use it in order wholly to 
dominate it and other men. 82 
Horkheimer and Adomo point a t  the two sides of this liberation process. 
The freedom conceived a s  license to interfere with nature and exploit it, also 
had the meaning of a riddance of limitations that natural processes impose 
upon human economic and other pursuits. In Magic Mount*. Thomas Mann 
depicts how Voltaire protested against earthquake a s  a 
scandalous dereliction of nature, to which were s a c n i e d  thousands of 
human lives [...I There you have the hostiltty the spirit feels against nature, its 
proud mistrust, its high-hearted insistence upon the right to criticize her and 
her evil, reason-denying power. Nature is force; and it is slavish to suffer 
force, to abdicate before it. 83 
- 
81 Eckersley, 1992: 65, emphasis mine 
82 Horkheimer and Adorno, op.cit.: 44-45 
83 Mann, 1924/ 1969: 250 
From the perspective of today's ecological crisis, Mam's somewhat ironic inter- 
pretation of Voltaire's position emphasizes its controversy: on one hand the re- 
bellion from the medieval prohibition of rationality and scientific probing into 
cosmic mysteries, and from the principle of the untouchability of god; on the 
other hand, when rationality became a dominant ideology, it turned into an an-o- 
gance of self-delusive pretence of man's superiority over nature 84. In light of 
the long-term outcomes of this arrogance which brought the planet and the civi- 
lization to the verge of ecological peril, the medieval prohibition gains a meaning 
of a (somewhat belated) warning. When this prohibition is unburdened of the 
layers of mystification and intolerance, of institutional hatred toward any stri- 
ving for liberty from sheer authoritarian power - it emerges as  a fundamental 
awareness of a necessity to preserve the self-regulatory mechanisms of the 
eco-system. 
The emergence of confidence or license to interfere with natural processes 
and to subordinate and exploit nature for human benefit, involved two develop- 
ments: the renaissance of Platonic dualism, and the Enlightenment with its 
new paradigm, which included rationalism, mechanism and utilitarianism. The 
basic dualist split between humanity and nature is derived from Platonic 
conceptual framework, and its historical development is succinctly outlined by 
Val Plumwood: 
The first step in the evolution of human/nature dualism, is the cons truc- 
tion of the nonnative (the best or ideal) human identity as mind or reason, 
excluding or inferiorising the whole rich range of other human and non- 
human characteristics or construing them as inessential. The construction of 
mind or reason in terms exclusive of and oppositional to nature is the second 
step. The construction of nature itself as mindless is the thud step, one which 
both reinforces the opposition and constructs nature as ineluctably alien [...I 
This last step is the one Descartes makes explicit I...] a major intens~fication 
of hurnan/nature dualism a t  this time. The first two steps are clear in Plato, 
and the thud is implicit in his treatment of original matter as chaos, the 
mindless material or primitive form of the world on which rational order 
must be imposed. The Cartesian contribution builds on and presupposes the 
earlier steps, and together they construct the great gulf between the human 
and the natural which has become characteristic of the western tradition. 85 
- - 
84 Ristic, 1990c 
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The Enlightenment put Platonic superiority over nature into the practice of 
human donlination in a utilitarian sense (a sense absent in Platonian outlook), 
which required the liberation from scruples to intervene into natural processes. 
To achieve this liberation, the conception of nature as  alive had to be superse- 
ded. This profound paradigm change was accomplished with the Cartesian me- 
chanistic concept of nature- as  dead matter and living mechanisms without any 
consciousness or sensitivity. Even living organisms came to be perceived as  me- 
rely mechanic systems which operated according to physical laws observable 
by science. Consciousness was not only ascribed to humans exclusively, but it 
was also conceived of as  detached, separate from the merely biological mecha- 
nism - the body. This detachment from nature, already inaugurated in Platonic 
dualism, was then intensified, and has since been a crucial aspect of the world 
view which developed into a profound rift between humanity and nature. 
Detachment from direct involvement in and responsibility for nature has 
evolved over time. Pagan worshiping of animals as  atonement for killing turned 
into Christian absolution by defining animals as  soulless and subordinated. 
This was a n e c c e s s q  relaxation of the pagan inner spirituality and sensitivity 
into godly (external authority) justification for using animals in the advance of 
technology. The Cartesian paradigm enabled the transition from godly to 
scientific authority, and to the authority of institutions that regulate and control 
the technologies for satisfyrng vital human needs. 
Domination over nature was the principal purpose underlying this world 
view of humanity/nature dualism: 
It was Sir Rancis Bacon who in the early seventeenth century most 
clearly put forward a new agenda for human domination through science and 
technology, emphasizing the need for organized empirical research Through 
probing Nature's secret places, as he put it, man couldfind out her secrets so 
that he could more efectively bind her into servitude and have dominion and 
power over her. 86 
Science became the institutionalized practice of domination over nature - 
a s  envisioned by Francis Bacon's treatment of nature as  an object, 
manipulating and modiijmg it to suit human purposes: 
86 Sheldrake and Fox, 1996: 16 
[Bacon] transfom~ed the magus from nature's servant to its exploiter, 
and naturefrom a teacher to a slave. Bacon argued that it was the magician's 
error to consider art [technology) a mere "assistant to nature having the power 
tof i ish what nature has begun" and therefore to despair of ever "changing, 
transmuting, or fundamentally altering nature." 87 
Bacon's attitude of extremely arrogant subordination of nature was 
consequent to his authoritarian views on social and political issues: 
In contrast to the organic egalitarian societies of Campanella and 
Andrea, in which women and men were to receive much the same education 
and honor, the social structure of Bacon's Bensalem was hierarchical and 
patriarchal, modeled on the early modem patriarchal family. I...] Bacon's 
utopia, the New Atlantis illustrated a patriarchal family structure in which 
the "Father" exercised authority over the kin and the role of the woman had 
been reduced to near invisibility. 88 
This comprehensive social, technological, economic and ecological paradigm 
was the necessary basis for the emerging social-economic system: 
Capitalism needed to turn nature into a market commodity and resource 
without signijkant moral or social constraint on availability. [...I The view of 
nature as terra nullius available for annexation, as empty, passive and 
without a value or direction of its own, often underlies and is implicit in early 
liberal arguments for the legitimacy of private property. 89 
Of the two attitudes toward nature described above, the older one is 
related to Platonic dualism - the conquering and taming of nature which is still 
considered alive. The other, newer attitude of use and exploitation is the 
outcome of the Enlightenment, and it presents what Carolyn Merchant 
describes as  death of nature: 
The removal of animistic, organic assumptions about the cosmos 
constituted the death of nature - the most far-reaching eflect of the scientijk 
Revolution Because nature was now viewed as a system of dead, inert particles 
moved by external. rather than inherent forces, the mechanical framework 
itself could legitimate the manipulation of nature. Moreover, as a conceptual 
framework, the mechanical order had associated with it aframework of 
values based on power, fully compatible with the directions taken by 
commercial capitalism. 90 
The essential aspect of this paradigm change is that detachment from nature is 
instrumental to domination over it. A nature with no sensitivity, consciousness, 
or inherent spirituality permits interference of any kind which cannot hurt or 
disturb nature, other than causing mechanical impacts that can be controlled 
87 Merchant, 1980: 169 
88 ibid.: 172-173 
89 Plumwood, op.cit.: 11 1 
90 Merchant, 1980: 192- 193 
by technology. The consequent relief from moral scruples for humans when 
interfering with natural processes is the situation which an ecocentric ethic is 
attempting to rectifj.. However, this reductionist, mechanistic paradigm has 
been compatible with the underlying economic system: 
Living animate nature died, while dead inanimate money was endowed 
with life. Increasingly capital and the market would assume the organic attri- 
butes of growth, strength, activity, pregnancy, weakness, decay and collapse, 
obscuring and mystifying the new underlying social relations of production 
and reproduction that make economic growth and progress possible. 91 
The older attitude of conquering and taming nature, however, involves a 
perception of nature as  something alive, with a will of its own, so that it has to 
be fought, conquered and, ultimately, tamed. Yet, despite of the pervasive 
diffusion of the new paradigm of "dead nature", the old one is still present. In 
fact, the shift was neither so abrupt, nor complete. It was rather a 
development within the dualistic construct of humanity and nature toward 
greater detachment and rift. Thus, the notion that non-human beings are 
insentient has developed from the Christian dogma which declared that they 
had no soul, and therefore could not be hurt in the same way as  humans. 
As a mater of fact, both views are simultaneously in use, and they make 
up a somewhat "schizophrenic" attitude toward nature - as  a dead, or 
insensitive mechanism, but, a t  the same time, as a lively force to be tamed and 
restrained. This vacillation is of crucial importance for understanding the 
deeper origin of domination over nature, and of domination in general. From 
conquering and taming to predicting, controlling and exploiting, there is a 
transition: a passage from force - distinctively male, warrior - to reason, order. 
Reason and rationality have been long considered (in dualistic tradition) an  
eminently masculine faculty, and a token of superiority over nature, which is 
perceived as  mindless, irrational, chaotic, and therefore inferior. There is 
manifested a "schizophrenic" situation again: it is against the honor of the 
91 ibid.: 288. This perception pertains to my discussion of the excessive role of money 
as the determinant of all aspects of life, and the consequent disconnection of the eco- 
nomy from real life processes - see text between footnotes 23 and 27 in chapter 4. 
masculine, warrior morality to attack the inferiors, and yet this male world view 
takes pride in the conquest over nature. 
The whole issue pivots around rationality, so it may seem as  if this 
domination pattern is a rational concept. There are two basic misleading points 
about that rationality. Firstly, the domination relationship is neither exclusively, 
nor primarily based on reasoning. It has deep psychological roots, complex 
motivational structure, and the cerebral, intellective part is mostly an  ex-post 
rationalization and justification. Likewise, a s  I explained above, the Cartesian 
rationalistic warrant for the exploitation of nature is a rationalization of older 
irrational (or non-rational) attitudes toward it. 
The other problem is that this rationality, a s  the criterion for superiority, is 
a dualized concept of reason - postulated in opposition to and in exclusion of 
the natural and the feminine, as  well as intuition, impulse, emotionality and 
sensuality. Such dualized, exclusive rationality is not only reductionist, it is 
actually quite irrational. 
However, this reductionist rationality has had a clear raison &&re in the 
utilitarian world view of economics. When the point of view is moved out of that 
perspective, such rationality does not appear reasonable at  all: 
In the common usage of the tenn rational one would not think of 
describing the robbing of a bank as a rational or reasonable act. However, we 
f i d  out that for economics this is quite possible [not because economics 
supports crime). Robbing a bank can be described in economics as rational, 
because for the economist the word rational strictly means the logical 
application of means to attain particular ends, regardless of what these ends 
are. For economics, therefore, a bank robber is behaving rationally if he goes 
about his work in an egicient and efective manner. 92 
Contemporary economics is predicated on a "value-free" approach 93, 
which basically excludes ethical considerations. Consequently, the issue is 
addressed by Mary Midgley in the context of moral extensionism: 
Another misleading idea which distorts both the charge of emotion and 
that of emotiveness, namely, an impression that strong feeling is in itself 
more objectionable than calm feeling, and that states of ind~ference, 
involving no feeling, would really be the best of aU. 94 
92 Lutz and Lux, 1988: 9 1 
93 I have pointed to this issue in chapter 4, between footnotes 3 and 5. 
94 Midgley, op.cit: 36 
The essential meaning of this reductionist perspective is again detachment 
from natural processes - in this instance, in ourselves. As  this reductionist 
rationality is dualized with (i.e. superior to) nature, everyttllng non-rational (or 
other-than-rational) pertains to the sphere of (inferior) nature - as I enumerated 
above: intuition, impulse, emotionality, sensuality. This detachment, or 
disconnectedness is the prerequisite of domination - subordination of nature. 
Man is emphatically not part of the nature he objectively describes; he 
dominates i t j v m  the outside. 95 
In the case of the nature within (our other-than-rational modes of impression 
and expression), subordination takes the form of suppression, or denial. When 
suppressed, the contact with nature perverts into combat against it. 
Nature is traditionally conceived as feminine, it is always a female 
grammatical gender (the cultural pattern manifests its linguistic reflection 96). 
and it is always represented as a female. Carolyn Merchant does not address 
the dualistic background of this convention, but her book gives an excellent 
insight into the evolution of the mechanistic paradigm and detachment from 
and domination over nature. 
In his "Experimental Essays" (1 661). Boyle distinguished between merely 
knowing as opposed to dominating nature in thinly veiled sexual metaphor: "I 
shall here briejZy represent to you ... that there are two very distinct ends that 
men may propound to themselves in studying natural philosophy. For some 
men care only to know nature, others desire to command her'' and "to bring 
nature to be serviceable to their particular ends, whether of health, or riches, 
or sensual delight. " 97 
This psychological and conceptual basis of domination over nature 
presents a link to domination over women, which is an important issue for 
understanding the essence of domination. Feminist and ecoferninist theory has 
argued that the subordination of women and nature is based on common 
95 Prigogine and Stengers, 1984: 50, emphasis mine 
96 Merchant, 1980: xix 
97 ibid.: 189- 190. The related figure (number 17) presents Nature Reveals Herself, 
sculpture by Louis-Ernest Banias mench, 1841 -1 905). This sculpture suggests the 
sexuality of nature in revealing her secrets to science. A similar statue by the same 
sculptor in the Ecole de Medecine, Rue de la Sorbonne, Paris, bears the inscription, 
"La Nature se dewilant devant la Science" ("Nature Revealing Herself to Science"). 
attitudes. The commonality is in the mind frame which justifies and maintains 
both domination patterns: 
a masculine perception of nature as a mother and bride whose primary 
function was to comfort, nurture, and provide for the weUbeing of the male. 98 
Connection between domination over nature and domination over women is 
the basic starting point of ecoferninism. Karen Warren finds that the 
connection is manifested in the 
oppressive conceptual framework [...I that explains, just~fies, and maintains 
relationships of domination and subordination. 99 
The key conceptual background is, of course, dualism. Women are 
considered less rational because they are considered closer to nature. Reason 
is posited as the criterion of human superiority over nature, and of male 
superiority over women. The crucial point of this mind frame is that 
subordination is justified by inferiority. 
One of the main objections to some ecofeminist writings is that they buy 
into the identification of women and nature, and thus unintentionally endorse 
the dualization of humanity and nature and of the masculine and the feminine. 
Such a view obscures rather than clarifies the issue of domination over nature 
and women. It supports the misconception that men and women are substan- 
tially different in their relation and belonging to nature, and it overlooks the 
fact that both men and women have become alienated from nature and the 
natural processes in the course of the cultural evolution which is now culmi- 
nating in social and economic conditions of unsustainable and unecological 
ways of life. 
It is true that, despite the obvious privileges that male domination gives 
men, gender roles also confine males to stereotypical roles of their own, and 
this keeps them from exercising the full range of their human capacities for 
love, cooperativeness, trust, and a nurturing emotional life in general. In 
these senses, feminism promises liberation for men as well as women. 100 
There is an  important fact for the issue of domination which is concealed 
by the feminist insistence on identifymg domination over nature primarily with 
98 ibid.: 9 
99 Warren, 1990: 268 
100 Biehl, op.cit.: 50 
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domination over women. Domination over nature in ourselves affects both 
genders. In the process of cultural evolution, humans - both women and men - 
have become thoroughly alienated from an indigenous sensitivity for the nature 
in themselves. This points to the deeper origins of domination as well as  of the 
loss of connectedness to nature and its processes. 
Domination over Humans 
Domination over nature, therefore, has two aspects: domination over 
nature outside and in humans themselves, in ourselves as  well as in others - 
over nature within and without. These two aspects are interrelated from an 
(eco-)systemic point of view. And they indicate the connection between 
domination over nature and over humans. 
The deeper origins of domination over humans are related to domination 
over nature within and without. They have been manifested in human 
relationships which are characterized by demonizing, denial and repression of 
sensuality and sexuality. The denial of sensuality and sexuality has had a 
fundamental impact on the epistemological framework of our culture 101. On 
the other hand, the repression of sexuality has been one of the primal vehicles 
of institutional coercion and domination over humans, a s  well as a source of 
violence and aggressiveness derived from perverting suppressed sexuality. 
Issues of patriarchal power required the control of women, turning 
woman into enemy in a man's house [...I By creating an enemy in his home, 
man has also created an enemy within his heart: his sexual feelings. 102 
In the outward mode, a s  domination over other humans, these attitudes 
are primarily exemplified in sexual inferiorizing and subordination of women, 
or, seen from another viewpoint, attitudes toward sensuality and sexuality 
underlie the relationships of domination over women. A fact of crucial 
importance for understanding both domination patterns and the current 
- 
101 which will be discussed in the following chapter 
102 Goodison, 1992: 177, 350 
alienation of sexuality and sensuality, is that sexuality in this context is not 
primarily a matter of love and eroticism, but of power and domination. Love 
and eroticism have in these conditions undergone a substantial change which 
has profoundly affected human relationships in general. 
The key issue is how and why sexuality has became the innermost psycho- 
logical vehicle of male power and domination- not only over women, but general- 
ly over others, over nature, and ultimately over man's own primordial, natural 
self, sexuality and sensitivity. What many feminist writers overlook is that ma- 
les are also crippled by power and domination patterns that have become their 
role model 103. This is an  important connection and makes domination a much 
more complex issue, than just a political one in the narrow sense of the word. 
The root of the problem lies in a social system in which [...I both men and 
women are taught to equate true masculinity with violence and dominance and 
to see men who do not conform to this ideal as "too s o p  or "effeminate." 104 
The complex, deeper origins of domination over humans are linked to 
violence and aggressiveness - primarily to aggressive attitudes toward 
sensuality, sexuality and nature in humans themselves, particularly in women. 
These attitudes link sexuality with the dualized notion of male power and 
female weakness. Sexuality assumes the symbolic meaning of male power and 
dominance and female submissiveness (and the power/submissiveness 
relationship is the basic domination pattern in general). This idea has been for 
a very long time ingrained in cultural models, so that the conditions it infers 
are widely accepted as  a natural and innate endowment. Therefore, it is hardly 
noticed as  obtrusive in its countless manifestations - in the warrior mentality, 
in the mass-culture, in the enticements for consumer behavior. This attitude of 
power and dominance is expressed toward nature as  the notion that humans 
103 Theweleit, 1987. 
Male liberation will constitute the next important chapter in the awakening 
of women's consciousness, for men too have been victimized by the system that 
exploits Mother Earth, women, and children. [ . . . I  At the level ofpatriarchal values, 
if appears that they are not victims at all but the successful ones in that system [...I 
And this awareness represents a new kind of masculinity, one that is both 
sensitive and strong. [...I 'Strength must be redefined not as power-over but as 
power-with (Fox. 1988: 174- 175) 
104 Eisler, op.cit.: xviii 
have the undoubted right to own, take and use nature for their own interest 
and pleasure. That is comparable, and can be perceived as  related to the 
attitude toward women, whom men presume to have the right to possess and 
use for their pleasure - without asking for women's consent, without thinking 
of it as  a relation of mutuality 105. 
When the evidence did not seem to support the conclusion of female 
dominance, many scholars returned to the more conventionally accepted 
view. Ifthere never was a matriarchate, they reasoned, male-dominance must, 
a t e r  all, always have been the human norm. The evidence, however, supports 
neither one of these conclusions. 106 
Although there are theories that claim domination generally, and over 
women specifically, to be an inherent characteristic of "human nature", a 
"natural law"lo7, - there has also been, particularly recently, abundant 
anthropological evidence that the domination model has been only a phase 
(albeit a prolonged one) in human development. The key anthropological 
question - most profoundly argued on the issue of sexuality - is whether a non- 
dominational model is only post-dominational or was also pre-dominational- 
whether it existed before. Both Riane Eisler and Lucy Goodison base their 
analyses on the more recent work of the anthropologist Maria Gimbutas, but in 
the first half of the 20th century, Malinowski did extensive research and 
analysis which point to the same essential conclusions 108. 
The archaeological data we now have indicate that in its general 
structure prepatriarchal society was, by any contemporary standard, 
remarkably equalitarian. [...I For a time span of overfiteen hundred years 
the archaeological evidence indicates that male dominance was not the norm. 
"A division of labor between the sexes is indicated, but not a superiority of 
either. " writes Girnbutas. 109 
It is important for the connection between domination and attitudes toward 
sexuality that, in this pre-patriarchal cultural mode, gender equality was 
consequent to mutuality as basis of love and sexuality. 
105 Such attitudes make rape possible. What is weird and amazing is that some men 
can derive pleasure out of forcing or intimidating women into giving it. See also at 
footnotes 114 and 116. 
106 Eisler, op-cit.: 24 
107 as I have indicated in the beginning of the chapter between footnotes 6 and 9 
108 Malinowski. l929/ 1987 
109 Eisler. op.cit.: 24. 13- 14 
The evidence which has suruivedfrom the communities living on Greek 
islands in the third and early second millennia BC [depicts] men who look 
tender, calm and peaceful, but who are by no means castrated; their genitals 
are strong, emphasised and sometimes erect I...] and yet who appear gentle and 
sometimes even meditative. I...] In a prepatriarchal society the phallus could 
have been seen not as I...] a symbol of masculine supremacy, of male violence 
against women, of misused political and military power, it could be celebrated 
for its part as the fertilising agent in the procreative process. I...] The genitals 
of both sexes were respected for the power and pleasure they carried. 1 10 
This important anthropological evidence of tenderness between genders is also 
supported by the analysis of the radical theologian Mathew Fox: 
In the Song of Songs there is no male dominance, no female 
subordination, and no stereotypes of either sex. Throughout the Song she is 
independent, fully the equal of man. Truly there is a recovery of mutuality in 
the garden of eroticism. [...I 
His love is not rapacious and possessive, not demanding and controlling. 
I...] He is more given to ecstacy than control and can confess that in her 
presence "I did not know myser' I.. .] This man and woman are mature lovers 
seeking one another's pleasure as well as their own 1 1 1 
Another very important connection is the absence of violence in these 
cultures which valued equality and tenderness between genders: 
The Cretans' more natural attitudes toward sex would also have had 
other consequences equally d~mcult o perceive under the prevailing 
paradigm wherein religious dogma ofen views sex as more sinful than 
violence. I.. .I These liberated attitudes toward sex seem to have contributed to 
the generally peaceful and harmonious spirit predominant in Cretan life. 1 1 2  
Such a conclusion is also supported by Malinowski's findings. He compared 
tribes with different attitudes towards sexuality and discovered an 
interdependence between sexually repressive cultures on one hand, and 
aggressiveness, violence and relationships of domination on the other 1 1 3 .  This 
concurrence has been pertinent to the present day: 
A cross-cultural study conducted by Shirley and John McConahay found 
a sign~ficant correlation between the rigid sexual stereotypes required to 
maintain male dominance and the incidence of not only warfare, but wiJe 
beating, child beating, and rape. 114 
With the emergence of patriarchy, sexuality become a symbol of 
dominance and violence. Patriarchal societies typically idolize war and 
1 10 Goodison, op.cit.: 3 15-3 16 
1 1 1 Fox, op.cit.: 170- 17 1, emphasis mine 
1 1 2  Eisler, op.cit.: 39, emphasis mine 
1 1 3  Malinowski, l929/ 1987 
114 Eisler, op.cit.: 188 
combative competitiveness - as  the domain of males, and the sphere where 
superiority and supremacy is determined over the weaker: women in general 
and the weaker, i.e. defeated men. Thus emerged the essential mechanism of 
domination - justifymg subordination by inferiority 
Warfare was an essential instrument for replacing the partnership 
model with the dominator model. [...I The gloriiation of the lethal power of 
the sharp blade accompanied a way of life in which the organized slaughter of 
other human beings, along with the destruction and looting of their property 
and the subjugation and exploitation of their persons, appears to have been 
normal. 1 15 
The connection between sexuality and power is of vast importance for 
understanding the deep roots of authoritarianism and domination. This form of 
sexual identification has thoroughly infused all aspects of our culture and life. 
The prevailing imaginative model of sexuality is of aggression, domina- 
tion, imperialism. I.. .I Fictional heroes, from James Bond to Rambo, are 
involved with sexual conquest rather than the erotic I...] When the adolescent 
youths I teach draw very large erect penises on the blackboard to greet me as I 
come into the classroom, they are saying that though I am a teacher, they are 
members of a more powerful class. It is not sex which is at issue but power. 116 
The pivotal change in sexual attitudes, motivations and behavior was the 
perverting of tenderness into conquest. It also meant the forsaking of any 
mutuality in sexual relationships and the shift to an antagonistic, combative 
and competitive basis of human relationships in general. There is a wide range 
of theoretical work which has been deconstructing this psychological core of 
violence and domination: from Freud to Wilhelm Reich, humanistic psychology, 
antipsychiatry and feminism. Reich's work offers a most profound analysis of 
the psychological and psychosomatic mechanisms of sexual repression and 
inhibition (which he metaphorically termed "annoring"), clearly revealing the 
process of distortion of tenderness into violence: 
The armored organism is essentially d~fferent from the unarmored one 
in that a rigid wall is erected between its biological core, from which all 
natural impulses stem, and the world in which it lives and works. As a result 
every natural impulse, particularly the naturalfunction of and capacity for 
love, is impeded. The living core of the armored organism has retained its 
impulses, but they can no longerfindfree expression In the desperate attempt 
"to express itself," every natural impulse is forced to penetrate or break 
through the wall of the armoring. The impulse must use force to reach the 
surface and the goal. While the impulse is trying to overcome the armoring by 
115 ibid.: 47-49 
116 Goodison. op.cit.: 12, 7 
force, it is transformed into a destructive rage, regardless of its original 
nature. [...I The core of the process is the transformation of all love impulses 
into destructiveness. 1 17 
The renunciation of mutuality and the support of antagonistic relationships 
have their conceptual core in dualization. Dualism is one of the fundamental 
elements of the Western mind frame. It perceives the basic concepts, relation- 
ships and entities in opposed pairs: male-female, human-nature, mind-body, 
matter-spirit, reason-emotion, self-other, etc. These polarities are deeply 
imbedded in our culture. Although I have already mentioned dualism 
throughout the text, I have left a more detailed discussion for this chapter, 
where it is most relevant because domination is based on dualism. Its two 
essential routines are inferiorization and exclusion of mutuality. Particularly 
important in the dualistic mind-set is its negative impact on mutuality or any 
related attitudes of empathy and harmony, which are prerequisites for a 
positive relation with the environment (social and natural): 
The qualities (actual or supposed), the culture, the values and the areas of 
life associated with the dualised other are systematically and pervasively 
constructed and depicted as inferior [...I so as to make equality and mutuality 
literally unthinkable. Dualism is a relation of separation and domination 
inscribed and naturalized in culture and characterised by radical exclusion, 
distancing and opposition between orders constructed as sys tematically 
higher and lower, as inferior and superior, as ruler and ruled. 118 
The sexual inferiorization and domination of women is connected to the 
dualization of body and mind, of nature and spirit - and of sexuality and love, 
which are defined as the dualized notion of male power and female weakness. 
Examining in depth the structure of the dualized perception of femininity and 
nature, Val Plumwood discerns a set of its principal mechanisms, some of 
which are: backgrounding (or denial), radical exclusion (or hyperseparation), 
instrumentalism (or objectification) and homogenization (or stereotyping). 
Backgrounding is related to detachment, which I have been mentioning as  an 
important aspect of alienation in systemic terms 119. 
1 17 Reich, l949/ 1973: 64-65, emphasis mine 
118 Plumwood, op.cit.: 47-48 
119 in this chapter, between footnotes 35 and 36, 85 and 86.90 and 91, and 94 and 95; 
in chapter 3 between 70 and 7 1, and 83 and 85. 
One of the most common forms of denial of women and nature is [...I 
their treatment as providing the background to a dominant, foreground 
sphere of recognised achievement or causation. [It involves] the denial of 
dependence on biospheric processes, and a view of humans as apart, outside of 
nature, which is treated as a limitless provider without needs of its own. 
Dominant western culture has systematically inferiorised, backgrounded and 
denied dependency on the whole sphere of reproduction and subsistence. 120 
Radical exclusion or hyperseparation is related to what I have termed 
disconnectedness from natural processes: 
Dualism denies continuity, treating its pairs as comprising two worlds 
between which there is nothing in common I...] Thus men are defined as 
active, intellectual, egoistic, competitive and dominant, while women I...] as 
passive, intuitive, altruistic, nurturant and submissive. Each has 
characteristics which exclude but logically require a corresponding and 
complementary set in the other. Because of the polarisation and elimination 
of overlap, dualistic pairs present a false dichotomy. 121 
Instrumentalism (or objectification) is a typical mechanism of domination, 
and it is exemplified in the attitude of use and exploitation of nature which I 
described in the previous subsection. Instrumentalism is also the 
dualizing/dorninational mechanism which most clearly manifests the connection 
between domination over nature and over women: 
Those on the lower side of the dualisms are obliged to put aside their 
interests for those of the master or centre [...I they are conceived of as his 
instruments, a means to his ends. 122 
It is important also to point to stereotyping (or homogenization) as  a salient link 
between dualization and domination: 
More than polarisation is needed if a relationship is to be a n  appropriate 
one for domination. The dominated class must appear suitably homogeneous 
if it is to be able to conform to and confirm its 'nature'. In homogenisation, 
diserences among the inferiorised group are disregarded. 123 
Plumwood's deconstructivist analysis of dualism has exposed uncritical re- 
actions which do not address the dualistic framework, but only create a reac- 
tive construct, leaving the basic dualistic mindset unchanged - the dualistic 
structure remains unrecognized and unresolved. There are two types of 
uncritical reaction strategies: the reversal and the unification (equalization) of 
dualized polarities. 
120 ibid. : 2 1, emphasis mine 
12 1 ibid.: 50-51, emphasis mine 
122 ibid.: 53, emphasis mine 
123 ibid.: 53 
Uncritical reversal keeps the established dualized relationship but shifts 
the position of the dualized pair 124. In the text so far ,  I have pointed out seve- 
ral examples: ecocentrism as  an  uncritical reversal of anthropocentrism 125; 
decentralization when it is conceived as  a dualized pair to centralization 126; 
and others. Likewise, the feminist deconstruction of dualism demonstrates how 
some ecofeminist positions reverse the dualistic notion of femininity versus 
masculinity by asserting the feminine as  superior to the masculine because of 
women's alleged closeness to nature. 
The diverse manifestations of uncritical reversal indicate that it expresses 
an  emergent awareness of the current oppressive conditions which result from 
the inferiorization of one dualized polarity. On the other hand, uncritical 
reversal also reflects the lack of awareness of the dualistic basis of the 
accepted mode of thinking, and the incapability to comprehend it. Dualist mind 
set is too deeply ingrained in psychological structure, and it therefore presents 
too much of a challenge and threat if one has to question it. 
The extreme manifestation of this misunderstanding of dualist structures - 
related to both uncritical reactions - is the identification with the oppressor. It 
presents the issue of domination defended by the subordinated (and I will 
return to it a t  the end of the chapter): 
The reclamation and a m a t i o n  of subordinated identity is one of the 
key problems for the colonised, especially in race, class and ethnic cobniza- 
tion. [...I The colonised is not free to proceed independently, but a m  
uncritically whatever the coloniser has made of him or her, or embraces 
whatever the coloniser despised and excluded. 127 
The uncritical reaction of equalization (unification) is also characterized by 
the deeply ingrained dualistic mindset, which is manifested (in this case more 
clearly than in uncritical reversal) in the inability to assert individual identity: 
There is a strong temptation, once the role of dualism in creating 
exaggerated separation is perceived, to conclude that the resolution of a 
dualism requires merger, the elimination of the problematic boundary 
124 ibid.: 61-62, 126 
125 at footnote 70 in this chapter 
126 at footnote 97 in chapter 6 
127 Plumwood, op.cit.: 6 1-62 
between the one and the other, the coloniser and the colonised, tacking the 
m_Edence to a t  a distinct identity. 1% 
In systemic terms, this is an inability to comprehend and sense the identity of 
the self in relation to the (social and natural) environment - and to understand 
that the integrity of the individual is not precluded by interdependence and 
ecosystemic belonging 129: 
Psychological and sociological research confirms that individual 
iden ti ty develops in a circular relationship with a system of constraints. 
Individuals are able to identih themselves when they have acquired the 
ability to distinguish betuseen themselves and the environment. 130 
In the context of this chapter, (eco-)systemic identity and integrity present a 
key issue of empowerment for individual responsibility, and thus of the 
transition to post-domination (and ecological culture). 
The essential misunderstanding of dualistic constructs expressed by un- 
critical equalization (unification) is the misinterpretation of differences. Instead 
of perceiving the problem in the dualistic counterposition of different 
characteristics - as a basis for superiority/inferiority and consequently 
subordination - the differences themselves are taken for the cause of 
antagonism. Uncritical unification attempts to eradicate the dualistic polarities 
by levelling the differences on which dualization has been based. 
A dualism is not same as a dichotomy, and we do not have to, and should 
not, abandon either dichotomy or d~fference in order to avoid dualism I...] A 
merger strategy is neither necessary nor desirable, because, while dualism 
makes d~fference the vehicle for hierarchy, it usually does so by distorting 
d~fference. The attempt to eliminate distinction along with dualism is 
misconceived on both political and philosophical counts. 131 
The salient point is the distortion of differences, both by the basic dualistic 
constructs and by their uncritical reaction 132. 
This attitude to dualism has also been manifested in some ecocentrist and 
feminist concepts and strategies. Some feminists seek to resolve the oppres- 
128 ibid.: 59. emphasis mine 
129 See text between footnote 53 and 54 in this chapter, and between 18 and 19 in 
chapter 2. 
130 Melucci, 1996: 29, emphasis mine 
131 Plumwood, op.cit.: 55, 59 
132 See quote at footnote 123. Also (as I indicated in chapter 2). by reducing all differen- 
ces to polar antipodes, dualism abolishes the multifarious variety and gradations 
of qualities. 
sion of women by denying gender differences, and thus can end up abando- 
ning their femininity. Ecocentrism is occasionally interpreted as an undifferen- 
tiated unity or continuity of humans and nature. According to this interpreta- 
tion, such unity is a prerequisite for changing the practice of anthropocentric 
imposition of human interests. 
The loss of the essential tension between drfferent and alike is 
characteristic of domination and instrumentalisation, which involves the 
erasure of the other as an external limit and its reappearance as a projection 
of self. In the domination framework, the entire dynamic of interaction takes 
place within the self, rather than between the selfand the external other. 133 
The eco-systemic or holistic perspective has to subsume differences and 
tensions, rather than equalize the opposites - it has to include a dialectical 
outlook as a non-dualistic acknowledgement of differences. Actually, dialectics 
is by definition opposed to dualism as it means the coexistence of differences, 
opposites, tensions, while the essence of dualism is to shut out the possibility 
of coexistence and mutuality as differences are the basis for confrontation and 
subjugation 134. An eco-systernic/holistic dialectic is therefore non-dominational 
and non-hierarchical. 
A non-dualist dialectics acknowledges inherent tensions. Tensions and 
relaxations are manifested in vibrations, pulsations, and in the thermodynamic 
non-equilibrium - which constitute the basis of life and metabolic processes. 
One of the essential dialectic antipodes, in eco-systemic terms, is the relation 
between integrity (identity of individual entity) and integration (its belonging to 
broader levels of eco-systemic interactions) 135. This tension is also related to 
the essential antagonism of life and death. 
The classical concept of dialectics has not addressed the issues of 
domination, and has often been depicted in terms of verticality, if not of explicit 
hierarchy. The political practice which emerged from classical Marxism has 
133 Plumwood. op.cit.: 175-176 
134 I have pointed out in chapter 2 that dualistic logic is exclusive ('either/or") because 
differences are construed as mutually exclusive, while systemic/holistic 
perspective presupposes an inclusive ('both/and") logic. 
135 I have discussed this issue in connection with the basic concepts of systems theory 
in chapter 2. 
interpreted dialectics within the domination paradigm - as  the basis for class 
struggle. It was in a way a strategy of a reversal of the current domination 
patterns. If the domination basis is not deconstructed, dialectics remains 
within the dualist mind frame. 
Dialectical tensions and oppositions have substantially weakened in the 
totalitarian unification of the institutionalized and consumerist culture. This has 
been pointed out by neo-Marxist and postmodernist theorists as  an  aspect of 
alienation. Marcuse is most elaborate in his critique of the levelling and 
neutralizing effect of the current "one-dimensional" culture, and he argues for 
conflicting realities, for dialectics. 
The new totalitarianism rnanifes ts itself precisely in a harmonizing 
pluralism, where the mos t contradictory works and truths peacefully coexist 
in ind~fference. 136 
The most important aspect (in the context of this chapter) of this alienating 
one-dimensional reality of the institutionalized world, is that the sides of 
domination are no longer clear-cut. The perpetuators of oppression are 
oppressed as  well (though not as  much) 137. The loss of dialectic/oppositional 
tensions in dominational relationships reflects the conditions of internalized 
domination, which is a further stage of alienation 138. 
The totalitarian tendencies of the one dimensional society render the 
traditional ways and means of protest ineffective - perhaps even dangerous 
because they preserve the illusion of popular sovereignty. This illusion 
contains some truth: "the people", previously the ferment of social change, 
have "moved up" to become the ferment of social cohesion. Here rather than in 
the redistribution of wealth and equalization of classes is the new 
stratrfication characteris tic of advanced industrial society. 1 39 
This argument is reiterated and further reinforced by Baudrillard, who 
contends that dialectic of class tensions cease to exist when the exploited class 
has been effectively assimilated into the process of reproducing the symbolic 
reality of the consumer culture 140. 
136 Marcuse, op.cit.: 61 
137 See text and quotes between footnotes 38 and 40 in chapter 5. 
138 See text around footnote 26 in chapter 5. 
139 Marcuse, op.cit: 256 
140 See quotes related to footnotes 28 in chapter 5, and 26 in chapter 4. 
These social-psychological aspects of domination and dualism point to a 
fact which is important to emphasize: neither domination, nor dualism are pri- 
marily, or exclusively rooted in the rational sphere. Domination is only rationali- 
zed by dualized constructs. Dualism is not the cause of domination. It is only 
its conceptual underpinning - as the basis for the relationships of competition, 
confrontation and subjugation, relationships which exclude any equality, close- 
ness, unity, mutuality and coexistence. These attitudes define the social, econo- 
mic and ecological relations in the current culture. The negative impact on 
mutuality, or any akin attitudes of care, empathy and harmony, is particularly 
important for the relations toward the social and natural environment. 
Racism, colonialism and sexism have drawn their conceptual strength 
from casting sexual, racial and ethnic dtfference as closer to the animal and 
the body construed as a sphere of inferiority, as a lesser fornl of humanity 
lacking the full measure of rationality or culture. 141 
Domination over women has been institutionalized into patriarchy, which 
became the sprout for disseminating the pattems of domination in human 
relationships. Patriarchy is based on sexual oppression and on the oppression 
of sexuality. Oppression is generated by the attitudes of inferiorizing and 
dominating women as  sexual objects. In the process of the institutionalization 
of patriarchy, these attitudes were linked to private ownership pattems and to 
economic and political domination by males. 
The origin of patriarchy has been the subject of some controversy, which 
essentially stems from the provocative aspect of any issues related to sexuality. 
Janet Biehl assumes the role of a somewhat dogmatic defender of the social- 
ecology position, which postulates the theory that gerontocracy is the primal 
form of domination, and, consequently, the origin of patriarchal culture. 
Ynestra King, for example, with her background in social ecology agrees 
that hierarchy developedfrom within, but she d~ffers with social ecology in 
arguing that the subordination of women, not gerontocracy, was the earliest 
form of domination. 142 
The scope of this essay does not include nor necessitate an  in-depth inquiry 
into this issue - beyond the salient connection between domination, sexuality 
- 
141 Plumwood, op.cit.: 4 
142 Biehl, op.cit.: 47 
and dualism, which I have discussed above. Perceived from the viewpoint of 
these connections, the origin of patriarchy primarily from sexual and gender 
oppression is much more consequential than the dubious gerontocratic theory. 
After all, why were they always male geronts who assumed this kind of 
supremacy3 
One reason why this issue is open to debate is certainly the current blur- 
ring of sharp overt forms of domination (as I pointed out above). However, it is 
also due to a shunning away from issues of sexuality. The critical link between 
sexuality and patriarchy is the perversion of tendenless into conquest, and the 
entire interrelatedness of sexuality, violence and subordination. It is manifested 
in domestic violence, in more intense presence of patriarchal traits in warrior 
cultures, etc. This crucial connection is not evaded solely by "orthodox" social 
ecology; it is typically overlooked by most anthropologists and other thinkers 
who tackle the controversial issue of patriarchy. Without considering the indis- 
pensable sexuality component of patriarchy, the picture remains incomplete, 
and from there ensue many sterile elaborations of the topic. 
One such effort is Rosalind Coward's detailed study of Patriarchal 
Precedents, which is promisingly subtitled Sexuality and Social Relations 143. 
However, although she starts from a feminist perspective, she disappointingly 
fails to offer significant insights about sexuality. She reduces the notion of 
sexuality to kinship and lineage patterns, which impoverishes her argument. 
She also neglects to address even the authoritarian context of patriarchy, 
which is one of its key issues. The sole (but comprehensively documented) 
argument of Coward's book is that patriarchy has not been the universal and 
eternal form of social organization. 
In his book The Invasion of Compulsory Sex-Morality, Wilhelm Reich 
addresses the problem of the emergence of patriarchy as  a social relation 
based on sexual subordination 144. Grounded on the anthropological findings of 
143 Coward, 1983 
144 Reich, 1931/1971: 123 
Bronislav Malinowski, the essence of his detailed analysis is that patriarchy 
arose a s  power based on property and sexual oppression. 
Evasion of issues related to sexuality reflects the attitudes of the dualistic 
mind set which I discussed above. Fear of sexuality is, furthermore, one of the 
essential buttresses of authoritarian education. 
Patriarchy has been the institution whereby these attitudes are reprodu- 
ced. Oppressed women, in their child rearing and educating role, have been 
the perpetuators of the domination patterns 145, which are based on the 
relationships of power and submissiveness, not only between males and 
females, but among humans in general. In that sense, patriarchy is the cradle 
of other social relations of domination - of family structures, class structures, 
of domination structures in economy, politics and technology. 
This early conditioning for authoritarian and dominational relationships ma- 
kes it difficult to discern and accept that they are not innate, biological, natural 
or god-given. Therefore, a great deal of scientific effort is devoted to arguments 
against such prejudices. Likewise, the above-mentioned book by Rosalind 
Coward is almost entirely committed to proving that patriarchy has not been 
the universal and eternal form of social organization, but only a long-lasting 
cultural pattern. 
Attitudes of domination permeate, affect and change all human relation- 
ships, which all became steeped in power. And it has been that way for rnillen- 
nia now. Throughout all this time, power and its intricacies have been preoccu- 
pying human minds, and diverse theories of domination, power and authorita- 
rianism, and approaches to understanding and treating them have emerged. 
There are two basic types of these theories and approaches: those which 
perceive domination, authoritarianism and power in social and economic 
context, and therefrom seek their origin; and the others which are 
characterized by oversight, denial or disregard of such context. These two 
viewpoints coincide with - or, rather, are consequent to - the related concepts 
145 This is the mechanism of oppression of the oppressed - see quote and text related to 
footnote 127. 
of the origin of domination. Domination is regarded - implicitly or explicitly - as 
innate, or genetically determined, by "context-free" approaches, and. 
alternatively, as a phase in cultural evolution by theories which perceive it as 
rooted in social and economic structures. 
A "context-free" approach is exemplified by behavioral psychology, which 
considers only the overt (and measurable) manifestations of human behavior as 
scientifically valid subjects of inquiry: only what a person does is important, 
not why; social background of behavior is irrelevant. Economic utilitarianism is 
based on the behavioral approach (or, rather, the two viewpoints support each 
other). Accordingly, behaviorism regards the individual as a utility maximizing 
entity 146, driven by his or her own, "value-free" interest (i.e. irrespective of 
social context), and therefore inclined to employ power over others and over 
nature. 
An innate. "natural" dominational predisposition is implicitly assumed, and 
also necessary as a ground for the underlying concept of human relationships 
characterized by "cut-throat" competition. These notions are derived from Social 
Darwinism and sociobiology (both based on the much older dualist mind 
frame), which explicitly posit domination as an inherent human trait: 
The notion of struggle among individuals in the midst of scarcity was a 
familiar social doctrine long before Darwin and Wallace used it as a basis for 
the theory of natural selection. I...] The arguments in favor [of "struggle for 
existence"] were developed mostfully, or at least with the greatest rigor, by 
Herbert Spencer. To Spencer is owed the grisly conception that nature as a 
whole is "red in tooth and claw. " His book "Social Statics" [was] intended to 
show that the predations of Victorian society were merely the natural and 
inevitable social expression of the vast and incessant struggle for existence 
which all living species waged in order to survive. [...I 
The gist of Spencer's argument was that the misery of the lower classes 
was coupled to certain inherent defects in their moral character and that 
these defects were ultimately due to their innate biological inferiority. 147 
It is actually a disservice to Darwin to connect this doctrine with his name, 
as he never related his theory of natural selection to social standing of humans. 
Neither did he perceive the "struggle for existence" as a continuous fierce and 
- - - 
146 I examined this concept in chapter 4 - see text and quotes between footnotes 5 and 
8, and between 38 and 4 1. 
147 Chorover, 1979: 89, emphasis mine 
ruthless competition among the members of the same species 148. It would, 
therefore, be more appropriate to call the doctrine Spencerism, the more so 
because it has been repeatedly refuted exactly on Darwinist grounds - initially 
by Kropotkin: 
The numberless followers of Darwin reduced the notion of struggle for 
existence to its narrowest limits. They came to conceive the animal world as a 
world of perpetual struggle among half-s tarued individuals, thirsting for one 
another's blood. 149 
It is true, however, that Darwin did frame his theory in the language of antago- 
nism between species and nature, which certainly reflects the dualistic 
paradigm, but, at  the time, dualism was hardly recognized as a perspective to 
be challenged. On the contrary, the constructs in terms of inferiority and 
superiority, domination and violence, were uncritically accepted. Within such a 
conceptual framework, Social Darwinism evolved into a broader approach 
termed sociobiology. 
In its applied form, sociobiology started with attempts to measure human 
characteristics and traits, and to infer from these measurables innate social 
and psychological predispositions. This correlation, however, has never been 
tenable: 
The origins of the present controversy are traceable to the work of a 
Victorian Englishman, Sir Francis Galton, who published a book about the 
inheritance of mental ability [. . . .] The presupposition that reputation, success, 
and social standing are correlated positively with intelligence not only yields 
a n  absurdly circular definition of mental capacrly in which intelligence 
equals eminence and eminence equals intelligence, it reJlects a bias in favor 
of the prevailing social order. 150 
Nevertheless, this approach has never lost its proponents. It has mutated from 
speculations like phrenology (which proposed that human scull - and brain 
underneath - is divided into zones responsible for every moral and physical 
aspect of behavior), whose absurdity is now widely obvious, to assumptions 
148 What Darwin did not mean to imply was that the struggle for existence consists 
solely or even mainly of a competition within species for scarce resources. He was 
emphatic in using the metaphor more broadly, to include the struggle all species 
and members of species must wage tofiurish in the face of inclement natural 
circumstances. (ibid.: 82-83) 
149 Kropotkin, op.cit.: 4. See also quote at footnote 165. 
150 Chorover, 1979: 33, emphasis mine 
which disguise the sociobiological underpinning within sophisticated scientific 
fields of inquiry: 
Genes "$or'' particular characteris tics are subject to selection pressure; 
genes are in competition, and some genes are more successful than others in 
terms of the number of copies that are propagated. I.. .I The leading proponent 
ofsociobiology, E. 0. Wilson, has [assumed] that there are genes, subject to 
natural selection, 'ybr" traits such as homosexuality, xenophobia, and 
attruism 151 
The most salient context of sociobiological theory and practice is its 
function as basis for behavior control 152. Various reiterations of the concept 
serve primarily to provide support and theoretical background for devising 
methods of controlling those human actions which deviate from institutionalized 
norms, and can question, challenge, threaten, or expose the undersides of the 
social and political status quo. 
The causes of social or antisocial behavior cannot be traced to inherent 
attributes or genetic predispositions, and when d~gerent societies and 
d~fferent eras cannot even agree on a defiition of antisocial behavior, the 
search for criminal chromosomes is scientijkally meaningless [. . .] So long as 
people can be persuaded to accept spwious defiitions of crime, absurd 
attempts to locate the root causes ofsocial conflict within defective 
individuals or stigmatized groups may continue to pass unchallenged. 153 
Behavior control represents institutional domination on mass scale. As a 
form of domination it is removed and abstracted from direct interpersonal 
interactions of competition, inferiorization and subordination, and elevated to 
an impersonalized, institutionalized level, where domination is no longer overt, 
but becomes implied and surreptitious. In his comprehensive analysis of 
behavior control as exertion of institutional power over people, Stephan 
Chorover reveals appalling practices: 
The "improvement" [from prefrontal lobectomy or lobotomy] often 
consisted ofan increase in docility and obedience which made the patients 
tamer and easier for hospital o m a l s  to control or rnanqe. [...I bbotomized 
people were liable to be rendered apathetic, irresponsible, and asocial, their 
inteUects were blunted, and they were likely to suffer from a drastic 
impairment of memory and creativlty.154 
151 Sheldrake. 1988: 83-84. emphasis mine. See also quote at footnote 9. 
152 Throughout its history the measurement of human diversity has been linked to 
claims ofhuman superiority and iqferiority and has thereby been used tojusw 
prevailing patterns of behavior control. (Chorover. 1979: 34, emphasis mine) 
153 ibid.: 181-182 
154 ibid.: 154- 155, emphasis mine 
The notion of innate or genetically determined violent behavior is conse- 
quent to the use of extremely aggressive forms of psychiatric treatment. Both 
at the level of medical behavior control, and on broader societal level, the 
conviction that power and dominational relationships are innate, leads to 
solutions (of eminently dualistic derivation) which are based upon taming or 
curbing "natural" impulses. Such solutions require the eternal presence of 
institutional bodies that perform this controlling and restraining function. The 
essential point is that individual power or violence is curbed by institutional 
power and violence. Power problems are allegedly cured by power, violence 
healed by violence. Furthermore, such a n  approach justifies the institutions 
that inevitably enable misuse and distortion of power. 
In behavior control violence is transformed into cruel medical procedures. 
But the strategy of distancing from direct expression of violence, and even 
immediate interaction, is consequently carried out 155. 
Psychosurgeons may now implant electrodes in the brain, allow the 
subject or patient to recover from the surgery, and then connect the electrode 
to a portable transmitter/receiver. In this way, it is possible to monitor or 
manipulate the behavior and brain activity of the unrestrained (and perhaps 
unsuspecting) subject. I.. .] A system [. . .I for =mote monitoring and brain 
stimulation I...] could blockfurther action by the subject by causing him to 
forget or abandon his pro_jsct. " 1% 
This utterly Orwellian project 157 on devising domination technology which 
turns people into robots is not merely spooky; it is ho-g because it not 
only discourages, but effectively abolishes individual responsibility. 
Of course, the concept of sociobiology and its associated practices are 
predicated on depreciating individual responsibility: 
Edward Thorndike, chairman of the psychology department at Columbia 
University, stated, [in 1939 that] our superiors in ability are on the average 
our benefactors, and it is safer to trust o w  interests to them than to 
ourselves. 158 
- 
155 See also text and quote between footnotes 35 and 36. 
156 Chorover, 1979: 160-161; 196- 197, emphasis mine 
157 Orwell, 1976; a more tragicomical association would be Charlie Chaplin's feeding 
machine in Modem Times. 
158 Chorover, 1979: 46, emphasis mine 
As domination becomes covert with institutionalization into behavior control, it 
gains a function of reinforcement and reproduction of authoritarian structures. 
In this context, authoritarian structures are conceived of a s  societally (and even 
naturally) given. However, discouragement and inhibition of individual respon- 
sibility and empowerment, for the most part, is not consciously intended 159. 
Consequently, behavior control methods are extended to children, with obvious 
assumption that the importance of the desired goals overweighs the unfortu- 
nate side effects: 
[In] the seemingly endless search for the biological roots of social 
problems I . .  .I highly potent drugs that act directly upon the brain [...I are being 
used on a large scale in order to bring under control the behavior of children 
who have no demonstrable biological disease. I.. .I 
"Minimal brain dysfimction," states a recent text, "is probably the single 
most common disorder seen by child psychiatrists." Yet, before the 1960s the 
disorder hardly seemed to exist [...I Adults since time immemorial have been 
alanned by, and ofen impatient with, the altogether "impossible" child. [...I 
The signs by which MBD is recognized are purely behavioral [...I About half of 
the preadolescent children 'yell into the MBD category." [The] "correct 
treatment," [is] the use of stimulant drugs; principally, d-amphetamine I...] 
Like all drugs, amphetamine has side effects, I...] such symptoms as 
headaches, stomachaches, tremor, tension, nail biting, sallowness, loss of 
appetite, and insomnia [. . .I Same children receiving amphetannine 
medication may sufler a reduction in growth rate. [. . .] The main point is that 
when children are treated with amphetamine they become quieter, more 
attentive, more respectful of authority. lm 
The first comprehensive theory of domination and its complex social, econo- 
mic and political context was offered by Marxism. It situated the problem prima- 
rily in the class relations of economic exploitation, but did not reach beneath 
the external manifestations of domination, neglecting to ponder the more basic 
issues of power and authority. Even contemporaneously, Marxist postulates 
were criticized by anarchists mainly because of the germ of domination 
retained in the notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat 161, which did 
eventually turn all practical applications into totalitarian rules. Developed 
simultaneously, anarchism has been devoted to more radical insights into 
mechanisms of power and authority, and it has envisioned a society based on 
- 
159 See text between footnotes 25 and 26. 
160 Chorover, 1979: 128- 13 1, emphasis mine 
161 Bakunin. 1973 
individuals empowered with responsibility, and therefore capable of managing 
their lives without oppression by any form of dominant institutions. 
Neo-Marxists, primarily the Frankfurt School, included a comprehensive 
critique of institutionalization and its dominational and oppressive character. It 
was principally Marcuse, Horkheimer and Adomo who extended the Marxist 
concept of alienation into a broader issue of individual freedom in institutiona- 
lized society 162. 
Much earlier, the most prominent theorist of anarchism, Peter Kropotkin, 
formulated a vision of de-alienation in his cooperative concepts 163, and 
primarily in his theory of mutual aid a s  a basic human trait, inherent in the 
biosphere. He derived it from an in-depth biological and anthropological 
analysis based on Darwinism. 
We may safely say that mutual aid is as much a law of animal life as 
mutual struggle, but that, as afactor of evolution, it most probably has afar 
greater importance. 164 
The theory was presented a s  a response to Social Darwinism and it offered a 
comprehensive counter-argument to the assumption of innate human 
competitiveness: 
If the evolution I.. .I were based exclusively, or even chieJy, upon the 
survival of the fittest during periods of calamities. [. . .] retrogression would be 
the rule in the animal world. Those who survive I...] are neither the strongest, 
nor the healthiest, nor the most intelligent. No progress could be based on 
those survivals - fhe less so as all survivors usually come out of the ordeal 
with an impaired health [...I 
Happily enough, competition is not the rule either in animal world or in 
mankind. It is limited among animals to exceptional periods, and natural 
selection finds betterfleds for its activity. Better conditions are created by 
the elimination of competition by means of mutual aid and mutual support. 
In the great struggle for life -for the greatest possiblefullness and intensity of 
life with the least waste of energy - natural selection continually seeks out the 
ways precisely for avoiding competition as much as possible. 165 
The theory of mutual aid, a s  well a s  other anarchist visions have seen little 
practical application because of deeply ingrained authoritarianism in the course 
162 I have referred to their texts in several instances: see particularly in chapter 5, 
quotes related to footnotes 20 and 26, and in this chapter, footnotes 24 and 136. 
163 Kropotkin, 1899 
164 Kropotkin, 1902: 6 
165 Kropotkin, 1902: 73-74, bolded emphasis mine. It is evident how dominational 
relationships waste enormous energy when just the devastations of war through 
history are taken into account - see quotes at footnotes 191 and 192 below. 
of the long history of dominational relationships. However, mutual aid - as 
individual responsibility in systemic interrelatedness - gains enormous 
importance in the context of an  ecological culture. Hence, the related issues 
are discussed by Arne Naess a s  part of his ecosophy: 
The violence found within modem industrial societies is more 
malignant and self-destructive than that found in almost any other 
mammalian society. The methods other mammals use to avoid and reduce 
violence appear to be more eflective and less brutal than our own. I.. .I 
Members of Homo Sapiens are not genetically or in any other way bound to 
torture, torment and exploit one another for all eternity. 166 
Individual responsibility emerges again as the key issue of a transition to 
post-dominational human relationships. The emphasis on individual 
responsibility is also pertinent to antipsychiatry, which applied in theory and 
practice a contextual approach to mental illness 167. Furthermore, it points to 
social roots of psychological disturbances (where it has common outlook with 
humanistic psychology, and particularly with Wilhelm Reich). By considering 
conventional psychiatric practice as a form of domination over (mentally 
disturbed) humans, the antipsychiatric approach 168 points to denial of 
individual responsibility. 
The contextual approach of antipsychiatry also indicates the systemic 
perspective as  the appropriate framework for understanding domination. From 
such a viewpoint, the individual should be regarded as a systemic unit in 
interaction with its social (and natural) environment, but also as  a subsystem 
with its inner interactions (somatic and psychic) 169. Consequently, the 
psychological basis of domination has to be perceived as a complex 
interrelatedness of systems. 
166 Naess, 1989: 170, 169 
167 Laing, l959/ 1974 
168 See Chorover and Szasz, quoted earlier, particularly excerpts at footnotes 33, 34, 
154 and 156. 
169 Bateson, 1980: 147 
Practice of Domination 
The analysis of dualism, as the essential basis for understanding domina- 
tion, has identified two essential routines: inferiorization and exclusion of 
mutuality. Stemming from there are the fundamental elements of domination: 
hierarchy, competition and power. Inferiorizing others is the way of establi- 
shing hierarchy, the relation of superiority and inferiority as the basis of every 
interaction. This process requires competition as a vehicle for defining the su- 
perior, the winner, the higher, the bigger, the wealthier and the more powerful 
- among the parties where mutuality is excluded. In this world of confronta- 
tion, competition, clash, cut-throat combat and conquest, the primary and only 
principle is power. 
In their book American Government: Freedom and Power, Lowi and 
Ginsberg define government as  having 
two basic components: means of coercion and of collecting revenue 170. 
Therefore domination and power (coercion) are basic elements of the present 
form of governance - and have been for a long period of development of human 
society. During this evolution, the notion of power as a social phenomenon has 
existed in two major paradigms. The paramount change occurred when the con- 
cept of power as  a god-given leave to rule others turned into the concept of po- 
wer given by people. This transformation was contemporaneous with and rela- 
ted to the emergence of confidence to interfere with natural processes, former- 
ly the province of god's jurisdictionl71. Both changes enabled the development 
of the scientific, industrial and technological breakthrough of the modem era. 
On the governance side, one could take the work of Niccolo Machiavelli as 
a turning point in this respect - as a very early hint at the paradigm shift from 
170 Lowi and Ginsberg, 1992: 8 
171 See text and quotes between footnotes 83 and 86 above. 
In [Bacon's] New Atlantis, politics was  replaced by scienttfic administration. 
[...I Decisions were made for the good of the whole by the scientists, whose 
judgment was  to be trusted implicitly, for they alone possessed the secrets of 
nature. (Merchant, 1980: 180) 
God-given to people-given power. His most famous work, The Prince 172, has 
provoked a standing controversy about its intended purpose - whether he 
meant it to be a cookbook or a satire (a it was probably both.) But it definitely 
turned attention to the possibility of regarding power as an  abuse. 
Power is understood as  the ability to dominate and to impose one's will and 
interests on those of others. Power is the central issue in politics and policy 
making, which is evident by the recurrent use of the word arena to describe 
the process. Power has been present in politics almost as  if immanent to it. 
Politics has for a long time been the means by which people have wrangled 
power exerted over them by one person or a group. However, the initial 
meaning of politics was local community management. 
The American democratic theory and the practice of separation of the 
legislative and regulative aspects of governance has been developed (and 
became internationally pursued) a s  an  attempt to resolve the problem of power 
imposition and usurpation. But instead of steadfastly addressing deeply rooted 
and ingrained psychological and social aspects of power and domination - the 
authoritarian attitudes and expressions - democratic theory and practice (not 
only in America) has assumed that ruling and administrating are rational 
matters. So administration has turned into bureaucracy, and the unresolved 
issues of power and domination have been just pushed under the carpet of the 
pretence of administrative rationality. 
The democratic process is based upon what a majority is assumed to 
want. However, the proponents of this approach typically fail to acknowledge 
that what a majority upholds does not necessarily represent its genuine needs. 
In authoritarian and domination-based societies, the majority is easily 
manipulated by the few who pursue power and domination goals. Furthermore 
- or because of that - politics has become a negotiation of ideas, issues and 
attitudes, regardless of their value. Such value is determined in the political 
market, where all values become malleable by political advertising and 
172 Machiavelli, 15 l3/ 194 1 
duplicity. In this way, democracy has remained deeply stuck in the domination 
and competition mode despite the good intentions to liberate it. Politics has 
become -just like the economy - a negotiation of competing interests, based 
on confrontation, contest and power in the political arena. 
The competition mode, and its rationalization into negotiation of competing 
interests, is derived from the profit-oriented economy. Indeed, the Weberian 
reform of administration looked up - and still does 173 - to business and 
industrial management as  a model for organizing administration as  an efficient, 
orderly mechanism. Such a management model is based on exact norms, strict 
hierarchies, and division and automatization of tasks 174. Max Weber 
established his theory of bureaucracy on the idea that autocracy as the 
arbitrary rule of a single sovereign should be changed into the rule of the office 
(bureau-cracy) 175. This idea obviously did not touch the issues of domination 
and authoritarianism. Consequently, bureaucracy shifted into a state of 
administrative dysfunction and alienating institutionalization 176. 
Politics and administration are not only organized by models taken from 
economics, they are fundamentally determined by the profit-oriented economy. 
and thus dependent on the prevailing structures of economic power. This 
dependence makes it extremely hard to reconcile the economic demands put 
on politics with social and community needs. That is why policy making and 
regulation, particularly in the social and environmental domains, are perceived 
as  constantly tom between the private and the public sector. The way policy 
making and regulation deals with this conflicting situation, is to treat the two 
sectors as competing interests, fighting for upper hand in the political arena. It 
is not difficult to guess which side wins most of the time: the side which has 
power, and which has therefore imposed this power-based competitive and 
confrontational approach. 
173 Barzelay, 1992, 115 
174 Taylor, 1912 
175 Weber, 1922 
176 See text and quotes between footnotes 48 and 49 in chapter 5, and between 72 and 
74 in chapter 6. 
Political and economic practice merge increasingly into the same type of 
discourse; propaganda and publicity were fused, marketing and 
merchandising both objects and powerful ideas. 177 
The political practice of negotiating the competing interests that are not 
defined by any value judgements is termed pluralism. Thus pluralism connotes 
multiplicity, diversity and fluidity of issues to be negotiated. And they are 
negotiated under pretence that they have equal, unbiased political weight. 
Like economists, pluralists treat individual desires asfiued, and the 
state is but a handy organizing device, a t r a m  cop, helpingfree market to 
function efficiently. [...I This view privatizes all political action, reducing it to 
the uninhibited pursuit of selfish objectives. All motives and goals are 
equally legitimate or illegitimate. The public sector is merely an arena in 
which various interests are forged into winning or loosing coalitions. [...I In 
the pluralistic world it is hard to make sense of the idea of the merits of an 
argument. Exaggerated claims and one-sided advocacy are merely defensible 
tactics. This optimistic irresponsibility presupposes that political and 
economic resources are unlimited. 178 
The pluralistic mode of operation of the current politics creates an over- 
whelming oppressiveness and alienation, a feeling of helplessness against the 
intangible webs of power, no longer traceable to concrete people and groups 179, 
and, most of all, completely detached from the local community. It all irnpres- 
ses and oppresses humans as  a virtual reality of ethical weightlessness and a s  
an environment of undefined and irrelevant responsibilities. 
With the growth in size of social and economic structures, the administra- 
tive structure that used to be appropriate to the management of the local com- 
munity, now expanded beyond this human scale. Consequently, the connection 
with local communities was lost, or - in terms of the systemic perspective - the 
continuum of nested levels of interaction became disrupted 180. Representative 
democracy is no longer supplementary to direct democracy as representatives 
increasingly lose direct contact with their constituency. 
Representative government may be a desirable expedient in a 
government of great sue, but as we have clearly seen it has nothing to do with 
citizen participation, popular decision-making, or democracy. 181 
177 Baudrillard, 1976: 64-65, emphasis mine 
178 Landy, et al., 1990: 12- 13, emphasis mine 
179 Hawley and Wirt, 1974 
180 See paragraph after footnote 33 in chapter 5, and between footnotes 2 and 3 in 
chapter 6. 
181 Sale, 1980: 493 
So, the paradigm change to power given by people (instead of god-given) 
has had the consequence, if not the intended meaning, of the relegation of 
responsibility. Without empowerment for individual responsibility (as a key 
issue of the transition to post-domination and ecological culture), the current 
political sphere is incapable of inducing an ecological consciousness. It only 
deepens the alienating domination. Domination becomes more alienated with 
depersonalization of oppression 182; it becomes a domination mediated through 
administrative, economic and technological institutions. 
As one of the principal manifestations of unsustainable economy, economic 
growth is an expression of competition and power-thirst, a compulsion to 
overrun, exceed and outpace all participants in the economy. The battle and 
race for growth becomes a self-perpetuating rule of the game. It pushes the 
growth of profit-making beyond all limits, and generates social and 
environmental deterioration. 
You can be sure a cornpetitor will put in new machines before you do and 
will ruthlessly eat away at your share of the market. So you have to get ahead 
of him Your p rom must always be at least as large as your competitors' [...I 
More, bigger, faster. 183 
Growth becomes the symbol of power and aggressiveness in the market. 
In order to speed up consumption, advertising impresses upon buyers the ima- 
gery of aggression, violence, war and horror, particularly with products for chil- 
dren, like toys, food packaging, clothing iconography. Growth thus becomes a 
cultural symbol of aggressive power, speed and competition, and it pervades all 
aspects of life by inescapable pressure to rush, grab and get more and morel84. 
There are two important outcomes of the growth-frenzied economy: one 
has to do with the size of businesses and their connectedness to local cornrnu- 
nity; the other has to do with the quality and duration of industrial products. 
182 See text between footnotes 136 and 138, and between 153 and 154. 
183 Gem. 1980: 80-81 
184 One among the overwhelming abundance of examples, is the cover design for 
"Freehand", the designing software, showing a muscular male (built-up by weight- 
lifting machines, presumably), but rather looking like a robot, holding a huge 
"rapidograph" (the pre-CAD professional drafting pen) like a spear, which he is 
just about to hurl and to pierce you (?) with. Why a computer drawing program has 
to be enfolded in such aggressive context is beyond comprehension. 
Power in the modern economy lies increasingly with the great organiza- 
tions and increasingly tess with the supposedly sovereign consumer and 
citizen, 185 
Galbraith perceives the increasing control over human lives by big 
corporations and institutions, but not at all as a negative phenomenon; he is 
actually quite thrilled with it: 
An increasingly large and complex organization [has to] control or seek 
to control the social environment in which itfunctions - or any part which 
impinges upon it. It must plan not only its own operations; it must atso, to the 
extent possible, plan the behavior of people and the state as these a@ct it 
This is a matter not of ambition but of necessity. [...I In the small, 
uncomplicated enterprise authority derives from the ownership of capital - of 
the means of production In the large and highly organizedJirm authority 
passes to organization itself- to the technostructure of the copration [. . .I 
Not surprisingly the growth of t h e m  is a dominant tendency of advanced 
economic development. 186 
The crucial change in connection with the size of business has been identified 
as bifurcation into small and big business. Apart from the great differences in 
operation and management, the essential contrast is in responsibility - social 
and environmental, just as well as commercial. Responsibility becomes more 
easily avoidable with the enormous increase of power of big corporations 187. 
However. Galbraith perceives this as an advantage: 
The market system mani$ests the same desire [. ..I to exercise control over 
its economic environment [...I, is much more visible in its effort and is much 
less successful. The one system dominates its environment; the other remains 
generally subordinate to it. I...] No one will be in doubt as to the source of these 
attitudes. It Lies with the technosbucture and the planning system and with 
their ability to impose their values on the society and the state. 188 
The direction of his analysis indicates that he supports the emergence of a 
totalitarian domination by corporate economic structures. 
Although these corporate giants are ofen close to bankruptcy, they still 
have the political power to persuade government to bail them out with 
taxpayer's money. 189 
This ethical mind frame of profit-oriented economy is consequent to its 
historical origin. Large-scale trade has often been linked with plundering raids 
- - -- 
185 Galbraith, 1973: 385, emphasis mine 
186 ibid.: 389-390, emphasis mine. (This reads like an economic couterpart of 
Machiavelli's Prince.) 
187 See also text and quotes between footnotes 17 and 21 in chapter 6. 
188 Galbraith. op.cit.: 404. emphasis mine 
189 Capra, 1982: 223 
and wars in the early historic periods, and later on, wars have been almost 
invariably connected to economic issues, to colonization and imperialistic 
expansion, and to contests for spheres of interest 190. These facts reinforce the 
link between economic activities and power exertion. 
The New Deal was at best only a partial success. In 1 940 [. . .] the economy 
continued in a depression [...I It was only global war that saved the American 
economy. Within a year afer the United States entered World War 11, 
government expenditures climbed from $1 6.9 billion to more than $51.9 
billion. I...] The war economy continued afer VJ day in the form of a vast 
military industrial complex, a labyrinth of Pentagon-Bnanced endeavors 
that came to dominate the American economy. [...I In the 1980s the United 
States spent more than $2.3 trillion on military security. Nearly $46 out of 
every $100 of new capital went to the military economy. 191 
The U.S. and the former U.S.S.R. spent over $10 trillion on the Cold War, 
enough money to replace the entire infastructure of the world, every school. 
every hospital, every roadway, building and farm. 192 
In the prevailing competition mode, trade and business typically establish 
the relationships of domination by inferiorizing the other side in the transaction 
- either openly or inconspicuously. That is necessary in order to impose the 
terms of transaction. The more formalized the negotiations, the more hidden 
and implicit are the power relations that the transaction is based upon. So the 
"freedom" of entrepreneurship is there only for those who have a power 
position in the transaction. A peculiarity of market economics, stemming from 
its domination basis, is that it limits the perception solely to the powerful 
actors in the market, those who maximize wealth. The other side, those at 
whose expense the wealth is maximized, who are exploited, who lose in the 
transaction - they are excluded from the picture, they are in the blind spot. 
The institutionalization of the market has developed to obscure the 
relationship in which there is also a side that loses, a side that is compelled to 
acquiesce to the terms of transaction. These participants in the transaction 
either have to concede to the price because they need to buy, or have to sell at 
the price because they need money to satisfy some other need. 
190 See text and quotes between footnotes 15 and 17 in chapter 6. 
191 Rifkin, 1995: 31-33 
192 Hawken. 1993: 58 
Those who are trading to meet their basic needs - that is, they trade in 
order not to be worse off - cannot be said to have a trulyfree choice. They are 
compelled to trade by the pressure of their needs even if they do not like the 
terms or conditions of trade. Literally, they must either trade or die. This 
means that their choices in the market are coerced. 193 
The profit making and wealth maximization purpose of economic activities 
is often justified by claiming that private wealth is the condition of public 
welfare, the source of job creation and community development. But the big 
businesses, with their exterritoriality and disconnectednes from community 
and with their absentee shareholding, only drain the wealth and welfare away 
from the community. They deplete the social and natural resources without 
renewal. What is maybe even more important, the uncritical acceptance of this 
altruistic claim reflects the irrational reverence for power and domination. I t  
reinforces the patronizing attitude of the wealthy toward the community and 
toward "everyday" people who are not so successful in maximizing their wealth. 
This patronizing attitude puts wealth into the position of power over individuals 
who are given salaries and work under market conditions where the wealthier 
party always has an advantage over the poorer. 
Work is something you have to go looking for out there, in the world. You 
apply for it and compete for it. Other people haw it to give. They are called 
bosses and they give you work as a rewardfor being the right kind of person. 
I...] People who don't work are either very poor or very rich. Poor people who 
don't work are lazy and contemptible. They are failures and freeloaders. You 
should despise them On the other hand, rich people who don't work are 
"lucky." [...I They deserve not to have to work because they are successfuL 
Smart guys grow up to be like them 194 
This patronization takes away from people the control over their lives. The 
patronizing conditions originate from the times when feudal lords owned local 
communities, and from even earlier stages of the history of domination and 
class rule: 
All this becomes clear in the genealogy of the slave. First, the prisoner of 
war is purely and simply put to death (one does him an honour in this way). 
Then he is 'spared' [epargnej and conserved [conserve] (=servus), under the 
category of spoils of war and a prestige good: he becomes a slave and passes 
into sumptuary domestidy. It is only later that he passes into servite labour. 
193 Lutz and Lux. 1988: 21 1 
194 Roszak, op.cit.: 205-206 
However, he is I.. .] finally relieved of the mortgage of being put to death. Why is 
hefreed? Precisely in order to work. 195 
This remarkable genealogy of labour brings up the issue of give-and-take 
relationship, which I have mentioned in the previous chapter in connection 
with an economy of mutuality and cooperation. Baudrillard does not put his 
observations in that context, but he offers another innovative insight: 
Contrary to aU appearances and experience I...] it is the capitalist who 
gives, who has the initiative of the g~ft, which secures him, as in every social 
order, a preeminence and a power fat beyond the economic. 1% 
A non-dominational (or post-dominational) relationship of giving and taking 
is not based on the dualized notion of either/or, but on a simultaneous 
process, a two-way unity of mutual give-and-take, pertinent to metabolic 
exchange. Such economic relations are possible only as  decentralized, direct 
interactions - and they require a revitalized community 197. 
Adam Smith himself emphasized in his Theory of Moral Sentiments 
that the market is a system so dangerous that it presupposes the moral force of 
shared community values as its necessary restraining context. The market 
does not economize on moral capital, it depletes it. The moral capital must be 
renewed by the community. 198 
The disconnectedness of big business from the community, from locale, 
and from natural processes of renewal creates specific ethical conditions for 
economic processes. As I indicated before, detachment is the essential 
mechanism and prerequisite of domination. Big business is detached from 
social and ecological connection and conscience 199. The market economy 
creates an ethical framework in which the limitations of social and ecological 
reality are removed from the p u ~ e w  of entrepreneurs seeking to increase 
profit. Market is typically perceived as  the means of liberation from limits, a 
liberation which enables unrestrained growth and free entrepreneurship. 
195 Baudrillard, 1976: 39, emphasis mine 
196 ibid.: 40-41, emphasis mine 
197 See text between footnotes 57 and 58 in the previous chapter. 
198 Daly and Cobb, 1989: 140 
199 As organization develops and becomes more elaborate, the greater will be its 
fieedomfiom external interference. (Galbraith, op.cit.: 389-390, emphasis mine) 
See also the issue of absentee ownership discussed in chapter 6, between footnotes 
20 and 22. 
The uniqueness of the market economy lies in its having no natural 
boundaries, no biological or natural constraints. It is a Faustian instrument, 
divorced from nature, with no inherent capacity for recognizing self-limiting 
factors. It is 1.. .I often proclaimed as the ins tnunent for abolishing limits. The 
market offers freedom 200 
However, Bums is mistaken in equating freedom with the ethical mind frame of 
the market economy. It merely provides an absolution from observing the 
limitations of the social and ecological consequences of profit-making. That is 
license, not freedom. But it reinforces the ethical environment of unrestricted 
power as  fearlessness and unscrupulousness to use any means in the fierce 
competition for profits. 
The market is often identified as  an institution which regulates 
negotiations. It introduces money as an  intennediary which becomes a measure 
of conscience in transactions and a screen from direct (emotional) involvement. 
Thus money can buy out ethical scruples and responsibilities. 
ZfI no longer must bribe my neighbor to keep her shade trees pruned low, 
but can instead rely on a zoning rule that protects my interest in solar rays. 
then our behaviors have been shifted from a "market" to a "non-market" 
basis. The neighbor can always offer to pay me not to invoke the new zoning 
rule, in which case a different "market" will emerge under quite different 
institutional arrangements. 201 
In direct, traditional market transactions, in direct interactions, this trading-off 
is all visible and someone might still blush for it. The institutionalization of the 
market economy does away with such direct transactions, puts them on a n  abs- 
tract level, and thus alleviates direct responsibility and scruples. Scruples and 
responsibility, embarrassment and ethical considerations - all that is translated 
into money, into transaction costs and externalities, and, consequently. it all be- 
comes negotiable. The responsibility for social, biological and physical environ- 
ment thus becomes blurred, and practically annulled. Money also screens 
power and domination. I t  conceals that those who have power simply claim the 
right to be arrogant and inequitable in economic and social transactions. 
The bigger the institution, the enterprise, the movement, the greater the 
opportunity for people to mystii one another and themselves. [...I As those 
who mrk  in the system are screened off'om the msu1t.s of their action, their 
200 Bums, 1975: 75 
201 Bromley, 1989: 22 
human sympathy and ethical sensitivity are deadened; their sense of p e r s o ~ l  
responsibility fades into an in$inite regression of delegated authority. 202 
The domination-based (and profit-oriented) economy creates the conditions 
of ethical weightlessness, a virtual reality of fictitious, monetary-defined values. 
It is a world detached from the reality of life and from the natural processes of 
renewal. And it is often mistaken for a world of freedom. Freedom is thus 
identified with irresponsibility; it is equated with the quantity of money 
possessed, and therefore with the ability to act in the market without 
respecting any limits. But freedom is first and foremost responsibility 203. 
The current technology is rife with irresponsibility for the social and 
natural environment. In other words, technology is now determined by the 
patterns of domination, competition and power. This is inevitable and 
understandable if technology is perceived as socially, politically, economically 
and culturally defined 204. 
The technological society is a system of domination which operates 
already in the concept and construction of techniques. 205 
Currently, technology is regarded as "context-free" and, consequently. 
"value-free". This is consistent with the dominant economic paradigm 206, 
which actually presents the context and value-system framework for 
technology, notwithstanding the related perspective that ignores contexts and 
values. This disregard is rationalized as neutrality of technology. However, it is 
only a self-deception. 
Technologies are never neutral. They are forms of life. In this sense they 
are also political insofar as they legislate and govern thefundamental pat- 
terns which much of modem li$e assumes. Indeed, in our ordinary understan- 
ding we make an uncritical distinction between "technology" on the one hand 
and "society" on the other. In some ways that distinction is still useful. But in 
other ways it is not. Is a factory a technological institution or a social one? Is 
- 
202 Roszak. op.cit.: 3 10-3 1 1 .  emphasis mine 
203 Because denial or loss of freedom primarily entails denial or loss of right to be 
responsible. See also quote and text between footnotes 28 and 30 above. 
204 I have discussed this issue in chapter 4, as a connection between cultrural 
definition of human needs and technology - see text after footnote 87. 
205 Marcuse, 1964: xvi 
206 See text before footnote 146 above. 
a mass transit system a social or technological phenomenon in the main? Is 
television a system of apparatus or a mode of social relationships? 207 
Dorninational determination of technology is manifested in various forms 
and aspects. I will differentiate them by the following expressions of 
domination practice: growth obsession; aggressiveness and violence; absence 
of mutuality; monopolization/dornineering the market and institutional 
domination; and alienation engendered by mediated domination. 
Growth obsession entails the pressure for constant increase in turnover. 
Technology is geared to support this requirement by several methods of decrea- 
sing the life-span of products. Maintenance is discouraged by design - in addi- 
tion to dissuasive organization of servicing and higher prices of parts which 
make mending more expensive than buying a new product. This is supplemen- 
ted by shortening the durability of products, so that the consumer is compelled 
to purchase new. Shorter life-span of products is secured by poor quality by 
design. However, deliberate reduction of quality is a limited possibility and a 
double-edged policy in the competitive market. Therefore, built-in obsolescence 
is devised as  a much subtler and more diversified way of inducing the quicker 
turnover of production. It involves manipulation by imposed fashion changes 
and by advertising pressures and enticements, but also by deliberate 
incompatibilities of newer components and products with the existing ones. 
Thefist_fluorescent lights put out in 1938 by Philips (Holland) had a 
lifetime of 10,000 hours. They could "bum" continuously for 14 months. Bad 
business, decided the Philips management, who, before putting the tubes on 
the market, carefully reduced the lifetime to 1000 hours (42 days). [...I Maxi- 
mum pro_fit is not made by economizing the factors ofproduction, but by 
means of waste and deterioration that guarantee an appropriate capital 
turnover. 208 
Such an approach qualifies most of the current technologies as  utterly 
unsustainable, careless about the rate of resources depletion, and mindless 
about the pollution and other environmental impacts. An overwhelming amount 
of waste and pollution is created for the purposes of merely intenslfymg the 
207 Winner, 1979: 373 
208 G o r ~ ,  1980: 82-83 
turnover and alluring consumers to more consumption. One example is packa- 
ging which often has more bulk and toxic chemicals than its contents. 
Silk blouses and ties are impregnated with zinc and tin to give them their 
"hand, " the heavy draping that gives people the impression they are getting a 
more valuable fabric. Shoe leather is tanned with chromium and contains 
toxic dyestugs. Although shoes are technically a toxic waste as presently 
manufactured, there is no reason that they and other apparel could not be 
made so that when they are ultimately discarded, they could break down into 
food for other organisms. 209 
All these technological efforts are demanded and determined by the 
competition- and profit-oriented economy. Such an orientation fundamentally 
changes the definition of technological efficiency, which is now measured by 
the rate of capital turnover. The consequence is the increasing rate of resource 
depletion and of pollution and waste buildup. The efficiency of technology by 
sustainability criteria would be defined by characteristics which are avoided in 
the domination-based technology: quality, maintainability, durability, flexibility, 
appropriateness to needs. The assessment of the rate of resource renewal and 
of the environmental impact would be particularly critical. Such an  assessment 
pertains to the technological sequence analysis, which I presented earlier 210. 
Aggressiveness and violence are primarily manifested in the current 
technologies of energy harnessing and usage. They epitomize an  obsession with 
power and control on one hand, and on the other present a recklessness 
toward humans and nature which most of the time verges on abuse and a 
serious threat of peril. All these aspects are most prominently and horrifiedly 
exemplified in the persistent use of nuclear technologies 211. The pretence of 
justification is provided by conscious or unconscious falsification of data about 
the economic efficiency of nuclear power. These data conceal that nuclear 
technologies are subsidized by the current political and economic system. But 
even without that, their apparent economic efficiency emerges from disregard 
of enormous social, political and environmental costs. 
209 Hawken, op.cit.: 68 
210 after footnote 107 in chapter 4, and at footnote 114 in chapter 6. 
21 1 Caldicott, 1982 
In the 1971 the estimated cost of building a typical nuclear plant was 
$345 million, but in 1980 thehure  had climbed to 3.2 billion. The federal 
government has spent nearly $18 billion in subsidizing the commercial 
development of nuclear power by 1980. 212 
Obsession with power and control in the context of domination results in 
obstinate claims that alternative sources of energy are not viable, although for 
decades their economic and ecological advantages have been proven, and the 
perils of nuclear technologies demonstrated 213. 
Having obtained heavy subsidies for conventional energy technology 
through their political power, the utility companies then I...] declared that 
solar energy was ineflcient because it could not compete with other sources in 
the mj?ee" market. 214 
Geothermal, wind, and solar energy produce limited if any air pollution, 
and could one day provide most if not all of the world's electricity. 215 
The clandestine, unspoken justification for the obsession with nuclear 
power can be found more in its connection to military systems and armament 
industry. But even such a rationalization cannot explain the irrationality of 
insisting upon the use of something that can be lethally dangerous for the next 
hundreds of thousands of years (as the half-lives of radioactive atoms involved 
in nuclear technologies are of that order of magnitude 216). Even if technologies 
for an  absolutely safe storage of nuclear waste were devised (which is not the 
case), and could be devised with a certainty that they would function for 
hundred thousand years - even then it would be a lunacy to rely calmly and 
confidently on them. It would be a lunacy because application and functioning 
of technology is socially and politically determined, and it is impossible to 
guarantee safety from even accidental human mistakes, let alone from planned 
terrorism and other abuse. 
Nuclear energy is costly in both an economic and social sense given the 
danger of accident and sabotage and the need for strict security and perhaps a 
garrison state. 217 
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Technologies effective at removing pollutants are susceptible to 
tampering and failure, which can release enormous quantities of pollutants 
into the biosphere. 218 
Nuclear technology is just the most notorious, and very likely the most 
dangerous of hazardous technologies, the proliferation of which creates 
ternfylng problems of pollution in all the phases of the technological sequence - 
production, use and after use. There is either no possibility at all of recycling, 
or detoxifymg the hazardous waste, or it is  not given attention because of 
prohibiting costs. 
Technologies for safely controlling and disposing of certain highly toxic 
pollutants are simply not available! 219 
These approaches in current technology present the absence of mutuality 
as a key characteristic of domination paradigm. Technology is in senrice of 
competitive interests. Consequently, care for human and natural environment, 
and sense of ecological interrelatedness are neglected, if not altogether 
nonexistent issues. 
Monopolization as a method of dominating the market requires centralized 
and large-scale organization. Monopoly is technologically achieved by avoiding 
standardization and by closed prefabrication. However, the efficiency of 
technology depends too much on standardization, so that it cannot be 
completely avoided. But it could be systematically developed to much broader 
levels of application, had it not been inherently dissuaded by the monopoly- 
oriented economy of competition and domination. 
Closed prefabrication technology is an attempt to enable that as much as 
possible of the technological process is specific to products of one company220. 
Thus the maintenance and repair of these products depend on parts made by 
the same company. This is further enhanced by reducing repair and 
218 Ringquist, 1993: 200 
219 ibid.: 200 
220 as opposed to open prefabrication technology, which is based on components that 
can be used by different manufacturers and for different designs of products. I have 
presented it in more detail in chapter 6. after footnote 122. 
maintenance to replacement of parts. And even that is discouraged by fostering 
the purchase of new products, as I mentioned above. 
Monopolized and centralized technological organization abolishes every 
possibility of involving the consumers (or the users of products) in technological 
processes across the nested levels of interaction and along the stages of 
technological sequence 221. 
A pertinent aspect of alienating technology is what Robert Thayer has 
addressed as transparency issue in the context of a perception of technology 
as an interface between humans and their environment 222. 
Technology has placed so many layers between our perceptions and the 
core realities of landscapes that surface and core no longer relate: what we 
oJten see is the opposite of what we get. Beautrful landscapes may threaten our 
health; apparently "natural" landscapes may be ecologically impoverished. 
The movement toward a sustainable world must include the peeling away of 
intervening images between landscape function and landscape experience [. . . 
making] responsible artrJiactual connections to the ecosystems we touch and 
occupy, and [connecting] these ecosystems directly to our eqerience in a 
transparent, congruent, and las ting manner. 223 
Alienation generated by the present form of technology is its most depres- 
sing effect. It implies a complete lack of control over the ways of satisfymg hu- 
man needs. In the present conditions, humans are not only compelled to acqui- 
esce to hazardous technologies around them, but they are forced to use and 
adopt as indispensable technologies like automobile, airplane, computer, the 
Internet. The adoption of technologies most of the time is not determined by 
real needs, but by competitiveness, growth and power which permeate our 
lives. And the more mass-used such technologies are, the less efficient, cornfor- 
table and useful they become, to the point of dysfunction and oppression. 
Instead of serving as a tool, technology becomes a vehicle of domination over 
humans. 
Technology in general manifests its dominational impact in an indirect way. 
This mediated domination is alienating and, therefore, it increases the extensive 
221 See discussion of this issue after footnote 108 in chapter 6, and also the connection 
between involvement and responsibility - text between footnotes 30 and 31 in this 
chapter . 
222 Hanks and Edwards, 1977: 36 
223 Thayer. op.cit.: 222-223. my emphasis is bolded 
alienation in the present institutionalized society. Furthermore, there are speci- 
fic technologies which engender alienation by themselves - because of their in- 
trinsic properties, or because they are geared to applications with such effects. 
It is not easy to be aware of all these oppressive conditions because 
technology has been increasingly creating a world of virtual reality, where 
artii3ciality and illusion is valued and revered. We live serviced (and dominated) 
by technologies which are less and less intelligible and more and more 
mystified and opaque (non-transparent in Thayer's terms). The sense of the 
natural and the tangible has been lost and forgotten. It is particularly the mass- 
media that create and foster the world of deception and unreality or hyper- 
reality. Technology and media have become the prevalent sphere of cultural 
reproduction and of the promulgation of domination patterns - in addition to 
the patriarchal family, which has thus been relieved of its exclusive role in 
sustaining domination. In this world of illusions and hyper-reality, the 
borderline between technology, economy and ideology becomes blurred, and it 
is hard to pinpoint what generates what. The technologies of mass media and 
the virtual reality they create, pervert art and creativity into commodities and 
businesses. At the same time, the commercialization of all forms of human 
activities and life functions in the profit-oriented economy, perpetuates the 
technology which expresses these social and economic conditions. 
Media are the foremost form of technology that performs this indirect, me- 
diated domination, as well as the function of its cultural reproduction. Baudril- 
lard perceives this social condition as  beyond alienation 224; rather as a consu- 
merist stupor resulting from seduction, which he considers the essential stra- 
tegy in the current cultural mode, and the new way of maintaining domination: 
The masses will be psychologized in order to be seduced: they will be 
rigged up with desires in order to be distracted. Yesterday they had a 
(rnystiJkd!) consciousness and were alienated - today they have an 
m n s c i o u s  and (repressed and wrmpted) desires and are seduced. Yesterday 
they were divertedfrorn the (revolutionary) truth of history - today they are 
divertedfrorn the truth of their own desires. The poor, seduced and 
224 See the quote in footnote 28 in chapter 5. 
manipulated masses! Where once they had to endure domination under the 
threat of violence, now they must accept it by dint of seduction. 225 
The central concept of Baudrillard's work is simulation and hyperreality, or 
simulacra - the essential forms of mediated domination. He contends that reality 
(or rather mediated reality, or hyperreality) is defined by symbols, signs, or 
codes 226. He formed this basic framework of his critique of postmodem cultu- 
re in the early seventies, much before computers emerged as  mass media 227. 
However, he predicted the whole world of computer-generated symbols, codes 
and models as  an  extensive basis of the cultural images that now surround us. 
Reality is increasingly defined by pre-determined patterns, models and 
signs, like graphic design, fashion and pervasively more and more aspects of 
consumer culture. Models and simulations of reality were initiated by film 
industry, but they are now taken over to a much more overwhelming degree by 
computers. The symbolic, virtual reality thus becomes potentially (and 
practically) a powerful medium of indirect (mediated) domination. Of course, 
computer simulations (as well as  ready-made graphic patterns) are enormously 
helpful in design and education - but only as  long as  those who use them keep 
clearly in mind that they are only simulations. This means that they are 
limited and predetermined representations of selected and reduced aspects of 
reality. Predetermination here implies that there is no place for the 
unpredictable evolutionary process of emerging probabilities which is the 
paramount characteristic of natural reality. 
In some biological environments, the variables that are given great 
weight by the designer of a simulation may not in fact be those that link with 
key d~serences in reality. The ways in which variables interact may also be 
art$cially limited by the computer-based environment. A further property of 
simulations is that there is usually a defied conclusion of some sort. 228 
With the overwhelming escalation of use and fascination with the possibili- 
ties of virtual reality, there is a serious danger of forgetting increasingly often 
225 Baudrillard, 1979: 174- 175 
226 See text between footnotes 24 and 25 and quote at footnote 31 in chapter 5. 
227 One of the most essential works is The Symbolic Exchange and Death (Baudrillard, 
1976), but its precursors appeared earlier, like For a Critique of the Political 
Economy of the Sign, in 1972. 
228 Kerr. 1996: 22 
that it is only a simulation, a representation of reality. However "life-like" it can 
get by sophistication of software, simulation will always lack the full experien- 
tial scope of natural sensations. Furthermore, with an increased forgetfulness of 
this kind, there is an even more alarming danger that simulations would take 
over, and that "dolled-up" representations would be taken for more acceptable 
forms of reality 229. 
Information, the central resource of our society, disrupts spatial 
relationships - above all the relationship between space and its dimensions. 
[...I The concepts of large and small, near and far, thereby cease to relate solely 
to measurable quantities. They are now symbolic indicators, cultural 
artefacts organizing a space which is no less real than the physical space. [...I 
Multidimensional experience devoid of B e d  spatial referents creates 
bewilderment and rootlessness. 230 
Mediation (in most contexts) involves detachment. Therefore, mediated 
domination, particularly through technologies of symbolic and virtual reality. 
entails an essential detachment and disconnection, not only from real human 
(and human-ecological) interactions, but also from the social and natural 
context of technology. The essential paradigm of this disconnected/detached 
perception of reality is information. Therefore we live in the information age, 
and we are - in Baudrillard's terms - thoroughly seduced into believing in the 
world of information as  a new dream world of possibilities, a new virtual, 
weightless (and responsibility-free) reality. 
Information, a s  well a s  media, are conceived of as  entities by themselves. 
Information is frequently referred to as  an entirely new ontological category, 
one that is considered to have no physical dimensions or properties, and which 
thus becomes metaphysical. Rupert Sheldrake criticizes this perception and 
offers a concept of information related to his theory of morphic fields 231: 
Duality of matter and nonmaterial organizing principles I...] is inherent 
in all traditional philosophies of form In the modem context, it is usually 
conceived of in terms of the duality of matter and information. Information 
is what informs; it plays an informative role, as Norbert Weiner, the founder 
-- 
229 That is what Aldous Huxley foresaw as 'feelies" in Brave New World (Huxley. 1973). 
However, from the vantage point of the world in which domination sides were still 
more clearly defined (the novel was first published in 1946), this virtual reality 
was envisioned as a 'dazzler" for keeping only the 'proles" in subordination. 
230 Melucci, op.cit.: 17- 18 
231 See between footnotes 59 and 61 in the following chapter. 
of cybernetics, emphasized in his concept of the primacy of informatwn over 
matter and energy. I...] In f a t  ever since the seventeenth century, the survival 
of materialism has depended on its combination with the Platonic notion of 
nonmaterial organizing principles. I.. .] Is the information Platonic, some- 
how transcending time and space? Or is it immanent within organisms? [...] 
Morphicfields play a role comparable to information and programs in 
conventional biological thought, and they can indeed be regarded asfields of 
information, Thinking of information as contained in rnorphic_fields helps 
to demysti& this concept, which otherwise seems to be refemng to something 
that is essentially abstract, mental, or mathematical, or a t  any rate non- 
physical in nature. 232 
McLuhanian theory of media and information is based on this metaphysical 
(and dualistic) concept. They are presented as  isolated entities which have im- 
pact on civilization by themselves. Media and information are therefore percei- 
ved as  non-relational in a systemic sense 233. Although it is seemingly other- 
wise because of the very term media - although media appear to be regarded 
as  relational (this appearance is part of the pervasive culture of simulacra) - 
the concept is essentially based on disregarding relations, context, and even 
content: 
Media content questions alone, while important, do not foster much un- 
derstanding of the underlying changes in social structures that new forms of 
communication may be encouraging or enabling. I.. .] Electronic technologies 
may have many consequences unintended by those who shape media 
messages. 
Marshall McLuhan has been one of a relatively small group of scholars 
I...] who have tried to call attention to the potential injZuences of communica- 
tion technologies in addition to and apartftom the content they convey. 234 
Media and information as  concepts emerge when mediation, interaction 
and interrelatedness are abolished by media themselves - when media 
become content- and context-free (as the current economy is value-free, and 
the current technology context-free). However, Meyrowitz's McLuhanesque 
analysis needs socio-cultural determinants. Media and information cannot have 
any impact without the social, political and economic conditions of human 
relations which are mediated by some technology. It is absurd to perceive this 
(or any) technology as  isolated from these determinants, but such is the context 
of the current context-free paradigm. 
232 Sheldrake, 1988: 88, 1 12- 1 13, emphasis mine 
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In his perception of the current cultural reality as  devoid of interrelated- 
ness and disconnected from "real" reality, Baudrillard falls in the trap of 
adopting such non-relational viewpoint for his own analysis. Therefore he fully 
endorses the MacLuhanian perspective of media 235, and thus supports his 
own view of the current reality a s  characterized by loss of meaning. 
Information carries meaning, and meaning is relational - it emerges in 
human interaction. However, current media technology detaches meaning from 
direct human interactions and thus meaning becomes isolated infonnation. It 
becomes a code - in Baudrillardian broader cultural sense, a s  well a s  in 
technical, software sense. Detachment and disconnection are the essential 
means of domination 236. Thus media and infonnation technology become 
vehicles of mediated domination. 
One aspect of this domination is social stratification and control through 
technically restricted access to meaning - through technology which is now 
needed to decode it: 
Control over production, accumulation, and circulation of information 
depends on code which organize information and make it understandable. 
I...] In its operational logic, information is not a shared resource accessible to 
everybody, but merely an empty sign, the key to which is controlled by few 
people only. Access to meaning becomes thefield of a new kind of power and 
conBict. 237 
The sheer abundance of information is naively equated not only with 
equal access to it but also with the advance of both genuine knowledge and 
genuine democracy. 238 
The fascination with quantitative abundance of information often leads to 
forgetting the integration into coherent, meaningful wholes. The integrative lear- 
ning processes, multidisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity, cannot be determined 
by technology - although there is some potential of computer media to enable 
them. At the same time, the Internet, as  it is structured now, seems to have an 
inherent inclination toward disparate, dissipated information and thus the 
medium can reinforce fragmentation, instead of fostering integrative learning. 
235 Baudrillard. 1976: 56 
236 See text between footnotes 94 and 95, and between 198 and 199 above. 
237 Melucci, op.cit.: 144, emphasis mine 
238 Segal, 1996: 44-45, emphasis mine 
In educational, as well as everyday uses, information technology has been 
promoted into communication technology. What has thus been achieved, is a 
more effective mediated domination because - without direct interaction - 
domination is not tangible, not easily perceptible, and therefore much safer 
from challenges and attempts at overcoming it. 
The essence of communication is human exchange of energy. If a supple- 
mental technical aid (however spectacularly it can enhance the process) is 
turned into a substitute, then not only a technical means is mistaken for a 
human process, but communication is rather thwarted than improved. Compu- 
ter media inherently lack and hinder true interaction - even when it is attemp- 
ted by an artificial "interactive" communication with the machine/software. The 
impersonality of the electronic medium adds to the increasingly alienating pat- 
terns of communication in our "hi-tech" culture. Furthermore, the alienation 
from immediate, natural and tangible reality has been presented as an achieve- 
ment of computer technology: "virtual reality" is accepted as a whole new, fasci- 
nating and even superior realm. Virtuality is taken for an advanced feature. 
It is important to perceive the problem of simulacra and virtual reality in 
the context of control and domination. Then it emerges as a relationship which 
has existed throughout the history of institutionalized religion, which has been 
using simulacra as a vehicle of power. The same pattern was utilized by 
communist totalitarianism, where the communist future became a simulacrum. 
a code. Seen in this light, the alienation and institutionalization of information 
technology becomes a continuum of the domination paradigm. 
I am inclined to believe, however, that these conditions are not 
unchangeable. Technology is socially, politically. economically and culturally 
determined and defined, and a different cultural pattern can bring about a 
transformation of the use and functioning patterns, and the meanings of some, 
if not all of technologies which are now oppressive and alienated. 
An ecological culture would, therefore, entail pertinent technologies - some 
of the existing technologies, modified in the new, different (culturally detenni- 
ned) context, as well as some new approaches. This cultural change would also 
entail different criteria of assessment 239. Post-domination technology would be 
necessarily sustainable and vice versa - sustainable economy, technology and 
social organization should be requisitely non-dominational. 
An example of an emergent sustainable technology is industrial ecology, 
which involves a collaborative, rather than competitive approach. Industrial 
ecology arised out of an acknowledged necessity of interrelatedness of 
technological and economic processes: 
The term ["industrial ecology"] was @st coined by Robert Frosch and 
Nicholas Gallopoulos in 1989 [ . . . I  Recognizing that industrial processes that 
harm and waste are, by definition, less economic and therefore more costly in 
the long run, companies and industries are trying to dovetail their material 
and waste _flows, attempting to eliminate pollution by tailoring 
manufacturing by-products so that they become the raw materials of 
subsequent processes. 240 
In the context of a comprehensive ecological (post-consumerist) culture, this 
excellent practice would gain a much broader interconnectedness not only with 
technological, but also with social and economic aspects of sustainability 241. 
The far largest quantity of energy (or money) is, and has throughout history 
been increasingly wasted on power and domination. A post-domination culture 
might well disengage a vast amount of these resources. 
Lewis Mumford has likened rocket ships to the pyramids of ancient 
Egypt: both are enormously expensive devices built by the sacriies of the 
many for the purpose of carrying an elite few into heaven. 242 
239 See text between footnotes 86 and 87, around 105 and between 107 and 1 10 in 
chapter 4. 
240 Hawken, op.cit.: 62. 
A prototype of industrial ecology and cooperation is in place I . . . ]  in 
Kalundborg, Denmark. [...I a coal-fled power plant, an oil refinery, a 
pharmaceutical company specializing in biotechnology, a sheetrock plant, 
concrete producers, a producer of sulfuric acid, the municipal heating authority, a 
_fish farm, some greenhouses, local farms, and other enterprises work 
cooperatively together. 1.. . I  
This synergy is remarkable because it happened "spontaneously, " without 
governmental regulation or law as the prime motivating factor [ . . . I  
The Environmental Protection Encouragement Agency (EPEA) in Hamburg, 
Germany [promotes the] concept of a completely cyclical economy [which] goes 
further than industrial ecology in that it eliminates waste altogether. [ . . . I  In order 
for a product to qualrji~ as a consumptive product, its waste must be wholly 
biodegradable, capable of transforming itself into food for another organism with 
no toxic residue that would cause harm or be accumulative. (ibid.: 62-68) 
241 See text around footnote 114 in chapter 4, and 117 in chapter 6. 
242 Daly, 1977: 1 12 
Transition and Barriers to Post-domination 
What is particularly fascinating and frighteqing, is that humans still so 
confidently rely on technologies which are based on reductionist, narrow- 
rationalist and mechanical concepts and notions, notwithstanding that these 
notions have for quite some time been thoroughly questioned and challenged. 
Such reliance can be perceived as irrational, and the following quotes illustrate 
some of the many-faceted manifestations of irrational technologies: 
The mutual vulnerability in the US.-Soviet relationship that stems 
from the existence of capabilities for Mutual Assured Destruction - MAD - 
threatens to make the actual execution of nuclear threats quite mad. 243 
The use of psychasur~ery as a means of controlling violence [considers 
that] the proper way to bring such behavior under control is by selectively 
destroying Wjic parts of the brain 24.4 
By granting broad patent protection over genetically engineered lge 
forn-~s, the govenunent is giving its imprimatur to the idea that living creatu- 
nes are reducible to the status of mamfactured inventions, subject to the same 
engineering standards and commercial exploitation as inanimate objects. 245 
The issue is not just the unreliability of current scientific and technological 
approach, as argued by conclusions from the Chaos Theory. What is involved 
is not only the unpredictability at the level of physical processes, but a broader 
social and psychological context of domination-based technology, economy and 
social organization. 
The work of postmodern scientists on unpredictability implies that 
human beings must give up the possibility of totally dominating and con- 
trolling nature. Because ecological and social systems are open, interacting, 
and unpredictable, we must allow for the possibility of surprise. 246 
All this might be more understandable, though not justifiable, if it is per- 
ceived as a result of institutionalization and alienation of technology and the eco- 
-- 
243 Rhodes, 1989: 1. The cold war between these two sides seems over now, but the 
armament goes on, so the basic concept is still around. For "peacetime" version of 
the madness, see text between footnotes 2 1 5 and 2 1 7. 
244 Chorover, 1979: 136- 137, emphasis mine 
245 Rifkin, op.cit.: 119, emphasis mine. Frankenstein comes true1 See also the quote at 
footnote 9. 
246 Merchant, 1994: 19-20, emphasis mine 
nomy - the alienation where individuals feel utterly hopeless and powerless to 
oppose the developments which appear to be unstoppable and self-perpetu- 
ating. The feeling of disempowerment, a s  well as  the process of institutionaliza- 
tion originate from the deep psychological and social roots of domination. 
There is an undeniable cleavage between power and rationality. Chorover 
frames it a s  an interplay of meaning and power 247: 
To promote their own survival, hierarchs reward the conformity of 
thought and action of their subordinates and punish deviance or dissentfrom 
organizationally required beliefs and behavior. Thus, they are inclined to put 
their power behind meanings mainly on the basis of their correspondence to 
organizational interests and not necessarily on the basis of their 
correspondence to facts. I...] Questions about the truth or falsity of ideas are 
different from questions about the relations between the meaning of ideas and 
the power of organizations. 248 
Although it is clear that such an approach to meaning is not rational (unless the 
current economic criterion of rationality is assumed 249), Chorover insists on a 
perspective which does not hide the irresponsibility of antisocial deeds behind 
psychiatric diagnoses 250. This argument is drawn from the antipsychiatric 
perspective 251 which also, and even more importantly, brings to attention the 
irresponsibility of institutions that usurp power over other people on grounds 
of their mental or other inferiority. Chorover consistently applies this approach 
to analyzing different manifestations of institutional domination and violence 
(primarily in the realm of psychiatry), including the Nazi genocide, which he 
demonstrates not as  a deed of lunatics (the popular notion), but a rational 
project initially devised by highest academic and medical institutions: 
Nazi genocide was not an aberrant symptom of national psychosis but a 
wldly calculated exercise in behavior control. I...] Considered in these terms, 
it becomes possible to understand how in_fluential social forces were able to 
use the symbolic power of allegedly objective sociobiological science to foster, 
promote, defend, and justiJy the radical extermination of "biologically 
inferior" elements of thepopulation.252 
Chorover, 1979: xi-xii 
ibid.: 16- 17, emphasis mine 
See quote at footnote 92 above. 
See quote at footnote 34. 
See text between footnotes 167 and 169. 
Chorover, 1979: 9- 10, emphasis mine 
The apparent rationality of institutional structure and particularly the use 
of scientific justifications, does indeed hide the deeply irrational background of 
institutional domination. The brutal means of Nazi genocide (or other atrocities) 
may well have been devised and executed in cold-blood, but the sadistic 
monstrosity certainly (and possibly even more with the associated withdrawal 
of affect) indicates deeply disturbed psyches that were involved in them. 
It is important to point to the difference between the institutional label of 
lunacy - for the purpose of behavior control and institutionalized domination - 
and psychological disturbances which are the background of pervasive social 
disruptions conspicuous both at the individual and the institutional level. I use 
a seemingly contradictory phrase "irrational rationality" to connote the deeper 
irrationality of institutional domination despite its appearance of being 
organized on rational grounds 253. 
The (more or less) rational approach of those who usurp power cannot ex- 
plain the authoritarian structure of people who succumb to it and perpetuate it. 
Today the proletarian is a 'normal' being, the worker has been promised 
the dignity of afull 'human being', and, moreover, in accordance with this 
category, he seizes onto every dominant discrimination: he is racist, sexist 
and repressive. I . . . ]  Thefundamental law of this society is not the law of 
exploitation, but the code of normality. 254 
Baudrillard demonstrates how domination has been internalized in the current 
culture 255. Consumerism as  a pervasive cultural model of the hyperreality of 
symbols - where the principal symbols are power and domination - has bribed 
people to buy into the system of domination, and thus reproduce it willingly 
and at the same time mostly unconsciously. However, authoritarian structures 
have been reproduced in different ways throughout the history of the 
domination paradigm. This cultural reproduction of domination is based on a 
deeper psychological core of authoritarianism. 
253 'Irrationality of rationality" also indicates the reductionist and dualist concept of 
reason which will be addressed as an epistemological issue in the following 
chapter. 
254 Baudrillard. 1976: 28-29, emphasis mine 
255 See also the quote at footnote 43 in chapter 5. 
Directly, through personal coercion, and indirectly, through 
intermittent social shows of force such as public inquisitions and executions, 
behaviors, attitudes, and perceptions that did not conform to dominator 
nonns were systematically discouraged. This fear conditioning became part 
of all aspects of daily lge, penneating child rearing, laws, schools. And 
through these and all the other instruments of socialization, the kind of 
replicative information required to establish and maintain a dominator 
society was distributed throughout the social system 256 
Social pressure has been a crucial means of maintaining domination, but 
there are also deeper psychological roots that make human insensitivity and 
cruelty possible. Wilhelm Reich's comprehensive analysis offers avenues for 
understanding the deeper causes and origins of authoritarianism. His findings 
also identlfy fear as  the essential emotion that maintains authoritarian 
structures - the fear of authority, impressed upon the individual in childhood, 
through the education and socialization processes. Fear is sealed into the 
bodily pattern and psychosomatic reactions as  emotional blockages which 
Reich termed "character armor" 257. It is a cumbersome hamper of an 
individual's inner freedom, but at the same time it is indispensable to prepare 
the individual for survival in the culture thoroughly imbued by domination and 
authoritarian patterns and structures. The deeply ingrained fear thus 
represents the psychological mechanism which fervently defends authoritarian 
structures, power and domination patterns. 
The armored organism perceives the self as consisting of isolated parts. 
Every impulse must penetrate the armor. From this, the feeling of "you 
should" or "you must" arises, as well as the idea that the organism has a 
higher center that gives "orders" to the executive organs. [...I From here to the 
political concept of human society or, conversely, from the concept of the 
absolute state to the mechanistic concept of the organism is only one step. 258 
"Character armor" is also the basis for mystification of power and authority 
- the process of "irrational rationalization" in order to just@ power and to 
endure or maintain it. Of crucial importance here is the two way process: the 
mechanism by which power is defended both by those who exert it, and by 
those who are subjected to it, who are dominated, oppressed, coerced. This 
256 Eisler, op.cit.: 82-83, emphasis mine 
257 See quote at footnote 1 17 above. 
258 Reich, 1949/ 1973: 1 17- 1 18, emphasis mine 
two-way process explains how domination patterns have been maintained and 
reproduced during such a long period of cultural evolution. 
Power, ultimately, is the result of the helplessness of the people. Power 
over men is either grabbed by leaders by force or leaders are pushed into power 
over people by the people themselves. [...I This type ojpower is taken because 
people let it happen, do not object to it, or even admire it. 259 
Reich followed the development of human irrationality from the level of in- 
dividual "character armor", that is perpetuated through education and socializa- 
tion, to the social level, where it sprawls into what he termed "emotional 
plague". It is the psychological essence of human evil, aggressiveness, violence 
and cruelty, as well as  of domination patterns, and it is manifested in both the 
readiness to succumb to power, and the lust to exert it over others: 
We can dejke the emotional plague as human behavior that, on the basis 
of a biopathic character structure, operates in a n  organized or typical way in 
interpersonal, i.e., social, relations and in social institutions [. . . manifested 
as] passive and active thirst for authority; moralism; [. . .] sadistic methods of 
education; masochistic toleration of such methods or criminal rebellion 
against them: gossip and defamation; authoritarian bureaucracy I . . . ]  antiso- 
cial criminality; pornography; racial hatred. [ . . . I  The compass of the emo tio- 
nal plague coincides approximately with the broad compass of social abuse.260 
The connection between irrationality, domination and sexuality 261 is 
manifested in authoritarian mentality and in the support of oppression by the 
oppressed: 
John Doe, a mental patient a t  Michigan's Ionia State Hospital [. . . I  was 
invited to participate in an experimentfunded by the state whose goal was to 
compare the "violence control" efects of limbic system psychosurgery and  the 
drug cyproterone acetate, a n  antiandrogen supposed to produce a "chemical 
castration" characterized by impotence, lass of sex drive, and docility. Ram 
information provided by the director, I . . . ]  Doe consented to participate in the 
psychosurgery treatment group; his parents also consented. 262 
This connection reiterates the relationship between domination over nature and 
over humansas a repression and oppression of nature within and without 
ourselves 263: 
259 Reich, 195 1/ 1980: 64, emphasis mine 
260 Reich, l933/ 1980: 508, emphasis mine 
261 which I pointed out between footnotes 1 13 and 1 17 above 
262 Chorover, 1979: 198- 199, emphasis mine 
263 See text between footnotes 100 and 10 1 above. 
The domination of internal nature makes possible the domination of 
external nature, which in turn leads to the domination of human beings. 264 
Authoritarian attitudes toward domination and power present a specific ter- 
minological issue. In physics power is defined a s  ability to do work, or energy 
The departure from this neutral meaning is manifested in the connotational 
shift from power a s  means to power as  goal in itself. A non-dominational 
meaning of power would be related to empowerment for responsibility, which is 
the key issue of transition to a post-domination (and ecological) culture. 
In contrast to the still prevailing view of power as [...I the power to take 
away or to dominate - a very d~fferent view of power seems to have been the 
norm in Neolithic I.. .I societies [...I a power that was more equated with 
responsibility and bue than with oppression, privilege, and fear. I..  .This] 
view of power [...I -for which I propose the term actualization power as 
distinguished from domination power - obviously reflects a very d~zerent 
type of social organizationfrom the one we are accustomed to. 265 
Joanna Macy refers to such a new definition as  power with instead of power 
over 266. 
The deep psychological basis of the barriers to post-domination surface as 
fear of freedom and disempowerment for responsibility. Loss of responsibility 
is a crucial aspect of alienation: 
Alienation is not I...] an estrangement merely from the means and fruits 
of production. It is also estrangement from the activity itself which allows us 
to deny our responsibility for what we do. 267 
I have already argued that freedom can be identified with responsibility - 
as  freedom from any external authority to which we relegate the responsibility 
to determine the conditions of our lives. That does not mean freedom from the 
responsibility for the external conditions of our lives. These two situations are 
often confused. The confusion emerges because authoritarianism is deeply in- 
grained. It is deeply implanted by fear, as  described above. Fear is reproduced 
a s  fear of freedom - or fear of responsibility, fear of becoming liberated from 
the false security that the reliance on external authority seems to provide. 
264 Merchant, 1994: 5 
265 Eisler. op.cit.: 28, emphasis mine 
266 Macy, 1995: 256-257. The same wording is used by Mathew Fox - see footnote 103 
above. 
267 Roszak. op.cit.: 2 14-2 16 
Fear and its deeper psychosomatic basis of "character armor" are essential 
causes of disempowerment for responsibility and freedom. They produce a 
numbness for freedom, a detachment which is a consequence of disconnection 
between the biological core, the natural impulses of the "armored" individual, 
and his or her affective expressions 268. De-alienation and empowerment would 
thus involve a liberation from authoritarian structures, as  well as  an 
overconling of disconnectedness and detachment, which are essential 
mechanisms and prerequisites of domination. 
The attempt to create afree society of autonomous individuals via the 
domination of outer nature was self-vitiating because this very process also 
distorted the subjective conditions necessary for the realization of that 
freedom [...I What was needed [...I was a new harmonization of o w  rational 
faculties and our sensuous nature. 269 
The emancipation into individuality and into an individual's responsibility 
for her or his environment is based on this psychological framework. When the 
domination patterns and authoritarian structures are deconstructed, what en- 
sues is an individual responsibility no longer derived from reliance on outside 
authorities, on prescribed compulsive morality. This post-dominational indivi- 
dual responsibility is based on sensitivity, an  inner sense of regard for the in- 
dividual's own self and for the immediate and wider social, biological and physi- 
cal environment - a senuous faculty which is numbed by fear and detachment. 
To bring nature into existence and to encounter it with respect would 
mean today that ourfild of experience be expanded to include awareness of 
our biological rhythms and thefundamental cycles within and without us. 
These rhythms, however, wiU not operate as the 'pure', natural forces they 
once were; they may still turn against us if ignored or violated, but they will 
become part of our everyday experience of time to the extent that we are able to 
consciously accept their presence. 270 
This inner sense consists of rational, but also emotional, intuitive and spiri- 
tual components. It  also presents the connection between sustainability and spi- 
rituality, or an inner ecology of the individual. Addressing the deeper aspects 
of eco-systemic connectedness involves insights into issues of spirituality. 
268 See quote at footnote 117 and the first sentence of the quote at footnote 258. 
269 Eckersley, op.cit.: 70-7 1, emphasis mine 
270 Melucci, op.cit.: 22, emphasis mine 
Chapter 
Ecological Culture and Spirituality 
I stand for the touch of bodily awareness between 
human beings and the touch of tenderness. I. .  .I And 
it is a battle against the money, and the machine 
and the insentient ideal monkeyishness of the 
world. 1 
Terminological and Connotational Issues 
I have again chosen to use a currently very popular word, in order to 
denote - in this case - a range of notions and concepts which span a wider 
connotational scope than what is commonly meant by spirituality. The notions 
now associated with spirituality are even more unclear and also much more 
controversial than is the case with the term sustainability. 
I am going to discuss only those aspects of spirituality which I consider re- 
lated to the conceptual framework of ecological culture. Therefore, as an inqui- 
ry into spirituality, this essay is unquestionably limited 2 .  Furthermore, some of 
the issues that I find pertinent to spirituality will certainly be considered deba- 
table and even objectionable by a more orthodox approach to the field. 
The controversy about spirituality arises primarily because the recent, 
enormous interest in it has been mostly expressed as a return to pre-rationalist 
views and concepts, which have for several centuries been considered unscien- 
1 Lawrence, 1928/ 1977: 292 
2 See also the last paragraph of chapter 1. 
tific and superseded by modem rationalist, objectivist and materialist science. 
The revival of interest in spirituality has indeed been manifested primarily and 
initially in non-scientific spheres. It is only most recently that spiritual topics 
have slowly begun to enter the scientific domain. But these attempts have been 
confronted with much caution and even animosity from the scientific cornrnuni- 
ty, because it is still largely steeped in the paradigm which deems spiritual 
issues unscientific and a province of other, primarily religious domains. 
In addition to these more recent contributions to the topic, throughout the 
reign of the rationalist and materialist/mechanistic paradigm, there have been 
thinkers and scientists who addressed spiritual issues 3, and who were 
preoccupied by problems which could not fit into the context of the prevailing 
paradigm. These more encompassing views have been upstaged and mostly 
forgotten by mainstream. However, these views, particularly the more recent 
ones, have mostly been addressed by rigorous scientific methodology. 
Nevertheless, they have been ignored or rejected, often exactly on methodologi- 
cal grounds - because the conclusions did not fit the current paradigm. Thus 
methodology has often been used a s  an  excuse for conservatism, or has been 
confused with the conceptual framework 4. 
The recent revival of spirituality has its most wide-spread manifestation in 
the "new age" movement. It has addressed spiritual issues in popular ways, as  
well as  in approaches which have scientific ambitions. The borderline between 
these forms often is not sharp because of the innovative character of their 
expressions which challenge the current paradigm. 
It can be expected, particularly in the case of scientific endeavors, that the 
renewed consideration of spiritual issues will be approached from a new 
perspective, from a different context defined by the new developmental stage 
in cultural evolution. Such an approach has to include the cultural experience 
3 i.e. Kepler, Newton, Leibniz, Schrtidinger - to name randomly just a few among the 
well- known. 
For Leibniz. 'yorce" was the foundation for an understanding of both the 
phenomenal and spiritual universes. (Merchant, 1980: 279) 
4 See quote at footnote 62 in chapter 2. 
which has been built-in in the meanwhile. This means that the heritage of the 
rationalistic paradigm and all its ramifications have to be critically included, 
and the new conceptual framework has to be established as post-rationalist. 
However, many of the "new age" preoccupations with spirituality return to pre- 
rationalist positions. Such approaches are often justified by proclaiming that all 
knowledge within the rationalist, mechanistic and materialist paradigm is a 
mistake and a developmental blind alley. 
For mos t of the recent modem era 1.. .I the reductionist stance toward spi- 
rituality has prevailed - all spiritual experiences, no matter how highly deve- 
loped they might in fact be, were simply interpreted as regressions to primiti- 
ve and infantile modes of thought. However, as if in overreaction to all that, 
we are now, and have been since the sixties, in the throes of various forms of 
elevationism (exernpl~fied by, but by no means con$ned to, the New Age move- 
ment). [. . .] Anything rational is wrong; anything nonrational is spiritual. [. . .] 
While we eventually want to move beyond rationality (and its own inhe- 
rent limitations and grave problems), it is crucial to acknowledge what it did 
manage to accomplish, and what its evolutionarily phase specific task was. 5 
This condemnation of anythmg rational as  "non-spiritual" is often rendered 
with more mystification so it does not appear as  simple a s  Wilber presents it. It 
is a peculiar manifestation of uncritical reversal of a dualistic pair 6 - one that 
has been newly established. Namely, spirituality was not traditionally counter- 
posed to rationality; on the contrary, they were initially construed at the same 
side of the duality between reason and nature, or spirituality and nature. The 
recent revival of spirituality emerges as  an opposition to the dominant status of 
rationality, and - following the habituated dualistic approach - it perceives spiri- 
tuality as inferiorized by the dominant paradigm, and, therefore, recourses to 
dualistic reversal as  a known strategy. Thus, spirituality is now treated as  a 
dualized pair with rationality 7, and the whole rationalist heritage is uncritically 
discarded. 
The consequence of this reversal is a return to mystification, which is con- 
fused with experiences that are described a s  mystical. The majority of "new 
age" preoccupations thus renounce all the present achievements in and further 
5 Wilber, 1995: 206-207,375 
6 See text between footnotes 123 and 126 in the previous chapter. 
7 This issue will be discussed again later on - see between footnotes 55 and 58, and 
after 94 below. 
possibilities of addressing and resolving the domination and authoritarian 
issues. Actually, authoritarian patterns are largely preserved in most manifesta- 
tions of the "new age" movement. "New age" is a very diverse mixture of all 
sorts of mystical pursuits, joining aspects of some new liberative developments 
with old mystical traditions, particularly Eastern and Native American. These 
interests are basically a somewhat groping quest for a new understanding of 
essential problems of our being. But, as  it usually happens with mass- 
movements, the majority of "new-agers" is fascinated with the mystical aspects 
and perceives them as  a goal in itself, rather than a vehicle to understanding 
more about humans and the context of their being. Consequently, most of the 
"new age" preoccupations establish authoritarian patterns by perceiving 
external spiritual entities as decisive determinants of human life. This is 
not only a dualist concept of spirituality, it also defies the possibility of de- 
alienation from the constraints of domination patterns, which I elaborated in 
the previous chapter - a de-alienation which would be based on responsibility 
as  an inner spiritual and rational sense. 
There are many strands within the [New Age] movement, but broadly 
speaking it offers a view of the world apparently less rigid than either religion 
or science: a view where the role of spirit is recognized without the dogmatic 
framework of traditional religions, [...I It might seem that this movement 
could offer us new guidelinesfor lwing that can bridge the great divides 
patriarchy and capitalism have created. But can it? [...I The recognition that 
each person has enormous Latent power is sometimes used to ingate the same 
selfish ambitions that capitalism has always encouraged into an ego-oriented 
vision of 'unlimited potential'. 8 
This misunderstanding of spirituality by some "new age" concepts and prac- 
tices does not entail that spirituality should be rejected altogether. Some criti- 
ques, however, fall into that trap and "throw away the child together with the dir- 
ty water". Bookchin is often undiscriminatingly adverse to most of the "spiritual" 
or "new age" attitudes, which reflects his generally justified concern that they 
are a mystification of nature, a step backward to religious authoritarianism. 
One wonders how notions of spirituality can be given priority over the 
need for a critical evaluation of social structures. [. . . ] Taoist and Buddhist 
- 
8 Goodison, 19922W241. This perspective is, of course, consequent to the current 
consumerist and economist paradigm of limitlessness -see around footnote 199 in 
the previous chapter. 
pieties replace the need for social and economic analysis, and self-indulgent 
encounter groups replace the need for political organization and action. [. . .] 
Social ecology I...] does not fall back on incantations, sutras I.. .] or spiritual 
vagaries. It is avowedly rational. 9 
Social context is typically absent from "new age" spirituality, and that is 
another manifestation of its regressive stance: 
What some in the new movement ignore is the fact that physical and 
spiritual health cannot be bought but must be lived, and are inseparable from 
the social conditions which are the context for that living. [...I The 'new age' 
spirituality is in many cases merely dispensing traditional religious values in 
'new age' bottles more appropriate to the conditions of twentieth century 
laissez-faire capitalism. 10 
All these problems indicate how important it is to deconstruct domination 
before embarking upon a spirituality quest. 
Another salient aspect of "new age" spirituality is its significance as a 
reaction to "postmodern" loss of meaning 11, and a potential for a new 
integration (despite the majority that regresses into mystifications). 
The postmodern collapse of meaning has been countered by an emerging 
awareness of the individual's self-responsibility and capacity for creative 
innovation and self transformation in his or her existential and spiritual 
response to l$e. 12 
The discussion of the domination and alienation patterns in the previous 
chapter follows to some extent the postmodern deconstructivist strategy. 
primarily of Jean Baudrillard. However, like most postmodernist writers, he 
often appears as  if he actually accepts the social conditions which he 
poignantly criticizes. 
Postmodernists emphasize thefiagmentaty cutd discontinuous nature of 
reality. Denying the accessibility of any objective truth, postmodernists have 
come to reject any sense of the individual subject as the locus of "truth," 
relying instead on a decentered concept of the individual as the intersection of 
power-desire relations. 1 3 
Postmodernism depicts reality as  disconnected and dissipated, and such a 
perception is to some extent determined by the postmodernist method of 
deconstruction. Notwithstanding the sagacious insights into patterns of 
9 Bookchin, 1988: 23 1-236 
10 Goodison. op.cit.: 244-245. emphasis mine 
1 1  See Baudrillard's quotes at footnotes 32, 3 1 and 28, in chapter 5. 
12 Tarnas, 1991:404 
13 Gold. 1993: xv, emphasis mine 
alienation, deconstruction typically leaves a rather pessimistic aftertaste. There 
emerges a sort of a vicious circle: the reality is characterized by loss of 
meaning, absence of dialectic and real conflict, and by pervasive impact of 
deceptive simulations - and in such a reality, every attempt at suggesting a 
different way is also deemed meaningless and doomed to be perceived as 
anything but another simulacrum. By denying any purposefulness, this 
inherent cynicism hinders the possibility of de-alienating visions and creates a 
hopeless impasse 14. Does this attitude have to remain an eternal reality, or is 
it just a phase, a reaction to the current stage of cultural development? 
I f  the postmodem mind has sometimes been prone to a dogmatic relati- 
vism and a compulsively Jiagmenting skepticism, and if the cultural ethos 
that has accompanied it has sometimes deteriorated into cynical detachment 
and spiritless pastiche, it is evident that the most sign~jkant characteristics 
of the larger postmodem intellectual situation - its pluralism, complexity, 
and ambiguity - are precisely the characteristics necessary for the potential 
emergence of a fundamentally new form of intellectual vision, one that might 
both preserve and transcend the current state of extraordinary 
differentiation. 15 
Deconstruction makes more (if not the only) sense when it opens possibili- 
ties for reconstruction, toward a new integration. After the deconstruction of 
domination patterns, authoritarianism and dualism, we are left with a shattered 
foundation of our present culture. So we need reconstruction, coming up with 
a new foundation - for an emerging ecological culture 16. The processes of 
deconstruction and reconstruction have to be taken as consecutive. 
Two antithetical impulses can be discerned in the contemporary 
intellectual situation, one pressing for a radical deconstruction and 
unmasking - of knowledge, beliefs, world views - and the other for a radical 
integration and reconciliation. In obvious ways the two impulses work 
against each other, yet more subtly they can also be seen as working together 
as polarized, but compkmentaty tendencies. 17 
14 There is no utopianism, no consolation, no telos to history, society, human lge. 
I.. ] The movement is beyond optimism and pessimism, ideology and utopia. 
(Hollinger, 1993: 169- 170, emphasis mine) See also quote at footnote 2 1 1 .  
15 Tarnas, op.cit.: 402 
16 See also the quote at footnote 10 in chapter 6. 
17 Tarnas, op.cit.: 407, emphasis mine 
The reconstruction emerging out of deconstructed domination paradigm 
offers a possibility of a new integration in the revisited sphere of spirituality 18. 
This reconsidered spirituality can be denoted as  integrative spirituality, and the 
two principal aspects of integration are immanence (re-connection of spirituality 
and nature), and integrative epistemology (inclusion of other-than-rational 
modes of [comlprehension 19 and communication 20). These two aspects will be 
discussed under the next two subtitles, respectively 
The essential characteristic of this integration is re-connection - surpas- 
sing the disconnectedness and detachment (from nature within and without, 
and consequently from direct interaction with social and natural environment), 
which are the crucial manifestations of alienation in the current culture, and of 
the domination paradigm that pervades it. The vehicle of connectivity in this re- 
connection is integrative spirituality. It is connoted as  an intrinsic, individual 
spirituality which enables the connections with spheres of non-rational (or not- 
only-rational) consciousness. In some of the renewed approaches to spirituality, 
these connections are conceived of as  mediated by subtle life energies which 
permeate us. 
The factor so oJen r e e d  as 'spirituality' can be understood as a quality 
o f f i e  energy present in all lge's activities. I...] We all have the ability to act 
intuitively, to be in tune with the essence of our own energy and the energy of 
others, to heal ourselves and others through acting in harmony with forces 
present in the universe. 21 
Moreover, intrinsic spirituality (Goodison refers to it as immanent spirituali- 
ty) consists of this very connection and connectedness, the subtle energy. It 
makes non-verbal and non-material links to other humans and to the environ- 
18 The modern search for a lost ancient spirituality can be seen in a new I...] light I...] 
the search for the kind of spirituality characteristic of a partnership rather than a 
dominator society. I...] Increasingly, the work of modern ecologists indicates that 
this earlier quality of mind, in our time ofen associated with some types of 
Eastern spirituality, was far advanced beyond today's environmentally 
destructive ideology. (Eisler, 1987: 75) 
19 Prehension is defined in Oxford Dictionary as "apprehension of something 
perceived that may or may not involve cognition; the interaction that exists 
between a subject and an entity or event". This meaning of the term is associated 
with A. N. Whitehead. 
20 Communication in this context is conceived of as a two-way epistemological mode 
- see text between footnotes 1 16 and 1 17 below. 
21 Goodison, op.cit.: 255-256, 284). See also quote at footnote 99 in chapter 4. 
ment - social, biological and physical. Therefore, intrinsic, inner, or immanent 
spirituality creates a sense of belonging, an ecospheric, or cosmic belonging 22. 
Immanence means the re-connection of this sense to the body. It is a 
sensitivity that we can feel in our bodies as connectivity and interrelatedness to 
our natural and social environment. Thus, eco-systemic inter-connectedness is 
not just an abstract notion, but it emerges as a tangible, "sensible" faculty. It is 
the sensitivity for subtle life energies, for nature within and without - as both 
the inner and the outer nature (the organism and the eco-system, as well as 
the entire cosmos) function on the same energy-based principle. This sensitivity 
can be experienced (under favorable circumstances) as streaming and vibrations 
of natural processes, of energies within and around us. Sensitivity thus 
enables us to feel our metabolic interaction with our environment. I have 
described energy exchange as the essential characteristic and criterion of 
sustainability. Inner sensitivity is what links our own life processes to the life 
processes around us. It lets us feel that we are part of the natural processes 
of renewal and energy exchange. It is a spiritual basis of sustainability. 
In this way, sensitivity is perceived as an ability and alertness, and can be 
considered as a manifestation of liveliness, vigor and health. Alternative health 
concepts and healing practices are based on the conception of the organism as 
a self-regulatory life process which has inherent tendency to heal itself. To heal 
means to make whole, to return to the state of integrity. In that sense, health 
is not primarily the treating of illness, but the sense of wellness, of wholeness. 
So sensitivity is the awareness, the feeling of the self-regulatory life processes, 
the energy exchange, the pulsation and streaming of life energy. Sensitivity is 
based on the flow of life energy itself - the energy that permeates us, that is 
within and without. So health is a sense of undisturbed flow of life processes, 
of life energy. It is the sensitivity for self-regulating, sustainable processes of 
natural renewal in ourselves and around us. In that way, inherent sensitivity is 
22 See quote at footnote 5 1 in chapter 1. 
the tangible basis for our relation to nature, to the ecospheric processes and 
intercomectedness, to the social, biological and physical environment. 
A whole new field has emerged under the name of ecopsychology. It is an 
extension, or a developmental transformation of psychology, or its broadening 
into the field of human ecology. 
There is only one core issuefor all psychology. Where is the 'me"? Where 
does the 'me" begin? Where does the 'me" stop? Where does the bther" begin? 
[...I The human subject has all along been implicated in the wider world of 
nature. How could it be otherwise, since the human subject is composed of the 
same nature as the world? Yet psychological practice tends to bypass the 
consequences of such facts. I.. .I An individual's harmony with his or her b w n  
deep self' requires not merely a jounzey to the interior but a harmonizing 
with the environmental world. 23 
Ecopsychology questions the current psychological paradigm which is 
established upon a rigid boundary between the self and the social environment 
(natural environment has hardly come within the purview of psychology). Such 
a concept of boundary perpetuates the mind set of disconnectedness. 
Conventional developmental theories have lent support to the illusion 
that we live wholly within this slender envelope o f f i s h  that encloses the soft. 
vulnerable organs - that we are irrevocably cut offfiom everyone and 
everything else. 24 
Ecopsychology puts the inquiry about human psyche into (eco-)systemic 
context, where the issue of boundaries emerges in an  entirely different 
framework: they become the interface, the medium of connectivity between the 
self and the environment, both social and natural. This marks the transition 
from separated self to self-in-relation. 
Such a sensitivity or spirituality is the basis for individual responsibility, 
liberated from domination patterns - a responsibility which is no longer a 
matter of reliance on external authority and imposed morality of prescribed 
rights and duties. Responsibility becomes an individual's inner ethic, an inner 
sense for the individual-in-her/his-environment. The sensitivity for self- 
regulatory life processes becomes a self-regulated ethic: 
23 Hillman, 1995: xvii-xix 
24 Barrows, 1995: 109 
The term "sensibility" is chosen to suggest a complex pattern of 
perceptions, attitudes, and judgements which, $fully developed, would 
constitute a disposition to appropriate conduct. 25 
Inherent spirituality and sensitivity as the basis for an ecological responsi- 
bility present one of the central issues of the concept of ecological culture. 
In the process of the alienating, domination-pervaded cultural develop- 
ment, humans have become numbed for this sensitivity, for an awareness 
about the streaming and vibrations of natural processes which permeate them. 
Consequently, they have undergone a process of alienation from natural, innate 
frankness and openness to sensuality and sexuality 26. 
Our inability to stop our suicidal and ecocidal I...] behavior that conti- 
nues in spite of the individual knowing that it is destructive to self, family, 
work, and social relationships [. .. indicates that] we as a species are suflering 
from a kind of collective amnesia. We have forgotten something our ancestors 
once knew and practiced - certain attitudes and kinds of perception, an abili- 
ty to empathize and identih with nonhuman l$e [ . . . I  We notice the emergence 
of an amnesia that is really a double forgetting, wherein a culture forgets, and 
then forgets that it has forgotten how to live in harmony with the planet. [ . . . I  
The amnesia metaphor is more hopeful than some of the other models, 
since it is easier to remember something that we once knew than it is to 
develop an entirely new adaptation. 27 
Yet, the sensitivity is not all lost, some of it is still there, some of it we still use 
without being aware of it - because we have not relied on it for so long in the 
culture which conditions us  to rely on external authorities and on rational 
mechanisms. 
Another way of describing the loss of sensitivity is desensitization, which is 
the result of overexposure to stimuli that are mostly simulations of reality 28. 
Thus, numbness appears as a more appropriate definition than amnesia which 
is rather a metaphor (as Metzner himself puts it), than an accurate depiction of 
the actual condition 29. 
This numbness is at  the same time a manifestation and the consequence of 
detachment and disconnection which are essential characteristics of the cur- 
rent culture of alienation and domination. An immanent spirituality, with re-con- 
25 Rodman, 1983: 90, 88. See also quote at footnote 72 in the previous chapter. 
26 See also quote at footnote 117 in the previous chapter. 
27 Metmer, 1995: 60-62 
28 See quote in footnote 33 in chapter 5. 
29 This issue will be discussed in more detail later on. 
nection to bodily sensitivity, would imply a non-dualized concept of spirituality 
- a deconstruction and surpassing of the dualism of spirituality and nature. 
Spirituality and Nature 
NOW, as the gods have indisputably and$nally lefl 
the stage and history no longer can promise any 
insured outcome as its conclusion, we are prepared 
to comprehend the nature that is ourselves. The 
renewed interest in the body expresses this new 
awareness of our belongingness to nature and of 
the fact that it is in nature that our roots and 
dignity lie. 30 
Spirituality has been initially dualized from the bodily, from the sensual 
and the natural, and in that polarization identified with reason. The current 
paradigm still essentially accepts and endorses the basic dualistic split of 
body/soul. Platonism was established as  a conceptual system based on these 
dualistic notions. 
One basic symbol, which can be traced back to Plato and the Greek tradi- 
tion, represents the body as a dark container imprisoning the divine light of 
the soul. I...] In Christian language sins are 'of thefish'. The body torments 
the soul with sexual desires whosefilfillment is forbidden. Its separate parts. 
when they are not evil, are sinister, frightening or disgusting. 31 
The basic dualistic pairs of body/soul and nature/spirit were developed in 
Platonism to their ultimate consequences - dualized cleavages between spirit, 
reason, masculinity, power and intelligence on one side, and nature, body, 
intuition, emotionality and femininity on the other. In the context of this essay. 
the detachment of spirituality from nature is the most significant of these 
developments. Spirituality has been posited a s  a sphere of the mind, of supre- 
me rationality, superior and dominant over nature within and without humans. 
Plato separates world-body and world-soul and insists on the world- 
soul's priority [...] 'the domination and controlling partner'. I...] The Timaeus 
explains the principle and process involved in the imposition of form on 
indeterminate and formless matter as the imposition of rational order (Zogos) 
on the female 'receptacle'. I...] The feminine is explicitly and repeatedly 
associated in Plato with the lower order of nature as opposed to reason, 
30 Melucci, 1996: 71 
31 Goodison, opxit.: 143- 144 
associated with formless, undisciplined matter or primeval chaos; with 
disorder and ungoverned emotion. 32 
The dualism of body and soul has been particularly implicative. It has en- 
tailed and further fortified a whole range of dualistic constructs: spirit a s  pure 
and divine - nature and body as  impure, dirty and despicable; the realm of 
spirit as  superior because it is eternal - the sphere of life and nature as  infe- 
rior because it is ephemeral; the realm of spirit a s  salvation - the sphere of life 
as  suffering, and body as  prison of the soul. These basic dualist notions have 
undergone some transformations in the course of cultural development through 
the Enlightenment and Modernity, but the fundamental dualistic mind frame 
has persevered a s  the cultural pattern based on domination, on unsustainable 
economy and on disconnectedness from the natural processes of renewal. 
Particularly severe implications have, throughout the development of 
western civilization, resulted from debasement and depreciation of everything 
bodily, sensual and sexual - and consequently of everyday life processes. 
The culture that we comefrom was suspicious of anything that had to do 
with the level of instincts, urges, or deep-seated needs. In its religious version 
of spirit possession and of sin, or in its secular-puritan version of bourgeois 
morality, the principle persisted that the impulses of the body were 
fundamentally evil in their origin and intuence, and thus to be considered 
injurious to proper conduct of life if not adequately contained. 33 
Debasement of everything related to body and nature has entailed the dualized 
constructs of irnpure/pure and obscene/divine, which have established a 
notion of spirituality as entirely devoid of any tangible and "sensible" reality - 
the basic dualism of sensitivity-sensuality versus spirituality. 
One of the most damaging myths we have inherited is that 'spirit' is pure 
while 'matter' is impure [...I The subordination of women and the denial of the 
body in early Greek patriarchy were paralleled by a growing emphasis on 
abstract, sky-dwelling divinities. The philosophy of Plato crystallises the 
elevation of the pure 'Idea' over the world of matter. As man became more 
alienatedfrom his own nature, so he became more alienatedfrom the world of 
nature in general. [...I The dualistic traditions of Platonism prevailed, via 
Neoplatonism and Christianity, to institutionalise a contict between the 
reasonable and the sensual. 34 
32 Plumwood, op.cit.: 84. 77 
33 Melucci, op.cit.: 7 1-72. See also quote and text around footnote 102 in the previous 
chapter. 
34 Goodison, op.cit.: 87-88 
These attitudes have had the meaning of detachment and disconnection 
from life and natural processes, and they have also been inducive and 
conducive to the numbing of sensitivity for life strearnings and for nature 
within and without. Moreover, they have engendered the further dualized pairs 
of lewd/elevated, or simply low/high and down/up, which, however, do not 
denote the simple spatial relationships, but are assigned a moral value. They 
are connoted hierarchically, thus establishing the inferiorization essential to the 
basic dualism of spirituality versus nature, and all its derived polarities. 
The dualistic concept of spirituality posited as  a sphere of supreme rationa- 
lity - superior and dominant over nature within and without humans - has been 
the foundation of transcendentalism, the idea that the meaning and purpose of 
existence are not life and natural reality, but the realm of pure spirit. The realm 
of pure spirit is thereby considered beyond material and bodily existence. 
In her comprehensive analysis, Val Plumwood demonstrates the Platonic 
derivation of the basic concepts of dualistic transcendentalism: 
There are important and obvious ways in which Plato is hostile to life: in 
the establishment of an otherworldly identity beyond the earth which is the 
real source of meaning and the corresponding treatment of the individual's 
life on earth as a prison; in the conception of the biological world of change 
and decay as inferior and corrupt; in the conception of the female giving of life 
as debased; and in the imposition of lifeless, abstract 'rational' patterns I...] on 
the supposedly 'disorderly' world of life. 35 
Dualistic transcendentalism posits spirituality and everything essential as  
beyond the present reality, as "other-worldly". The consequent dualist pairs are 
life/eternity, ephemeral/eternal, life/pure spirit, life/"after-life". By conceiving 
of spirituality as  external to life, dualistic transcendentalism reproduces aliena- 
tion in the form of presenting life as  inferior and illusory. Detachment and 
disconnectedness are very effectively the vehicles of this form of alienation. 
For both Platonic and Christian systems, the meaning of death is that 
the meaning of human life is elsewhere, I...] in a separate realm accessible 
only to humans (and only to certain chosen of these), the world of the Forms 
and the world of heaven The salvation awaiting them beyond and above the 
world of nature, a fate marked out for humans alone, confirms their 
35 Plumwood, op.cit.: 97-98 
diflerence and separationfrom the world of nature, and their destiny as one 
apartfrom that of other species. 36 
The essential meaning of transcendentalism is the perception of external 
spiritual entities as  decisive determinants of human lives. Ken Wilber shapes 
his theory of holism in order to establish and prove that a transcendentalist 
position is pertinent to ecology. He contends that noosphere includes biosphe- 
re, but not the other way around, thus positing a hierarchical and dualist con- 
cept of holism, rather than a systemic perspective of interrelated, but non-dua- 
lized levels of complexity. His approach to holism is cast as  a n  all-encompas- 
sing system of holons which he claims to be the ultimate reality. He states at  
the beginning of his theoretic elaboration that "the universe is not what it ap- 
pears" 37. His consequently argued ultimate tenet is that pure spirit is higher 
and a more desirable state of being than life. He perceives spirituality as  salvzi- 
tion from the constraints of the lower holon of bios, as  freedom from the cum- 
bersome embodiment of life processes. He returns us  to the cave of shadows. 
The Platonic theory appears to represent an extraordinary inversion of 
intuitive thinking: the lgeless world of the Forms gives eternal lqe, the living 
world of nature is called a tomb. 38 
Wilber analyses the etymology of the word hierarchy and concludes that it 
means -sacred governance", or "governing one's life b y  spiritual powers" 39. 
What else is that than domination of external spiritual entities over humans? 
This shows that Wilber retains some deeply ingrained authoritarian attitudes. 
They are consequent to his dualized concept of spirituality and nature. 
Because of its orientation toward "othenvorldliness" and its perception of 
external spiritual entities as  decisive determinants of human life, dualistic trans- 
cendentalism is incompatible with an ethic focused on nature, ecological systems 
and living processes - and generally incongruous with any ecological perspec- 
- - - - - 
36 ibid.: 100 
37 Wilber, op.cit.: vii. See also quotes and text between footnotes 45 and 48 in chapter 2. 
38 Plumwood, op.cit.: 97-98 
39 Wilber, op.cit.: 17 
tive 40. Detachment of spirituality from body and nature is an essential concep- 
tual obstacle to a comprehensive paradigm change toward a different culture. 
An overcoming of dualistic transcendentalism is offered by the concept of 
immanent spirituality - a spirituality conceived of as a unity of consciousness 
and sensitivity. The concept of immanent spirituality does away with the dualist 
idea that embodiment is an inferior state of being, and that pure spirit is what 
we have to aspire to (with different prognoses for attaining it, dependent on the 
different religious contexts). Immanent spirituality also entails a different 
attitude toward the body, toward sensuality and sexuality, toward nature in 
ourselves and around us. Such an attitude has profound consequences for the 
idea of sensitivity as the basis of responsibility for the social, biological and 
physical environment 41. Immanent spirituality is therefore essential for the 
concept of ecological culture that I am presenting in this essay. 
Some non-dualistic theories of spirituality point out that the perception of 
embodiment in terms of in/out, makes much more sense that down/up, or 
descent/ascent. It implies that spirit is both within and without: 
The mos t appropriate symbol or picture of divine omnipresence is that of 
a circle of water withfish in it. We are thefih; God is the water. We breathe 
God in and out all day long. We are in God and God is in us. I...] The circular 
dynamic I...] corresponds to the in/out energies of pantheism while the ladder 
motif I.. .I corresponds to the God-distinct-jirom-us motif of theism. I.. .I We 
need not climb up and up, merely wake fuller and fuller to what is already 
present and pulsating in ow midst. 42 
Matthew Fox is a foremost contemporary theologian who demystifies spirituality 
and purges it of the long-lasting perversions of the domination paradigm. Thus 
it becomes an immanent spirituality no longer disconnected from life and 
everyday reality. 
40 Considered as an environmental model, the platonic vision of the world-soul 
yields not a spiritualisation of nature but rather a colonisation model which 
points not to leaving things be in nature but to imposing human 'rational' design 
on them (Plumwood, op.cit.: 86) 
41 These consequences will be discussed in the last subsection of this chapter. 
42 FOX, 1979: 50-51, emphasis mine. 
It is important to note, however, that transcendentalization of spirituality 
has had its role in human development: 
By separating Yahwehfrom nature, the Hebrews also separated the 
divine from the human social order. I...] Thus, the abolition of the immanence 
of the divine was in fact afirst step in the secularization of society. 43 
Yet, in tenns of domination, this historic change actually achieved much less 
than Janet Biehl implies. But it had a meaning congruent to separation of 
intellect from intuition, which Bergson perceived as  an important step in the 
development of human consciousness, despite its negative consequences in the 
form of detachment, disconnection and dualization 44. 
Dualistic transcendentalism is indeed eminently dominational. It implies a 
mediated domination 45 - via a system of simulacra: transcendental, i.e. 
elusive, virtual entities as external determinants of our lives 46. 
The issue of determinants emerges as  essential in this connection. Determi- 
nism is actually an aspect of transcendentalism. In the current paradigm (and 
stage of cultural development) it appears as a problem of the conceptual and 
methodological framework of science: 
Any science that conceives of the world as being governed according to a 
universal theoretical plan that reduces its various riches to the drab applica- 
tions of general laws thereby becomes an instrument of domination. 47 
Rupert Sheldrake has comprehensively examined and questioned the deter- 
ministic aspect of the current scientific paradigm, and identified its origin in 
the transcendentalist world view: 
- 
43 Biehl, 199 1: 62-63 
44 See quote at  footnote 159 below. 
45 See text between footnotes 223 and 226, and the fourth paragraph after 238 in the 
previous chapter. 
46 See quote by Plumwood at  footnote 32 above. 
47 Pnigogine and Stengers, 1984: 32, emphasis mine. 
Science depends on a rigid. limited, and restrictive structural reality. This 
limited view of reality is nevertheless very powerful, inasmuch as it allows for the 
possibility of control whenever phenomena are predictable, regular, and subject to 
rules and laws. The assumption of order is thus fundamental to the concept of 
power, and both are integral to the modern scienhfic world view. (Merchant, 1980: 
230) Of course, Merchant's observation is applicable to institutionalized science - 
which, after all, seems to be almost the only form of science we have nowadays. 
The orthodox assumption is that everything about a new kind of 
molecule could in principle be calculated in advance before the molecule is 
synthesized I . . . ]  determined by transcendent principles of order that exist 
prior to its material existence. I...] It is not in fact possible to predict in any 
detail the structures and properties of molecules [...I on the basis of quantum 
mechanics and the other theories of present-day physics. [...I But in so far as 
this assumption is still taken for granted, chemistry, biochemistry, and 
molecular biology continue to operate within a Platonic paradigm. 48 
Once he has spotted this anomaly of the present paradigm (in Kuhnian tenns 49), 
Sheldrake has gone ab ovo with his inquiry, and initiated a discussion which 
indicates the onset of a profound paradigm change - one which has not yet ma- 
nifested the immense ripple effect of its consequences. He has posed the fun- 
damental question about natural (physical) laws - about their origin - and obser- 
ved that, since the establishment of Darwinist evolutionary paradigm, science 
has led a sort of a schizophrenic existence where "evolution was kept down to 
earth, whereas the heavens were eternal." 50. Sheldrake has identified this in- 
consistence as "dual vision of the world" that perceives the continuously chan- 
ging and evolving biosphere within a physical universe which is assumed to be 
fmed for ever in its mechanical timelessness 51. However, he considers that the 
Big Bang theory has put the final touch on a process of conceptual change in 
physics 52 - a process which (together with theories of irreversibility 53) has 
moved physics into the evolutionary paradigm. 
Starting from this fundamentally changed viewpoint, Sheldrake poses the 
crucial question: 
Do the laws of nature evolve? Or does physical reality evolve while the 
laws of nature stay the same? In any case, what do we mean by the "laws of 
48 Sheldrake, 1988: 6 1-63. emphasis mine 
49 See quote at footnote 60 in chapter 2. 
50 Sheldrake, 1988: 5-6 
51 See quote at footnote 64 in chapter 2. 
52 The Big Bang [. . .] implicitly means that cosmology has adopted an image of a 
developing organism as opposed to a machine. (Sheldrake and Fox, 1996: 19-20) 
See also the quote at footnote 92 in chapter 4. 
53 In the classical view the basic processes of nature were considered to be 
deterministic and reversible. Processes involving randomness or irreversibility 
were considered only exceptions. Today we see everywhere the role of irreversible 
processes, offluctuations (Prigogine and Stengers, op.cit.: xxvii-xxviii, emphasis 
mine) 
nature"? I...] Laws that are invisible and intangible, but are nevertheless 
present everywhere and always. 
The nothingness "before" the creation of the universe is the most comple- 
te void that we can imagine - no space, time, or matter existed. I...] Yet this 
unthinkable void converts itself into a plenum of existence - a necessary 
ansequence of physical laws. Where are these laws written into that mid? 
What "tells" the void that it is pregnant with a possible universe? It would 
seem that even the void is subject to law, a logic that exists prior to time and 
space. I...] Orperhaps the laws of natum have actually arotved along with 
nature itself: and perhaps they are still evolving. [...I Maybe the very idea of 
"laws" is inappropriate. 54 
The evolutionary paradigm has a profound significance. It offers the 
possibility of integration of the "dual vision of the world", and, generally, it is a 
non-dualist, or post-dualist perspective. 
"Dual vision of the world" is also related to the new dualization of rationali- 
ty and spirituality 55. Since the Enlightenment, rationality was identified with 
science, and the emerging rationalist, materialist/mechanist scientific paradigm 
blurred the perception of spirituality as  a sphere of the mind and reason 56 - 
the supreme godly reason which governs the world. The Enlightenment was a 
process of secularization of reason. With its strict rationalist and positivist 
orientation, science has excluded the spiritual issues from its scope of vision 
and left them to the domain of religion. Thus, it has prepared the possibility for 
the new dualization. Most of the "new age" revival of spirituality has emerged as  
a reaction to the dry, soulless rationality of the modem science 57, and has 
therefore created a newly dualized antagonism of spirituality versus rationality 
On the other hand, dualistic construct of spirituality versus scientific 
rationality reflects the deeply ingrained authoritarianism which needs a sphere 
of elusive and external spiritual entities to govern our lives 58. The overcoming 
of the dual vision of the world offers an integration of the transcendental 
54 Sheldrake, 1988: 10- 1 1, emphasis mine 
55 See text between footnotes 5 and 7 above. 
56 The point of the cosmology of the Timaeus is to justi& the primacy of reason I.. .I 
God as maker and fabricator of the universe imposes on the natural disorder of 
nature (chaos) a properly regular, rational and perfect shape/motion and form. 
(Plumwood, op.cit.: 84) 
57 See also Carolyn Merchant's issue of the Death of Nature - at footnote 90 in the 
previous chapter. 
58 See in this connection the quote a t  footnote 258 in the previous chapter. 
sphere of the godly "laws of nature" with the evolutionary processes within 
nature. And the overcoming of dualism entails the deconstruction of domination 
and authoritarianism. Once the authoritarian need for external seats of 
domination is surpassed, transcendental laws of nature loose their function. 
And Sheldrake questions the appropriateness of "the very idea" of natural laws: 
The concept of laws of nature is metaphorical. It is based on an analogy 
with human laws, which are binding rules of conduct prescribed by authority 
I . . . ]  Laws imply lawgivers, and they are maintained by the power of authority. 
If we drop the idea that the laws of nature areframed and maintained by God, 
then we must ask: what makes them up and how are they sustained? I...] 
What is the basis of the regularities of nature? They cannot depend on 
natural laws $these laws are only in human minds. 59 
Disposing of natural laws is a fundamentally post-dominational proposition 
emerging from Sheldrake's theory of formative causation. It suggests habits - 
as an evolutionary category - which develop interactively with natural 
processes, instead of natural laws, as  a deterministic category. Sheldrake 
posits fields which he terms morphic and which function a s  depositories of the 
habits of nature. He denotes as  "morphic resonance" the process of 
communication - of transfer of habits as  information. 
I f  the evolving regularities of nature are not governed by transcendent 
laws, then could they not be more like habits? Habits develop over time [...I 
They are not all given in advance by eternal laws which are quite independent 
of anything that actually happens - and even independent of the existence of 
the universe. Habits develop within nature; they are not imposed on the world 
ready-made. 1.. . 1 Not only does the world evolve in space and time, but these 
immanent organizing principles themselves euolve. According to the 
hypothesis of formative causation, these organizing principles are morphic 
fields, which contain an inherent memory. 60 
The essential aspect of the concept of formative causation is self-organization of 
natural processes, and it entails immanence rather than the transcendental cha- 
racter of natural laws as  external determinants of natural processes. Formative 
causation dispels the determinism implicit in the notion of natural laws, and of- 
fers a basis at  cosmogenic level for a post-dominational world view. Furthermo- 
re, the immanence of morphic fields is conceived of a s  immanent spirituality: 
- 
59 Sheldrake, 1988: 1 1- 13, emphasis mine 
60 ibid.: 13, 312,emphasismine. 
In general tenns, _fields have inherited many of the properties 
traditionally ascribed to souls in the pre-mechanistic philosophies of nature, 
and the growth offild theories can be regarded as another of the ways in 
which nature has been coming back to lge I...] In this process the idea of souls 
as purposive organizing principles has been replaced by concepts of 
organizing fields, organizing relations, principles of self-organization, mind 
in nature, patterns that connect, the implicate order, information, and 
organizing principles under yet other names. 61 
Sheldrake's theory presents an evolutionary concept of cosmos which overco- 
mes the "dual vision of the world". The evolutionary and self-organizational aspect 
are congruent with Bergson's principle of becoming 62. Becoming is consequent- 
ly immanent, and its immanence, furthermore, entails a parallelism of the evolu- 
tion of (human) consciousness and of natural processes within and without. 
Evolution is a creation unceasingly renewed, it creates, as it goes on, not 
only the fonns of lge, but the ideas that will enable the intellect to understand 
it, the terms which will serve to express it. I.. .I 
Life in its entirety, regarded as a creative evolution, is something 
analogous; it transcends _finality, if we understand by _finality the realization 
of an idea conceived or conceivable in advance. 63 
Bergson identified these complementary self-organizing processes as  the 
essential creative thrust of evolution or development at all levels and scale. He 
termed the thrust elan vital (life impetus): 
An original impetus of life I...] sustained right along the lines of evolution 
I...] is thefundamental cause of variations, at least of those that are regularly 
passed on, that accumulate and create new species. I...] Life is tendency, and 
the essence of a tendency is to develop in the form of a sheaf, creating, by its 
very growth, divergent directions among which its impetus is divided. I...] The 
essence of lge is in the movement by which life is transmitted. 64 
The self-organizing principles and the implied fields of interrelatedness and 
connectivity have been discerned a t  the molecular level, primarily through the 
research of Nobel-prizewinner Ilya Prigogine. Examining the far-from-equilib- 
rium thermodynamics, he observed that particles in these conditions behave 
interactively - that they practically communicate 65. Prigogine identifies life a s  a 
61 ibid.: 3 13-314, emphasis mine. 
62 Reality has appeared to us as a perpetual becoming. It makes itself or it unmakes 
itself, but it is never something made. [...I The universe is not made, but is being 
made continually. (Bergson, 191 1 / 1983: 272, 24 1) 
63 ibid.: 103, 223 
64 ibid.: 87, 99. 128 
65 See quotes at footnotes 61 in chapter 3. 
process occurring in high thermodynamic non-equilibrium which explains its 
self-organizing character 66. 
Self-organization, becoming and non-deterministic immanence present the 
essential conceptual basis for an  ecological culture. The implicit overcoming of 
the "dual vision of the world" entails the human-ecological perspective of 
integration of the social and natural spheres. The social sphere itself has been 
regarded - in the dualist paradigm - as  having the natural and the spiritual 
aspect. The post-dualist mode of non-deterministic immanence opens the door 
to an integration or re-connection of spirituality and nature. 
The concept of fields (morphic, or self-organizingl is of crucial importance 
for this integrative perspective. Fields are the appropriate physical entities to 
manifest (eco-)systemic interrelatedness and interconnectivity. This intercon- 
nective aspect of fields has fundamentally changed the perception of matter 
and energy. Sheldrake maintains that "matter is explained in terms of energy 
within_fields."67 For such a perspective, physicist David Bohm has devised the 
term "unbroken wholeness": 
Instead of having separate little particles as the constituents of matter, Ein- 
stein thought of afield spread through all space, which would have strong and 
weak regions. Some sbpng ~ g i o n s ,  which ane stable, =present particles I...] just 
as the vortex or whirlpool is a temporarily stable form I...] We speak of a whirl- 
pod but one does not exist In the same way, we can speak of a particle, but 
one does not exist: "parficle" is a name for a certain form in the_field of moue- 
ment I...] a view which I call "unbroken wholeness orflowing wholeness" I...] 
All the forms we see in it are abstracted by our way of looking and thinking. 68 
This altered perception entails a fundamental questioning of the sharp 
differentiation between energy and matter. The recent developn~ents in 
quantum physics have demonstrated that, at the subatomic levels, there is 
absolutely no tangible matter to be delineated; there are only vibrations, or 
66 See quote at footnote 69 in chapter 3. 
Only eten~al aws were seen to express scientific rationality. Temporality was 
looked down upon as an illusion This is no longer true today. We have discovered 
that farfiom being an illusion, irreversibility plays an essential role in nature 
and lies at the origin of most processes of self-organization (Prigogine and 
Stengers, op.cit.: 7-8) 
67 See quote at footnote 100 in chapter 4. 
68 Bohm. 1988: 345-346. emphasis mine. See also text at footnote 42 in chapter 2. 
energy fields 69. A physical meaning of (eco-)systemic interconnectedness is 
thus established, and it re-defines the notion of boundaries of physical entities, 
a s  well as  of living beings. Instead of separation, which the mechanist scientific 
paradigm has imprinted on our gestalt, boundaries appear as  interface of 
connectivity (and of metabolic exchange of energy with the environment) - a s  
suggested by eco-psychological perspective 70. 
Weare dealing with contact phenomena, with excitations of the orgonefield. 71 
- or subtle energy field, as  Goodison has depicted it 72. 
Wilhelm Reich developed a fundamental theory (as well a s  practical 
demonstrations and use) of life energy - which he named "orgone energy". His 
concept is, unfortunately, still widely misunderstood and considered 
controversial because of its radical implications. A life energy has so far 
remained unidentified by mainstream primarily because of the viewpoint of 
detachment which characterizes the current scientific paradigm 73. 
It is beyond the scope of this essay to supply any extensive review of the 
literature that supports the concept of a life energy 74. Such a concept has 
Now atoms are known to be complex structures of activity composed of subatomic 
particles, themselves patterns of vibration withinfitds. (Sheldrake, 1995: 4, 
emphasis mine) 
Our notions of separateness are challenged: the distinction between a person and 
the air around, or between one person and another, so apparently self-evident to 
us, can be seenfrom this perspective as a [. . .I series of energy movements. 
(Goodison, op.cit.: 232). See also text and quotes around footnotes 23 and 24 above. 
Reich, 1949/ 1973: 71, emphasis mine 
See quote at footnote 99 in chapter 4, and at footnote 21 in this chapter. 
See in the previous chapter: quote at footnote 95; quote at and text before footnote 
36; and text after footnote 85. 
Notwithstanding that life energy is now so widely implied and applied, the 
mainstream still arbitrates that it is unscientific to assume the existence of such a 
phenomenon. (But, after all, if it were otherwise, there would be no reason for 
writing about it in this essay.) 
been present throughout the history of Western thought 75, in addition to 
Eastern philosophies and practices which are famed for the various forms of 
vital energy that they are based upon. 
Reich discovered that the waves of orgone energy merge in a spiral 
movement, and this merger, which he called superimposition, can create 
matter, or initial life forms: 
Inert mass emerges from the slowed-down motion of two or more 
superimposed orgone energy units. I.. .I The basic point is the emergence of 
inert mass from [...I kinetic energy. 76 
This essential aspect of the orgone energy theory implies a genetic unity of 
matter and energy (which was initiated by Einstein's theory of relativity, but 
became a more extensive field of inquiry in physics after Reich's lifetime). 
Fields are inherently holistic. They cannot be sliced up into bits, or 
reduced to some kind of atomistic unit; rather.fundamenta1 particles are now 
believed to arisefromfields. 77 
Consequently there is also a genetic unity of energy and organisms. Reich 
perceived organisms as  enclosed energy systems - self-contained, with their 
own integrity, and yet interconnected and interdependent to their environment: 
the pervasive orgone energy (or life energy) "ocean" 78, or field 79, which 
permeates all matter and living beings. 
The more renowned names include Paracelsus ( 1493- 1 54 1) , Van Helmont ( 1577- 
1644), Leibniz ( 1646- 17 16), Galvani ( 1737- 1798), Mesmer ( 1734- 18 15). Reichenbach 
(1 788- 1869), and, of course, Wilhelm Reich (1 897- 1957). Probably the most critical 
and meticulously compiled resource is Dr. W. E. Mann's Vital Ene ra  and Health 
(Mann, 1989). Carolyn Merchant's The Death of Nature also has extensive coverage 
of the history of vitalism. 
A reassessment of the values and constraints historically associated with the 
organic world view may be essential for a viablefuture. (Merchant, 1980: 288-289) 
Reich, 1951/ 1973: 185- 186 
Sheldrake, 1995: 80-82, emphasis mine. See also quote by Bohm at footnote 68 
above. 
Sheldrake uses the same metaphor as  Riech. (See Reich's quotes at footnotes 133 
and 190 below): 
Ilhe vacuum has ceased to be an empty mid; it has become a seething ocean of 
energy, producing countless vibrating particles all the time and taking them back 
again. "A vacuum is not inert and featureless, but alive with throbbing energy and 
vitality " (Sheldrake, 1988: 4-5, emphasis mine) 
Others may prefer to propose d~fferent names for thesefilds, which could in 
general be called biologicalfilds or Zife_fields. (Sheldrake, 1995: 94-96, emphasis 
mine) 
Orgone energy is present "everywhere," and it forms an uninterrupted 
continuum. This continuum varies in d~fferent places with regard to its 
"denseness" or "concentration. " 80 
The enclosed energy systems were termed by Reich "closed orgonomes" 81, 
denoting both the primal, primordial form of life, of organism - the proto- 
organism - and every developed organism (including human). (This concept 
presents a biological interpretation of embodiment - where the spiritual aspect 
is part of immanent nature or cosmos - and it thus surpasses the dualist 
transcendentalism and offers a re-connection of spirituality and nature.) 
"Closed orgonomes" are systemic units in the sense of nested levels of 
complexity, as every cell in a multi-cell organism is a closed orgonome by itself, 
and at  the same time a part of more complex units. The whole organism is also 
one closed orgonome and it belongs to larger systems. Life energy, or orgone 
energy permeates all the levels. In that way bodies, or closed orgonomes, are 
within the all-pervading orgone energy. 
Orgonomes as  life (or orgone) energy systems are characterized by pulsa- 
tion. It is a manifestation of the frequency of orgone energy - its long wave- 
length (compared to the much shorter wave-length of sound energy, or the still 
shorter one of light and further high-energy forms). Pulsation also manifests 
the life processes of metabolic exchange of energy with the environment - all 
vital functions, from the simplest monocellulars to humans are primarily 
manifested by pulses: 
IOrgone energy] current does not_flow continuously but in rhythmic 
thrusts. Hence we speak of PULSATION. The pulsation can be plainly observed in 
the blood circulation of all metazoa. The pulsatory current of body _fluids is the 
work of the organismic orgone, a direct expression of its form of movement. 82 
Pulsation reflects the essential alteration of tension and relaxation, the 
throbbing of life processes. I t  also expresses the fundamental dialectic 
80 Reich, 1949/ 1973: 145-146, emphasis mine. The variable density of orgone field is 
congruent with Bohm's theory of unbroken wholeness and his comparison with 
vortices - see at footnote 68 above. 
81 Energy is traqfonned into matter. ?his matter is alive. [...I We shall call the 
spectjk basic form of living matter the orgonome. (Reich, 195 1 / 1973: 195, 204, 
emphasis mine) 
82 ibid.: 204 
antipodes of integrity (enclosed energy system, "closed orgonome") and integra- 
tion (belonging and interconnectedness to larger systems of life energy func- 
tioning, to the open "orgone ocean"). This dialectic often appears as a feeling or 
sense of the tendency to burst the enclosure and reach beyond the 
boundaries. Freedom and creativity - a s  well as biological growth - are closely 
related to this dialectic condition. 
Mass-free orgone always strives to break beyond the enclosure of the 
membrane. The bio-energetic orgonome is extended and open; the material 
orgonome is closed. I. ..I The function of growth corresponds to the expansion 
of the membranes of the closed orgonome. 83 
On the other hand, from his extensive experience of psychotherapeutic 
practice, Reich concludes that "armored" character types 84 are inclined to 
interpret this longing to burst the bodily boundaries in a mystified 
transcendentalist mode. (Such an  interpretation emerges a s  an "orgonomic" 
basis of dualist transcendentalism 85). 
Pulsation thus signifies the basic dialectic of open/closed, or in/out. In the 
context of the notion of embodiment, this means the life energy within and with- 
out, or the dialectic of life and death. At broader levels, pulsation is the basic 
phenomenon of the (evolutionary) cosmos. It occurs at various strata of 
complexity and at different scale - u p  to the ultimate cosmic pulse 86, the Big 
Bang and the Big Crunch 87. Pulsation thus emerges a s  a manifestation of 
natural cycles of renewal at  all levels, including life and death of biological 
organisms and eco-systems 88. 
83 ibid.: 2 14 
84 See quotes at footnotes 1 17 and 258 in the previous chapter. 
85 In dying, too, the biological energy reaches beyond the confmes of the physical sac 
in which it is imprisoned. Thus the irrational religious concept of "liberating 
death," of "salvation in the hereafter" [. ..] appears in the arnwred organism (Reich, 
195 1 / 1973: 222-223) 
86 Pulsation as the basic characteristic of orgone energy [...I can be divided into two 
antithetical part-functions - expansion and contraction (Reich, l949/ 1973: 100- 
102, emphasis mine) 
87 See quote at footnote 92 in chapter 4; and also Reich's quote at footnote 190 below. 
88 See also the second paragraph after footnote 87 in chapter 4. 
The essential conclusion from the discussion of the concept of life energy 
fields for the re-connection of spirituality and nature is that the energy within 
and without is the same energy - therefore the basis of interrelatedness and 
interconnectivity. Fields of orgone (or subtle) energy are thus the vehicle, the 
physical medium of sensitivity - the medium of the sense of interrelatedness 
between humans and their natural, social and spiritual environment. 
Integrated Epistemology: Sensitivity to Natural 
Processes 
So powerful is the mystique of reason as 
instrument in the control of nature and human 
bodies that it banishes other modes of 
participating in the world to the periphery of 
society. 89 
A client is to me a mere unit, Sherlock Holmes 
said, a factor in a problem. The emotional 
qualities are antagonistic to clear reasoning. [...I 1 
am a brain, Watson The rest of me is a mere 
appendix. 90 
Think feelingly. 91 
Immanent spirituality has emerged as  the basis of individual responsibility 
for the multifaceted environment, and as the central issue of post-dominational 
reconstruction. Such a view entails a different concept of knowledge and aware- 
ness, a different epistemology 92, congruent with a non-dualistic immanence - 
an integrated (holistic) epistemology. It primarily means a non-reductionist way 
of (com)prehension 93, one which includes other-than-rational components of 
knowledge: emotional/affective, sensual/sensitive, intuition and parapsychologi- 
We must lean1 to cultivate and employ qualities of mind that go beyond 
its mere cognitive operations [...I Changing our ways of seeing and doing 
89 Merchant. 1994: 4 
90 Arthur Conan Doyle, The Penguin Complete Sherlock Holmes: 96. 1014 
91 Plant, 1990:82 
92 Oxford Dictionary defines epistemology as  'the theory or science of the method or 
grounds of knowledge". 
93 See footnote 19 above. 
involves leaming to I...] trust our emotions, leaming to listen to what we are 
told by our intuitive faculties. 94 
The crucial prerequisite for such an integrated epistemology is the (re-)inte- 
gration of the dualistic concept of reason. Such a re-integration would unite the 
formerly dualized antipodes of reason and emotionality, mind and spirit, intelli- 
gence and intuition, thus establishing a way of knowledge - an integral humane- 
ness - that would not rely exclusively on either rational or sensual experiences. 
The basic dualist split between rationality and nature was derived from 
Platonism and furthered by Cartesian mechanist/reductionist paradigm 95. 
Reason/nature dualism sfill casts its shadow across the projects of mo- 
dernity. The greatest of its philosophical and scientrjk projects has been ma- 
terialis t reductionism [. . .] which resolves the dilemma presented by human/ 
nature dualism through conceiving not only nature and animals but also the 
human itselfin the mechanistic and reductionistic terms inspired by Carte- 
sianism Empiricism [. . .] has also become part of this thrust. Its main import 
has not been to reinstate the senses and the body, much maligned by rationa- 
lism, as sources of knowledge and identity, but to validate a 'scientr_fic', strip- 
ped-down, impoverished and subordinated conception of the object of know- 
edge through observational restrictions on what can count as a knowledge. 96 
The consequence of the dualization of reason and nature (within and without 
humans), has been that all the aspects of knowledge which are associated with 
the body and with nature - emotions, sensitivity, intuition, instinct - all the 
sensual components of awareness have been deemed inferior to reason. They 
have been rejected as sources of knowledge, which has consequently been 
identified exclusively with rationality. Dualism is the conceptual underpinning 
of domination, so the dualized notion of knowledge has been posited as rational 
control and order over the chaos of nature. Knowledge is considered a tool for 
control, colonization and exploitation of nature 97. Reason is, consequently, 
perceived as detached from the sphere of nature (within and without) 98. 
94 Melucci and Chorover, 1997: 79 
95 See quote at footnote 85 in the previous chapter. 
96 Plumwood, op.cit.: 120- 12 1 
97 See also quote in footnote 56 above. 
98 I have repeatedly pointed out in the previous chapter that domination is based on 
detachment from nature - see text and quote between footnotes 94 and 96 in 
chapter 8. 
It is important to reiterate that the deconstruction of the dualistic concept 
of rationality does not imply its rejection - which is a typical "new age" reac- 
tion 99, and presents an uncritical reversal of the dualized construct. 
Since defenders of the western tradition persistently and voci$erously 
portray criticism of the dominant f o m  of reason as the rejection of all rea- 
son and the embrace of irrationality, it is still necessary to stress that criti- 
quing the dominant fonns of reason which embody the master identity and 
oppose themselves to the sphere of nature does not imply abandoning all 
f o m  of reason, science and individuality. Rather, it involves their redefi- 
nition or reconstruction in less oppositional and hierarchical ways. 100 
It is actually equally irrational to dismiss rationality as  to stick to its 
dualized construct 101. Therefore, a non-dualist, integrated epistemological 
framework retains the heritage of rationalism and includes and transcends it 
by complementing it with other-than-rational aspects of knowledge and 
awareness (or com-prehension). 
The mainstream, of course, still embraces the current dominant 
epistemological paradigm - the reductionist scientific rationality. It is further 
reproduced primarily in the thrust of (and the trust in) the cybernetic concept 
of intelligence and brain functioning, which leads to a frighteningly 
impoverished notion of human consciousness. 
Computer scientists contributed significantly to t h e m  establishment 
of the information-processing dogma by using expressions such as 
"intelligence," "memory," and "language" to describe computers, which led 
most people - including the scientists themselves - to think that these terms 
refer to the well-known human phenomena. This, however, is a grave 
misunderstanding, which has helped to perpetuate, and even reirlforce, the 
Cartesian image of human beings as machines. [. . .I Recent developments in 
cognitive science have made it clear that human intelligence is utterly 
diferent from machine, or "art~ficial, " intelligence. The human nervous 
system does not process any information [...I but interacts with the 
environment by continually modulating its structure. 102 
An essential epistemological aspect of scientific rationality is the notion of 
objectivity, which is one of the pillars of the current scientific paradigm. 
99 See text between footnotes 4 and 7. and between 56 and 57 above. 
100 Plumwood, op.cit.: 4, emphasis mine 
101 The notion that thinking is opposed to feeling is a product of our culture, with its 
restricted and distorted demition of 'rationalism' - which is itselfa disguised 
irrationality. (Goodison, op.cit.: 107) See also the two paragraphs before and the 
quote at footnote 92 in the previous chapter. 
102 Capra, 1996: 66-68, emphasis mine. See in this connection also Sheldrake's theory 
of morphic resonance - between footnotes 59 and 61 above, and at 134 below. 
Objectivity assumes the meaning of a supreme authority, of absolute truth 
which reigns above human judgement. 
A belief in the objectivity of science is a matter of faith for many modem 
people. [. . .] This image of science I...] tends to be absorbed implicitly and taken 
for granted. [...I Most simply assume that by means of "the scientijii method." 
theories can be tested objectively by experiment in a way that is uncontamina- 
ted by the scientists' own hopes, ideas, and beliefs. 103 
This retraction of human interference is, of course, only a consensual rule of 
the game as part of the accepted scientific paradigm, but it also expresses the 
fundamental reductionism, the inherent characteristic of scientific objectivity. 
This reductionism has several aspects. The most basic is the narrowing down 
of the scope and choice of infornlation to be included in the definition and 
analysis of a scientific inquiry. It is a necessary limitation of the research 
process, but it is in conflict with the belief in absolute objectivity: 
Probably the commonest kind of deception - and of self-deception - 
depends on the selective use of data 104 
Even if conscious, or subconscious (self-deceptive) selection of data were 
strictly avoided, it would still be impossible to evaluate and include all relevant 
data which would determine a comprehensive truth assumed by objectivity. 
The theories of chaos and of uncertainty in physics have clearly indicated that 
any scientific interpretation is only a partial and incomplete view of a problem, 
which cannot imply the pretence of any absolute validity, either in temporal or 
spatial sense. 
The idea of changeless laws and constants is the last survivorfrom the 
era of classical physics in which a regular and (in principle) totally 
predictable mathematical order was supposed to prevail at all times and in all 
places. In reality, w e m  nothing of the kind in the course of human affairs, 
103 Sheldrake, 1995: 165 
104 ibid.: 169. 
For example, from 191 0 to 191 3, the American physicist Robert Millikan was 
engaged in a dispute with an Austrian rival, Felix Ehrenfeld, about the charge on 
the electron. [...I A historian of science has recently examined Millikan's 
laboratory notebooks I...] The raw data were individually annotated with 
comments such as "very low, something wrong" and "beauty. publish this." The 58 
observations published in his article were selectedfrom 140. EhrenfeZd meanwhile 
went on publishing all his observations, which continued to show a far greater 
variability than Millikan's selected data. EhrenfeZd was disregarded while 
Millikan won the Nobel Prize. (ibid.: 169- 171) 
in the biological realm, in the weather, or even in the heavens. The chaos 
revolution has revealed that this perfect order was a beguiling illusion 105 
Furthermore, according to Bergson, reduction is inherent to rational 
analysis. In his examination of duration and time, he showed that, by turning 
reality into a thought process, intellect is geared to split it into descrete bits of 
information. He likened this procedure to cinematographic representation of 
continuum by a series of static images: 
Science proceeds according to the cinematographical method. It cannot 
do otherwise. [...I For it is of the essence of science to handle signs, which it 
substitutes for the objects themselves. [. ..I Signs are made to dispense us with 
this effort by substituting, for the moving continuity of things, an artificial 
reconstruction which is its equivalent in practice and has the advantage of 
being easily handled. 106 
This means that reductionism happens only when we think that our partial 
evidence, and necessarilly the partial generalizations, are all there is to reality - 
because we think that we think only "rationally" and "objectively". Objectivism, 
thus, has a dualistic origin; it is based on dualized notion of subject and object, 
and hence of subjective and objective truth, evidence, knowledge, where the 
objective is superior and excludes the subjective. 
Subject/object dualism is another legacy of the Cartesian denial of 
mindlike features to the world which underlies western scientific accounts of 
objectivity I.. .I as a mode of attention to the world which denies dependency 
and kinship between observer and the observed. 107 
Methodologically, the dualistic construct is primarily manifested in the sharp 
separation of the observer from the object of observation - the detachment 
which is the essential characteristic of dualism, and the instrument of its 
dominational meaning and effect. 
The -cogito" set I...] 'man' ontologically and epistemologically upcut 
fmm (and aboue) 'natum* and "teason* epistemologically, and axiologdcally 
apartfmm (and aboue) 'experience. ' [. . .I This detached disembodied, 
Archimedean conception of mind I...] offers the only available support to an 
otherwise patently unsupportable 'specular ideal' of scientific 'detachment' 
according to which a human observer, supposedly having succeeded in 
detaching him/herselffom things and events observed, is in a position to 
observe and describe them 'objectively.' 108 
105 ibid.: 203-204 
106 Bergson. op.cit.: 329 
107 Plumwood, op.cit.: 123. See also quote at footnote 118 in the previous chapter. 
108 Chorover, 1990: 94-95, emphasis mine. See also the quote in footnote 47 above. 
The dominational aspect of objectivism is revealed in its detachment from 
nature within and without humans - the detachment which gives it the 
meaning of supreme rule, the absolute truth that governs human lives and 
natural processes. Moreover, epistemologically it is manifested a s  denial of 
subjective (com-)prehension. Scientists typically withdraw or even deny their 
subjective viewpoint, their own personality. It is tacitly agreed, under the rule 
of the game of the scientific paradigm, that they are humble servants of the 
"objective truth", which they strive to achieve in their research. 
Duality and detachment between the objective and the subjective 
necessarily defines rationalist scientific objectivity as  transcendentalist. The 
power of determining the scientific truth is ascribed to (Platonic) metaphysical 
abstractions - by substituting the reality for mathematical representations (a 
procedure depicted by Bergson's cinematographic metaphor): 
Galileo made a clear distinction between that which is absolute, 
objective, immutable, and mathematical and that which is relatiue, 
subjective, andfluctuating. [...I 7he objects we know by means of our senses 
are not the real or mathematical objects; nevertheless they have certain 
qualities which handled by mathematical rules, lead to a bue knowledge. [. 
This distinction was of great importance in the subsequent development of 
science and was a major step towards banishing direct human experience 
Jiom the realm of nature. 109 
Reality is thus encoded in the cryptic language of mathematics which can be 
accessible only to the ordained. The further step are computerized 
representations of reality - the step which turns reductionism and assumed 
objectivity into virtual reality (or, in Baudrillarian terms, into a digitalized 
simulacrum). Via the 'cinematographic procedure", reduction is succeeded by 
artificial synthesis of disintegrated pieces 110 (a rather Frankensteinian 
undertaking) - cut and then rejoined into a substitute reality. 
The computerfetishist endows the computer model with a validity and 
an independent power which altogether transcends the mental models which 
are its essential basis. I...] This inevitably means that the rnodellers are 
required to make assumptions [...I to omit what they consider to be irrelevant. 
These decisions are matters ofjudgement, not of fact or mathematics [...I an 
109 Sheldrake. 1988: 24-25, emphasis mine. 
110 See the quote at and the paragraph after footnote 34 in chapter 2. 
attempt to substitute mathematics for knowledge and computation for 
understanding. 1 1 1 
Subject/object dualism and detachment are inherently non-systemic. They 
reflect an  attitude of diconnectedness between the individual and her/his 
environment - the environment which, in scientific research context, becomes 
the object, in most general terms, of his/her observation, inquiry, or 
manipulation. However, from the systemic perspective, subject and object are 
interrelated 112. And quite tangibly so in all contexts, a s  well a s  in scientific 
research. The impact of the observer/researcher on the "object" of his or her 
research has for some time become a salient issue. This impact is an  
interactive relationship which can be as  simple (or as  complicated) as  the joy or 
sorrow of the researcher/exarniner, or just the individual presence - having a 
decisive effect on the result of the examination. 
As investigators, we interact with the systems we observe. [...I It is [...I an 
irreducibly composite instance of participation/observation, in which the 
observer's intervention affects the system being observed. 113 
The interactions that are tangible by mainstream criteria are, now, largely 
acknowledged. However, the more evasive forms of interrelatedness include 
expectations which can have as  simple impact as  the selective reduction 
described before, but also the "paranormal" or "parapsychological" effects - 
thus named because (if a t  all admitted) they are considered beyond the 
approved purview of scientific physiology, or psychology. 
The tendency t o m  what is being looked for is deep-seated. It has a basis 
in the very nature of attention. [...I Most people 'are well aware that other 
people's attitudes affect the way they interact with the world around them [...I 
But the 'ScientiJic method" is generally supposed to rise above cultural and 
personal biases, dealing only in the currency of objective facts and universal 
principles. [. . . ] 
First, expectations affect the kinds of questions that are asked in 
experiments. And these questions in tu r r~  shape what kinds of answers will be 
found. [...I Second, experimenters' expectations affect what they observe, 
gwing a tendency to see what they want to see and to ignore what they do not 
111 Freeman, 1973: 220-221, 227. See also text and quote between footnotes 225 and 
229 in the previous chapter. 
112 We accept the time-hallowed discrimination between subject and object. [...I 
Subject and object are only one. The banier between them cannot be said to have 
broken down as a result of recent experience in the physical sciences, for this 
banier does not exist. (Schrtjdinger, 1956: 50-5 1) 
1 13 Chorover, 1990: 96 
want to see. [...I Third, and more mysteriously, experimenters' expectations 
may # i t  what actual@ happens. 114 
However, if (or when) the viewpoint is changed, and the interaction is 
perceived as  mediated by fields of connectivity (morphic, subtle energy, 
orgone), the influence of one energy system on another ceases to be anything 
abnormal, miraculous, or even unexpectable. It is simply inevitable from the 
systemic viewpoint which perceives the boundaries between entities and their 
environment, not as  delineations of total separation, but as  interfaces of 
interaction and energy exchange. In other words, human energy vibrations 
necessarily interact with the vibrations of the object of scientific examination, 
and it happens with any other interaction too. 
There is actual experimental evidence for the effects of experimenters' 
expectations on the behavior of animals. But in most areas of biology, the 
possibility of such effects is usually ignored. I...] In psychology and medicine, 
experimenter effects are generally explained in terms of inJluences 
transmitted by "subtle cues." Butjust how subtle these cues may be is another 
question. [...I The possibility that they include 'paranormal' influences such 
as telepathy and psychokinesis is not discussed in polite scientific society. I 
believe that it is better to face this possibility than to ignore it. [...I Tension. 
fear, and hostility tend not only to inhibit psi effects, but Qlso to influence 
e x p e r i m e n t s i n t h e ~ a l l e d h a r d ~ t a o .  115 
Wilhelm Reich did not only emphasize the existence of the interaction 
between the scientist and the object of his/her experiments. He furthermore 
insisted on the critical importance of its quality because, in dealing with life 
energy phenomena, the attitudes of the persons involved are manifested in 
their energy metabolism, and, therefore, in the impact on the surrounding 
energy systems (as the same energy within and without functions a s  the 
medium of connectivity and interactivity) . 
The structure ofthe observer is of importance since it is the organismic 
orgime energy in his sense organs that reacts to the extema2 otgone 
phenomena. The inclusion of the structure of the observer in the judgment of 
natural phenomena is a very important, if not decisive, step fonoard toward 
the integration of the subjective and the objective, the psyche and the 
physical. [...I Natural-scientijk research is an activity that rests on the 
interaction between observer and nature, or, expressed differently, between 
or~noticfunctions inside and the samefunctions outside the observer. 1 16 
1 14 Sheldrake, 1995: 167, 209-2 10, emphasis mine. 
115 ibid.: 2 12-213, 224, emphasis mine. 
1 16 Reich, 1949/ 1973: 156- 157, emphasis mine. 
Dualist and non-systemic perspectives entail an essentially reductionist de- 
finition of epistemology - consequent to the notion of detached, objective and 
passive acquiring of information without involvement in the (life) process. A re- 
definition is therefore necessary: a non-dualist, systemic and integrative 
(holistic) epistemology as interrelational - a two-way process. It involves both 
the receiving and the conveying of knowledge, both the impression and the 
expression in all its cognitive, intuitive, emotional and sensual aspects - the 
(com-)prehension and communication. It is a metabolism, an exchange of 
energy with the environment. In other words, epistemology should not be only 
about getting the knowledge, but a give-and-take process - an expression of 
mutuality as an essential non-dualist attitude. 
The hypothesis of formative causation postulates a two wayflow of 
influence: fromfields to organisms and from organisms to fields. 1 17 
Emotionality is the most overt, or the least objectionable of the 
epistemological components which have been excluded within the paradigm of 
reductionist rationality 118. This obviousness is probably the chief reason why 
the lack of emotionality is the most implicative aspect of epistemological 
reductionism. Humans have decreasingly relied on the emotional means of 
knowledge and awareness, because emotions have been considered part of the 
inferior realm of the irrational. This attitude is reflected in the complete denial 
of emotionality by the dominant scientific paradigm of objective rationality. 
However, it is impossible to exclude emotions; only a suppression might be 
achieved, which nevertheless does not preclude their influence in interactions 
of scientific experimentation, just as in everyday life situations. 
Our capacity to create and to communicate passes through aflective and 
emotional channels as importantly as it does through the cognitive circuits 
exclusively privileged in the modem notion of rationality. [...I Affect no less 
than cognition provides us with consensually valid and trustworthy ways and 
means of addressing reality; openness to feeling affords insightful access to 
dimensions of experience that cannot be reached otherwise. 119 
1 17 Sheldrake, 1988: 1 10, emphasis mine. 
118 At the beginning of this subsection, I have identified the other epistemological 
components as sensual/sensitive, intuition, parapsychological/"psy- 
chic"/spiritual. 
119 Melucci and Chorover, op.cit.: 8 1 
The current science does not only deny emotions as  an allegedly unreliable 
epistemological component. In its mechanist approach, it is also incapable of 
truly accounting for the substance of the sensual and emotional qualities. 
Science only describes the physical properties or mechanisms that are 
associated or observed as coinciding with such qualities. The chemical or 
physiological processes cannot depict the feelings of joy or sorrow, or the 
sensation of yellow 120, or of a piano cord sound, or the sense of beauty. The 
current science only accounts for the indirect, "tangible" (behavioral) and 
measurable phenomena: 
Nowhere along [the] wayfiom the eye through the central organ to the 
arm muscles and the tear glands - nowhere, you may be sure, however far phy- 
siology advances, will you ever meet the personality, will you ever meet the 
dire pain, the bewildered wony within this soul, though their reality is to you 
so certain as though you suflered them yourself- as in actual fact you do! [ . . . I  
I have tried by simple examples [ . . . I  to contrast the two general facts (a) 
that all scienttjk knowledge is based on sense perception, and (b) that none 
the less the scientific views of natural processes formed in this way lack all 
sensual qualities and therefore cannot account for the latter. 121 
A significant consequence of these attitudes toward emotionality in general 
is that humans have learned to suppress and deny their feelings. This suppres- 
sion of emotionality has added to the development of the numbed sensitivity for 
natural processes within and without. This numbed sensitivity includes also 
the other means of (com-)prehension: the sensual, instinctual, intuitive and the 
sphere of the parapsychological ("psychic", or spiritual) ways of learning. 
Bergson defines intuition as  a contact with "the very inwardness of Zi$en, or 
'the key to vital operations" 122. Every human regularly uses intuitively 
obtained information, but is not aware of it because of predominance and high 
120 Ifyou ask a physicist what is his idea of yellow light, he will tell you that it is 
transversal electromagnetic waves of wavelength in the neighbourhood of 590 
millimicrons. I f  you ask him: But where does yellow come in? he wiU say: In my 
picture not at all, but these kinds of vibrations, when they hit the retina of a 
healthy eye, give the person whose eye it is the sensation of yellow. I. . . I  We may 
further ask: Is radiation in the neighbourM of wavelength 590pp the only one to 
produce the sensation of yellow? The answer is: Not at all. I f  waves of 760pp, which 
by themselves produce the sensation of red, are mixed in a demite proportion with 
waves of 535pp, which by themselves produce the sensation of green, this mixture 
produces a yellow that is indisturguishablefiom the one produced by 590pp. 
(Schr6dinger, 1956: 88-90) 
121 ibid: 45-47. 101-103 
122 Bergson, op.cit.: 176 
esteem that rational avenues to knowledge have had for such a long period of 
human development, and because of the related dualistic inferiorization of 
intuition as a sphere of the non-rational. Parapsychological avenues, on the 
other hand, attract exceptional attention because they are associated with 
much more spectacular effects than the everyday use of intuition. They are 
therefore assumed to be endowed upon rarely gifted individuals. Yet 
parapsychological phenomena are the same connectivity to "vital operations" as 
intuition, but the term parapsychology denotes that these phenomena are 
beyond the recognition of the mainstream. 
If we are inJuenced by morphic resonance fi-om particular individuals to 
whom we are in some way linked or connected, then it is conceivable that we 
might pick up images, thoughts, impressions, or feelings fi-om them I...] Such 
resonant connections would be possible even if the people involved were 
thousands of miles apart. I.. . I  The occurrence of telepathy, many people claim 
to have experienced themselves, and it has been detected in many parapsycho- 
logical experiments. This evidence is, of course, much disputed, largely 
because fi-om the conventional scient$c point of view telepathy, like the 
other alleged phenomena of parapsychology, is theoretically impossible. By 
oontrast, in the context of morphic resonance, it is  theoretically possibk. 123 
Specific parapsychological phenomena have been applied as practical 
techniques - most of them from immemorial times, like dowsing, which has 
recently been revived and given serious consideration by scientists 124. It has 
developed into a research of energies radiated from the Earth - geo-pathologi- 
cal and geo-positive - and, further, of human ability to receive information 
about their environment through energy connectivity. The tools, such as 
dowsing rods and pendulums (used traditionally in water-search) can actually 
confuse the understanding of the energy basis of dowsing (their function is just 
to amplify the energy transmission). The recent popularity of this 
parapsychological technique has given an important indication that such an 
ability to establish the energy connectivity with the environment might well be 
dormant in all humans. 
- - 
123 Sheldrake, 1988: 220-22 1, emphasis mine. 
124 For example: Yves-Andre Rocard (1 903- 1 992), French mathematician and 
physicist who contributed to the understanding of such diversefields of research 
as semiconductors, seismolwy, and radio astronomy; was head of the physics 
department at hole  Normale Superieure in Paris; in later years he concentrated 
on the scienhjk study of biomagnetism and dowsing. (Encyclopaedia Britannica) 
Kinesiology is another "technique" which achieves the same connectivity 
with vital processes - but without any intermediaries, so that the energy basis 
is clearly indicated. It utilizes "the innate intelligence of the bodyw 125: 
Through the use of muscle testing, the Kinesiologist can gain 
information about almost any part of the body, and about the body's response 
to any stimulus [. . . I ,  sensitivities to [. . .] foods, liquids and airborne and tactile 
allergens [. . . I  metal toxicity (e.g. mercury), environmental and geopathic 
stress, alcohol, tobacco, and food supplements. 126 
These "parapsychological techniques" are significant in epistemological con- 
text because they become pertinent in the search for the answer to a key 
question: How has some primeval intuitive knowledge been absorbed? How 
have humans come to "know", for example, which mushrooms are poisonous? 
By trial and error? By witnessing deaths and painstakingly learning from the 
fear of getting poisoned? This is the same epistemological issue as  the child's 
innate endowment to avoid a precipice 127. YOU can get a book about 
mushrooms (and still be quite uncertain whether your rational understanding of 
the written explanation will be reliable enough), or you can keep screaming at 
your child not to lean over. But the child's "knowledge", demonstrated by the 
Visual Cliff experiment - like the "knowledge" animals possess about 
mushrooms and myriad of such things - that knowledge is pre-rational: 
intuitive, instinctual, parapsychological. 
Rupert Sheldrake has devoted extensive research to issues of instinctive 
and other non-rational avenues of knowledge, both human and animal. One of 
125 La Tourelle and Courtenay, 1997: 9, emphasis mine 
126 ibid: 41, 44, emphasis mine. 
The Indicator Muscle Test involves using one muscle only as a biofeedback 
tool to gain information I...] it will weaken under light pressure when the stimulus 
is causing disorganization or imbalance in the client's system [...I It is thought 
that the reason for this is that, if the muscle is strong and there is no stress, the 
brain can cope simultaneously with the muscle test and the additional, non- 
stressful stimulus. I f ,  however, the stimulus causes some stress. [...I the brain 
prioritizes the stress and as a result, the indicator muscle instantly weakens. [. . .] 
This is sometimes referred to as 'asking the body' or 'intuitive muscle testing'. [...I 
Testug in the mouth, before the substance is digested, can provide an accurate 
result. [...I 50 per cent of the sensory and motor brain ceUs are devoted to the jaw 
area, ie.  50 per cent of the brain's messagesfilter through this area. (ibid: 50, 61) 
127 discussed in connection with the Visual Cliff experiment which I mentioned in the 
previous chapter - see between footnotes 21 and 23, and 26 and 27 in chapter 8 
the spectacular examples he discusses is the movement coordination 
performed by schools of fish, 
the "jZash expansion," so called because on f lm  it looks like a bomb bursting 
as eachJish Simultaneously darts awayfrom the centre of the school as the 
group is attacked. The entire expansion may occur in as little as one-fiftieth of 
a second, and theJish may accelerate to a speed of ten to twenty body lengths 
per second within that time. Yet theJish do not collide. Not only does eachJish 
know in advance where it will swim ifattacked, but it must also know where 
each of its neighbours will swim 128 
Such extraordinary capabilities - which make human "high-tech" attempts at 
similar control pitiful in comparison - seem utterly inexplicable from the 
current computational approach to intelligence. (Sheldrake indicates this 
approach in the quote above by presenting the circumstances intentionally - 
and ironically - in terms of the rationalist paradigm: fish "know in advance", 
etc.) His morphic resonance offers a different perspective: 
Ij however, the school is organized by a morphicfwld that embraces all 
the fish within it, the properties of this field could underlie the behaviour of 
the school as a whole and help account for the co-ordinated behaviour of the 
individualJish. I...] Flocks of birds, like schools of_tish, show such a 
remarkable coordination of their individual members that they too have 
been ompared to a single organism. 129 
This field interconnectivity is based on self-organization, or spontaneous 
order at the molecular level in conditions of high thermodynamic non- 
equilibrium, characteristic of life processes 130: 
Such a degree of order stemmingfrom the activity of billions of molecu- 
les seems incredible, and indeed. if chemical clocks had not been observed, no 
one would believe that such a process is possible. To change color all at once, 
molecules must haue a wag to "wmmunicate."The system has to act as a 
whole [...I which is of obvious importance in so many fields, from chemistry 
to neurophysiology. [...I 
The sensitivity of far-from-equilibrium states to externalfluctuations is 
another example of a system's spontaneous "adaptative organization" to its 
environment. 13 1 
Instinctual/intuitive/parapsychological modes of comprehension and 
communication are based on this essential sensitivity - which is a molecular 
property of matter in high non-equilibrium, or a quality of subtle energy: 
128 Sheldrake, 1988: 232 
129 ibid.: 233, emphasis mine 
130 See between footnotes 64 and 67 above. 
131 Prigogine and Stengers, op.cit: 147-148, 165, emphasis mine 
'Subtle energy*, refers to systems of energy within and around the body. 
[It] is synonymous with the Qi (pronounced chi) of Chinese acupuncture, and 
with the prana of traditional Indian medicine and philosophy; through the 
ages many other terms have been given to this universal li$e-$orce, the 
harmonious flow of which is vital to the health of mind and body. 
Although it has long been disregarded by modem medicine and science, 
the existence of subtle energy is coming to be much more widely accepted [. . .] 
partly due to the Western culture's acceptance of acupuncture. 132 
This sensitivity is the bodily knowledge about the individual's environment, and 
it is mediated through subtle (or orgone) energy. It is based in the organism, in 
bodily functions - the energy metabolism of the organism. And the primary 
sphere, the organ of sensitivity is the b o u n d q ,  the interface of eco-systemic 
connectivity and interactivity : 
Sensation is afunction - thefunction of a limiting membrane that 
separates the living systemjkom the surrounding orgone ocean. IThrough this 
membrane the orgonotic living body communicates with all other orgone 
systems. 133 
In other words, the contact surface between the inner and outer energy proces- 
ses - or between nature within and without - is the "instrument" of sensitivity. 
This essential characteristic is also confinned in tenns of Sheldrake's morphic 
resonance: 
According to the hypothesis of formative causation, the morphic fields 
that organize our behaviour are not confined to the brain, or even to the body, 
but extend bepnd it into the environment, linking the bodg bo the sunoundings 
in which it acts. 134 
From epistemological viewpoint, the most salient aspect of the concept of 
subtle (or orgone) energy is that it can be sensed within and without our bodies 
- because it is the same energy within and without 135. Sensitivity is thus the 
same for the processes in our body and in the surrounding eco-system. Sensi- 
tivity, therefore, establishes a tangible realization of the eco-systemic intercon- 
132 La Tourelle and Courtenay, op.cit.: 5-6, emphasis mine. 
In all these teachings [ancient Eastern alternative traditions] 'spiritual' 
energy is not separatefrom the body but immanent throughout it. [... It] is thought 
to run through the body along certain paths; and also to radiate out from the body 
into a wide energy field or 'aura' surrounding the body, This 'aura' I.. .I can connect 
us to other people and things [...I The structure which these traditions propose for 
energy movement in the body corresponds closely to that which Wilhelm Reich 
arrived at from a very d~fferent starting point in his psychotherapeutic work. 
(Goodison, op.cit.: 145. emphasis mine) 
133 Reich, 1949/ 1973: 80-81, emphasis mine 
134 Sheldrake, 1988: 197- 198, emphasis mine 
135 See quote at  footnote 116 above. 
nectedness - of our eco-systemic belonging and our interrelatedness with the 
social and natural environment. It is the crux of a different, integrated (or 
holistic), but also essentially post-objectivist epistemology 136 - one which 
includes both rational and other-than-rational modes of comprehension and 
communication. 
Sensitivity is one of the central concepts of this essay. As a substantial 
component of immanent spirituality, sensitivity is the key to an ecological 
consciousness. Ecological consciousness implies and presupposes an inner 
awareness, a sense that we are part of nature, that we breathe and pulsate 
together. Within the self-regulatory mechanisms, this sense operates without 
rational mediation - it is part of a biological process. Consequently, sensitivity 
is the crucial epistemological basis of individual responsibility for the social, 
biological and physical environment, and thus of an ecological culture. 
Humanists for thousands of years have attempted to construct a 
naturalistic, psychological value system that could be derivedfrom man's 
own nature, without the necessity of recourse to authority outside the human 
being himself. 137 
These attempts could be actually perceived a s  a quest to recover a lost 
ability- or a numbed faculty: the sensitivity for life processes within and 
without ourselves. 
There can be little doubt that animals have developed or not allowed to 
atrophy powers of identification and sensitivity that we humans have almost 
totally forgotten. 138 
The entire antipersonalist critique is grounded in a tragically bifurcated 
psychology that persists in pitting the ratwnal against the emotional, the 
intellectual against the instinctive, the analytical against the inspirational - 
an age-old warfare of the self against the self which remains the prime 
symptom of Wes tern society's dissociation of the sensibilities. 139 
Roszak characterizes this loss of sensitivity as  a consequence of the dualist 
construct of avenues to comprehension, which has had a prolonged impact on 
human development. He contends that this kind of world view is reproduced 
through the way we educate our children: 
136 See quotes at footnotes 107 and 108 above. 
137 Maslow. 1968: 149 
138 Fox, 1979: 166, emphasis mine 
139 Roszak, 1979: 74, emphasis mine 
The role Freud assigned to psychotherapy, that of patrolling the "boun- 
dary lines between the ego and the external world," remained unquestioned in 
the psychiatric mainstream until the last generation. Moreover, his convic- 
tion that the "external world" begins at the surface of the skin continues to 
pass as common sense in every major school of modern psychology. The "pro- 
cedure" we teach children for seeing the world this way is the pennissible rep- 
ms&n of cosmic empathy, a psychic numbing we have labeled "normal-" 140 
These statements indicate that humans most probably have not entirely 
lost this sensitivity - which Reich, in the quote above, defines as  an inherent 
function of organisms. Yet, the developmental distance might be too big 
between organisms in their "natural" state and humans that have undergone a 
lengthy process of alienation from their natural endowments (most of which are 
looked upon as atavisms - in the depreciative spirit of the dualist paradigm 
indicated by Roszak). The distance might imply that the "forgotten" ability is 
buried in the unfathomable depths of some primordial phases of anthropologi- 
cal evolution, and, therefore, hardly imaginable as  retrieved for use by modem 
humans. The following account (which I will reproduce here at some length) 
documents, however, an  actual experience of regaining such "powers", and - 
what is equally important - the process of losing them again in uncongenial 
environment and mode of life: 
My exposure to traditional magicians and seers was gradually sh~fting 
my senses; I became increasingly susceptible to the solicitations of non hu- 
man things.[..] Animals began to intercept me in my wanderings, as if some 
quality in my posture or the rhythmofmy breathing had disarmed their wari- 
ness; I w o u l d w  myself face to face with monkeys, and with large lizards 
that did not slither away when I spoke, but leaned forward in apparent curiosi- 
ty. In rural Java I ofen noticed monkeys accompanying me in the branches 
overhead, and ravens walked toward me on the road, croaking. [...I I found 
myself caught in a nonverbal conversation with this Other, a gestural duet 
with which my reflective awareness had very little to do. It was as if my body 
were suddenly being motivated by a wisdom older than my thinking mind [...I 
I returned to North America excited by the new sensibilities that had 
stirred in me - my newfound awareness of a more-than-human world, of the 
great potency of the land, and particularly of the keen intelligence of other 
animals, large and small, whose lives and cultures interpenetrate our own. I 
startled neighbors by chattering with squirrels, who swifly climbed down the 
bunks of trees to banter with me, or by gazing for hours on end at a heron 
_fishing in a nearby estuary [. . .] 
Yet very gradually, I began to lose my sense of the animals' own awareness. 
[...I I found myself now observing the heronfrom outside its world, [. . .] no lon- 
ger feeling its tensed yet poised alertness with my own muscles. And, strangely, 
the suburban squirrels no longer responded to my chittering calls. Although I 
wished to. I could no longer engage in their world as I had so easily done a few 
weeks earlier. for my attention was quickly deflected by internal wrbat deti- 
140 Roszak, 1995: 10- 1 1, emphasis mine 
berations of one sort or another, by a conversation I now seemed to cany on 
entirely within myself. The squirrels had no part in this conversation. [...I 
As the expressive and sentient landscape slowly faded behind my more 
exclusively human concerns, threatening to become little more than a n  
illusion or fantasy, I began to feel -particularly in my chest and my abdomen 
- as though I were being cut offfrom vital sources of nourishment. 1 4 1  
Of course, the extent of sensitivity that Abram attained (and lost again) 
might seem too extravagant to be considered a common goal for an  ecologically 
conscious humankind. Nevertheless, his example indicates that humans are 
capable of regaining the sensitivity for their eco-systemic environment (and use 
it in more "everyday" expressions) - when they get immersed in a congenial 
morphic field, to put it in Sheldrake's terms. Sheldrake has shown (on animal 
and human examples) that learning is also manifested a s  exposure to 
influences of increasing number of individuals who have already adopted or 
attained certain skills or behavior. He denotes these spheres of influence a s  
behavioral and social morphic fields. 
Behavioural jklds I...] co-ordinate the movements of animals primarily 
through imposing rhythmic patterns of order on the probabilistic activities of 
the nervous system I...] Even when animals learn new patterns of activity, 
they do so within a n  inherited framework of potentialities, and there is no 
sharp dividing line between instincts and learned behaviour, which depends 
on inherited capacities. I...] 
If the hypothesis of formative causation is correct, then it should be 
possible for the habit memories of one organism to influence another by 
morphic resonance, facilitatuzg the acquisition of the same habits. [. . .I Our 
learning of language and of physical and mental skills is facilitated by 
morphic resonancefrom many other people who have already learned them 
Several experiments have been carried out to test for this efect, with results 
that are consistent with the hypothesis of formative causation. [...I 
The morphic_fields of societies and cultures, like morphic_fields of other 
kinds, are stabilized by morphic resonance from previous similar systems. 
This principle sheds new light on the inheritance of social and cultural 
patterns, which is still very poorly understood. 142 
The current predominant cultural pattern (or social morphic field) is charac- 
terized by detachment from sensitivity. It is important to identify and examine 
the associated mechanisms that have initiated and perpetuated this detachment. 
In other words - how have we lost the natural sensitivity? I have already men- 
tioned Ralph Metmer's suggestion that it has been a kind of amnesia 143. His 
analysis explains it in terms of dissociation - which is a psychological concept 
141 Abrarn, 1995: 3 12-3 14, emphasis mine 
142 Sheldrake, 1988: 149- 150, 168, 196, 240-241, emphasis mine 
143 at footnote 27 above 
related to the more general notions of detachment and discomectedness that I 
have been indicating a s  a salient aspect of alienation in eco-systemic sense. 
The concept of dissociation [...I involves a "vertical" separation of 
strands of consciousness that may be equally well organized, rational, and in 
touch with reality. For example, the mental and emotional components of a 
painful experience may be dissociated, so that we remember what we saw and 
thought, but not what we (appropriately) felt; or conversely, a certain stimulus 
may trigger a feeling state of panic, but the cognitive memory of what 
happened remains dissociated. I...] I believe that this concept of dissociation 
or splitting provides a more accurate and more useful understanding of the 
collective human pathology vis-a-vis the environment than the notion of a 
repressed and primitive "ecological unconscious." 144 
However, he posits this explanation as  contrasted to Freudian and post-Freudian 
concepts of the subconscious and of repression 145. I find it unnecessary to per- 
ceive the two mental processes as  mutually exclusive. Metzner does not men- 
tion concrete post-Freudian names, but the concept of repression is primarily 
associated with the work of Wilhelm Riech, who gave it a profound psychoso- 
matic understanding, and - what is particularly important - exposed its social 
context in authoritarian and dorninational aspects of our culture. Reich develo- 
ped a comprehensive theory of repression manifested in bodily expressions 
which he termed "armoring" 146. But he did discuss it in terms of dissociation: 
Contactlessness, it tunzed out, is as general a phenomenon of neurosis as 
is the change of function of the instinct. I...] When an instinct is taken over by 
the ego for the purpose of gratijkation and it meets with a frustration, it can, 
as we pointed out, split up or dissociate. One part of it turns against itself 
(reaction formation); another part continues in the original direction toward 
the outer world. When this happens, however, the dynamic relations have 
changed. At the point where the [orgone energy] current directed toward the 
outer world and the current turned toward one's own ego diverge, a condition 
of paralysis or rigidity arises. 147 
Metzner seems to neglect the unavoidable social component in his discus- 
sion, and he ends up accounting for the dissociative processes without looking 
into any social causes. Presumably, he expects that a dissociation from 
sensitivity to nature can only be explained by traumatic experiences related to 
nature, so he seeks the causes exclusively in cosmic or earthly natural 
144 Metzner. op.cit.: 64. emphasis mine 
145 ibid.: 63 
146 See quote at footnote 117 in the previous chapter. 
147 Reich, 1933/ 1980: 3 12-3 13, emphasis mine 
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cataclysms (earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, epidemics, Atlantis etc. 148), which 
is an unconvincing hypothesis. On the other hand, Reich offers a clear 
demonstration of the mechanism of dissociation as  a consequence of 
"arrnoring". Such an etiology would go much further in explaining Metzner's 
own example of Nazi officials - or other individuals in their positions, that 
history, unfortunately and indicatively has had in abundance - who were able 
to accept the situation in which they would listen to Beethoven and play with 
children after the day's work of killing and torturing 149. But "arrnoring" as  a 
dissociative mechanism also elucidates the more everyday and the less overtly 
vicious manifestations of human disconnections and detachment from natural 
processes within and around their organisms. 
Metzner's rejection of repressive aspects of dissociation reflects the typical 
avoidance and denial of the social context 150. Thus he misses the entire 
essential connection between the dorninational culture and its dualistic 
underpinning on one hand, and on the other the multifarious alienation 
manifested also in the loss of sensitivity. I have elaborated upon these 
connections in the previous chapter referring also to the complex relationship 
between the repression and alienation of sexuality and sensuality, and dornina- 
tion over nature within and without humans 15 1. 
All this etiology points to what I think is best described as  "numbing" of hu- 
man sensitivity for natural strearnings, for pulsations of life energy within and 
without. The notion of numbness indicates that it is not an irretrievable loss. It 
Metzner, op.cit.: 62 
ibid.: 64 
See text and quotes between footnotes 8 and 11 above, and text before footnote 146 
in the previous chapter. 
[The human] must have felt rightfrom the beginning that his genital drive made 
him "lose control" and reduced him to a bit of streaming, convulsing protoplasm 
Here, the now well-known human orgasm anxiety may wel l  have originated. [...I In 
this manner, man "lost his paradise" (orgastic root in nature) and fell prey to "sin" 
(sexual perversion). He lost contact with one of his most m i d  roots in nature and 
thus with nature itself, not only in the sensory and emotional but also in the 
intellectual realm He could neither be in contact with nor understand nature, 
except in devious. mystical ways or by abstract reasoning. (Reich, 1951/ 1973: 284- 
285, emphasis mine). See also text and quotes between footnotes 102 and 104. and 
259 and 263 in chapter 8. 
is a dullness which is the basis of estrangement from humans' natural being, 
the being rooted in nature. This stiffness and inhibition might well be the 
sensuous core from which originate most forms of alienation and constraint 
that have developed and diversified as civilization evolved. This basic alienation 
is manifested essentially as derangement of natural self-regulatory 
mechanisms, and, consequently of individual responsibility and initiative. Reich 
puts the emergence of this numbing into developmental perspective: 
The witMrawa1 of sexual interest or the inhibition of an outwardly 
striving impulse is directly experienced as a growing feeling of "coldness," 
"numbness," "hardness," "deadness." I.. . I  At an early age not every feeling and 
desire can be expressed and articulated. The child m u s t m  some other way to 
appeal for understanding of the inexpressible psychic condition. But parents 
and teachers, being what they are, are seldom capable of divining what is 
going on in the child. In vain the child makes his appeal, until jinally he gives 
up the struggle for understanding and grows numb: "It's utterly useless." 152 
This apathy becomes a pervasive cultural trait which is one of the origins 
of authoritarianism and domination patterns in human relationships 153. It can 
also lead to mass-depression and helplessness which, according to Joanna 
Macy, defines the typical response (or lack thereof) to environmental problems: 
This state of absence or at best dulled human response to our world is 
called psychic numbing. [... It] produces self-doubt and cuts us o m o m  our 
deep subconscious sources of creativity. Separatedfiom our inner authority, 
we become more susceptible to panic and mob hysteria 154 
Psychic numbing is culturally supported - at the level of consumerism. 
which, in Melucci's brilliant insight, reveals the reproduction of disem- 
powerment for individual responsibility (and sensitivity is essentially significant 
as an epistemological basis for individual responsibility 155 and, consequently, 
ecological consciousness): 
In modenz society, the consumption of painkillers, tranquilizers, 
sedatives, and stimulants has reached astounding levels, accounting for the 
largest portion of the pharmaceutical industry's market share. [. . .]  
Pharmaceuticals [ . . . I  erase the existence of the ailmentfrom o w  minds. 
152 Reich, 1933/ 1980: 320-32 1 ,  emphasis mine 
153 See also quote at footnote 259 in the previous chapter. 
154 Macy. 1983: 13. See also (Macy, 1995), and the related issue of learned helplessness 
- in chapter 5, between footnotes 46 and 48. 
155 The body annor makes inaccessible the basic organ sensations, and with them the 
genuine feeling of well-being. The feeling of one's own body is lost and natural self- 
conwence with it. They are regularly replaced by fake, show-offappearances and 
false pride. (Reich, 1949/ 1973: 125) 
Where previously there was a presence, we create, mentaUy and aflectively, an 
empty space. This is the most important eflect of the pharmaceuticals, and it 
explains their massive, indiscriminate, and uncontrolled use. I...] The silence 
of the body thus represents the everyday counterpoint to its inordinate 
display in public. While body-related images and signs assail us from all 
directions, the only body that counts - ours - is consigned to silence. 156 
Yet, this prevailing presence of psychic numbing suggests that it is necessary 
on a mass-psychological level - that it fulfills a certain cultural role. I have 
already pointed out that "annoring" has been a necessary function developed in 
cultural evolution 157. That is the context in which evolved the anxiety because 
of the loss of control that Reich presented in the quote above. Furthermore, he 
suggested that the anxiety was engendered with the emergent consciousness in 
the context of dominational relationships: 
Reasoned thinking [...I slowly developedfrom the exact, sure contact 
between nature within and nature outside the orgonotic system. [...I Man 
slowly began to reason bgpnd his &ng orgonotic contact and harmony 
with nature [...I In thm about his own being andfunctioning, man turned 
involuntarily against himself, not in a destructive fashion, but in a manner 
that may well have been the point of origin of his annoring, [...I Just as in the 
well known fable, the miUipede could not move a leg and became paralyzed 
when asked and started thinking about which leg he puts 3rs t and which 
second, it is quite possible that the turning of reasoning toward itself induced 
the _first emotional blocking in man. [...I In attempting to understand himself 
and the s trearning of his own energy, man integered with it, and in doing so, 
began to armor and thus to deviatefiom nature. 1% 
This view is congruent with Bergson's concept of the (dialectic) divide 
between the two essential epistemological components - intuition and intellect. 
He argued that in the course of cultural evolution, the intellect emerged and 
developed "at the expense", so to speak, of the neglect of intuitive faculties. 
Intuition is mind itself, and, in a certain sense, life itsew the intellect 
has been cut out of it by aprocess resembling that which has generated matter. 
[...I Consciousness, in shaping itself into intelligence, that is to say in 
concentrating itself at _first on matter, seems to externalize itself in relation 
to itselj [ . . . I  
If consciousness has thus split up into intuition and intelligence, it is 
because of the need it had to apply itself to matter at the same time as it had to 
follow the stream of life. 159 
This divide has thus had its evolutionary function. But now that the negative 
aspects of rationalist reduction have become an impediment to further cultural 
156 Melucci, op.cit.: 77-78, emphasis mine 
157 between footnotes 257 and 259 in the previous chapter. 
158 Reich, 195 1/ 1973: 29 1-294, emphasis mine 
159 Bergson, op.cit.: 181. 178 
development, there must emerge, what Bergson suggested as a reunion of 
intellect and intuition - an integrated (holistic) epistemology: 
By developing also the other faculty, complementary to the intellect, we 
may open a perspective on the other half of the real. For, as soon as we are con- 
fronted with true duration, we see that it means creation [...] To intellect, in 
short, there will be added intuition. [. . .] A complete and perfect humanity 
would be that in which these two forms of conscious activity should attain 
theirfull development. I...] Thus [would be] revealed the unity of the spiritual 
lije. 160 
This integrated consciousness is the appropriate basis for an ethics pertinent 
to ecological culture 161. 
Ethical Issues: Eco-Systemic Responsibility and Joy 
An ethic pertinent to an ecological culture has to be defined - in consequen- 
ce to the discussion above - as an immanent ethic. Such a definition primarily 
entails a distinction between morality and ethic. Morality, or "moral dictum", 
connotes an external authority, while ethic is based on an internal sense, or 
consciousness. Etymologically, morality is derived from mores - habits of 
conduct - and ethic from ethos which means personal disposition. Thus, the 
delineation between morality and ethic is not so clear-cut 162 because a person 
can and often does internalize external moral directions (the habits of conduct). 
but the determinative criterion is individual responsibility, a reliance on perso- 
nal judgement and consciousness, independent of authoritarian imposition. 
Immanent ethics is based on immanent spirituality which is not grounded in 
authoritarian and dominational relationships. 
A major consequence of the idea of an immanent spirituality is that the 
notion of 'superior beings' comes severely into question. [ . . . I  A spirituality 
whose activity centres on a tree rather than a cathedral allows afreer access 
to the partxipants to establish their own connection with what they 
160 ibid.: 342-3, 267, 181 
161 Virtue-based concepts such as care, respect, gratitude, sensitiv*, reverence and 
friendship seem more applicable. [ . . . I  They are moral Ifeelings' but they involve 
both cognitive elements, ethical elements and emotion in ways that do not seem 
separable. (Plumwood, op.cit.: 183) 
162 See the paragraphs around footnote 3 1. 
experience as a source of strength, without it being diverted through an autho- 
rity structure. It also allows greater equality among the participants. 163 
Immanent ethic and its immanent spiritual basis emerge from the decon- 
struction of domination and its dualist underpinning, and, therefore, do not 
imply external physical or metaphysical entities as  determinants of human life. 
Immanent ethic is not based on dualistic transcendentalism, and is not defined 
by institutionalized spirituality or institutionalized (authoritarian, imposed) 
morality - a "higher" sphere of supreme, eternal consciousness. It is defined by 
an ecological consciousness which implies individual responsibility based on 
sensitivity for the individual's environment (natural, social and spiritual). 
With nature, as with the human sphere, the capacity to care, to experien- 
ce sympathy, understanding and sensitivity to the situation and fate of 
particular others is an index of our moral being. 164 
The immanent spiritual basis of ethic ensues from the integrated 
epistemology - from united (non-dualized) cogmtive and sensual, emotional and 
intuitive components of comprehension and expression. 
Throughout most of the development of civilization, truth has been a 
"loaded" concept. It has two basic connotations - as  a moral category (in the 
sense of external moral dictum), and as  a category of scientific objectivity 165. 
As a judicial category, truth is, in the current cultural pattern, essentially 
defined by the previous two meanings. All of these approaches to determining 
truth bypass individual responsibility - which is an entirely consequent 
situation in the dominational and authoritarian culture. However, in a post- 
dominational and post-objectivist context, truth becomes a category of 
immanent ethic - based on immanent spirituality and integrated epistemology. 
Truth is a naturalfinction in the interplay between the Living and that 
which is lived. I...] It develops as long as the organism maintains its unitary 
functioning, which meansfill orgonotic sensing. I.. .] 
Truth, basically, is not, as many believe, an ethical ideal. It became an 
ethical ideal when it was lost with the loss of [.. .I the full functioning of the Li- 
ving in Man. Then truth was suppressed and the ideal mirror image of truth 
seekmg appeared. Neither is truth something to be striven for. You do not stri- 
p p 
163 Goodison, op.cit.: 248 
164 Plumwood, op.cit.: 185 
165 I have presented a deconstruction of scientific objectivity between footnotes 102 
and 1 16 above. 
ve to make your heart beat or your legs move, and you do not, by the same to- 
ken, "strive" for or seek truth. Truth is in you and works in you just as your 
heart or your eyes work, weU or badly, according to the condition of your 
organism. 166 
Truth is often described as  a "gut feeling" 167. Thus defined, it presents a 
ground for individual responsibility - because with this meaning of truth, there 
is no lying, only suppression or selfdeception. One cannot lie to one's own body: 
Some branches of Kinesiology use an Indicator Muscle Test to assess 
emotional factors. When a person says, truthfully, 'My name is so-and-so', the 
muscle will remain strong; if a false name is given, it will weaken. [...I This 
principle can be used to access information from the unconscious mind. [...I 
For example, the practitioner or client might make the statement, 'The fear of 
water started between the years 20-1 5 . . . 15- 1 0 . . . 10-5 . . .' and so on, until the 
exact age is identijkd by a change in the muscle response. 168 
It is necessary to reiterate that, of course, in the context of the integrated 
epistemology, the inclusion of the "gut feeling", or intuitive "hunch", does not 
exclude the rational sources of information which complement the integral 
sense of truth. Furthennore, this means that truth is related to sensitivity for 
natural processes within and without, to the sense of eco-systemic comected- 
ness and belonging. Therefore it is a ground for the individual's responsibility 
for her/his social and natural environment. It is a basis for an immanent ethic: 
Truth means full  contact with oneself as well as with the environment. 
[... It] is inextricably bound up with Life's energy economy. 169 
The comotational framework of such an  eco-systemic consciousness 
involves a deconstruction of all the dualized notions related to the categories of 
morality and ethic. Thus, eco-systemic consciousness or ethic is beyond the 
duality of anthropocentric or ecocentric definitions 170. From a post-dualist 
viewpoint, the current preference for remote, global issues a s  objects of 
environmental concern by ecologically conscious (and ecocentrically-minded) 
166 Reich, 195 1 / 1980: 167- 168, emphasis mine 
167 7h th  comes from the guts, from our viscera and not exclusively from the head. 
Descartes' defiition of truth as "clear and distinct ideas" does violence to our 
intuitions and deep feelings which are equally important avenues of insight and 
awcveness. (Fox, 1979: 97-98, emphasis mine) 
168 La Tourelle and Courtenay,op.cit.:65. For the kinesiological background see a t  
footnotes 124 and 125 above. Also. see in this light the paragraph about health 
before footnote 23 in this chapter. 
169 Reich, l%l/ 1980: 169- 170 
170 discussed in the previous chapter between footnotes 41 and 43, and between 50and 54 
citizens reads as one of the consequences of the misinterpreted conception, or 
dualized construct of the antropocentrism/ecocentrism divergence. Typically 
people are more readily womed about spotted owls, or penguins, or famine in 
Africa because of the imposed monoculture economy, or about other problems 
distant from their own back (and front) yard - than about the consumption 
patterns and waste management of their own life processes (in the integral 
sense - both within and without), their own internal and external metabolism of 
matter and energy, and its inclusion in natural cycles or renewal 171. 
Again, when a situation is presented which typically tends to be interpre- 
ted from an either/or (dualist) mind-frame, it is necessary to emphasize that 
these noble (and absolutely vital) concerns are not devaluated if an (eco-)syste- 
rnic approach is suggested. This approach starts with the basic level of inter- 
action between the individual and her/his immediate social and natural environ- 
ment, and from there it inevitably implies the interrelatedness with broader le- 
vels of eco-systemic complexity. In other words, the best (and the most active) 
way of exerting the care for species (human and animal) endangered by unsus- 
tainable practices is to apply sustainability in one's own interaction with the 
environment 172. 
Unfortunately, the profound alienation of the current institutionalized cul- 
ture, and the resulting disempowerrnent and helplessness, induce wide-spread 
discouragement of such "think globally, act locallyw-approach. Consequently, it 
is most often deemed futile. 
The essential basis of this cultural pattern is the dualized construct of 
individuality versus commonality. It entails an interest-based morality: the 
individual against communal interest, the self against the common. An ethical 
position is established by negotiation of conflicting and competing interests, 
171 Many people interested in thefuture of our nation and our planet may have only a 
"headline news" awareness of environmental problems. (Switzer, 1994, vii) See 
also the quote at footnote 82 in chapter 6. 
172 I have elaborated this approach in the earlier chapters of this essay. 
which is consequent to the underlying dominational patterns of human 
relationships 173. 
The current definition of self-interest is based on "rational economic man", 
and the "rationality" is supposedly determined regardless of common (social 
or/and environmental) interests. Thus, self-interest is identified with 
selfishness and greed. 
In such a perspective any ethical issue based on the fact that the self- 
interested person is sel@sh becomes immaterial, and the word "self- 
interested" is seen as equivalent to the words 'rational" or "purposeful." [...] 
We do not know what he wants. But we do know that, whatever it is, he will 
maximize ruthlessly to get it. 174 
This relation between self-interest and selfishness presents a major 
conflict. It is commonly understood in the dualist either/or mode that two 
ethical alternatives offer themselves: utilitarianism or deontology. That is to 
say, one will either accept to be selfish and greedy because it is an inevitable 
consequence of pursuing and maximizing one's utility, or will adopt a 
"disinterested moral obligation" regardless of self-interest (which is the 
definition of deontology). Deontology is typically interpreted as  a dualist 
category. A s  it is usually related to environmental ethics, environmental 
interests are posited a s  exclusive of any individual, or self-interest. 
Consequently, it always appears that a safer moral attitude is to manifest one's 
environmental concerns toward the issues which present no suspicion of 
possible self-interest. From there stems the preference for remote and 
personally unrelated environmental problems, like endangered species and 
threatened Third-World populations. 
Furthermore, deontology is invariably beyond the individual's own "gut-felt" 
sense of ethos, because it is by definition an external moral dictum, a duty 
which implies a transcendental imperative. The deontological opposite to self- 
interest is often belabored in the language of higher, nobler, elevated purposes: 
173 I have discussed the related pluralist/behaviorist approach in connection with 
domination-based politics - in chapter 8, between footnotes 177 and 180. 
174 Lutz and Lux, 1988: 94-95. See also quote at footnote 92 in chapter 8, and text and 
quotes between footnotes 3 and 5 in chapter 4. 
Deontology [...I sees human beings as subject to "binding duties" [deon in 
Greek). The result is a continuous sbuggle between a nobler and a more 
debased self; between moral commitments and urges. Kant is the leading 
deontologist; we draw here on some of his positions to indicate the ethical 
basis for a new economics and, more generally, a new social science. 175 
- 
175 Etzioni, 1990: 221, emphasis mine. This reflects a typical dualist mind-frame - see 
text and quotes between footnotes 30 and 32, and between 33 and 34 above. 
176 Lutz and Lux, op.cit.: 96, emphasis mine 
177 See text between footnotes 82 and 83 above, and footnotes 18 and 19 in chapter 2. 
178 See also text and quotes between footnotes 67-72 in chapter 4. 
179 Val Plumwood defines dualism as  'the construction of a devalued and sharply 
demarcated sphere of otherness. " (Plumwood, op.cit.: 41) 
180 ibid.: 32 
Rationality, whether sel@sh or not, is about a single-se& the interests 
and purposes of that self. As long as we do not admit another and higher phase 
of our self there cannot be a higher purpose, a higher force, and a higher-order 
preference ordering [...I what economic orthodoxy ends up denying: the 
possibility of an inner conJict I...] between two incommensurable interests, 
one of the ego-se& the other of the higher [and more idea0 se& 176 
This counter-position of self- versus common-interest presents a dialectic 
tension, related to the (eco-)systemic contrast between the integrity of the indi- 
vidual system and its belonging and interrelatedness to more inclusive systems, 
to broader levels of complexity and interaction 177. From the systemic view- 
point, however, this dialectic tension does not imply a mutual exclusion (charac- 
teristic for dualist positions) of individual and common (or communal) interests. 
Rather, the systemic interrelations entail an interconnectedness of interests. 
Lutz and Lux cannot perceive this issue in such a non-dualist frameworkl78. 
Thus they subscribe to the principal cleavage of dualistic morality: selfishness 
versus altruism. 
Altruism denotes "devotion to welfare of others", and the term is derived 
fi-om alter (the other). This terminological and etymological definition lends itself 
to the typical dualist interpretation - the dualized otherness 179. Thus, 
emerging from the dualist world view, altruism is identified with self- 
sacrifice and self-denial. 
Dualism is a process in which power forms identity, one which distorts 
both sides of what is split apart, the master and the slave, the colonizer and 
the colonized, the sadist and the masochist, the egoist and the self-abnegating 
altruist [...I 180 
The "self-abnegating" altruist is a product of the characteristic dualist strategy 
of reversal. The inherent contemptuous construction of the other as  the 
inferiorized, devaluated and, consequently, subordinated sphere, is thereby 
perceived as a morally unacceptable position, so the only available procedure 
within the dualist paradigm is the reversal: (an often hypocritical) "devotion to 
welfare of others" by self-sacrifice and self-denial. 
Altruism has come to mean in common usage the love of another at the 
expense of onesew Instead of loving others as we love ourselves, the 
degenerated use of the term "altruism" implies that we love others instead of 
loving ourselves. If this be the operative meaning of altruism today, then 
compassion is surely not altruistic. [...I In loving others I am loving myself 
and indeed involved in my own best and biggest andfullest self-interest. 181 
Self-sacrifice and denial (dualistic altruism) has been uncritically adopted for 
the basis of environmental morality, where it is manifested as a recommended 
resolution of the conflict between consumption and environmental concern. Fru- 
gality (or self-sacrifice/denial) is thus perceived as  a (dualized) opposite of con- 
sumption. The typical expression of such moral precept is the diet-metaphor: 
One of the most prevalent views is that we must dramatically change our 
consumption patterns - the so called conservation alternative - simply to go 
on energy diet. 182 
A sustainable society is also likely to require a return to many Puritan 
virtues such as simplicity of living styles and conservation practices. 183 
There are also some ethical _first principles indicating the desirability of 
a steady state. Nearly all traditional religions teach man to conform his soul 
to realm by knowledge, selfdiscipline, and restraint on the multiplication of 
desires, as well as on the lengths to which one will go to satisfy a desire. 184 
This approach proposes a (dualistic) remedy within the consumer culture, 
without seeking an alternative. Earlier, I presented a departure from the 
passive position of consumers as the transition to full awareness of, 
involvement in and responsibility for the technological sequence - the exchange 
of matter and energy with the environment and the inclusion into natural cycles 
181 Fox. 1979: 33-34, emphasis mine 
182 Switzer, op.cit. : 146, emphasis mine 
183 Platt, 1977: 277, emphasis mine. Again, the preference for sensitivity-based 
responsibility over imposed morality does not imply that the present consumer 
culture, particularly in the regions most wasteful of matter and energy resources 
like North America, should not adopt comprehensive conservation programs. 
184 Daly, 1977: 113, emphasis mine 
of renewal 185. Furthermore, the diet metaphor offers a negative motivation. 
The alternative is to turn towards wholesome and full richness of life in all of 
its aspects - material and spiritual fulfillment, the bodily and the mind, 
freedom and love. All that is feast, not diet in comparison with the miserable 
life of dependency upon institutionalized irresponsibility, of slaving to 
competitive, exhaustive, greedy, empty, never satisfymg devouring of material 
commodities, and of constant fear of ecological and human destruction 186. 
Self-sacrifice and denial, and dualist altruism have to be perceived as a 
give-and-take issue 187. Throughout the evolution of dualism-based cultures, 
unconditional giving, as  an expression of self-sacrifice, has been praised as  a 
model of morality. On the other hand, in the current consumer culture, taking 
disproportionately exceeds giving, so there is more and more squandering. 
dissipating, devouring, and less and less creativity - far more entropy, than 
ektropy 188. AS a result, many people are inclined to think, more than ever, 
that only a dualized opposite to consumption would be an ethical ideal. 
Dualized concept of give-versus-take - as  an expression of the related 
either/or logic - is deconstructed when the (eco)-systemic perspective is 
applied 189. Giving and taking can be conceived of only as complementary 
processes - a dialectical simultaneity of ektropy and entropy, an eco-systemic 
185 See text in chapter 6 between footnotes 30 and 3 1,  and between 109 and 1 13, and in 
chapter 7 between 42 and 44, and between 65 and 67. 
186 You devour your happiness. [...I You can only ladle in and only take, and cannot 
create and cannot give, because your basic bodily attitude is that of holding back 
and of spite; because panic strikes you when the primordial movement of LOVE and 
of GMNG stirs in you. This is why you are afraid of giving. (Reich, 1948/ 1979: 45) 
187 I have already discussed it in chapter 7 - between footnotes 56 and 58. 
188 The issue of entropy and ektropy issue is elaborated in chapter 3 - see between 
footnotes 37 and 38,40 and 41, 52 and 54, and between 66 and 67. 
189 The mechanist cannot reconcile "society" and "individual," [...I He will gSe 
priority to the interests of society or to those of the individual. While he knows 
that the interests of society are conditioned by gratiAing the interests of the 
individuals, and vice versa, his thinking and acting are invariably a question of 
either/or. This produces the sharp contrast between state and individual, which in 
this form is insolvable and irreconcilable. (Reich, l949/ 1973: 105-106, emphasis 
mine). See in this context the Tragedy of the Commons issue - between footnotes 60 
and 62 in the previous chapter. 
interaction of the individual with her or his environment, the exchange of 
energy. Giving and taking, or gain and loss, are the essence of creativity. 
Ihe whole universe is ruled by this cycle of give and take, absorb and ref- 
lect, gmu and die, wncentrate cosmic power and dissipate it again into the 
great cosmic ocean [. . .I  
In this manner Life reproduces, maintains itself and grows endlessly. 
Not so, armored man He became a one-waydeadend-mad. 190 
Give-and-take metabolism is impaired by "armoring" 191. Therefore 
"armored" humans produce an imbalance of entropy. Unsustainable processes 
stem from self-interest as  one-way taking. 
On the other side, the giving-only is a dualized mirror image of self- 
interest. It is the expression of self-sacrifice and self-denial, which have a 
deeply authoritarian basis. They manifest a passive exertion of power by moral 
blackmail - inducing the feeling of guilt and sinfulness as  a principal ground 
for power over people. The self-abnegating mechanism and its authoritarian 
underpinning are culturally reproduced, primarily by mothers who - as a 
consequence of their position in the patriarchal/dominational culture 192 - are 
the main purveyors or self-sacrifice and self-denial. 
Lucy Goodison suggests the alternative view of systemic interdependence 
of giving and taking: 
Any mother who has spent hours and days taking care of her children 
knows that if she does not have time to withdraw, to take care of herselfand 
enrich her sense of self, she will eventually have nothing left to give. 193 
However, the overwhelming majority of mothers is utterly unaware of this 
perspective, and is immersed in dualistic culture which glorifies sacrifice and 
suffering for others' sakes. 
This authoritarian underpinning points at another immensely consequential 
dualistic construct, resulting from imposed morality - the split of freedom and 
(ecological) responsibility into competing opposites. The essential cleavage 
where this split is manifested is the confrontation of individuality and 
190 Reich, 195 1 / 1980: 39-40, emphasis mine. 
191 also indicated by the quote in footnote 185 above 
192 See between footnotes 144 and 145 in chapter 8. 
193 Goodison, op.cit: 256 
commonality - the dualization in which interest-based morality is grounded (as 
pointed out above). Morality is thus identified with self-sacrifice, or denial of 
individuality - with restriction of individual freedom, which is perceived as 
incompatible with, or as a dualized opposite of common interest. 
It is indicative of the dualist attitude to freedom that prison is used as a 
pertinent metaphor. An essentially life-negative situation is evoked to illustrate 
conditions which should clarrfy the key issues of freedom in the context of 
morality: the explication of the conflict between individuality and communality, 
between the self-interest and the common interest: 
If there is an agreement to team up with each other, each prisoner has to 
choose to either cooperate and do his proper share, or else gain at the expense 
of the other - to get something (instantfreedom) for nothing (no penalties for 
his cheating). mis  selJish desire to gain while letting the other(s) foot the bill 
goes by the name of being a 'Pee rider. " In contrast, the choice not to exploit 
the opportunity, the refusal tofree ride, is what cooperation is aU about. It is 
intrinsically linked to setf-denial, not self-interest. I...] Only ij men were 
actuated by moral s e t f m ,  could they serve the interest of the whole 
human race. 194 
This is known as the "prisoner's dilemma" parable, and it presents cooperation 
as identified with self-denial or self-sacrifice, and freedom as a dualized 
opposite of responsibility. 
If the dualist (and consequently dorninational) conceptual framework is not 
deconstructed, the only possible resolution of the confrontation between 
individuality and commonality is perceived as recourse to curbing and 
restricting the sphere of individuality and the individual's freedom. I have 
discussed before Kropotkin's argument against the common assumption that 
people are inherently inclined to asocial behavior unless an authoritarian 
structure is instituted to control them 195. Kropotkin's concept of mutual aid, 
and the anthropological and zoological evidence he provided about its evolu- 
tionary signikance, indicate that cooperation is a natural, or instinctual faculty 
- akin to sensitivity for eco-systemic interrelatedness between individuals and 
their social and natural environment. In other words, responsibility is a sense, 
like the "gut-feeling" of truth, and it can be perceived in the same way as 
194 Lutz and Lux, op-cit.: 8 1. emphasis mine. 
195 See text and quote between footnotes 18 and 21 in the previous chapter. 
inherent in an undisturbed functioning of life processes in the organism 196 - 
an expression of the individual's freedom in the most basic sense. 
Freedom, therefore, cannot be an opposite to responsibility. Freedom 
means having responsibility. 
When a person unjustly deprived of responsibility - by being declared in- 
competent to manage his fiances or stand trial- is restored to responsibili- 
ty, we do not say that he has been "responsibilitated," because there is no such 
word. Instead, we think of such a person also as having been liberated, which 
is true, since depriving a person of responsibility is one of the most effective 
ways of depriving him of liberty as well. I.. .I Modem psychiaby dehumanizes 
man by denying - on the basis of spurious scientiJc reasoning - the existence, 
or even the possibility, of personal responsibility. But the concept of personal 
responsibility is central to the concept of man as moral agent. 197 
The connection between denial of responsibility and freedom points to Kropot- 
kin's argument that authoritarian regulation results in reproduction of 
irresponsibility and asocial behavior, rather than promotion of individual 
responsibility 198. 
A monk named Pelagius I...] believed that I.. .I denial of free will only ser- 
ved to just[& and reinforce the predatory and licentious behavior of people 
and that insistence upon the innate impotence of human nature was an uncon- 
scionable attempt to evade social responsibility. [...I Obviously, by asserting 
the possibility of individual responsibility, Pelagian doctrine threatened the 
survival of a church predicated upon the need for institutionally authorized 
redemption. I . .  .I Pelagius was o-ly condemned as a heretic [. . .I 199 
In the context of conventional'enwonrnental morality, responsibility (if it is 
at  all brought to attention as  a salient issue) is considered achievable only by 
restriction of individual freedom. And freedom is perceived in the dualist mode 
- as pursuit of self-interest. Moral obligation (environmental or other) is thus 
posited as  oppositional to freedom. Freedom is interpreted - consequently to 
the current culture dominated by the profit/utility-maximizing economy - as  
economic irresponsibility (disregard of social and enwonmental consequences). 
This dualist position is maintained to keep unresolved the present disharmony 
between economy and ecology 200, and to retain the domination paradigm 
196 See Reich's quote at footnote 165 above. 
197 Szasz, 1970: 44, 1 1, emphasis mine. 
198 See text and quote between footnotes 24 and 26 in chapter 8. 
199 Chorover, 1979: 18-19, emphasis mine. 
200 See text and quotes between footnotes 30 and 34 in chapter 4. 
within which the discord is continuously addressed (but never resolved) by 
litigation, i.e. institutionally enforced morality. 
Some seem to believe that, if we relaxed and werefreefrom moral 
pressure, we would not care. I...] A relied morality would be unnecessary ifwe 
were still in touch with the sense of belonging and of self-regulation which are 
possible, but neglected, faculties in our organisms. 201 
Goodison indicates the sensual aspect of an ecological ethic (that I 
presented above) within her concept of immanent spirituality. On the other 
hand, dualistic ground for morality and ethic is constructed on a concept of 
spirituality a s  an external, transcendental sphere of moral power over humans 
in their "earthly state of being" (or embodiment). Alternatively, an ethic perti- 
nent to the concept of immanent spirituality is based on immanent, i.e. internal 
sense of the individual's interrelatedness to her/his social, natural (and cosmic) 
environment - on an eco-systemic consciousness. Such an understanding 
presents a liberation from the domination of external transcendental spheres or 
entities. And, most importantly, it also entails a re-connection of freedom and 
responsibility, and empowers us to have both in our own lives. 
However, the pervasive human disempowerment to take responsibility has 
been a long-lasting historical burden (as I have pointed out in the previous 
chapter). It is continuously manifested in authoritarian dependence on imposed 
morality, and in defending such dependence: 
The armored person perceives himself and the world as complicated 
because he has no immediate contact, no straightforward relationship to the 
world around him The secondary result is that over the years this world 
becomes actually complicated. Since these complications make an ordered 
existence impossible, artificial rules in "human intercourse" emerge: rigid 
mores, customs, rules of etiquette, diplomatic maneuvers. 
No unarmored person would have the impulse to vomit or pass wind in the 
presence of others. Hence it would never occur to him to advise or demand 
obedience to the rules of society that one must not vomit in the presence of 
others or yield toflatulence. The armored person, however, is full of such 
impulses. It i s m m  his own sowce of secondary driues that he derives the 
rules and ethical customs against them 202 
Reich's analysis (based on his therapeutic experience) shows the dependence 
on external authority as  a result of dissociation - the disruption of sensitivity to 
life processes within and without. From there stems the rampant fear of free- 
201 Goodison, op.cit.: 269 
202 Reich, l949/ 1973: 72-73, emphasis mine. 
dom (and of responsibility) which presents an impasse - a principal obstacle to 
an ecological ethic based on identity between freedom and responsibility. 
A demandingfreedom does not lead everyone toward autonomous self- 
realization. There are those for whom the experience ends in willing 
submission to some form of spiritual or therapeutic fascism [...I Where 
human identity is thrown into radical doubt, we walk the razor's edge between 
thefullfreedom of realized personhood and the treacherous security of a new 
collective enslavement. 203 
Self-sacrifice and denial are essentially manifestations of the fear of 
freedom, and it is expressed as  denial of the bodily, the sensual, the emotional, 
the intuitive, and particularly the sphere of sexuality. These attitudes are 
consequential to the dualist mind set which suppresses everything related to 
body and nature 204. 
It is hard to appreciate the deeply debilitating effect this mind/ body split 
has upon our self-respect and our ability to use ourfull power to act in the 
world. If we believe that no unequivocal good can comefrom the body, it 
becomes extremely hard for us to take our experienced needs and desires 
seriously or to act on the basis of them [. ..I Hence, to work with a model in 
which spirituality is immanent in, and expressed through, the body is a way 
in which we can make some return to a concept of wholeness. 205 
In cultures defined by the dualist world view, self-denial and sacrifice primarily 
mean denial of pleasure - and more than anythmg, the pleasures related to the 
body. Therefore these cultures have developed suffering as the most 
acceptable, the most cherished criterion of eligibility for moral standing 205 
while any expression of bursting, joyful, life-affirmative attitudes is very likely 
to be looked upon with suspicion by most moralists. What is that? The 
Christian inheritance? Masochism? Hypocrisfl We seem to be immersed in a 
suBero, ergo sum! paradigm. 
Pity and suffering have for a very long historical period been the appropri- 
ate pretext for moral claims. Consequently, ecological awareness is now still 
almost exclusively presented in this negative mode - essentially based on an  
203 Fb~zak, 1979: 3 18-3 19 
204 See text and quotes between footnotes 29 and 33 above. 
205 Goodison, op.cit.: 148- 149 
206 Peter Singer [...I suggests that 'no matter what the nature of the being, the principle 
of equality requires that its suffering be counted equally with the like suffering - 
in so  far as rough comparisons can be made - of any other being'. (Midgley, 1983: 
89) This quote is related to text between footnotes 46 and 48 in the previous 
chapter. 
underlying attitude toward suffering a s  prefered evidence of morality. This 
attitude is manifested in two aspects. One is the cataclysmic view at  environ- 
mental issues. It also shows how fear is more effective than life-positive emo- 
tions as a motivation for environmental (and generally moral) concerns - which 
are more easily instigated upon the fear of ecological and environmental disas- 
ters, than upon a vision of better life conditions. The other aspect of the suf- 
fero-ergo-sum-basis of the current mode of ecological awareness is the unneces- 
sary lack of comfort provided or promised by most alternative technologies - 
presumably a form of suffering to appease the guilt feeling, and to atone for the 
damage generally inflicted upon natural environment and the eco-system. 
In the standard vision of ecological consciousness, there is no joy of life. 
Unless transcendence, as  salvation from and reward for earthly suffering, is 
accepted as a source of joy, and as an essential sublimation of ecologically- 
minded being - which is Ken Wilber's position in his book about ecology as  a 
world view 207. Such a life-negative perspective can be connected to ecology 
only by a tremendous stretch of cerebral speculation. As I have comprehensi- 
vely argued throughout this chapter, ecology is a concept inherently defined by 
immanence. And that means a re-connection of dualized notions of spirituality 
and nature (within humans and without), an overcoming of the dualization of 
body and spirit, and re-inclusion of sensual and sexual aspects of life into a 
dignified sense of being. Ecological consciousness, therefore, entails an 
immanent ethic of joy as an ultimate expression of liveliness 208. 
207 Let the Earth and Cosmos and Worlds dissolve, and see Spirit still shining in the 
Emptiness, never arising, never dissolving, never blinkuzg once in the worlds of 
created time. 'That joy, " says Teresa, "is greater than aU the joy of earth, and 
greater than all its delights, and all its satisfactions; and they are apprehended, 
too, very d~fferently, as I have learned by eqerience." (Wilber, 1995: 293) 
208 Consciousness wmes about t h m u g h h  I.. .I Indeed one of Uze reasons why 
Aquinas preferred Aristotle over Plato was that the former was less suspicious of 
pleasure. Aristotle refutes Plato's arguments against pleasure [...I though of course 
i f  is necessary to distinguish authenticfiom inauthenticpleasures. (Fox, 1992: 34, 
emphasis mine) 
Some scholars have described Minoan lve as "perfectly expressive of the idea 
of homo ludens" - of "man" expressing our higher human impulses through joyful 
and at the same time mythically meaningfid ritual and artistic play. Others have 
tried to sum up Cretan culture with words and phrases like "sensitivity, " 'brace of 
life," and "love of beauty and nature." (Eisler, 1987: 32) It is difficult to assert that 
This essay can be perceived a s  a consequent endeavor to present an  eco- 
logical culture as  a life-positive alternative, a liberatory vision which offers the 
possibility of more joyous ways of life 209. However, the principal appraisals of 
the current culture, as  well as  the typical environmental and ecological 
projections, are mostly rendered in grim and grey terms. The cataclysmic 
preoccupations of environmental warnings induce an  overwhelming feeling of 
despair 210. The entire postmodernist critique of our social reality casts a 
shadow of pessimism and hopelessness: 
Nothing remains for us to base anything on. 21 1 
And, generally, the deconstruction of the present cultural patterns - which is a 
necessary prerequisite for an insight into possible alternatives - reveals a gloo- 
my picture. As I have emphasized earlier 212, deconstruction needs to be succe- 
eded by reconstruction, by a new, positive vision. However, from the current 
cultural environment, characterized by the suflero-paradigm, it is much easier, 
and seemingly much more acceptable to present and critique the negative 
aspects. It is not so easy to offer projections and visions because they tend to 
be perceived as  naive unless they spell gloom and doom. It is not easy to write 
about joy. One feels it is somewhat out of place in a "serious" treatise to show 
life-positive feelings like enthusiasm, joy, hope. There is an  acceptable form 
where these feelings are (or at least used to be) comfortably sublimed - art. 
The breadth of human-ecological perspective necessitates an  integration 
not only of natural and social sciences, but, even more importantly, of sciences 
such a reconstruction can reflect a remote historic reality, but this is certainly a 
vision worth pursuing in the emergent cultural evolution. 
209 The classic Blueprint for Survival states that an important condition of a stable 
and sustainable society is also b social system in which the individual can eyoy, 
rather than feel restricted by the conditions of a stable society". (Goldsmith et al., 
1972: 23) 
210 See quote at footnote 153 above, and text around footnote 48 in chapter 5. 
211 Baudrillard, 1976: 4-5. See also quotes at footnotes 13 and 14 above. 
212 See text and quote between footnotes 15 and 18 above. 
and art 213. The disciplinary boundaries, which now pigeonhole human 
creativity, will thus become interfaces of interrelatedness and interaction. 
Consequnetly to the entire discussion above, I perceive ecological 
consciousness as  supporting and encouraging creativity. Moreover, it is itself 
the sphere of creativity a s  an  expression of joy of life, permeated with a strong 
urge of life energy - an urge to love, to work, to create, to burst with joy, to 
feel, to meet people and to meet nature, to live without resignation, youthfully 
and sincerely. Ecological consciousness entails a creativity a s  an ektropic 
(counter-entropic) process 214, or as  the thrust of @Ian vital 215. And, more than 
anything, it involves a creativity defined by a non-violent and post-dominational 
attitude to life, body, sensuality and sexuality - a creativity of tenderness 216. 
213 I have pointed this out in chapter 1, between footnotes 72 and 73; see in that 
connection also the discussion of the objectivity issue between footnotes 106 and 
108, and between 1 1 7 and 12 1 above. 
214 Human work can be 'ektropic', it can decrease the entropy of a partial system 
(Martinez-Alier. 1987: 78, 80) See also text between footnotes 52 and 53, and 
between 66 and 67 in chapter 3. 
215 See text and quotes between footnotes 61 and 64 above. 
216 See the opening quote to this chapter. 
Epilogue: 
Hope and Utopia 
The purpose of this essay is to present an integral overview of an 
ecological culture and to explore the interrelatedness of its aspects. The 
currently prevailing culture is characterized by inclination to identify and 
delineate a problem, and seek solutions and remedies. However, problems are 
not isolated phenomena, but intricately interrelated systemic processes. 
Pinpointing one problem and seeking its solution typically results in focusing on 
symptoms rather than systemic interconnections. Therefore, this essay is not 
oriented toward offering solutions to the environmental crisis, or a set of 
remedies that would enable transition to an  ecological culture. 
I have followed the interconnectedness of my principal components of an 
ecological culture. Sustainability - as  an  economy of metabolic exchange with 
the environment, of inclusion into natural cycles of renewal, and of creativity 
and mutuality - is interdependent to a culture of post-domination. Post- 
domination - as  human relations based on individuals' responsibility for their 
social and natural environment, and on surpassing the authoritarian structures 
of subordination of humans and nature - is interdependent to a redefined 
spirituality - a spirituality of immanent ethic and sensitivity. 
Nevertheless, a recapitulation of the elaborate discussion presented in this 
essay can emerge as  a set of solutions. Deconstructivism often appears more 
acceptable because it avoids the naivety of offering solutions. It is much easier 
to be negative. 
Systems, even when they are based on radical indeterminacy (the loss of 
meaning), fall prey, once more, to meaning. They collapse under the weight of 
their own monstrosity, like fossilised dinosaurs, and immediately 
deoompose. [...I ?his is why the only strategy is catastrophic [...I 1 
Against the gloom of postmodernist deconstruction and the doom of some 
environmentalist predictions, I will summarize the outcomes of this essay as: 
the joy of revived sensitivity for nature within and without ourselves; 
the joy of relying on our own inner ethic - our sense of truth (both rational 
and 'gut-felt", intuitive) in relations with our natural and social 
environment; 
the joy of a sense of the spiritual conceived of and felt a s  immanent - a 
spirituality that is inseparable from our bodily existence and our 
interrelatedness to nature in us and around us; 
the joy of having (or regaining) one's own responsibility - a responsibility 
based on inner sense of belonging and interdependency to our immediate 
as  well as broader eco-system - the responsibility for people and nature, 
and for our own lives; 
the joy of shedding the fear of taking responsibility for one's own life - the 
fear of authority, deeply ingrained in our bodily attitudes; 
the joy and relaxation of living without the relationships of domination - either 
subordinating other people and nature, or being subordinated ourselves; 
the joy of mutuality and tenderness; 
the joy of taking responsibility and caring for the ways we live and satisfy our 
needs; 
the joy of living in a community - of experiencing togetherness with other 
people and nature, the integrity of life - of feeling and knowing that the 
impact of our existence is not entirely irrelevant against the over-sized 
social, economic and technological structures; 
the joy of participating in a sustainable, life-centered economy, technology 
and social organization; 
the sheer joy of it all - of an ecological culture. 
When a vision of a "better world" is conveyed a s  a list of "to do's" or "to 
be's" - even if these are presented as  source of joy - such a vision is easily 
taken for a utopia or a dictum. There is a thin line between utopias and 
totalitarianism. As I have elaborated in the chapter on domination, we have 
been so long and so deeply immersed in the culture of authoritarian 
relationships, that we typically either rebelliously decline other people's 
suggestions about our own life, or succumb to them if they become imposed 
rules. It is difficult to open up to a post-domination perspective. 
The Western mind's overriding compulsion to impose some fonn of 
totalizing reason - theological, scientijk, economic - on every aspect of life is 
accused of being not only self-deceptive but destructive. 2 
2 Tarnas, 199 1: 400. See also quote by Robertson at footnote 9 below. 
I will wrap up with excerpts from texts by other people 3. These quotations 
illustrate the essential utopistic character of an inquiry into the future of 
human cultural development. They express both utopia and reality, hope and 
despair, but I wish to emphasize life-positive attitudes: joy and liveliness. 
The century to come will be the environmental century - either because 
we use the basic principles of ecology to design a new economic system or 
because we fail to, andfind that continuing deterioration of the economy's 
environmental support systems leads to economic decline. 4 
There is, at present as in the past, a deep, unbridgeable GAP between the 
dream of Lge and the ability to live WFE in man. 5 
The word "Utopia" is synonymous with a happy, desirable form of 
society. Utopia, in this respect, represents mankind's dream of happiness. 6 
We call ideal places utopias, a word made up in 151 5 by Thomas More 
from the Greek words meaning "no-place". But the trouble about utopias is 
that the people who think them up usually imagine themselves as the rulers 
and the rest of us as the ruled. And who wants to be a worker or a slave in 
someone else's utopia? 7 
I f  today or tomorrow the authoritarian state organization were suddenly 
abolished so that people could do as they pleased, chaos, notfreedom, 
would result. Years of utter disorientation would have to pass before the 
human race would learn to live according to the principles of natural self- 
regulation. 
This deep-rooted biopathic organization of man appears to the careful 
student of human behavior as the most outstanding reason for the failure of 
all previous attempts to secure humanfreedom. 8 
The choice offutures which seems to face us are: business as usual; di- 
saster; the totalitarian conservationist; the hyper expansionist 0; and the 
3 In the Introduction (after footnote 7). have already given an explanation of the 
somewhat unorthodox use of quotations in this essay. Here, I will add that, from a 
systemic perspective, I have been putting ideas of different people into a new 
context, thus revealing interrelations, interconnections and interdependences. I 
avoided retelling what others wrote in order to make these interrelations overt. 
Sheldrake's morphic fields (see text and quotes between footnotes 60 and 62, and 
text between 1 15 and 116 in chapter 9) can be perceived as media of interconnectivi- 
ty and exchange of ideas. Fritjof Capra has used a diagram (Capra, 1996: 38) to 
illustrate the paradigm shift from perception of objects to beholding 
relationships. It reminds me of the story about a literary critic who objected to a 
writer that his book was merely a linkage for material written by others. When a 
systemic viewpoint is applied, the linkages become important. 
4 Brown et al., 1999: 19 
5 Reich, 195 1/ 1980: 55 
6 Berneri, 1982: 2 
7 Ward,1974:9 
8 Reich, l949/ 1973: 133- 135 
sane, human, ecological (SHE). [ . . . I  We need to understand all these dzfferent 
views. because the actualfuture will almost certainly contain elements of all 
_five. [ . . . I  The actualfuture will be shaped by each interacting with the 
others. Other people approach thefuture dzfferently from ourselves. 9 
Ifthe majority represents what is natural and the few are the exceptions 
from the "normal," as so m a n y  want us to believe, then there is no hope of 
ever overcoming the split in the cultural setup, the wcirs emergingfrom this 
split, the splitting of character structures, the hate and universal murder. 
Then we would have to conclude that all the misery is a natural 
manifestation of the given, unalterable order of things. 
IJ on the other hand, the majority is the exception from the natural, and 
the few creators are in agreement with nature, then things would look better. 
[. . .] Then, i f  our exposition of the annoring is correct, man could return home 
to nature and what appears today as exceptional in a very few could 
become the rule for all. 10 
Both men and women must challenge the dualised conception of human 
identity and develop an alternative culture whichfully recognises human 
identity as continuous with. not alienfrom, nature. The dualised conception 
of nature as inert, passive and mechanistic would also be challenged as part 
of this development. [ . . . I  In doing so [men and women] will cornefrom 
dzxerent historical places and have d@erent things to contribute to this 
process. 11 
A slow but most effective process of softening up the rigidities in the ar- 
mored character structures will inevitably take place. [. . . ] And thus, for the 
first time in the history of man, the rigidity in the human structure will begin 
to crack, to soften, to yield, [ . . . I  In this manner, the blocking of natural con- 
tact with the selfand the surrounding world will slowly, possibly over 
several centuries, diminish. andfinally, as the prevention of annoring in the 
newborn generations succeeds, will completely vanish from the surface of 
this earth. 
This is no prophecy. Man, and not fate, is burdened with thefull 
responsibility for the outcome of this process. 12 
The ecology movement has emphasized the need to live within the cycles 
of nature, as opposed to the exploitative, linear mentality of forward 
progress. 13 
Spiral unites the cycle, the arrow, and the dot in a single movement which 
constantly funs back onto itsel$ but every time on a dzfferent plane. 14 
Instead, in writzng 'herstory', women have used a circular or a spiral 
model suggestzng a kind of cyclical return to our origins, which are always 
incorporatedfrom a vantage point of greater understanding in order to inform 
9 Robertson, 1978,9, 19 
10 Reich, 195 1/ 1973: 294-295 
11 Plumwood, 1993: 36 
12 Reich, l%l/ 1973: 296298 
13 Merchant, 1980: xvii 
14 Melucci, 1996: 12 
another cycle of learning in human culture. In other words, we always start 
again, but neverfrom quite the same point. 15 
We are human only in contact and conviviality with what is not human. 
Only in reciprocity with what is Other do we begin to heal ourselves. 16 
I was sony for Polina, I swear, but it was a strange thing -from the 
moment I touched the roulette table the day before and begun raking in piles 
of money, my love seemed to have retracted into the background. 17 
[. . .] Preserve the tenderness of l$e. 18 
Under the new view of cultural evolution, male dominance, male 
violence, and authoritarianism are not inevitable, eternal givens. And rather 
than being just a "utopian dream," a more peaceful and equalitarian world is 
a real possibility for ourfuture. 19 
Love, work and knowledge are the well-springs of our l$e. They should 
also govern it. 20 
- 
15 Goodison, 1992: 264-265 
16 Abram, 1995: 3 15 
17 Dostoyevsky, 1966: 140 
18 Lawrence, 1928/1977: 125 
19 Eisler, 1987: 73 
20 Wilhelm Reich, motto of all his books 
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